

WHAT IS THIS THING CALLED ADAT LOGIC?

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Abstrak

Gagasan seputar hukum adat (atau kebiasaan) tidak mendorong orang dalam bidang filsafat untuk mengungkap logikanya. Artikel ini bertujuan untuk menginvestigasi kemungkinan logika adat, keragamannya, dan sebuah dasar pijak atau tesis di antara berbagai jenisnya. Secara umum, logika adat bermakna kontradiksi yang benar antara rigiditas dan fleksibilitas kebiasaan. Dengan kata lain, logika adat menyerupai ide tentang dialetheia di dalam logika modern tetapi tidak berarti bahwa logika adat merupakan sebuah sub-divisi dari dialetheia. Untuk mencari sebuah tesis ihwal logika adat, saya mendiskusikan logika adat Jawa dan Minangkabau, dan mentransformasikan keduanya menjadi beberapa notasi guna menghindari hambatan dan tantangan linguistik yang tak perlu. Kemudian, saya memasukkan masing-masing notasi dari sebuah logika adat yang khusus ke dalam notasi umum seputar logika adat. Dengan melakukan hal tersebut, saya berharap dapat menemukan sebuah dasar pijak yang sama di antara beberapa logika adat yang berbeda.

Kata kunci: Adat, Dialetheia, Kebiasaan, Logika.

Abstract

The notion of adat (or custom) law does not encourage people in philosophy to reveal its logic. This article aims to investigate the possibility of adat logic, its variety, and a possible common ground or thesis among its own kinds. In general, the adat logic means the true contradiction between the rigidity and the reflexivity of custom. In other words, it resembles the idea of dialetheia in modern logic, but it does not mean that the adat logic is a subdivision of the former. To seek a thesis of adat logic is to discuss the Javanese and Minangkabau adat logics, and I transform both logics into some notations for the sake of avoiding unnecessary linguistic

challenges and hurdles. Thus, I insert each notation of a particular adat logic into the general notation of adat logic. By doing so, I wish to discover a common ground between some different adat logics.

Keywords: *Adat, Custom, Dialetheia, Logic.*

INTRODUCTION

Decolonisation requires the liberation of reasoning. Such liberation needs an identification over the particular way of logic that is distinctive to a polity and a political community. According to Jonathan O. Chimakonam, “Thought system is the metaphysical characterisation of that worldview which describes the reasoning trend in a given culture. As the structure of thought system varies from culture to culture, so do the structure of logic borne out of them.”¹ In other words, a culture usually has a trend of reasoning, each of which differs across various cultures. If this is the case, then imposing the Aristotelian logic into all cultures across the globe is equal to imposing the culture of ancient Greek. This issue has been encouraging some people to dig and discover a particular system of logic based on their own culture. For instance, Africa has at least three systems of logic. First, Chimakonam and his idea of Ezumezu logic. Second, Chris Ijiomah and the idea of harmonious monism. Third, Innocent Asouzu and his concept of complementary logic.² In contrast to the African logics, I have never been knowing a particular system of logic built on the foundation of Indonesian cultures.

Common values and collective memories among various peoples in the Nusantara archipelago seem insufficient and

¹A further discussion on this issue please see Chimakonam, J. O. (2019).

Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies. Springer, p. 95.

² See Chimakonam, J. O. (2019). *Ezumezu: A System of Logic for African Philosophy and Studies*. Springer, p. 105. Among these three systems of African logic, only the first one that I used to study seriously for the interest of seeking similarities and differences between Jonathan Chimakonam’s Ezumezu logic and Graham Priest’s paraconsistent logic and *dialetheia*.

inadequate to reflect how people in this area do reasoning. If there are some things in which case binding all peoples in the archipelago, then it should be what Wiryomartono claims as follows:

“Despite the diversity of ethnicity and culture, the archipelago people have and share something in common in terms of values and collective memories. Regarding themselves as the descendants of seafaring ancestors, the indigenous people in the Indonesian archipelago share the similar concept of the territorial unit of settlement called *wanua*, an old Malay word originally meaning boat community and the lifeworld. The chief of the settlement and community is *penghulu* or *datuk*, meaning head, upstream, bow, and chief. The native settlement and community of *wanua* is an egalitarian village polity. This pre-Hindu habitation unit of *wanua* is a village republic with various names, for instance, *dukuh* in Central and East Java, *banua* in South Nias, *lepo’* in Kenyah, *gampong* in Aceh, *soa* in Halmahera, *paraingu* in Sumba, *pekon* in Lampung, *jero* in Badui and *lembang* in Toraja. Every unit of indigenous settlement mentioned above has its own temple or sacred place, such as *candi* in Java, *osali* in South Nias, *kaseba* in Halmahera, *bumi ageung* in Naga West Java, *kabubu* in West Sumba, *meunasah* in Aceh, *tambak kepapang* in Lampung and *rante* in Toraja. The traces of ancestral reminder are figures of outrigger boat and serpent, *naga*, which are delicately expressed in various forms on the houses, coffin, textile motifs and various artworks” (Wiryomartono, 2014: 5–6).

However, the combination of ancestral reminder, sacred place and an egalitarian village polity is not adequate to reveal a type of logic being identical to the peoples. Once colonisation did happen in the region of Southeast Asia, the colonisers divide and rule the colonised by confronting custom and religions just as much as they ignited clash among and waged war against kingdoms and political communities in this area. Therefore, I need to look upon some

customs rather than religions whose logic may take root in other regions.³

Given that most Indonesians are Muslims, it might be tempting to rush into Islam as a reference for identifying and conceiving a particular way of reasoning. However, it would seem unfair to non-Muslim Indonesians who embrace other religions. Moreover, it is not merely a matter of religious bias but also whether or not a particular system of faith has always been coherent with logic. For instance, Abbas Ahsan claims that “an Islamic theological contradiction does not entail an actual (logical) contradiction.” (Ahsan, 2021: 325). On this occasion, he focuses on the arguments in favor of God as both ineffable and unknowable, and it leads to a consequence that Islam offers an approximate representation of God rather than a comprehensive depiction of God (Ahsan, 2021: 298–300). In short, Islamic theology does not always fit with logic, or logic itself could not bear the complexity of Islamic theology. If this is the case, then Islam should not be a common reasoning system in Indonesia.

