



Enhancing Tenure Security: A Case Study of the Social Forestry Scheme in the State Forestry Corporation, Malang District, East Java

Jaminan Tenurial dalam Kebijakan Perhutanan Sosial: Kasus Skema Perhutanan Sosial di Perhutani, Kabupaten Malang, Jawa Timur

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ABSTRACT

The Social Forestry Program was a government initiative that yielded significant outcomes and provided unprecedented access and opportunities to the community. One notable change has occurred in the Perhutani area through a scheme known as IPHPS. This scheme provides long-term tenure security to forest farmers with higher returns than before. In addition, extensive experience in addressing tenure conflicts in the Perhutani area, a State Forestry Corporation (SFC), has prompted communities to apply for the IPHPS scheme. Therefore, this research aimed to investigate the dynamics of changes in access and assess their implementation using the concept of property rights as a framework. The results showed that the IPHPS scheme provided community groups the right to manage forests but needed more flexibility to decide on the use of resources. In addition, the management patterns regulation had a significant responsibility to restore forest conditions. Furthermore, this research proposed new rights, particularly management rights, for community groups to manage their forest resources up to the operational level and improve forest conditions. In addition, the absence of a management authority caused difficulties in achieving social forestry's objective of increasing local communities' role in managing their forest resources.

INTISARI

Program Perhutanan Sosial telah menunjukkan hasil yang signifikan dimana masyarakat memperoleh akses dan kesempatan bagi hasil yang besar tanpa terbayangkan sebelumnya. Salah satu perubahan akses terjadi di wilayah Perhutani melalui skema yang disebut IPHPS. Skema ini memberikan jaminan tenurial yang panjang bagi petani hutan dengan bagi hasil yang tinggi dibanding sebelumnya. Pengalaman panjang atas konflik tenurial di wilayah Perhutani menuntun masyarakat untuk mengajukan skema IPHPS. Penelitian ini ingin melihat dinamika perubahan akses dan bagaimana pelaksanaannya ditinjau dengan menggunakan konsep property right. Kami menemukan bahwa meskipun skema IPHPS memberikan hak jaminan tenurial kepada kelompok masyarakat dalam melakukan pengelolaan hutan, namun tidak memiliki keleluasaan dalam mengatur sumber daya hutan. Pola-pola pengelolaan diatur secara formal dengan tanggung jawab yang besar dalam pemulihan kondisi hutan. Kami mengusulkan adanya penambahan hak yaitu hak pengelolaan bagi kelompok masyarakat untuk mengatur sumber daya hutan mereka hingga tingkat operasional yang berkorelasi dengan perbaikan kondisi hutan. Tanpa adanya otoritas pengelolaan, maka tujuan perhutanan sosial untuk meningkatkan peran masyarakat lokal dalam mengatur sendiri sumber daya hutannya sulit dicapai.

Introduction

The Indonesian government has reaffirmed its commitment to reducing inequalities in land distribution and overall access to forests through the implementation of the agrarian reform (*Tanah Objek Reformasi Agraria*, TORA) and Social Forestry (SF) programs (Herawati et al. 2019; Resosudarmo et al. 2019; Rustiadi & Veriasa 2022). Despite the various efforts made in recent years, tenure issues have proven to be persistent. These issues include the involvement of numerous stakeholders, the abuse of authority over the equitable distribution of land, and the incapacity of local institutions (Katila et al. 2020). Moreover, enduring conflicts between the state and communities or between enterprises and local communities pose additional challenges (Priyo Purnomo & Anand 2014; Riggs et al. 2016; Wulandari et al. 2021). Rodd et al. (2022) showed that effective and efficient implementation of tenure reform depends on the coordination of implementing institutions.

