NARRATIVE CONNECTEDNESS: A CHAIN FOR UNDERSTANDING OTHERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ELEONORE STUMP

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Abstrak

Kata kunci: Narasi, Pengalaman Orang Kedua, Orang Kedua Mengetahui, Intersubjektif, Keterkaitan
Abstract
This essay aims to explore Eleonore Stump’s insights on narrative as a means of knowing others and to defend narrative cognitivism. Central to this defense is an examination of the narrative analysis in mediating second-person experience as a tool to gain both self-understanding and understanding others. This study is a combination of the expository, the analytical, and the critical methods. It is expository because it aims to understand how Stump explores the variant variable in seeking the meaning and explanation of human interaction. It is analytical because it examines how second-person experience can be communicated in narrative. And it is critical because it introduces a methodological concept in dealing with her thoughts and demonstrates in which sense her approach is tenable or not. In developing this approach, I introduce the second-person perspective and the nature of knowledge that is acquired through narrative. I conclude the discussion with a contribution of narrative connectedness in the form the understanding of the other as a person. This article will show that narrative connectedness is a significant form of reasoning, a medium for understanding, and an instrument for self-expression.

Keywords: Narrative, Second-Person Experience, Second-Person Knowing, Intersubjective, Engagement.

INTRODUCTION
Eleonore Stump (born 1947) is a Robert J. Henle professor at Saint Louis University. In 1969, she received her Bachelor of Arts in classical languages from Grinnell College. She earned a Master’s degree in Biblical Studies (New Testament) in 1971 from Harvard University and in Medieval Philosophy from Cornell University in 1973. In 1975, she completed her Ph.D. in Medieval Philosophy from Cornell University in New York. Her intellectual works cover the wide spectrum of the philosophy of religion, medieval philosophy, metaphysics, the science of human nature and personhood, the relationship between philosophy and theology, and biblical studies (Stump, 2016). Stump’s investigation into narrative communicates second-person experience, an exposition which can be found in her essay “Faith and the Problem of Evil” (2001).
Darkness (2010), she considers the problem of suffering in the context of biblical narrative. In Atonement (2018), she sharpens more the concept of second-person experience concerning union in love and indwelling.

The significance of telling a story highlights the relational understanding of the other (Hutto, 2007). Unlike expository prose, narrative communicates truths in depth and variety. It conveys thoughts and feelings. It forms connections and gives content to personality. In fine, narrative constitutes human identity. Perseverance, for example, can be illustrated better in The Odyssey (Howell, 2017). In storytelling, one communicates to the other one’s experience, understanding, intention, interpretation, emotion, etc. Even though this is a subjective perspective, the significance of telling a story highlights the relational understanding of the other. The connectedness between two persons urges them to share life with each other. In such an activity, human connectedness is strengthened.

In Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering (hereafter Wandering in Darkness), Eleonore Stump, a Thomistic contemporary philosopher, claims that narrative is a means for what she calls knowing other persons. She notes, “There is ... a broad array of knowledge commonly had by human beings that cannot be formulated adequately or at all as knowledge that. Such knowledge is provided by some . . . experiences . . . in which the qualia of the experience are among the salient part of the knowledge. One important species of such knowledge is the...knowledge of persons.” (Stump, 2010).

In the above, Stump gives her readers access to a side reality that can be captured better in narrative than in expository. She then considers narrative as a means to communicate second-person experience and second-person knowledge.
DISCUSSION

1. First-, Second-, and Third-person Perspectives

In philosophical discourse, the concept of second person has been developed since “the rise of social neuroscience and it has brought about an emerging development in the philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, ethics, and epistemology” (Eilan, 2016). People need to get an integral understanding of each other, and this is possible in a second-person experience.

The second-person perspective is an approach towards the being of others. Before going into a detailed explanation of this issue, it should be better to highlight some aspects of the first- and third-person perspectives. Broadly speaking, ‘perspective’ is defined as a way of looking at something or the place from which one looks at something (Stelten, 1995). Both definitions correspond to the method and the idea of viewing something. This concept is close to what Michael Pauen calls the way of “epistemic access” (Pauen, 2012), in which a certain object is determined and recognized by the subject. When I speak directly with the other, I articulate ‘I’ and ‘you,’ and when I speak indirectly, I say ‘she’ or ‘he’ or ‘it.’