Having said that, it is fascinating to notice that the *Oxford English Dictionary* has absorbed the word *adat*. Accordingly, it means, ‘custom, accepted practice’ in the particular context of Southeast Asia’s Islamic areas though its root is located in Arabic.⁴ In other words, English native speakers should not express the word ‘adat’ to refer nor to represent the non-Southeast Asian customs due to its contextual meaning given by the *Oxford English Dictionary*. Various adat influences the life of people in the region so much so

³ For instance, the Islamic logic belongs to the thoughts of al-Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd whose country of origins are not located in Southeast Asia. However, this is just the peripatetic chamber of Islamic philosophy but, in contrast, the perennial (*hikmah*) and illuminationist (*ishraqi*) chambers of Islamic philosophy exercise inevitably a different type of logic.

⁴ Although I put it here, I think that a dictionary should only objectively capture the way people utter words in a certain period of time. The linguistic authority should be the native speakers instead of a dictionary.

that it turns out to be a sort of legal rule in its own kind. Van Vollenhoven explains:

“Legal practice, again, gets along with yet another word: it uses ‘the law’ (i.e., in a broad sense, the codified law) as against ‘*adat*’. The latter term- the Arabic word [*cādat*] for ‘custom’- has found a place in many indigenous languages, either simply as *adat* or ‘*adat*’ (Javanese, Malay, Acehnese), or as *ngadat* (Javanese), *ödöt* (Gayonese), etc...” (Vollenhoven, 1981: 4).

In other words, *adat* has been an integral part of the people though they might exercise *adat* in a different way. Van Vollenhoven describes it as follows:

“In Java, for instance, the word *adat* is used for all that is custom or ought to be customary: they speak of ‘*adat*’ in connexion with festivities, visits, homage, the preparation of food, the rice stock, and so on. In this sense the people of Minangkabau use, besides *adat*, also *limbago*, or *adat limbago*; and it has sometimes been said (Kooreman, 1901: 146, 148f.) that ‘*adat*’ here represents ‘law, or a binding rule of custom’, as against non-obligatory customs referred to as *limbago*. But it would be wise not to rely too much on such distinctions (so often based on the pretentious prattle of indigenous authorities who want to impress the European investigator)” (Vollenhoven, 1981: 4).

Apparently, Minangkabau has a more complicated system of *adat* given that they distinguish between *adat* and *limbago*. The stronger *adat* commands the people’s life, the more it has the tendency to be legal rules. However, it is not clear how to objectively measure which customs belong to *adat* and which ones are part of *limbago*. Having been growing up in a Minangkabaunese family, I myself failed to comprehend two fundamental questions: (1) is it possible (*mungkin*)?; and (2) is it proper (*patut*)? Both questions are highly necessary for considering which things belong to *adat*, *limbago* and something else. For instance, is it possible to integrate

the Islamic inheritance law into the Minangkabaunese adat? Given that most Minangkabaunese families favour the female progeny to 'enjoy'⁵ the filial properties, is it proper to do so with respect to adat and Islam? These two examples reflect how intriguing are being possible and being proper in the Minangkabau setting.

In 1854, the Constitution of the Netherlands East Indies (or Indonesia currently), known as the *Regeringsreglement*, included three words in some sections. In section 75(3) contains "religious laws, institutions and customs;" section 71(3) mentions "popular institutions;" and section 78(2) addresses "religious laws or ancient sources" (Vollenhoven, 1981: 3). It tells us that the law in pre-Indonesian polity has taken adat as an integral part of its constitution, and it constitutes the notion of adat law. Moreover, Van Vollenhoven reminds us not to confuse between the adat law, the native law, and the indigenous law in this interesting way:

"Should 'adat law' be accepted, its technical meaning must not, of course, be confused with that of other terms such as 'indigenous law' or 'native law'. 'Indigenous law' has a more restricted meaning, because it refers to adat law minus its foreign religious elements. 'Native law' (in the accepted English sense) again covers a wider field, because it embraces both the codified and uncoded law applicable to natives, and in the Indies therefore also includes any Native Criminal Code or Native Code of Procedure" (Vollenhoven, 1981: 5).

In other words, the adat law connotatively means the indigenous law plus foreign elements. Moreover, the adat law seems to be a part of the native law covering both codified and uncoded laws. If one takes for granted Van Vollenhoven's distinction between the adat law, the native law, and the indigenous law, then he or she should also be able to identify the logic beneath these laws: are they the same, similar, or different by any rate? I

⁵ Save the notion of 'enjoy' refers to both the ownership right and the right to utilise it.

suspect that the logic is different from one another due to its constitutive elements. Apparently, the logic of native law is a mixture of local ways of reasoning and its foreign counterpart, and the logic of indigenous law is the local ways of reasoning towards their surrounding nature, viz., animism and dynamism. Yet, what about the logic beneath the adat law? It seems to be stuck in the middle of both logics. How can it be different and similar to other types of logic?

DISCUSSION

In general, this section will discuss two theories. First, it will explore a theory concerning the idea of adat law in Indonesia. Second, this section will demonstrate a concept of dialetheia in modern logic.

