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VIRTUAL REALISM: DAVID CHALMERS ON THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF VIRTUAL REALITY

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Abstrak

Kehadiran suatu teknologi dapat membawa perspektif baru yang lantas membuka kembali pertanyaan filsafat lama. Realitas virtual, misalnya, mendaur ulang gairah di Barat atas topik-topik metafisika. Pertanyaan fundamental mengenai realitas kembali hidup dan menarik perdebatan sengit filosofis seperti: Bagaimana mendefinisikan realitas? Apa batas atau cakupan dari realitas? Bahkan, apakah sungguh kita bisa menjangkau atau mengetahui realitas yang sejati? David Chalmers, seorang tekno-filsuf Australia-Amerika, adalah tokoh yang berada di pusat medan kajian itu. Ia menghadirkan konsep "realisme virtual" untuk mewakili pandangan bahwa segala objek dan lingkungan dalam realitas virtual adalah nyata dan setara dengan segala yang lain. Hal ini menimbulkan pertanyaan mengenai bagaimana seharusnya kita memaknai segala objek-objek, tindakan, pengalaman dan kejadian di dalam realitas virtual dan kaitan mereka dengan realitas non-virtual. Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengelaborasi dan menganalisis pandangan Chalmers mengenai realisme virtual. Studi konseptual digunakan untuk memahami argumen dan tesis yang diungkapkan Chalmers. Hasil dari penelitian menunjukkan bahwa Chalmers menyusun realisme virtual menggunakan berbagai argumen realisme secara eklektis. Argumen puncak Chalmers adalah mengatakan bahwa sebagaimana di dalam realitas non-virtual, ada pula derajat kekuatan dan hubungan kausalitas pada keadaan virtual yang sekaligus dapat mempengaruhi sekaligus dipengaruhi realitas non-virtual.

Kata kunci*: realitas virtual, realisme virtual, ontologi, kausalitas*.

Abstract

The presence of a new technology can bring a novel perspective which then reopens old philosophical questions. Virtual reality, for example, recycles passion in the West over metaphysical topics. Fundamental questions regarding reality are coming back to life and attracting heated philosophical debates such as: How to define reality? What is the limit or scope of reality? Can we really reach or know true reality? David Chalmers, an Australian-American techno-philosopher, is a figure at the center of this field of study. He presents the concept of "virtual realism" to represent the view that all objects and environments in virtual reality are real and equal to everything else. This raises the question of how we should interpret all objects, actions, experiences and events in virtual reality and their relationship to non-virtual reality. The purpose of this research is to elaborate and analyze virtual realism as conceptualized by Chalmers. This research conducted a conceptual study to understand the arguments and theses put forward by Chalmers. The results of the research show that Chalmers constructed virtual realism using various realism arguments eclectically. Chalmers' ultimate argument says that as in non-virtual reality, there is also a degree of power and causality in virtual circumstances that can both influence and influence non-virtual reality.

Keywords*: Virtual reality, virtual realism, ontology, causality*.

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INTRODUCTION

In the last three decades, innovators in the field of communications have given birth to a technology called virtual reality (Gigante, 1993: 3). Via an oculus device worn on the head, a person can jump from an office or living room to a giant ball field full of cheers or perhaps a mega-beautiful but solemn flower garden. However, what is interesting is that the field and park cannot be designated on a map. It is not located in any country, island, province or city. In fact, he is not in the same time and space as us. The innovators called it virtual reality. Simply put, it is a man-made

environment created through simulation and based on computational processes (Heim, 2000: 5-6).

The potential benefits of this technology for human life are truly unlimited. In recent years, aviation education institutions abroad have used virtual reality to train prospective pilots (Oberhauser & Dreyer, 2017: 265). Rather than letting them learn directly to pilot a plane that costs millions of dollars, these young pilots are invited to learn through virtual reality. A giant capsule can be opened and inside is a perfect replication of an aircraft control desk with a monitor displaying the environment while a person is on board the aircraft. Aspiring pilots can log in and start all the take off to landing scenarios exactly as they would if they passed the test.