A speaker of the first-person pronoun refers to self. One observes the mind she or he knows best, her or his question, desire, position, etc. The epistemic access to oneself is characteristic of the first-person perspective. Pauen asserts that the access to the feeling of pain of others is only possible through experiencing others (Pauen, 2012). According to Pauen, epistemic access to an object is the fundamental difference between the first-, the second-, and the third-person perspectives. To illustrate, the ‘I’ in the sentence “I think that I will pass this exam,” does not only indicate the first-person pronoun; it also consists of the first-person perspective. The ‘I’ represents the state of mind and being of a speaker who expresses a sense of certainty after studying hard. The ‘I,’ more precisely, pertains to a subject who makes the utterance. A speaker expresses his or her knowledge or experience, and knows the reason why he
or she uses it. As Thomas Metzinger notes, “It is not only necessary to have thoughts that can be expressed using ‘I.’ What is necessary is the possession of a concept of oneself as the thinker of these thoughts, as the owner of a subjective point of view” (Metzinger, 2003).

The ability to think affirms that I am a person who is the point of reference. I conceive of my inwardness and my subjectivity. David Hume argues that the ‘I’ expresses the thought of the utterer; and it is not necessary to identify what is being referred to. The ‘I’ is an ‘independent’ doctrine—that is, it says something about what an individual is thinking. He contends, “If you tell me, that any person is in love, I easily understand your meaning, and form a just conception of his situation; but never can mistake that conception for the real disorders and agitations of the passion” (Hume, 1993).

The term ‘I’ can be associated with the object denoted and with the sensitivity of a rational subject’s capacity for recognizing that object. This association indicates the self-consciousness and the truth-value of the utterance and the ‘I.’ Richard G. Heck Jr. characterises the first-person perspective of the ‘I’ as “self-conscious Thoughts.” He writes, “Self-conscious Thoughts and Thoughts of recognition are Thoughts one can entertain only if one is in an appropriate context, i.e., suitably placed with respect to one’s environment” (Heck, 2012).

The philosophical implication of the first-person perspective entails epistemological theses concerning self-knowledge, self-identity, self-awareness, and direct knowledge of subjective experiences. The ability to speak of what I know well implies my responsibility for that utterance. It means that the uttered word consists of my thoughts or my experiences. It is something with which I guarantee against an incorrect reference. The first-person perspective characterises my concerns, my existence, and my subjective experience.

If the account of first-person is subjective, the account of third-person is objective. In third-person perspective, there is a distance between subject and object. The other is the object of my talking, my
abstraction, or my argumentation. I can only speak of him or her and not speak with him or her. Emile Benveniste, for instance, claims that the third-person is not a person; it is really a verbal form that functions to express the non-person. He points out, “The ‘third-person’ . . . is exactly the non-person, which possesses as its sign the absence of what which specifically qualifies the ‘I’ and the ‘you.’ Because it does not imply any person, it can take any subject whatsoever or no subject, and this subject, expressed or not, is never posited as a ‘person’” (Benveniste, 1996).

The absence of the third-person in a conversation affirms the impersonal character of this perspective. The other can be treated not as a person but as a case, as an object. An object, Gabriel Marcel says, is “[s]ignified only by the portion of the real which is deviant, before the subject, separated from him and quite impersonal” (Marcel, 1951). In human relationships, the third-person perspective is the subject-object relationship. This is a “relationship without personhood, a person without a relationship: it is the unrelated, the irrelative, and finally the impersonal” (Esposito, 2012).

Third-person perspective is ‘objective,’ since it is a relation between the epistemic subject and object. Such a relation can be found in the confines of scientific method of research. In contrast to the first-person perspective, the third-person perspective implies no such limitation. All kinds of objects can be recognized within this perspective. Pauen believes that the difference of perspective is not in the epistemic object but in epistemic access. He gives as an example the case of someone wanting to know whether the orchestra plays well or not, whether the composer is Mozart or Beethoven. It does not depend on whether she listens to or watches the concert. The concert does not change, no matter whether she watches it or not; however, the acoustic perspective may give her such information on the quality of the orchestra, and who is the composer (Pauen, 2012). With direct access to the other arises a unique quality in establishing human mental states, since the other is not viewed as something but as a person.
The differences between the first-, and third-person perspectives help one to characterise the second-person perspective. Grammatically, the main function of ‘you’ as the second-person pronoun is to take the place of a noun, and it can be used as a subject or an object in a direct sentence or conversation. Since it forms a direct speech, there are two conditions that, according to Guy Longworth, enable someone to use the second-person pronoun: (1) the referred thing must be animate (perhaps a person); (2) and it must be designated for the addressee of one’s remark, the one to whom you are talking (Longworth, 2016). Saying, “Your bus is coming,” for instance, is typically giving information to the person who is being addressed, that he or she can get into the bus. On second-person thoughts, Richard Heck writes that it is the phenomenon of “a linguistic one, bound up with the fact that utterances, as we make them, are typically directed to people.” So, for him, the word “you” has no correlate at the level of thought (Heck, 2012).