1. Adat Law

The investigation owes to Van Vollenhoven, revealing the tricky connection between the adat law and the religious law by collaborating with Snouck Hugronje.⁶ Thereby implying a perception that I might fall into the colonisation of knowledge. However, it is not really true because I ought to be honest that this idea of adat law is fabricated by those two Dutch persons. Van Vollenhoven sets the foundation for the adat law on the basis of a particular legal theory in which case allows different legal rules for different peoples. He wrote:

⁶ *Historia* magazine captures their collaboration in this way, “Snouck, yang kembali ke Leiden pada 1906, tetap terlibat dalam urusan kolonial. Dia lalu berkolaborasi dengan Cornelis van Vollenhoven, profesor hukum Leiden, untuk mengembangkan doktrin Adatrecht (hukum adat).” See Hutary, F. (2019, February 16). *Jejak Silam Hukum Islam. Historia*. Hutary, F. (2019, February 16). *Jejak Silam Hukum Islam. Historia*. <https://historia.id/agama/articles/jejak-silam-hukum-islam-P94wJ/page/2>. It literally means “Snouck, who returned to Leiden in 1906, remained involved in colonial affairs. He then collaborated with Cornelis van Vollenhoven, Leiden's law professor, to develop the Adatrecht (customary law) doctrine.”

“He is Mr L. W. C. van den Berg...His doctrine is the theory of a *receptio in complexu* of Hindu law by Hindus, of Moslem law by Moslems, and of Christian law (insofar as it exists) by Christians. According to this doctrine, the law of the natives (and foreign orientals) is conditioned by their religion until the contrary is proved, because by accepting a religion they also 'virtually' accept its religious law. If the contrary or 'exception' is proved for one or more subjects (whole institutions or merely subordinate points), such exceptions should be regarded as 'deviations' from a religious law which has been accepted *in complexu*. The founder of this doctrine thinks that his willingness to admit such counter-evidence proves his 'open mind' and his 'unbiased appreciation' for the 'national sense of justice of the Queen's dark-skinned subjects'. In other words, the adat law of the natives (and foreign orientals) in the Indies is not shaped by the indigenous law with occasional intrusions in the form of fragments of religious law, but, to the contrary, by religious law plus deviations!” (Vollenhoven, 1981: 20).

Therefore, the notion of equality before the law seems to be irrelevant in this particular instance of adat law though the theory could potentially reflect the idea of affirmative action towards people who are subject to their own religious law. For instance, it is reasonable to assume that two Muslims should conduct a business transaction based on sharia law. In contrast, they should commit to the “institutions” in section 75 of *Regeringsreglement* or to federal law if one party is not a Muslim. Furthermore, the theory of *receptio in complexu* keeps inspiring people across the Nusantara archipelago. During the preparation of Indonesian independence, this doctrine finds its token in the 22 June 1945 Preamble or the so-called Jakarta Charter. In contrast to *receptio in complexu*, Van Vollenhoven establishes the legal doctrine of *receptio a contrario* in which saying that the adat law only applies if it does not contradict the religious law adhered to by the community (Hasanah, 2018). Considering that most Indonesian Muslims are not really religious, the works of Van

Vallenhoven are more reasonable to serve my academic interest in investigating the adat logic.

2. *Dialetheia*

As a concept, the adat logic is coherent on the basis of a particular type of logic. The notion of true contradiction is called *dialetheia* in modern literature, and it refers specifically to the ideas of Professor Graham Priest and Professor Richard Routley. Priest indeed claims:

“(The area of aesthetics, for example, where we are wont to make inconsistent judgements concerning artworks, would seem to be a fruitful ground for dialetheism. There are also numerous issues in the Asian philosophical traditions that beg to be considered in the light of it)” (Priest, 2006: 295).

Indeed, Priest argues that “I believe, for example, that it is rational (rationally possible—indeed, rationally obligatory) to believe that the Liar sentence is both true and false” (Priest, 2004: 23). Another easy example of *dialetheia* is as follows:

“I walk out of the room; for an instant, I am symmetrically poised, one foot in, one foot out, my centre of gravity lying on the vertical plane containing the centre of gravity of the door. Am I in or not in the room? By symmetry, I am neither in, rather than not in, nor not in, rather than in. The Pure Light of Reason therefore countenances only two answers to the question: I am both in and not in, or neither in nor not in. Thus, we certainly appear to have a denizen of either the top left or the bottom right quarter. But wait a minute. If I am neither in nor not in, then I am not (in) and not (not in). By the law of double negation, I am both in and not in. (And even without it, I am both not in and not not in, which is still a contradiction.) Hence, we have a denizen of the bottom right” (Priest, 2004: 28).

In short, he cannot determine nor claim whether or not he is in the room. Yet, it does not mean that a *dialetheia* should always be located in the midst of two contradictory parties. It just allows the existence of trivalency or the third value entailing true and false. In contrast to trivalency, bivalency is the habitancy for the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction. Although a true contradiction violates the Aristotelian principle of non-contradiction, it does not fall into the *ex contradictione quodlibet* or Explosion because the two are different. Priest explains:

“They are very different. For a start, as we have seen, Explosion is a relative newcomer on the logical scene. The LNC is not. It is true that some have challenged it: some Presocratics, such as Heraclitus; some Neoplatonists, such as Cusanus; and some dialecticians, such as Hegel. But since the time of Aristotle, it is a principle that has been very firmly entrenched in Western philosophy. (Its place in Eastern philosophy is much less secure.) The view that the LNC fails, that some contradictions are true, is called *dialetheism*” (Priest, 2004: 29).