One of the things that makes virtual reality popular is in video games (Kaplan & Haenlein, 2009: 72). Thanks to virtual reality, a person can become part of a fictional environment where dragons, elves and dwarves live. A person seems to have hands, a body, and is actually in a reality that does not exist at all in everyday life. Avatars (another name for virtual bodies) can be designed arbitrarily by the user. If in reality he is thin, short and dark-skinned, he could choose an avatar that is chubby, tall and light-skinned. Uniquely, some people can be sure that they are the real person in virtual reality rather than what they see in the mirror every morning.

However, virtual reality is not only seen because of its practical and temporary uses. Virtual reality also promises life itself: the fantasy of eternal life. Several research groups have started a project to upload consciousness into virtual reality (Geraci, 2010: 137). This project may sound crazy. However, when the earth becomes increasingly damaged and finds it difficult to accommodate human life, it is very natural to look for another place to live. Virtual reality, which does not "occupy" space in general, allows humans to save themselves from an increasingly inhospitable earth.

This variety of practical to imaginative potential is certainly attractive to business people whose orientation is only profit and

loss. Shares of large companies continue to soar due to their involvement—among others—in accelerating virtual reality technology. Some big companies worth watching, for example, are Meta (transformation from Facebook), Qualcomm (chipset company), Nvidia (graphics memory company), and even Apple. All of these companies are giant companies that have long led the world's technology business. Their great attention clearly confirms the future of virtual reality as an economically promising technology.

Slavoj Žižek (2023) observed the above phenomenon in a different way. Rather than a collective effort for technological development or innovation, what is happening according to him is a struggle for power in virtual reality. The technological feudal lords are competing to monopolize the new reality in order to establish their status as virtual landlords. What they did was no different from the colonialists who annexed as many of the homelands of technologically weak nations as possible to enslave them for the sake of enriching themselves.

Rather than a matter of conflict between classes, the presence of virtual reality has long sparked quite fierce discourse in metaphysics (Beisbart, 2019: 55). The main problem that continues to attract many different views is regarding the ontological status of virtual reality. Philosophers can be divided into two large groups, namely supporters of virtual realism and virtual fictionalism (Chalmers, 2023: 12). The first states that virtual reality is real while the second views virtual reality as unreal or fictional (Ali, 2024). Each presents arguments to support their theses.

Proponents of virtual realism then take the claims of virtual reality further to various implications. They say that the reality we face is a perfect virtual reality that we cannot recognize because of the perfect simulations created throughout human history (Summers & Arvan, 2022: 497). This claim is then clashed with the rejection of religious beliefs which say that God created reality. Instead, they say that the world was created by a clever human behind a super sophisticated computer (Chalmers, 2023: 66-67).

This real-fiction problem becomes significant when it is also drawn to its moral implications (Brey, 2020). To what extent can actions in virtual reality have the same consequences as actions in non-virtual reality? A case that has been discussed for a long time, for example, is how playing first-person shooter virtual games does not trigger the same social punishment as dating simulation games that tend to be more erotic and involve fetishes through small, skinny avatars of children (thus, home to digital pedophiles) (Nader, 2020: 240). This difference in values is justification that ontological and moral issues in virtual reality are not as simple as imagined (Ali, 2024; Brey, 2020; Nader, 2020).

However, virtual reality encourages discourse about values that were previously minimally discussed because they were considered impossible. Leibniz once coined a "connected mind". He does not mean a centralized soul force such as the active mind or universal mind but he means a kind of virtual reality: an immaterial space in which individual minds can interact (Heim, 2000: 66-67). Now that virtual reality has arrived in our time, the axiological issues regarding it have emerged.