This passage delineates the reference of second-person perspective to an addressee in that utterance. The direct reference is only possible in the dialectic between the speaker and interlocutor (‘you’ and ‘I’). This process involves self-consciousness, belief, understanding, mental states and attitudes that express in the uttered word. “The you is conceivable only and always in a relation to the I” (Esposito, 2012).

However, the second-person perspective is valid even if the word ‘you’ disappears. Jane Heal, for example, proves the weakness in Heck’s theory by maintaining that the second-person character is only available when the pronoun ‘you’ is uttered. The sentence, “It is starting to rain,” for instance, has no pronoun ‘you;’ but when it is uttered directly to an addressee, it refers to a certain situation, here and now. Heal believes that Heck’s position originates from the idea that the epistemology of the second-person perspective is different from that of the third-person perspective. The thought of the other directs to me, not only through her utterance; it is also mediated by a certain situation or non-linguistic action (Heal, 2016).
The body language of a person that accompanies one’s act of asking someone to be silent is a case that can be understood as direct information. Heal characterises the second-person thought as “co-operation action—we together are doing such and such” (Heal, 2016). To elaborate the co-operative action, Heal sketches two aspects of it: (1) giving the reaction directly to something that is common or uncommon, and even to criticize each other, but in a simple form of a language. Take for example, “When are you free to talk again?” or “I will send you some messages.” (2) A face-to-face interaction reveals a quality of relationship where people feel amicable, familiar, and in touch with each other (Heal, 2016).

Different from the first-person perspective which is subjective, and the third-person perspective which is objective, is the account of second-person, which is intersubjective. The intersubjective character of second-person perspective is close to what Antoni Gomila consideration of it. He says that “second-person perspective is a genuine perspective of mental attribution where transparent mental states are attributed to each other in a face-to-face interaction” (Gomila & Peréz, 2018). Only in a face-to-face engagement and interaction that people attribute their mental states to the other in a significant way. The reciprocal contingent information is expressed and perceived. The emotional reaction is created. In such a way, participants are driven to feel compassion with others. The intersubjective interaction between a baby (in his or her first year of life) and his or her mother or caregiver, for instance, is the paradigm of human second-person experience. The eye contact or the smiling between them forms the bond of their perceptual connectedness. Here, one is a spectator or observer like in the third-person perspective; rather, one is involved intersubjectively with the other. The fundamental insight of the second-person account is that people come to know each other—experiencing the other as a ‘you’ with one’s own ‘I’.
2. **Eleonore Stump, Second-person Experience, and Narrative**

Of central importance to this paper is her work *Wandering in Darkness* (2010). In this work, Stump engages the problem of evil through philosophical analysis of the narrative. Combining medieval metaphysics (notably the metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas) and biblical narrative, Stump presents the central question of the correlation between the omnipotent God and human suffering in the world. Her approach to the problem of suffering is based on the account of second-person experience and narrative as a means to know and communicate a second-person experience. The particular purpose of this method is not merely to investigate the problem of suffering from the philosophical-theological standpoint but also to examine how narrative could be a means to understand the other as a person.

In *Wandering in Darkness*, Stump designates the meaning of second-person experience through the following propositions. “Paula has a second-person experience of another person Jerome only if: (1) Paula is aware of Jerome as a person (call the relation Paula has to Jerome in this condition ‘personal interaction’). (2) Paula’s personal interaction with Jerome is of a direct and immediate sort. (3) Jerome is conscious” (Stump, 2010). Here, Stump formulates three necessary conditions for a second-person experience: personal interaction, direct and immediate interaction, and mutual consciousness. These three conditions make a second-person experience differ from the first-and third-person accounts. In the first-person account, I report about some first-person experiences of mine. In the third-person account, a subject makes a report about the other’s consciousness. In second-person experience, there is only a sharing of consciousness (Stump, 2010).