Thereby, inserting the concept of *dialetheia* in order to conceive the adat logic seems to be necessary here because it has an adequate foundation. Moreover, it is necessary to give a response towards a potential challenge against *dialetheia*. For instance, Wansing proposes what he claims as “an alternative to *dialetheism*” (Wansing, 2022: 1). He conceives it as *dimathematism* which means “an informational view: some contradictions are such that their truth is supported by some states from some models” (Wansing, 2022: 13). Moreover, *dimathematism* is also “a thesis about support of truth and support of falsity,” and it considers “logic as the science of the most general laws of information flow;” as opposed to “the science of the most general laws of not being false” (Wansing, 2022: 11). Interestingly, Wansing argues that:

“The notion of semantical consequence behind *dimathematism* is that of entailment as information flow,

where support of truth is on a par with support of falsity, or if not, this is just to tie up with a traditional bias or because one notion is definable in terms of the other, and vice versa.” (Wansing, 2022: 12)

Instead of putting *dimathematism* as an alternative, Wansing seems to treat it as a derivation or a specification of *dialetheism*. Priest defines *dialetheism* as “the view that some contradictions are true, does not commit one *per se* to any particular account of truth” (Priest, 2006: 53). In other words, *dialetheism* is not singular but plural with respect to truth. If this is the case, then *dimathematism* is one token of *dialetheism* instead of the latter’s alternative.

3. The Concept of Adat Logic

If the adat law is equal to deviations plus the religious laws, then it does not mean that the adat logic is the sum of religious law and its deviations. It is fallacious to reason in such a way, reflecting a slippery slope. Although law and logic are interrelated one another, it does not mean they always be the same. On the one hand, law has a strong tendency to embrace consistency as much as to despise contradictions. On the other hand, logic gives some space to some contradictions while favouring coherence. Indeed, I propose the concept of adat logic as following:

The true contradiction between the rigidity of and the reflexivity of custom in Southeast Asia in general and Indonesia in particular.⁷

This concept is different from the ‘logic of adat’ whose denotative meaning is reasoning assessed or conducted on the grounds of strict principles of adat rather than validity. On this occasion, adat outweighs validity under the banner of the logic of adat, and this is not what I mean by establishing the concept of adat

⁷ It is necessary to maintain the area of Southeast Asia in this proposed meaning of adat logic due to the scope of meaning of the word ‘adat’ just as the way the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines it above.

logic. It seems to be similar with a distinction between 'philosophy of politics' and 'political philosophy.' While the former studies the fundamental nature of politics per se, the latter refers to a particular study starting from the works of John Rawls and perhaps Robert Nozick whose main concern is justice and political institutions. Another example is a difference between the 'philosophy of Pancasila' in which case philosophy plays the role of the so called *genetivous subjectivus* and Pancasila be the *genetivous objectivus*; and the 'Pancasila's philosophy' by which case one may develop her or his own philosophy on the ground of five Pancasila values. Having said that, the 'adat logic' is arguably different from the 'logic of adat.'

Custom plays an inevitable role to constitute the idea of adat logic for some reasons. First, adat succeeds in inspiring Van Vollenhoven to create the adat law despite the colonial interests embedded in this type of law. Second, if we do agree that every law contains logic, then so does the adat law contain its own type of logic. However, the adat logic might be not singular in its variety given that adat itself is plural in its nature. Having said that, I will strive to compose a possible, general notation for the adat logic in the next section.

Adat Logic Notation

To minimise some potential confusions on the ground of linguistic challenges, it is necessary to transform such a definition of adat logic into a notation as following:

$$al = \exists(a \wedge \neg a) \subset r1 \wedge r2 \subseteq c$$

For 'al' is the adat logic, $\exists(a \wedge \neg a)$ represents the true contradiction, 'r1' for rigidity, 'r2' for reflexivity and 'c' for custom in the region. Please do notice that I deploy the notation of both subset and proper subset above. By doing so, I strive to argue that the true contradiction of adat logic is a subset of *but not equal* to all rigidity and reflexivity of custom. In contrast, both rigidity and reflexivity are a subset of all custom, and otherwise all custom has the characteristics of both reflexivity and rigidity. Therefore, rigidity and reflexivity are subset and equal to all custom.

However, such notation could change when one inserts the notation of various adat being available in the archipelago as I will demonstrate in the section concerning a thesis of adat logic. In that section, I strive to show two varieties of adat logic in the context of Javanese and Minangkabaunese custom. One reason for choosing these two custom is people from these two ethnic groups have been playing major role in the establishment of Indonesia. Another reason is the Javanese people constitute the largest ethnic group in Indonesia while the Minangkabaunese people are famous for their matriarchy as opposed to the Javanese patriarchal custom. Prior to do so, I need to discuss the notion of *dialetheia* that is quite alien even to people in philosophy whose academic interest is not the study of modern logic.

4. Javanese Adat Logic

In general, adat refers to accepted practices or custom in which case the word has its root on the Arabic word *'ādat*. On the one hand, the rigidity of adat is obvious to generation for which preserving their own adat so much so that it could be in contradiction against some religious teachings as it is the case of Islamic inheritance law that is generally patriarchal; against the Minangkabaunese inheritance adat law that is matrilineal in its nature. On the other hand, adat gradually changes from time to time. For instance, women in the time of Kartini (1879–1904) did not have a set of rights similar to their counterparts in Europe though she believed such adat would change in the future. She wrote in her letter number I sent from Jepara on 25 May, 1899 to Mevrouw Zeehandelaar:

“If the laws of my land permitted it, there is nothing that I had rather do than give myself wholly to the working and striving of the new woman in Europe; but age-long traditions that cannot be broken hold us fast cloistered in their unyielding arms. Some day those arms will loosen and let us go, but that time lies as yet far from us, infinitely far...It was a great crime against the customs of our land that we should be taught at all, and especially that we should leave the house every day to go to school. For the custom of our country forbade girls in the

strongest manner ever to go outside of the house. We were never allowed to go anywhere, however, save to the school, and the only place of instruction of which our city could boast, which was open to us, was a free grammar school for Europeans” (Kartini, 1921: 3, 5).

Kartini’s account implies that such adat law will eventually change in the future. Indeed, she commits a *dialetheia* when she truly contradictorily undermines the benefits of arithmetical theory but Kartini also admits its function. She wrote in her letter to Mevrouw Abendanon-Mandri on 30 March 1903:

“I have been writing so irregularly to you recently—this is because my books have been taking up so much of my time. What do you think, I am now able to prove that $2 + 3$ is the same as $3 + 2$? Don’t you think this is extraordinarily clever of me? Oh, I think it is terrible work, I much prefer to do 20 difficult sums than read one page of arithmetical theory. It is so meaningless and one has no benefit from it in real life. What one learns from it is logical thinking and reasoning, and that is something. Oh, do not imagine great things of my intelligence, you might be disappointed. I still have so much to learn” (Kartini, 2014a: 584).

