THE TRADE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK PROVIDED BY TRIPS AND CLAIM OF ‘PRO­-DEVELOPMENT’ AGENDA

https://doi.org/10.22146/jmh.36976

Karina Dwi Nugrahanti Putri(1*)

(1) Scopus ID : 57192265977, Universitas Gadjah MAda
(*) Corresponding Author

Abstract


Abstract


Having encountered objection from developing countries during previous negotiations, the WTO has tried to soften the framework of trade liberalisation in subsequent negotiations, held in Doha in 2001. In this round, the WTO gave rise to the ‘pro-development framework’ to attract fuller participation by developing countries. However, the development agenda had been assumed as a strategy in maintaining the superiority of advanced industrialised countries in applying ‘organised imbalance. This essay will discuss the implementation of special and differential treatment (SDT) for developing countries within TRIPS provisions. The promise of help through SDT for developing countries (as the majority of importer country of patented rights) is merely used as the medium with which to prioritise MNCs from developed countries which operate in developing countries.

 

Intisari


Setelah mendapatkan pertentangan dari negara-negara berkembang dalam putaran negosiasi sebelumnya, pada Putaran Doha (Doha Round) WTO merespon dengan memperkenalkan konsep framework perdagangan bebas baru yang dinilai lebih lunak. Pada putaran Doha, WTO meluncurkan konsep ‘pro-development framework’ untuk menarik partisipasi dari negara berkembang. Akan tetapi, hal ini dianggap sebagai strategi negara maju untuk mempertahankan dominasi mereka di dalam sistem WTO. Tulisan ini akan membahas bagaimana implementasi dari Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) didalam aturan Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) yang ditujukan untuk negara berkembang. Ide pro-pembangunan yang digadang-gadang sebagai bantuan dalam bentuk SDT bagi negara berkembang (sebagai mayoritas pengimpor produk-produk intelektual), dinilai sebagai kedok untuk melayani kepentingan perusahaan multi nasional (PMN) yang banyak beroperasi di negara-negara tersebut. 

 

Intisari

Intisari

Setelah mendapatkan pertentangan dari negara-negara berkembang dalam putaran negosiasi sebelumnya, pada Putaran Doha (Doha Round) WTO merespon dengan memperkenalkan konsep framework perdagangan bebas baru yang dinilai lebih lunak. Pada putaran Doha, WTO meluncurkan konsep ‘pro-development framework’ untuk menarik partisipasi dari negara berkembang. Akan tetapi, hal ini dianggap sebagai strategi negara maju untuk mempertahankan dominasi mereka di dalam sistem WTO. Tulisan ini akan membahas bagaimana implementasi dari Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) didalam aturan Trade Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) yang ditujukan untuk negara berkembang. Ide pro-pembangunan yang digadang-gadang sebagai bantuan dalam bentuk SDT bagi negara berkembang (sebagai mayoritas pengimpor produk-produk intelektual), dinilai sebagai kedok untuk melayani kepentingan perusahaan multi nasional (PMN) yang banyak beroperasi di negara-negara tersebut.


Keywords


developing countries; special and differential treatment; Doha Round

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References

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.22146/jmh.36976

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