The SF Program aims to promote tenure formalization for local communities, enabling them to engage in secure and sustainable long-term investments. Santoso & Purwanto (2021) stated that gaining rights and access assured secure tenure, enhancing income and well-being. They examined forest communities' rights and access claims using the bundle of rights concept initially proposed by (Schlager & Ostrom 1992) and later revised by Sikor et al. (2017). This concept includes a bundle of rights consisting of four distinct types: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation rights. The management regimes, such as state and non-state forest areas, highly influence community rights and access to forest resources (Madjid et al. 2022). The rights obtained by the community correlate with the extent of their access to forest resources. Previous research suggested that the level of access gained by the community, including access to information, technology, finance, labor, and social capital, had significantly impacted the success of the social forestry program (Hardianti et al. 2020). Therefore, the engagement of the central government is crucial in facilitating the inclusion of communities in forest management, as noted by (Permadi et al. 2022).

The implementation of the social forestry initiative can be traced, in part, to tenurial conflicts over forest land, such as disputes between *Perhutani*, a State Forestry Corporation (SFC), and the community in the Java Forest. In the Java Forest, conflicts between SFC and the forest communities over land ownership have been recurrent territorial disputes. Tenurial conflicts are prevalent in the SFC area, triggered by competition for forest resources due to limited community land access (Susilowati 1999; Endah Ambarwati et al. 2018). They examined changes in forest tenure rights driven by social forestry programs in SFC areas with a long history of relationships between SFC and local communities (Peluso 1993; Maryudi 2011; Maryudi et al. 2012; Rosyadi & Sobandi 2014; Setiahadhi et al. 2017). SFC, managing Java's forests since the colonial era, has adopted a timber management paradigm based on the popular notion of "science forestry" at the time (Peluso & Vandergeest 2001; Fisher et al. 2019). This notion emphasizes the endurance of timber production with tenure rights over land, trees, and labor (Peluso 1993). However, the dominance of labor has limited people's right to forest management to enhance their welfare.

Previous research indicated that providing tenure rights for forest communities remains elusive, especially in the SFC area. SFC initiated community engagement in forest management in early 2000 through the Community Forest Management (*Pengelolaan Hutan Bersama Masyarakat* or PHBM) program, despite the absence of a land rights guarantee. However, this initiative has observed other obstacles, including the community's restricted access to land under teak plantations (Maryudi 2012), leading to constrained development. PHBM has also faced several obstacles, particularly regarding the low return on timber incentives (Djamhuri 2012; Rosyadi & Sobandi 2014; Sahide et al. 2020).

In 2014, The Indonesian government committed to providing community groups with asset and access legalization through the agrarian reform program (TORA), targeting nine million hectares of land to provide asset legalization (Resosudarmo et al. 2019). The primary objective is distributing land to small or landless farmers and reorganizing land ownership (Kartodihardjo & Cahyono 2021; Nazir Salim et al.

2021; Soedomo 2021). Furthermore, the Social Forestry program aims to legalize access to 12.7 million hectares of forest land by 2024 (MoEF 2020). An essential facet of this initiative is the Social Forestry Utilization Permit operating in the SFC work area (*Ijin Pemanfaatan Hutan Perhutanan Sosial* or IPHPS). IPHPS intended to provide more secure tenure rights for 35 years and a more significant role for local groups (Ragandhi et al. 2021). Although the 35-year tenure does not ensure full ownership, it guarantees tenure rights similar to ownership rights (Sikor 2006). This tenure-right arrangement differed from the prosperity program in SFC areas, where tenure rights were not guaranteed (Arupa 2014; Bratamihardja et al. 2005).