However, I have no idea why or by what reasons Kartini does think that there is no benefit of arithmetical theory in real life. Are not reasoning and logical thinking some benefits of arithmetical theory in real life? Indeed, does not our real-life require both logical thinking and reasoning (so much so that we can conduct a good life)? In short, this is a token of Kartini’s *dialetheia*.

Moreover, Kartini’s struggle might be illogical (or fallacious indeed) if and only if it cannot convince men by means of reason; or if it is not sound especially to men whose rational capacity goes beyond Kartini’s or her female comrades. She argued in her letter to Mevrouw Abendanon-Mandri on 4 September 1901, “We know that, even if we cannot compete against his excellent ability in logic we will, nonetheless, not surrender. For that our ideal is too dear to

us and too tightly interwoven in our existence for us to be able to give it up, unless there were a mighty and invincible reason for it” (Kartini, 2014b: 232).

She was thankful to the courage of her parents to break a certain adat rule in which case allowing Kartini to study foreign languages. Kartini describes this issue as follows:

“From the time I was a child I loved learning and it has always been my dream to learn and know as much as possible in order to make myself useful to others. How I had wanted to join our boys at the HBS, but alas, I was not permitted. It was already quite something that we girls were allowed to attend a European elementary school. We are so grateful to our parents that they broke with adat and allowed us to go to school” (Kartini, 2014c: 357).

Had her parents not taken the courage to break the Javanese adat, Kartini would not have been able to write her letters in Dutch, and no one would have recognised her thoughts and struggle against the Javanese adat logic. More Javanese women enjoy education nowadays though they still struggle with the patriarchal adat. Such gratitude might discourage Kartini from totally fight against the overall Javanese adat. Had it not for Kartini’s love for her own parents, she could have broken the old Javanese adat as she wrote in the same letter as following:

“Day and night I wonder by what means our ancient traditions could be overcome. For myself, I could find a way to shake them off, to break them, were it not that another bond, stronger than any age-old tradition could ever be, binds me to my world; and that is the love which I bear for those to whom I owe my life, and whom I must thank for everything” (Kartini, 1921: 3-4).

In other words, the Javanese adat logic has triumphed over Kartini’s mind through the idea of filial love. This victory did not happen only in Kartini’s mind but to most Javanese minds during

her time as it is written in a one page letter number XXII on August 19, 1901 to Mevrouw H. G. de Booij-Boissevain:

“There is a restlessness in our native civilization, the spirit of progress is moving among us. It is strongly combated by the inherent love which the Javanese has for the ancient "laws." There will be a hard fight before these hoary ideas and customs shall be deeply buried in the ground, never again to rise” (Kartini, 1921: 116).

Thereby, preserving the Javanese adat is not a matter of being uneducated nor unenlightened but a conscious preference for loving and respecting custom in their own unique way. Apparently, Van Vollenhoven did not capture this idea of love in the Javanese adat. Therefore, filial duties strengthen the adat including its logic. This phenomenon justifies any effort to develop the notion of adat logic as though it has been supported by our family institution. Having said that, it is also peculiar to notice that Kartini desires justice for the sake of shifting custom⁸ as though the two cannot at ease one another. At this point, I think the Javanese adat logic cannot avoid the idea of true contradiction, and by accepting it, it does not mean such logic is a derivation. Instead, the Javanese adat logic justifies and strengthens the existence of *dialetheia* in modern logic.

To fight against the Javanese patriarchy, Kartini seems to fall into the politics of sexual identity. In her letter number III on November 6, 1899 to Mevrouw Zeehandelaar, “Everything for the man, and nothing for the woman, is our law and custom” (Kartini, 1921: 17). However, she also had the aspiration to ally with a specific category of men in her letter number VI in 1900 to Mevrouw M. C. E. Ovink-Soer below:

⁸ She wrote in letter number XXIII on August, 1901 to Mevrouw Van Kol, “And it was the misery that I saw, even in my childish years, that first awakened in me the desire to fight against these time-honoured customs, and substitute justice for old tradition.” Kartini, R. A. *ibid*, p. 118.

“...we are going to seek the co-operation of the best and most enlightened men in Java (even one of them could help us). We wish to form an alliance with our enlightened, progressive men, to seek their friendship, and after that their co-operation with us. We are not giving battle to men, but to old moss-grown edicts and conventions that are not worthy of the Javanese of the future” (Kartini, 1921: 50).

It means that Kartini might commit to a true contradiction or a *dialetheia* between her cynicism against all men on the one hand; and her political need to develop a sort of alliance with some enlightened, progressive men on the other hand. Had Kartini known Soekarno, she would have written that even some enlightened, progressive men could disdain women and his own religious faith in Islam by marrying more than four women at one period time.

Reflexibility in Kartini’s thought is also obvious in her letter number XXIX on December 31st, 1901 to Mevrouw Abendanon in which case she had to hold her personal ambition to publish her letters due to a unique consideration made by her father as following:

“I was asked a few years ago, by a Dutch authoress of reputation, editor of a Woman's Journal, with whom I correspond, and whom I like very much, for permission to publish a letter in which I had touched upon these questions. The publication of private opinions such as mine, would be good for the cause, she thought. She would have kept my identity a secret, name, dwelling place, everything would have been concealed. Only those places would have been mentioned, wherein I allude to certain peculiar customs of my country. The letter was sent back to Java, so that it could be shown to Father. He said that it must not be published; ‘later perhaps.’ I knew what that ‘Later’ meant. It meant that when I should have become harmless, by having the Raden Adjeng changed to Raden Ajoë” (Kartini, 1921: 151).