The first condition of second-person experience is personal interaction which is presupposed by presence. “Second-person experience is necessary for both kinds of presence and sufficient for minimal personal presence” (Stump, 2010). This is an approximate and a physical presence. Such a presence characterises as presence *in* or presence *at*. However, there is another presence that is crucial
for union. It is what Stump calls a second-personal presence. She explains this by the following example: “She read the paper all through dinner time and was never present to any of the rest of us” (Stump, 2013). This example shows there is presence at a time and in a place, but a significant personal presence that characterises second-personal psychological connection is missing. Stump affirms that minimal personal presence is at issue when we say things such as: (1) “Some of those presents were already asleep.” (2) “Her family was present with her while she was comatose at the last hours of her life.” (3) “The doctor himself was present and available to her only in the early morning” (Stump, 2010). The first is limited to the physical concept of the presence (in a certain place). By appending the preposition ‘with,’ the second meaning denotes a relation. Here, we obtain a gradation of consciousness. It is only one side if the other side is absent. For Stump, the first two meanings refer to the meaning of presence, while the third represents the personal presence.

As for the second condition, Stump spells out that a personal interaction should be a direct and immediate process. She argues that even Paula’s interaction with Jerome is mediated by mechanical devices such as a telephone or computer. There is a possibility to have the account of second-person experience if through those media they encounter the other in a second-person experience (Stump, 2010). But, in what way does conditioned interaction via a mechanical device enable them to meet in a second-person experience? Stump asserts that it is possible if “it really is Jerome with whom Paula is in email contact” (Stump, 2010). This means there is no manipulation of each other in their communication. The communication is addressed to achieve mutual understanding by telling the truth in a right way. Jerome believes that the email is sent by Paula because he knows the content and the context of the email when he reads it. The truth and the recognition of each other through mechanical-device-communication bring them to interact personally.
The third condition concerns the consciousness. ‘Paula has a second-person experience of Jerome only if Jerome is conscious.’ This condition requires Jerome’s consciousness of Paula. In the third condition, Stump declares that even though Paula is hidden from Jerome, she has a second-person experience when she, for example, is watching Jerome interact with his sister.

In explaining the three conditions, Stump defines second-person experience as “a matter of one person’s attending to another person and being aware of him or her as a person when that other person is conscious and functioning, however minimally, as a person” (Stump, 2010). Stump underlines the importance of the phrase “as a person” to rule out the possibility of misunderstanding the consciousness of the person who suffering from agnosia. Such a patient is conscious of someone but because of his or her agnosia, he or she does not recognize the other person as a person (Stump, 2010). In Stump’s view, second-person experience is communicated in the narrative.

Stump’s three conditions of second-person experience affirm the causal effect correlates two subjects. A man cannot be called a father if he does not exert an effect on the character as a child. There is no relation if there is no effect to each other. Culwick, for example, mentions three models of relations among people: potential, virtual, and actual. While potential relationships are understood as intrinsic attributes (scenarios) that allow two people to relate, virtual relationships can be explained in the case of one who feel lost when his or her brother died. Formally, he or she no longer has relatives nor relationship with the dead, a situation, Culwick considers as "a mind-dependent relation to a memory…". In the virtual relations, "there is no sign of terminus, there is no determining correlation on the side of one’s quiddity, and so no real relation arises”. So, it is only actual relation is a real relation, said Culwick. In actual relation, one, is like facing the actual sign, gets a fundament, material terminus, and can be an interpretant (Culwick, 2020).

The actual relation implies second-person experience. Since second-person experience characterises personal and immediate
interaction, Stump believes that these characteristics highlight the human capacity to know what other persons are thinking. This is what Stump provocatively calls the “mind-reading cognition of persons and their mental states” (Echavarriá, 2017). It makes a person recognize the personal experience of others. Such features are involved in narrative. As a means of understanding a person, narrative actualizes human participation in real life. Stump notes, “Story gives us a kind of access to a part of reality that matters to us greatly in human life for everything that has to do with a person” (Echavarriá, 2017). Even though reality is not fully captured in the telling of a story, it is worth noting that an event is only meaningful when it is communicated. “If we are doing philosophy about something where persons matter a very great deal, then, in that case, we do need stories to do the philosophy well” (Echavarriá, 2017).