IPHPS originated from Minister of Environment and Forestry (MoEF) Regulation No. 39 of 2017 concerning Social Forestry in the SFC working area. This rule differs from national laws that regulate social forestry programs outside of the SFC area, aiming to address tenure rights and conflicts within the protected and production forests. According to Article Four, the critical criteria for obtaining an IPHPS permit are a forest cover of less than 10% for five consecutive years and a socioeconomic problem requiring special treatment. In 2018, Forest Farmers Group/FFG (*Kelompok Tani Hutan* or KTH) Maju Mapan in the Tambakrejo Village received a Decree (SK) on the IPHPS program. This FFG managed the Tambakrejo Village Forest within the PHBM program from 2004 to 2016. The community's dissatisfaction with the previous program, particularly regarding the distribution of profits from logging activities, led to the application of new access regulations. Therefore, this research examined the dynamics of changes in access and tenure security provided by the social forestry program at KTH Maju Mapan using the concept of property rights in the SFC work area (Schlager & Ostrom 1992). This concept analyzes rights at the level of collective decision-making, including management, exclusion, and alienation, and operational rights, such as access and use rights. Social forestry, positioned to ensure access to forest management, garners attention for its capacity to provide complex long-term tenure protections, particularly in SFC areas where the community previously had not received these benefits.

Methods

Research Site

This research took place in the KTH Maju Mapan in Tambakrejo Village, Sumbermanjing Wetan District, Malang Regency, East Java, from March 2022 to June 2022. In 2017, KTH Maju Mapan applied to the MoEF for a forest area management permit under the IPHPS scheme. Subsequently, the MoEF approved the request in 2018 for a total area of 289 ha, of which 259 ha were production forest and 30 ha were protected forest areas. These forest areas fell within the working area of SFC at RPH Sumberagung of BKPH Sumbermanjing in KPH Malang.

Data Collection

Data collection employed various methods, including observation and in-depth interviews with key informants. Informants were selected based on the relevancy of information collected from previous informants using the snowball sampling technique. Furthermore, the interviews involved a total of seven informants, including the SFC Administrator of KPH Malang, the Head of the Social Forestry Sub-Section (KSS), the Head of KTH Maju Mapan, the Secretary of KTH Maju Mapan, and several Heads of the Social Forestry Business Group (*Kelompok Usaha Perhutanan Sosial* or KUPS) at KTH Maju Mapan.

Framework Analysis

This research used the conceptual framework proposed by Schlager & Ostrom (1992) on the modified Property Rights (Sikor et al. 2017) (Figure 1). The concept was related to the existing rights and ownership status (who holds the rights) in managing forest resources, both collectively and operationally. The collective rights comprised management, exclusion, and alienation, while operational rights comprised access and withdrawal rights. Furthermore, Sikor et al. (2017) divided ownership status into four categories: authorized user, claimant, proprietor, and owner. Rights at the operational level differed significantly from the level of collective decision, and they marked the distinction between exercising rights and defining future or long-term rights. The ability to design future rights at the operational level increased the power and ability of collective agency. The

framework to respond to this question included the access change mechanism, the permissions received, and the holder of these access rights.

The property rights theory was operationalized through in-depth interviews with informants. A list of questions was developed based on the property rights framework, including collector-choice and operational-level rights and benefits derived from natural resources questions (Figure 1).

Collector-choice right

1. How does the mechanism for changing access and rights occur? Who has the right to change their rights and access?
2. Who has the right to organize internal management rights and change forest resources (management)?
3. Rights determine who can enter the forest land (exclusion).
4. Who has the right to sell or transfer the management and exclusive rights (alienation)?

Operational level-right

1. At the operational level, who has the right to enter the forest land that has been designated (access)?
2. Who has the right to obtain products from forest resources (timber, non-timber, environmental services, tourism services, and others)?

Benefits derived from natural resource

1. Who obtains rights, and what benefits are derived directly from forest resources?
2. Who obtains rights, and what benefits are obtained indirectly from forest resources?

Results and Discussions

Dynamics of Forest Management in KTH Maju Mapan

The majority of land in Tambakrejo Village comprised protected forest and productive forest, spanning an area of 2,700 ha, of which 146 ha were residential. The southern Malang Forest was previously viable and was similar to other natural forests. Furthermore, the forest area of Tambakrejo Village experienced severe damage from significant forest plundering during the 1998 reformation. This condition led to frequent natural disasters, such as floods, landslides, and drought. People also experienced difficulty in obtaining water during the onset of the dry season due to the drying up of primary water sources. The community recognized the importance of preserving the forest, starting with an individual's motivation to conserve the forest by planting plants and cooperating with the community towards improving forest sustainability.