So overcareful and diplomatic was her father. The way Kartini comprehended and interpreted her father's wish gives a clue, in which case there was a notion of reflexibility between two different ranks of Javanese nobility. Why should a married Javanese princess (the Raden Ayu) be able to publish her letters while an unmarried one (the Raden Ajeng) not? Did her father wish to avoid the social consequence and pass it to Kartini's future husband by putting the expression 'later perhaps'?

To an extent, it illuminates the true contradiction between rigidity and reflexibility in Javanese custom as it is also available in the account of being a Javanese mother. The Javanese adat logic encourages women to totally dedicate her life to her infants. Indeed, it might look like the baby enslaves his or her Javanese mother while the Javanese adat logic compels women to do so. On this occasion, Kartini wrote:

"A Javanese mother cannot bear to see her child cry, she would rather indulge it, even when she realizes that it would not be in its best interests, than to see it grieve any longer...That is what the Javanese mother cannot understand; her reasoning is: 'A child is a child, that is something one cannot and should not try to do anything about, other than to love and care for it. Therefore, one who allows a child to suffer, to cry, is cruel'" (Roekmini, 2014: 828).⁹

As a consequence of being unable to bear a crying child, Javanese women are likely to establish an excellent example of adat logic. Kartini captures it well as following:

"If a child falls on the ground or bumps into something, the mother comforts the crying babe by sharply hitting the ground or the object on which it hurt itself: the object is rebuked, abused, it is guilty, not the child. In this way the child learns that in the case of accidents it should look to others for the

⁹ To avoid confusion, I need to tell Kartini and Roekmini were the same person because Kartini puts her last name as 'Roekmini' in this letter.

cause in the first instance; it learns to be hard, to seek revenge” (Roekmini, 2014: 828–829).

Peculiarly, this fallacious practice has been influencing non-Javanese women and men as though it were a good habit. In fact, they unconsciously train their kids not to be a gentle person by acknowledging their own mistakes. It resembles the saying: “if you cannot dance, then blame the floor”.

A stronger case of Javanese *dialetheia*, if I may say so, is available in Kartini’s letter number XXXV on March 29, 1902 to Mevrouw de Booij-Boissevain, “A day or two before the wedding, we commemorated our dead. That is our custom: in the midst of joy we always invoke the memory of our dead. There was a sacrificial meal, during which their blessing was asked for the offspring of the coming nuptials” (Kartini, 1921: 172). In fact, joy and sorrow contradict one another. If it happens at once, then it constitutes a *dialetheia*. Among various ethnic groups in Indonesia, Javanese people are well known as those who love to say ‘yes’ before others but ‘no’ behind their backs, as it is well reflected by a Javanese maxim, “*inggih inggih boten kepongkih*.”

5. Minangkabaunese Adat Logic

Some, if not most, Indonesian proverbs come from Minangkabau. One out of many outstanding proverb is “*adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah*” (ABS-SBK)¹⁰ which means “adat hinges at shariah, shariah hinges at the Holy Book of Allah.” Minangkabaunese people love to urge the virtue of this particular maxim as though they had succeeded to cohere between their adat and their faith in Islam. Nonetheless, my late father used to adjust, if not twisting, the proverb as “adat hinges at shariah, shariah hinges

¹⁰ It is an acronym for the principle of *adat bersendi syariat*. Moreover, *syariat bersendi alur dan kepatutan* which means adat hinges at shariah, shariah hinges at groove and propriety. It is a kind of subtle mockery.

at groove and propriety” (ABS-SBAK)¹¹ because the Minangkabaunese inheritance law is in contradiction to the Islamic inheritance law. Abdullah is apologetic in assessing such conflict, in which case he argues that:

“The question of conflict in Minangkabau society is not simply one of opposing value systems, as for instance Islam vis-a-vis adat, nor is it simply the problem of central versus peripheral values, such as the whole system vis-a-vis the dissident elements...As a conclusion, it can be argued that a conceptual scheme for social analysis should not be based on the abstraction of a particular aspect of the society...The concept of adat-Islam conflict as a tool for analyzing the social development of Minangkabau falls, as we have seen, into these errors...This kind of conflict, as I have argued, should not be seen as the tension between two separate entities, but as one within the whole system itself. The so-called adat-Islam dilemma is only one aspect of internal conflict in the whole social pattern. The contradiction, then, should not be interpreted exclusively as the conflict between the actual and the ideal, but rather as a tension within social realities striving to achieve proximity with the ideal” (Abdullah, 1966: 23-24).

In short, he appears to argue against a slippery slope. Yet, adat and Islam are two different world-views both of which are exercised by most Minangkabaunese people. When the two collide, thus the Minangkabaunese people are likely to argue in favour of the true

¹¹ This modification of ABS-SBK into ABS-SBAK is relatively common. Another example of such modification is “*adat basandi syarak, syarak basandi kitabullah, syarak mangato, adat memakai.*” It means that adat hinges at shariah, shariah hinges at the Holy Qur’an, shariah compels, adat applies. According to Tono, Syibly, Mu’allim, Nurozi, & Purwanto, “The adoption of this saying in the lives of the Minangkabau proves that there is certainly no conflict between custom and Islam; in fact, they complement each other” (Tono, Syibly, Mu’allim, Nurozi, & Purwanto, 2019, 47). However, this evaluation might be apologetic in its nature with respect to the fatwa enacted by Syekh Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi as I will discuss later.

contradiction between rigidity and reflexivity of custom in Minangkabau. If this is the case, then ABS-SBAK is more realistic compared to ABS-SBK.