The problem is that the discussion of the value of virtual reality does not seem to have been studied much. Because, the more (or most) basic questions regarding the ontology of virtual reality itself are still unanswered (Chalmers, 2023: 11-12). As a result, the value of virtual reality cannot yet be determined while its status as real or fictional is still being debated. Of course, this can be understood because something that is real definitely has different values than something that is fictional. The answer to this may be able to explain how differences in value occur for actions in the virtual world, compared to the non-virtual world.

Based on the concerns above, this research will explore the perspective of David Chalmers, who is widely known for his "virtual realism". This concept is closely related to answering the fundamental questions about reality coming back to life and attracting heated philosophical debates such as: How to define reality? What is the limit or scope of reality? Can we really reach or

know true reality? How Chalmers answers those questions is the main goal of this research.

The various research questions that have been mentioned indicate that this research limits itself to ontological status. The ontological status in question is the situation in which something is placed as existing or not existing, as well as what justification is used to state the ontological status of something. Research on ontological status also seeks to find out, if something exists, then what does it exist as and what is its existential relationship with other existences.

DISCUSSION

1. Virtual Realism: The Beginning of the Structure of the Concept

Virtual realism is not a new view conceptualized by Chalmers. This view appeared for the first time in Michael Heim's book in 1998. At that time, Heim used virtual realism as a broad socio-political view that mediates two extreme views (Heim, 2000: 12-17). At one pole are naive people who blame technology as the source of various moral problems in the modern world. At the other pole are those who appreciate virtual reality as something real, useful and will play an important role in life in the future. Chalmers claims that he agrees with this latter pole (Chalmers, 2023: 115).

The word "realism" in virtual realism already explains the position of this view. Like most schools or variants of realism, they have beliefs or interests to justify that something is real. One example is moral realism. Some philosophers (such as Plato and Kant) say that morals are something real, independent, and objective. The same also applies to Chalmers' virtual realism: that virtual reality is real, independent, and objective (Chalmers, 2023: 116).

Virtual realism transformed from Heim to Chalmers. Rather than just a reactive ideology regarding the presence of science fiction technology, Chalmers makes virtual realism a school or strand within realism. Without hesitation, he dared to state that it is very likely that we live in virtual reality with virtual bodies.

However, all these facts do not change the fact that the world we live in, the environment, the people and ourselves are real.

The structure of the argument in Chalmers' virtual realism consists of several aspects. The first aspect is the meaning, boundaries, and scope of reality. Chalmers questioned the old views and showed that they would be inadequate to explain virtual reality. Chalmers took small parts of each theory of realism to then state that virtual reality is real.Chalmers then proceeds to the second aspect, namely the meaning of virtual. The virtual is defined as "the digital", not "imitation, artificiality or fiction". This is an important part of explaining how the word virtual as a predicate emphasizes the difference between virtual reality and non-virtual reality. Ultimately, Chalmers says that as in non-virtual reality, there is also a degree of power and causality in virtual circumstances that can both influence and influence non-virtual reality.

2. The Meaning and the Criteria of Reality

The concept or meaning of reality occupies an important position for Chalmers. The whole problem he studied led to the disclosure of an incomplete discourse regarding virtual reality. Chalmers (2017: 333) views this as happening partly because the meaning of reality itself is different. Different meanings will certainly create different positions and responses that may be disproportionate. Therefore, Chalmers explains what reality is before interpreting and attaching the predication "virtual" to "reality".

Chalmers mentions several meanings of reality and he uses all three meanings simultaneously when using the term. *First,* reality as in "existence" or everything that has existence (Chalmers, 2023: 117-118). This refers more to what is contained in the universe. Reality as this, that, you, him. In other words, reality is all things or objects/subjects that have unity or personal identity.

Second, reality in the sense of "a world". Here, reality is like a giant space, a kind of world or a galaxy (Chalmers, 2023: 116).