A story, she contends, helps an audience in having a similar emotion to the characters in the story. The presentation of second-person experience in a story constitutes a second-person account. Stump gives her reader access to “a side reality that can be captured better in narrative” (Stump, 2010). A lot of human details can be discovered in a story than in an expository. A philosopher, according to Stump, must expand his or her horizons and apply his or her skills not only to symbolized arguments but also to narrative (Stump, 2010). Stump’s idea of the meaningfulness of narrative in human life can be compared to what is considered by Munslow, A. Following Munslow, Arif Akhyat, in his article entitled, “Explaining a Narrative in the Critical Philosophy of History”, claims that in telling a story, a narrator, at the same time, constructs and reconstructs events by looking at the complexity of reality, and finds out its potential relevance and reformulates new concept. In such a way, telling a story is no longer a method to articulate idea, but it is also a way to reproduce meaning (Akhyat, 2019). Concerning the reconstruction of the meaning of narrative, Stump considers non-expository prose as a locus for second-person experience. This format enables two persons to interact directly, interpersonally, and consciously.
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Stump illustrates the second-person experience with Frank Jackson’s story of a woman named Mary. Even though Mary is isolated, she can know everything by reading books, searching the internet, visiting a library, etc. However, when she encounters her mother face-to-face, Mary realizes that she gets a new awareness that is different from what she had before. Mary feels how deep the mother loves her. This is knowledge that can never be had by third-person experience (Jackson, 1986). Even though Mary can access all the information about the world, her encounter with her mother makes her know who her mother really is, and what it is like to be loved. What Mary learned from her mother is a kind of “personal interaction with another person,” the “complex give-and-take of interpersonal interactions” (Stump, 2010). This is the non-propositional knowledge of a person. Without it, we, according to Stump, “miss something crucial in our understanding of persons” (Stump, 2010). Stump believes that the injection of narrative can counter the aridity of analytic philosophy (Stump, 2010).

The moment of having new knowledge and renewed awareness becomes possible in a second-person experience. What we gain from the story about Mary and her mother is Mary’s reaction at the moment of their encounter. In her face-to-face encounter with her mother, Mary feels how deeply the mother loves her. She gets a new and different awareness from what she had before. Such reaction helps us to see how and why narrative affects and gives impression to someone. For Stump, this is the kind of non-propositional knowledge of a person. This knowledge is obtained from personal interaction, inter-subjective relation, and the sharing of life. In Stump’s term, narrative communicates second-person experience and second-person knowledge. Narrative, therefore, is a means of knowing and acknowledging others.

This is the main concept that one should hold in mind in considering Stump’s approach to narrative and second-person experience. At the surface, one may notice that Stump tends to give an important role to the interpersonal and intuitive aspects of knowing others than the cognitive (epistemic) aspect. Or, others
may consider that Stump forgets that narrative has its own structure since it correlates with characters, agents, contexts, etc. But as one goes deeper in the consideration of her work, one realizes that the knowledge of persons through the narrative is more significant. Unlike a cognitive elaboration in which sensory information is based upon a logical proposition, in engagement with others immediately and interpersonally (second-person experience), one presents oneself to the other as a ‘you’ person. It is here that knowledge of a person is generated.

3. Narrative Connectedness as Means of Understanding Others

Stump’s philosophical thought of second-person account, second-person experience, and second-person knowing can be constructed as narrative connectedness. The fulfilment of union with others requires a mode of connectedness that can be revealed in personal presence, direct interaction, and mutual awareness.

I would propose three crucial insights that make sense Stump’s approach to second-person experience, which is communicated in narrative. First, second-person experience and second-person knowing can be presented in narrative. Second, second-person experience is a way of being a person. Third, second-person knowing is the intuitive knowledge of others.

**Narrative can Present Second-person Experience and Second-person Knowing**

Employing narrative in the philosophical discussion is uncommon. In the analytic tradition, a philosopher works with order and logical structure. An argument and conclusion, for example, consist of premises. However, not everything knowable in a second-person experience can be expressed in an expository description or prose (Stump, 2001). In prose, one intends to expose something by describing, delivering information, conveying an idea, etc. These characteristics represent both first-, and third-person perspective rather than second-person experience.
In a narrative, one refers to the life story. Such an experience contributes to the philosophical understanding and argumentation. Even though one cannot appropriately express the distinctive knowledge of an experience, one can still, according to Stump, “represent the experience itself” when she or he shares it with others. The moment and the way of sharing such an experience enable the participants to have something to known and to experienced (Stump, 2013). A story, therefore, sets a second-person experience. For Stump, the way one re-presents a second-person experience in a story constitutes a second-person account. In this account, the “distinction of second-person character of the experience does not lose” (Stump, 2013). However, if in second-person account the distinction of second-person character of experience remains, what will happen if that character is manipulated by a storyteller? Do we already need second-person experience for reliable knowing?