The Minangkabaunese adat logic has been practically dominating the dynamics of Minangkabau people in West Sumatera or their rantau (overseas). For instance, Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann reported, "Adat logic dominated not only among villagers but often within courts and even the administration as well." (von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann, 2013: 151). One token of Minangkabaunese adat logic is the establishment of a new nagari should contain a mosque, for matrilineal and an adat hall (von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann, 2013: 266). Indeed, the Minangkabaunese adat logic vanquishes the Islamic law on the issue of transforming the ownership status of a property as it is obvious in Von Benda-Beckmann's account below:

"And given the fact that many existing parcels of *pusako* property have the status of self-acquired property and carry the exploitation rights associated with that status, inheritance according to Islamic rules would affect the existing stock of *pusako* property objects under adat rules. Courts frequently have to decide this issue but have no clear guidelines. For the most part, civil courts uphold adat logic" (von Benda-Beckmann & von Benda-Beckmann, 2013: 372–373).

It tells me that even in the realm of Minangkabau, whose people claim themselves to be devoted Muslims, the adat logic still reigns in such a way that civil courts favour it instead of the Islamic inheritance law. In fact, a prominent Islamic scholar like Syekh Ahmad Khatib al-Minangkabawi – who used to be the Head for Syafi's school of jurisprudence in the Masjidil Haram as well as a Minangkabaunese man – has issued a *fatwa* against the Minangkabaunese inheritance custom.¹² Unfortunately, it is

¹² The fatwa is available in his book entitled in his book entitled *al-Dâ`i al-Masmû*.

unsuccessful to abolish such custom. So strong is the adat logic implying the people to abandon a fatwa from such prominent scholar but they truly contradictorily keep being proud over the fact that the scholar was born as a Minangkabaunese.

Having discussed the rigidity of Minangkabaunese custom, it is interesting to recognise that the adat has a specific maxim to illustrate how it gradually changes from time to time as below:

“Sakali air [aie] gadang, sakali tapian baranjak,

Sakali rajo baganti, sakali adat [adaik] barubah.

If the river is in spate, the washing place is shifted,

With a change of *raja* (king) comes a change of adat”
(Vollenhoven, 1981: 24).

This maxim is a perfect example of the reflexivity of custom in the long run as opposed to its rigidity in the short term. Nonetheless, the Minangkabaunese matrilineal adat law has been static for ages no matter who the king has been. Thereby, leaving a perception that everything may change except the inheritance adat law in which taking its root on the extreme feminist insitution called as *ninik mamak*. I call it ‘extreme’ due to two reasons. First, *ninik mamak* puts women first, and this stance contradicts the patriarchal Islamic teachings given that most, if not all, Minangkabaunese people are Muslims. Second, the power of Minangkabaunese *adat* logic relies upon the idea of *ninik mamak*.

Moreover, *ninik mamak* has been marginalising men since their teenage years. The adat logic has been encouraging boys not to sleep in their homes but *surau*¹³ whose pretexts are for learning Islam, martial art, rhetoric and others. I grew up in a Minangkabaunese family. Both my father and mother came from an underdeveloped area namely Pesisir Selatan but we have been living in Jakarta and

¹³ An Islamic assembly building for learning religious teachings and worship in Sumatera and Malay peninsula.

Bogor for most of the time. Consequently, I did not have the duty to sleep in *surau*, and I lost the chance to study martial arts, rhetoric and Islam in *surau*. I might be truly contradictorily lucky because, on the one hand, I enjoyed some benefits by sleeping at home. On the other hand, I lost the opportunity to study martial arts and exercise my rhetoric ability at *surau* because there is no such building in Jakarta and Bogor whose functions resemble the ones in Minangkabau. Having said that, my mother and her sisters are solid in supporting and practising the *ninik mamak* because they think that they ought to pass the benefits to their daughters. For instance, there was a moment in which my mother rejected my claim on the basis of Islamic inheritance law simply because she fully believes in the *ninik mamak*, especially the adat inheritance law, which leaves nothing to me. My mother earned the support from her sisters. They helped one another in preserving the *ninik mamak*. There was another moment where my mom assisted her elder sisters to bully my female cousin simply because the latter wishes to marry a man. My mom and my aunties were firm to reject the proposal simply because the man limps heavily as he moves. However, the man has a rational capacity to run the family in accordance with adat and religion. In short, the Minangkabaunese adat logic is rigid on the inheritance issue, but it is reflexive on the occasion of obliging boys to sleep in *surau*.

To understand how Minangkabaunese women behave is to study the *ninik mamak* institution. Indeed, Wiryomartono claims, "In Minangkabau, there is no better concept for describing hegemony, motherhood and home than *ninik mamak*" (Wiryomartono, 2014: 113). He defines this institution as "*Ninik mamak* is the mother of all customs and traditions and the highest agency of female power. In its local language, *ninik mamak* is the upholder of customs and traditions such that Minangkabau people are human inasmuch as they know, practise and value their culture" (Wiryomartono, 2014: 117). As both the female highest agency and the source of all custom, *ninik mamak* has been existing at the expense of men. Being a Minangkabaunese man means being ready to be "a slave" for both

his own maternal family and his family in law. For instance, I have the adat obligation to support my matrilineal nieces and nephews if they cannot go to school simply because my sister and her future husband are poor enough to provide sustenance. At the same time, I have to be ready anytime when duty calls from my wife's extended family because they consider me as the so called *urang sumando* or the son in law who has no right to express my view on anything but my hands have to be ready to support them anytime. Therefore, I have triple filial duties: to my own family, to my family in law and to my matriarchal family though the latter leaves nothing to me regarding the inheritance.