Chalmers believes that there may be several realities. Simply put, a reality for Chalmers is the same as a "universe". Chalmers uses the word "cosmos" to refer to something that contains or gathers all reality. Chalmers embraces the basic idea that we live in a universe, side by side with various other universes. The entire universe is in a cosmos as a collection of various universes.

The final meaning of reality is the "real" nature or property of a situation. Here the word "reality" can be interpreted to be synonymous with the word "real" (Chalmers, 2023: 117). Saying that the car is real has the same meaning as saying that the car is reality. Likewise, the proposition "cars are not real", has the same meaning as "cars are not reality". It is in this last meaning that a problem arises which becomes the main research direction of virtual realism: Is virtual reality real? (Chalmers, 2017: 325)

Chalmers then uses the term "real" to anticipate the confusion that will arise due to the variety and breadth of the meaning of reality. The use of the word "real" also means that he wants to focus on the third meaning of reality, and set aside the first (as existence) and second (as world) meaning. Another approach taken by Chalmers to reveal the meaning of "real" is to describe its criteria.

There are five criteria for the word "real" as far as Chalmers' analysis goes. First, "real" means it can be perceived, sensed or measured (Chalmers, 2023: 120). Chalmers took this criterion from Berkeley, who is famous for his dictum "*Esse est percipi*" or "Real is what can be perceived". This criterion means that something is said to be real if it is perceived through the senses, whether smelled, tasted, touched or seen. In today's context, perception has developed into "measurable" (Turri, 2016: 210). According to Chalmers (2023: 453), this criterion is too extreme. For him, there are many things that humans may not be able to perceive through the senses directly but are still real. On the other hand, there are things that we can see but are not actually what they seem. Chalmers concluded that this criterion acts as an initial indication that must be accompanied by other criteria. This criterion cannot stand alone.

The second criterion is that a real thing is something that has the power of effect. A stone is real if it can be thrown and leave a crack in the wall. An event such as a fire can be said to be real because it causes the destruction of a house. According to Chalmers, the criterion for the power of effect for real properties is taken from the Elea dictum contained in the work of Plato. It is said in The Wise that a stranger suddenly shouted for no reason in the middle of the city of Elea. What came out of his mouth were the following words: "I say that anything that has power in any form, whether to create a change in something or in the nature of something or which is influenced deeply by the slightest cause, and even in just one instance, is something real ..." (Nash et al., 2021: 210)

We can draw a relationship between the two criteria. Something has the power of effect because it has the power of effect at least in perception. Something has a shape and surface which is then perceived as a certain shape and type of surface. This means that something real by the first criterion will automatically also be real by virtue of the second.

Continuing to the third criterion, Chalmers (2023: 120) said that real is something whose existence does not depend on thoughts or beliefs. The meaning of this criterion is that something is real regardless of whether the human mind believes or denies it. Real things do not suddenly exist because people think about them, nor do real things suddenly disappear when people stop thinking about them. This criterion indirectly seeks to differentiate something that exists in the mental world and something that exists in the external world. Existence in mental reality alone is not sufficient to claim a real nature. It must also have an existence in external reality.

For this reason, Chalmers (2023: 120) puts his attention to objects that have a social function. Money is said to have value because the human mind believes in the value of money. Money can lose or decrease in value when people's minds change. However, Chalmers considers that the physical form of money itself is independent or free from thought. Even the human need to transact

efficiently is an objective fact that is independent of the beliefs of one or many individuals (Chalmers, 2017: 330).

"Not an illusion" is the fourth criterion compiled by Chalmers (2023: 121). For him, reality is the contradiction of illusion. If real is "being as it seems", then illusion is "not being as it seems". Something real does not make a trick as in a magic trick: it shows something as it is.

Finally, Chalmers (2023: 122-123) describes the authenticity of something as a real criterion. Take the example of the illusion discussed in the previous criteria. We call a tree real if it is a real tree. It's different if the tree is apparently just a two-dimensional cardboard picture of a tree or if it's just a sponge cut, painted and assembled like a tree, or if it's just a hologram emitted by a projection instrument. We would say that the tree is not real because it is not real.