From the story of a woman named Mary, Stump presents two different situations of Mary’s life: living in solitary confinement (third-person experience) and her personal encounter with her mother (second-person experience). In Stump’s view, an exceptional moment in Mary’s life is the moment through which she becomes conscious of her mother’s presence. Such a moment characterises the role of narrative in having a second-person experience and in knowing someone as a person. Stump elucidates that from a face-to-face contact with her mother, Mary learns two things: the new knowing (awareness) that was missing before the encounter; and that knowing can be obtained through her personal interaction with her mother (second-person experience).

The two aspects of Mary’s awareness indicate the role of narrative to communicate second-person experience and as a means of understanding others. Even though narrative is also possible in third-person relation, Stump limits her investigation of narrative to the sense of personal and direct interaction, in order to underline a possibility of understanding the other as a person. In a personal interaction, in sharing about life story and emotions, one recognizes the others easily and immediately. For this reason, Stump claims
that second-person experience is communicable in narrative, in a dyadic joint attention, and in a conversation through which the participants engage with others personally and approximately. Stump explains, “A story gives a person some of what she would have had if she had had an unmediated personal interaction with the characters in the story while they were conscious and interacting with each other, without actually making her part of the story itself” (Stump, 2010). In relating a story, a storyteller represents his or her second-person experience. Such a representation then constitutes a second-person account.

However, in Frank Jackson’s story of Mary, Stump forgets that there is a misinformation that Mary got about her mother before she met her. If Mary was informed about her mother, then a question can be raised: “What did Mary know when she read the narrative, or what did Mary hear about her mother?” In the story given above, Mary had no other interaction with anybody. She was isolated and knew things only through third-person knowledge and experience.

Furthermore, there is a different thing to be considered, for instance, when I listen to a person about whom I have never heard of or met before. If the narrator’s description is accurate, it may not make me feel strange when I encounter that person. This is the main point of the notion that a narrative communicates second-person experience. But is this also second-person knowing? What will happen if the description is different from what I experienced with that person? Stump’s claim that narrative communicates second-person experience might be true but not always. In this case, does second-person experience a condition to have second-person know? If Mary is informed about her mother, does she get the same knowing when she meets her mother? Or, is it a better version of her mother? Or, does Mary get a different kind of knowledge after encountering her mother? These questions should be addressed in order to gain an understanding of Stump’s theory of second-person experience and second-person knowing through narrative. The knowledge of a person through a narrative depends on second-person knowledge one has and also the kind of people one meets.
Whatever may be known in a second-person experience, and how it may be available for others depend on who is the storyteller, and how she or he relates a story.

However, Stump’s thought experiment on Mary indicates that a personal relationship is only possible when someone really exists with others. It means that in the second-person experience, according to Stump, and in line with Marek Dobrzenieski, a personal presence is conditioned to the establishment of a personal relationship. Personal presence, therefore, is “the access to a person as a person,” and is a direct presence of the person in a given situation. It is in the presence that human will and reasonings are involved (Dobrzeniecki, 2021).

Second-person Experience: A Way of Being a Person

Stump’s account of second-person experience involves the attendance and awareness of the other minimally as a “you.” This is expressed in her definition of second-person experience. She states that a person is a “matter of one person’s attending to another person and being aware of him as a person when that other person is conscious and functioning, however minimally, as a person” (Stump, 2010). Stump then considers three necessary conditions for a second-person experience i.e., personal interaction, direct, and mutual consciousness.