Figure 1. Modification of the Property Rights Regime from Schlager & Ostrom (1992) and Sikor et al. (2017)

From 2004 to 2016, the KTH Maju Mapan initially managed the forest areas in Tambakrejo Village under the PHBM program. However, the community believed that the performance of the PHBM initiative was below expectations and needed more accountability. An example was the execution of harvesting (tree cutting), which was conducted improperly at the time of PHBM. The logging activities occurred abruptly, the plot selection required clarification, and there was no consent from the community before logging. In addition, the profit-sharing policy and process could be more transparent. SFC also distributed the funds from the tree harvesting without specific explanations, confusing the community. Based on the findings above and the community's incompatibility with the implementation of PHBM, an application for IPHPS management was submitted in 2017. In 2018, KTH Maju Mapan gained legal recognition from the MoEF for the IPHPS program.

Alterations in Forest Resource Access

KTH Maju Mapan decided to withdraw from the PHBM program and moved forward with the IPHPS scheme, an initiative conceived by the government. The two schemes regarding the forest area's access and management were identical. However, profit sharing varied between these two methods, as shown in Table 1. IPHPS modified the composition of profit sharing, which was previously ambiguous and relatively low for the community. PHBM offered partner institutions a

20% profit share from the price of the harvested timber instead of the market price at the time of harvesting (Sahide et al. 2020). However, the 20% figure must be clarified since community members frequently needed help understanding reductions. Community partner institutions were not involved in the planning process, positioning SFC as the dominant actor (Rosyadi & Sobandi 2014). PHBM also demonstrated that there was an elite capture area consisting of only executive members from partners, leading to limited participation (Ota 2019).

IPHPS provided an enormous space for community participation, primarily attributed to the augmented land use rights and the associated benefits accruing to the community members within the group. Furthermore, the community obtained access in parts through staple crops, and in cases where the outcome was a product of community investment, the farmer and SFC received 70% and 30%, respectively. However, when the plant was a SFC asset, community members received approximately 30%. Based on Table 1 above, future community management rights plots were no longer directed toward timber but rather agroforestry, particularly the cultivation of seasonal crops, which was the main benefit for farmers. Observations showed that farmers engaged in corn, rice, coffee, and fruit cultivations.

The bundle of rights between PHBM and IPHPS showed significant differences, especially in the associated main actors, SFC and KTH (Table 2).

Table 1. Access obtained in the PHBM and IPHPS schemes

No.	Access	
	PHBM	IPHPS
1.	Entrance to the forest area	Entrance to the forest area
2.	Access to management area	Access to management area
	Utilization of forest products (timber and non-timber)	Utilization of forest products (timber and non-timber)
3.	Access to profit sharing:	Access to profit sharing:
	Forest Plants (20% for Farmers and 80% for SFC).	Food Crops (70% for Farmers 70% and 30% for SFC)
	Annual Crops (20% for SFC and 80% for Farmers)	Fishery (70% for Farmers 70% and 30% for SFC)
		Multipurpose Tress Species (80% for Farmers and 20% for SFC)
		Seasonal Crops and Livestock (90% for Farmers and 10% for SFC)
		Environmental Services (90% for Farmers and 10% for SFC)

Table 2. Bundle of rights between PHBM and IPHPS programs

No.	Bundle of Right	PHBM		IPHPS	
		SFC	KTH	SFC	KTH
1.	Access	+++	+	+	+++
2.	Withdrawal	+++	+	+	+++
3.	Management	+++	+	+	++
4.	Exclusion	+++	o	o	++
5.	Alienation	o	o	o	o

Note: +++ indicates the greater rights obtained. The value o indicates that the program has no rights.