This cultural injustice has been happening for ages, and the Minangkabaunese adat logic has been struggling to supply various arguments to justify the practise of *ninik mamak*. For example, some Minangkabaunese men like to argue in favour of the adat inheritance law though they enjoy nothing. They fallaciously believe that it saves them from bankruptcy. Once they lose their business in overseas, they could still come back to their parents' home which is managed by their sisters (and their husbands) if they do not mess up with the property. However, it begs further questions some of which are: how many Minangkabaunese men are fail in overseas and choose to go back home? Would their sisters support them to redevelop their business and carrier in overseas? If they would, then to what extent? Would the adat people not bully the man who come back to their home due to bankruptcy? So strong is the institution of *ninik mamak* so that it succeeds to encourage its victims to justify such injustice in the way of Minangkabaunese adat logic. In addition to its strength, it seems taboo even to discuss *ninik mamak* so that most scholars in Minangkabaunese study, according to Wiryomartono, "leavethe[sic!] concept of *ninik mamak* hidden" (Wiryomartono, 2014: 16). Therefore, to challenge the institution of *ninik mamak* is equal to challenge the Minangkabaunese *adat* logic.

6. A Thesis of *Adat* Logic

Having discussed the concept of adat logic, *dialetheia* and the principle of non-contradiction; it is also important to develop a thesis concerning the adat logic. To do so, I insert both the Javanese adat logic in which “the word adat is used for all that is custom or ought to be customary: they speak of 'adat' in connexion with festivities, visits, homage, the preparation of food, the rice stock, and so on” (Vollenhoven, 1981: 4). In contrast, the Minangkabaunese adat reflects “'law, or a binding rule of custom', as against non-obligatory customs referred to as *limbago*” (Vollenhoven, 1981: 4). The logic notation is represented by the following:

Javanese adat : $\forall a \Rightarrow cx^{14}$

Minangkabaunese adat : $\forall a \Rightarrow l \vee oc \neq \neg ocxi^{15}$

Thus, we can insert those two notations into the concept of adat logic in order to acquire some possible theses. First, I will start with the Javanese adat as following:

$a_l = \exists(a \wedge \neg a) \subset r_1 \wedge r_2 \subseteq c$

$a_l = \exists(c \wedge \neg c) \subset r_1 \wedge r_2 \subseteq c$

It appears to me that the Javanese adat logic is the true contradiction of all¹⁶ rigid and reflexive custom for which case there is no significant distinction between adat and custom in and of themselves in the definition of Javanese adat. If this is valid and true, then one could claim a thesis saying that the Javanese adat logic is beneficial and relevant only to those whose style of reasoning is characterised by submission and compliance to all rigid and reflexive Javanese custom. It is not exclusive to Javanese individuals but open to those who have an open mind to the idea and practice

¹⁴ 'a' = adat; 'c' = custom.

¹⁵ 'l' = law; oc = obligatory custom; $\neg oc$ = non-obligatory custom.

¹⁶ I took the courage to amplify in this way because adat is custom in its Javanese definition.

of true contradiction. The truth value of such a thesis relies upon the principle of identity of what it means to be a Javanese. This issue is nevertheless located beyond the scope of this article.

Second, I move to the Minangkabaunese adat logic whose notation is very different from its Javanese counterpart. It proceeds as below:

$$a1 = \exists(a \wedge \neg a) \subset r1 \wedge r2 \subseteq c$$

$$a1 = \exists([1 \vee oc \neq \neg oc] \wedge [\neg 1 \vee oc \neq \neg oc]) \subset r1 \wedge r2 \subseteq c$$

Here, we acquire a relatively new definition of what Minangkabaunese adat logic is. The Minangkabaunese adat logic means the true contradiction of some rigid and reflexive custom in which case there is a significant distinction between law or obligatory custom on the one hand; and non-law or non-obligatory custom on the other hand. It entails a thesis claiming that the Minangkabaunese adat logic is significant and relevant only to those whose style of thinking is constituted by a clear and distinct line between which custom is obligatory and which one is not. This Minangkabaunese adat logic is unfortunately exclusive only to those familiar with the true contradiction between the Minangkabaunese custom and other valences, one of which is Islam. The principle of identity concerning what the meaning of being Minangkabaunese is; does not really determine the truth value of such thesis because the matriarchal structure of Minangkabau allows a person to possess two different cultural and traditional identities. For instance, Megawati Soekarnoputri is actually both a Minangkabaunese and a Javanese because her mother was a Minangkabaunese who grew up in Bengkulu, and her father was a Javanese. However, most Minangkabaunese people fail to recognise and admit this inevitable fact though they might need to be proud of Megawati.

A leading English newspaper in Indonesia, *The Jakarta Post*, used to publish an editorial column whose point might serve the modern context of adat logic. It says:

“There is always a wide gap in logic between the elite and the masses. For the elite, there is no eternal friend or foe, only interests. But the supporters of each side often take the political rivalry personally, as apparent, for example, in reactions across social media accounts” (NN, 2019).

The political context of such editorial is the meeting between Megawati and Prabowo Subianto, which allows the latter to serve his political opponent during the second presidential service of Joko Widodo. On the one hand, the logic of the elite resembles the reflexivity of custom. On the other hand, the logic of masses appears like the rigidity of custom. Therefore, such a logic gap between the Indonesian elite and the masses constitutes a true contradiction. It is true because it happens as though elites easily ignore the logic of their followers.

CONCLUSION

The logic beneath different laws should be various in their nature though there might be some intersections and similarities here and there. Although the adat law has been in effect in Indonesia since its colonial time. In other words, to liberate Indonesia is to set free their way of reasoning from the Aristotelian one to what I call as the adat logic. Indeed, this adat logic could share a feature with other logics in terms of its stance on the modern logic account of *dialetheia*, while its difference might be apparent when I employ formalism or some notations in logic. Moreover, this preference would overcome some linguistic obstacles in discussing and revealing various types of adat logic being available in Indonesia and neighbouring countries. My examples of Javanese adat logic and its Minangkabaunese counterpart are two indications that this adat logic is fertile with ideas, concepts and potential theses for a study of logic. My definition of the adat logic could shed some light to those who are confused by the inconsistent behaviours and reasonings towards the Javanese and Minangkabaunese peoples both of which are influential to the peoples in the Southeast Asia whatsoever.

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