To my mind, the three significant conditions for second-person experience can be grasped as a way of being a person. To understand the first condition (personal interaction), for example, it requires knowing what Stump means by the term ‘person.’ A person is “somebody who is made to relate in that I-you way” (Stump, 2000). Accordingly, being a person means having the competence to connect with the other in an intersubjective relation (Stump, 2017). This capacity can be realized in an intimate interaction through which two persons keep close to each other and communicate in an interpersonal way. Also, being a person means living in an intimate distance or direct contact (second condition). But Stump also includes mechanical or technological devices (mobile, email, etc.) as
media for personal interaction, as long as these gadgets help people to engage with each other in an animated conversation. The media of communications do prevent interaction among human beings; they lead them to second-person experience, so that communication enhances second-person experience. Stump, in this case, combines presence and absence (one does not have the sensory perception of the other) in a second-person experience. However, this combination seems to be a grey area, since modern means of communication can be manipulated.

To avoid such manipulation, participants should have a good intention and express it truly, so that trust can be established between them. Telling the truth in an interpersonal interaction indicates that human communication should have rational consciousness and moral dimension (Habermas, 1984). This means that two persons have the same opportunities to speak with each other and discuss things over. There is no difference in power. The participants consider each other as equals. They speak the truth without manipulation; and they are open to listen to each other. These conditions bring us to understand and develop a mutual awareness (third condition) in a second-person experience. This is also another way to exist as a person.

The three conditions of second-person experience, therefore, affirm the existence and identity of an individual as a person. And this is revealed in an intersubjective encounter. The term intersubjective should be understood in a strong experiential meaning i.e., mutual co-arising and engagement of interdependent subjects. Two subjects create a respective experience with each other. Only in this meaning that the human second-person experience obtains its aim, involving non-physical presence.

Albeit Stump includes mechanical devices as means of interaction, she tends to consider dyadic conversation and presence as a true second-person experience, rather than the fact of absence. However, can absence be a metaphor for understanding? How does absence determine what is present? These questions lead us to
discuss the meaning of absence and address the issue as to how we can analyse absence in narrative. Absence may also be presence.

**Second-person Knowing is the Intuitive Knowledge of Others**

The knowledge of a person is one of the subjects that cannot be formulated adequately. However, such knowledge can be explained in the function of the mirror-neuron system. This system enables two persons to know each other’s action, intention, and emotion directly and intuitively. Stump explains a second-person knowing by comparing it with the function of the mirror-neuron system (Stump, 2013).

Investigating the ability of a pre-linguistic infant to recognize a caregiver as a person, Stump asserts that such capacity is the basis to know others. She says, “A pre-linguistic infant is not capable of knowing that a particular person is her mother, but she can know her mother, and to one extent or another she can also know some of her mother’s mental states” (Stump, 2010). This is possible, Stump contends, because of a certain neuron in human beings called the mirror-neuron system. This system enables one to do some actions by oneself when one sees the same action being performed by someone else. The system empowers a person to imitate the other through facial expression and to mind-read what the other does (Stump, 2010). The system makes us understand action, intention, and emotion of the other in a direct apprehension. The mirror-neuron system, therefore, contributes to the knowledge of a person in an intuitive way.

In Stump’s view, the mirror-neuron system also explains human knowledge in a second-person experience even through fiction. But she underlines that in fiction, we do not gain a real second-person experience. We only gain some knowledge of a person (Stump, 2013). She thinks that second-person account is just a narrative that communicates the content of a second-person experience. Second-person experience is a conscious experience of another conscious person. Conversations with friends, a hug, a sharing of a life story are examples of second-person experience.
These experiences provide a particular kind of non-propositional knowledge. This is a second-person knowing which is also characterised by intuitive knowing.

However, do we have no second-person account in a second-person experience with others? In a second-person experience, when we are conscious of the experience of another person, we still have a second-person account. What is shared or told in a second-person experience remains as the other’s (a story-teller) perspective, interpretation, understanding, and awareness. This is second-person account. When I am listening to Rossy’s stories about her experience with her mother, it is for me, a second-person account. I gain some knowledge of a person (Rossy’s mother). In reading fiction, like Harry Potter, people can know the personal character of the hero, and that character touches them emotionally, making them cry even if it is unreal. Such knowledge is possible because people know how to read the other’s mind. But what we obtain here is a kind of simulation.