Apart from these five real criteria, Chalmers also discusses one other real criterion. This criterion states that real means something that is in more fundamental or basic reality. Chalmers (2023: 123-125) means that two realities can now be identified with different levels of fundamentality. External reality or non-virtual reality that we experience every day is more fundamental or basic than virtual reality. Because external reality is a reality that existed first and is a place for computer machines which will then simulate virtual reality. If we use "fundamentality" as a criterion then it is certain that virtual reality is not real. It is inferior to non-virtual (external) reality.

Based on all these criteria, Chalmers stated that virtual reality is real. First, for him, virtual reality remains real, just with a lower level of realness. Virtual reality can still be perceived, has the power of effect, is independent of the human mind and in itself is a (genuine) digital existence. Second, Chalmers reminds us that we cannot guarantee whether the external reality we believe in is truly the fundamental reality. If we look at the simulation hypothesis popularized by the film *The Matrix*, it is possible that the reality that we consider fundamental is also a simulation. With this assumption,

we would make a mistake if we declare that virtual reality is not real even though external reality is also not fundamental.

3. Virtual as Digital

The next main argument from virtual realism is not in virtual reality itself, but in the conditions that exist in virtual reality. These circumstances are virtual and real at the same time. Virtual existence does not mean existence that is illusory or merely produced by a computer (Chalmers, 2023: 191). Chalmers reviews these two virtual meanings because they are popular meanings. A virtual cat, for example, can be understood as a cat or something that resembles a cat even though it is not a cat itself (virtual meaning is an illusion). Virtual cats can also be interpreted as cats that exist inside a computer (virtual meaning anything that is simulated by a computer).

These two meanings are correct if used in the narrow context as above. However, here we use the meaning of virtual as a state that is the object of interaction of users (or residents) of virtual reality. It is thanks to interaction with virtual conditions that virtual reality has the ability to create immersive and interactive experiences in addition to being an imitation or computer simulation (Chalmers, 2023: 193).

We also understand that if we use these criteria then we will face the complexity of applying them to all types of virtual situations (McDonnell & Wildman, 2019: 372). In particular, the implementation difficulties are very obvious when we also include another criterion: immersiveness. Not all objects allow a person the perception of "enveloping" or "being there" because the virtual existence in question is not an environment or space. Therefore, Chalmers himself understands differently what virtual existence is.Chalmers (2023: 195) understands virtual objects as all objects or conditions that exist in virtual reality. Whether it is objects such as virtual tables, chairs or avatars that represent users. Virtual objects also include any events or actions that take place in virtual reality.

This means that virtual teaching and virtual meetings are all virtual objects too.

After constructing an understanding of virtual objects, Chalmers asked ontological questions. On the one hand, he asks whether virtual objects are real. On the other hand, he asks whether the virtual events or actions actually happened. In the first one, one can state that the objects are illusory because they have a visual existence that seems to occur before the eyes but actually does not exist in non-virtual reality (Chalmers, 2017: 311). Even in the second question, people can put forward the view that virtual events are fictional because they often ignore the laws (say, for example, the laws of physics) that apply in external reality (Chalmers, 2023).

Rejectors of virtual realism or what is usually called virtual fictionalists will express the opposite position (Silcox, 2023: 25). They view that virtual objects or events are not real or exist and do not happen. Virtual objects are purely fictional objects and occupy the same position as fictional characters and objects as dragons and Naruto (Ali, 2024: 15). Likewise, virtual events or actions are fictional events, like the big war between ninja villages in the *Naruto* series. Their final conclusion is that virtual reality is a fictional reality.

Chalmers (2023: 197-198) refutes this view of virtual fictionalism with a part-all argument. According to him, it is true that the world in a *Naruto* video game is fictional. The problem is that video games like Naruto and others are only some examples of virtual worlds. Not everything in the virtual world is a video game. It has been stated that virtual worlds are different from virtual reality. Video games are virtual worlds but not virtual reality.

Regarding the fictional aspect of video games like *Naruto*, this is an aspect that must be separated from their virtual aspect. They are fictional because they involve the imagination and are almost entirely monologues. Almost no aspects of the concrete world actually occur except that they borrow various features from the real world. They borrowed ninjas which are part of Japanese culture and once existed. But they also developed the fictional ninja culture to

be more than the factual. There is magic, there are superhumans, and there are monsters previously unknown in ninja culture and facts.

Chalmers (2023) then showed supporting evidence that not all virtual worlds work like video games. He cited an application called "Second Life". Many people in the application use it as a world in which they interact and communicate. For example, two people are chatting in Second Life through their respective avatars in a virtual room. The two discussed hobbies and plans to camp together on weekends. In this example, the label "fiction" is inappropriate.

This is where Chalmers then enters the next argument to state the reality of virtual objects or actions. He called this argument virtual digitalism (Chalmers, 2019: 453-454). In general, virtual digitalism is explained through two premises. The first premise is that virtual objects and actions are entirely digital objects. Meanwhile, the second premise says that digital objects are real objects. So, through the syllogism, it is concluded that virtual objects and actions are real.

Virtual digitalism is thus based on proving that digital objects are real (Chalmers, 2023: 198). Digital objects themselves are a series of networked or structured computer codes. The codes are physical in that they are manifested by electrical voltage working in a circuit, memory, chip or other electronic physical object (Chalmers, 2019: 453). This means that all objects in virtual reality have been, are, and continue to be active representations or productions of a computer machine (Chalmers, 2023: 203-204). All changes, both movement and location, will be read and responded to by the computer machine.

This condition becomes one of the first arguments for virtual realism. Namely, that the perception generated by virtual reality is fiction because an object that "looks like" it is in front of you when using an oculus does not actually exist immediately when you remove the oculus. It is fictional because there is no identical object physically in front of the user. Virtual digitalism will explain that the object in front of it really exists and is existing, but the

procurement of the object occurs on the server and the oculus is only tasked with displaying sensations that are relatively based on the user's position.

The second argument from virtual digitalism is that virtual objects, actions, events and environments are all data structures or algorithmic codes that are composed and read by computers (Chalmers, 2023: 200). Analogously, a similar condition occurs in non-virtual concrete objects such as tables and atoms. The table is made up of atoms, but to humans what appears to them is the table. Likewise with everything virtual: they are data structures but presented by computers and perceived by humans as "something" or existence.

This relationship can be further explained as a causal relationship to existence (Chalmers, 2023: 199). Just as changes to atoms will result in changes to the table, changes to data structures will result in changes to the virtual correspondences of the objects, actions or environments being simulated. If the atoms disappear, the table will also disappear. This also applies to all virtual situations that require an existing structure. At the extreme, the absence of a virtual existence is due to the absence of a data structure.

The third argument for virtual digitalism is that there is an equal role between the human mind and both virtual and non-virtual situations (Chalmers, 2023: 199). Various kinds of furniture with their respective functions were created because of the needs and consequences of the structure that humans attached to them. The same condition also occurs in virtual situations. Virtual furniture and virtual currency used for transactions were created because of the human need for the functions of buying, selling, and ownership (Chalmers, 2019: 454). That is, the real status of virtual reality is confirmed by the way humans treat virtual states like non-virtual states. If the mind does not differentiate between the states of the two realities, then declaring one (the virtual state) as fiction is an unfair conclusion to the reasoning process itself (Chalmers, 2016).

The fourth argument that synonymizes virtual reality with non-virtual reality as real is the causality argument. All virtual events can influence each other (Chalmers, 2017: 325). The virtual body or avatar of a user can make a kicking movement which, when in contact with the virtual ball, causes the ball's location to shift. In more detail, Chalmers discusses that virtual reality has virtual states with varying degrees of causality.