I think Stump is right when she holds that in a second-person experience, the mutual consciousness is required to be aware of and know the other as a person. However, in a second-person experience, there are two levels of encounter: (1) I and my act of speaking directly to you, and (2) I and my telling of things about you (my narrative). So, what kind of knowledge do I have in these two forms? It seems that it is significant to clarify that in a second-person experience we have narrative, account of narrative, and engagement with the other as a person. In an interpersonal encounter, two persons are able to gain a real second-person experience in which both the knowledge of a person and the person herself or himself are included. From these models of interactions, we can see a difference between simulated knowing and approximate knowing. In a second-person experience, the second-person knowing of the other is more than an argument. We have knowledge of a person, and that person of herself or himself. However, what is the principle to value and trust narrative as a means of understanding others? Is it reasonable to claim narrative
as one of the standards of understanding a person? What does it mean when we say “I know you?” Through intuition, one may gain an instance of knowledge about the other.

But what if one’s affirmation turns out to be true? We may find a sense of absolute certainty in the spoken words of a couple who express their love to each other, “I know you love me.” But lovers are completely certain that they will always be true to their promises under all conditions. Sometimes we know that something is true not by logical reasoning but through feelings. For this reason, it should be necessary of having a mutual learning process, meaning that those who are engaging in knowing the other share responsibility and respect to each other (Madung, 2021).

Since a person is unique, the knowledge of the other person is irreducible to knowing propositions about a person. It is not enough to get information about the other in the account of the third-person experience (Stump, 2010). Here, I agree with Stump that second-person knowledge is irreducible to knowing that. However, Stump’s claim that human knowledge of the other is conveyed in the form of a story is not always true. It is also possible that human knowledge of the other can be articulated in a propositional form. Asking a question, “Why are you doing this”, for instance, can be a propositional form in second-person experience. And this kind of experience has a cognitive content. What is known as second-person knowing (the intuitive knowledge) also involves cognitive knowledge. What we have in second-person knowing is having access to a person and understanding others. Here, it is necessary that in telling a story, one should have the ability to tell the truth hermeneutically and epistemologically (Akhyat, 2019).

Furthermore, since the subject in second-person experience is a person with her or his uniqueness, the hermeneutic of the term ‘understanding’ of others can be an alternative to bridge the gap between narrative and life. This hermeneutic is a nexus that connects second-person experience, narrative, and understanding others as persons.
‘Understanding’ others in second-person experience is ‘narrative connectedness.’ This connectedness stems from an interpersonal encounter, mutual closeness, and capacity to reinterpret life experiences and share it with others.

‘Understanding’ others means ‘identifying’ their experiences and ‘respecting’ them as persons. This is a model of narrative connectedness that should be uninterrupted.

In understanding others, we also include solidarity, respect, and love. In narrative, one is compassionately involved with others. This is human solidarity. Such compassion is given with respect for others as alter ego. In respecting others, the gap between ‘he’ or ‘she’ and ‘I’ is obliterated. What remains is ‘we,’ the community. This is the communion of love itself. Solidarity, respect, and love are essential elements, since they combine to understand others as persons.

As a locus of interpersonal engagement, narrative allows participants to construct self-identity and understanding of others. However, we should recognize that since human life is not fully captured in narrative, and that the subject of our understanding is a person, we need to further explore this gap. Such a gap shows that the understanding of others as a model of connectedness is not limited to narrative. Understanding others through narrative is not a single story. We have no straightforward, one-to-one correlation between our life as it is lived and life as it is told. Since every narrative can also be recorded and narrated again, understanding others through narrative remains an open sphere. The process of human understanding through narrative is always being updated.

CONCLUSION

The analysis of the role of narrative in human understanding of others provides evidence of how narrative becomes life. It means that face-to-face engagement with others should result in understanding them. Living and talking about human lives are woven together in a complex movement of reciprocal determination. Narrative and human action become a model of
creative transformation. Both can be paradigms to understand others as persons. Even though narrative and life are unified, such union is not absolute. There is a level at which human life experience is immediately given and human existence is non-narrative.

This study has shown that the second-person experience communicated in narrative is an approach not in the sense of pure epistemology of the narrative. It is a combination of narrative and analytic philosophy that demonstrates that narrative is a means in understanding others as persons. The knowledge of self and others through narrative is not the collection of facts about others, but rather an access to them. Saying “I understand you” means knowing how to stand in a second-person experience with you. This is what it means to be a person. And it is a narrative connectedness. Narrative connectedness is how two persons are integrated in sharing their story of life, by listening to each other. Such a union makes them understand each other. Narrative connectedness, therefore, is the integration of life story and being related with others. Such integration constitutes understanding the other as a person.

REFERENCES