4. Virtual Beings and Their Causality Power

The weakest among them are virtual existences that are decorative. The mountains and clouds mentioned by virtual fictionalists fall into this category. However, Chalmers reminded us that virtual decorations at least influence perception or result in the emergence of an immersion experience that approaches conditions in non-virtual reality.

This decorative virtual existence is also at least somewhat independent of the human mind (Chalmers, 2023: 200). Whether humans exist or not, whether humans think about them or not, virtual states still exist independently. They are not like fictional objects that exist because humans believe or think they do. Next is a virtual existence that is solid in nature (Chalmers, 2023). They are considered solid because they are programmed so that they cannot be penetrated by other virtual entities. The ground or virtual floor that is stepped on or the boundary line of the road is usually made that way.

Solid virtual states can be said to be more real than decorative virtual states. Apart from having an influence on visual perception, they also have a restrictive or imperative capacity, which means limiting or regulating. Unfortunately, they could still be said to be quite weak causally and in interactions because they appear passive or silent.

At a higher or more real level there is a virtual existence that is mobile. This can be moved, changed shape and face directions and it interacts or causes certain effects when it makes contact. For

example, when a user is driving a virtual car and it collides with a virtual car from another direction. In these conditions, there will be a sound of impact, damage, or a bouncing movement of both (Chalmers, 2017: 325).

Next, there are the so-called special virtual objects (Chalmers, 2023: 201). This type of object has unique causal powers. An example of the former is a virtual key that can only be used to open a door, unlike keys in non-virtual reality which due to their hard nature (because they are made of metal) can be thrown at individuals when there is a threat (although of course keys in essence do not function like that). Virtual keys, on the other hand, do not allow the same thing to be done (although they are possible as long as they are programmed that way).

Especially for this special virtual event, Chalmers differentiates them into two types (Chalmers, 2023: 202). One is passive in the sense that it can only be active when someone uses it. They are like the keys that we explained earlier. Meanwhile, another one is active, meaning it has artificial intelligence so it moves or acts independently. These are non-player characters (NPC) such as monsters or agents who act like users but are actually artificial.

The peak is the existence of virtual human representations (Chalmers calls them "animated virtual objects") (Chalmers, 2023: 202). This category includes virtual bodies or avatars that mediate users with virtual objects and environments. The true avatar is a fluid state that is passive in nature. However, it can be distinguished from other fluid environments because the user controls their avatar directly. The uniqueness of this type of condition is also because it has various effects that apply to the original human body (Chalmers, 2017: 203).

In terms of the degree of realness, perhaps the virtual existence of human representation is the most real. Apart from being able to provide perceptual influence and interact with virtual objects and environments, it is also a virtual reference for human users. Every action or effect that arises in the virtual body originates from human consciousness.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this research is to elaborate and analyze virtual realism as conceptualized by David Chalmers. The result shows there are three main points of virtual realism which support the ontological status of virtual reality. First, virtual reality remains real, but with a lower or weaker level of realness. This helps the distinction and the justification of the daily experience of our non-virtual reality to be of more significance than virtual reality. Indeed, virtual reality is an artificial reality inside reality.

Furthermore, Chalmers suggests that virtual reality can still be perceived both individually and collectively, has the power of effect, is independent of the human mind and in itself is a (genuine) digital existence. The word "fiction" is not applicable to virtual reality since "fiction" renders an object to be mind-dependent and have no causal effect in reality. The causal power of virtual reality is interconnected with the non-virtual reality where the user and the human both co-exist. Finally, virtual reality as a reality composed of digital objects and environments is the result of a concrete computer simulation process in non-virtual reality. This computer simulation holds the integrity of virtual reality including its causal power and its appearance towards humans' senses and perception.

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