Although the IPHPS program was a partnership with KTH, the collection of rights owned by the SFC was more significant, such as the aforementioned profit-sharing example. As the forest authority in Java, the SFC controlled access, withdrawal, management, and exclusion rights. The SFC also had the status of proprietor and claimant because it had the right to determine forest management and who participated in management activities. KTH gained access mainly to crops under teak stands and revenue sharing from teak logging. Meanwhile, KTH became the managing subject in the IPHPS program due to its larger profit share compared to SFC. KTH possessed the right to determine forest management that the government had already determined. As the representative of the state, the MoEF had the function of a regulator and had full rights over state-owned forests.

Tenure Rights Security within IPHPS Program

This section examined the protection of tenure rights in KTH Maju Mapan concerning the property rights concept. The KTH Maju Mapan comprised a chairman, secretary, treasurer, and 1,100 members. Furthermore, members formed 41 small groups, or KUPS, with a leader for each group. The KTH Maju Mapan occupied the authorized user, claimant, and proprietor positions, while the State/MoEF was the owner (Table 3).

The tenure security model in SF management presented by Santoso & Purwanto (2021) indicated that the prevailing tenure model in the research area was license-based with a duration of 35 years and adjustments for areas of concession lands or forests without the required licensing authority. The tenure model comprised access, withdrawal, management, and exclusion rights. The bundle of rights was available in the IPHPS program for KTH members, specifically access to the area and ability to conduct forest utilization activities based on the specified management approach, such as agroforestry,

silvopasture, and silvofishery systems. KTH received support in utilizing permit areas, coaching, business development, appropriate technology, financial access, and marketing. However, KTH was prohibited from converting, cutting down, or utilizing plants and buildings that were SFC property without approval from the organization.

In terms of management rights, when analyzed through the tenurial security model, IPHPS empowered permit holders to oversee operations based on the specific characteristics of the area and the existing potential. Although IPHPS holders did not have ownership rights over forest areas, they had the right to carry out management activities in the area according to Article 13, paragraph 2, in the MoEF Regulation No. 39 of 2017. The KTH needed more flexibility to manage the use of forest resources despite having management rights. For example, the KTH held the authority to determine how, when, where, and how the structure of forest resources could be changed, but the government still formally regulated the pattern and percentage of plant species. This result was in line with (Moeliono et al. 2017), where the ongoing IPHPS showed that the government carried out regulatory activities through formal definitions and regulations.

In IPHPS, transfer rights, such as the ability to buy and sell land or to lease, were prohibited by law, but cultivated land could be inherited with the permission of community groups. Meanwhile, the right of exclusion, which referred to the ability to determine who had access and how it was transferred, had also been regulated by MoEF. Individuals should participate in community groups or cooperatives to obtain land access rights. According to Article 11, paragraph three, these groups comprised cultivators who did not possess land or farmers who owned less than or equivalent to 0.5 hectares of land. Regarding tenure security, the IPHPS program provided a reasonably strong tenure security system. The IPHPS program in

Table 3. Bundle of rights for the IPHPS program at KTH Maju Mapan

No.	Bundle of Right	Ownership status			
		Owner	Proprietor	Claimant	Authorized User
1.	Access	MoEF	KTH	KTH	KTH
2.	Withdrawal	MoEF	KTH	KTH	KTH
3.	Management	MoEF	KTH	KTH	KTH
4.	Exclusion	MoEF	KTH		
5.	Alienation	MoEF			

Table 4. The concept of property rights according to KPH Malang

No.	Bundle of Right	Ownership status			
		Owner	Proprietor	Claimant	Authorized User
1.	Access	MoEF	SFC	SFC	KTH
2.	Withdrawal	MoEF	SFC	SFC	KTH
3.	Management	MoEF	SFC	SFC	
4.	Exclusion	MoEF	SFC		
5.	Alienation	MoEF			

the SFC area was included in the licensing-based tenure model when using the tenure model created by (Santoso & Purwanto 2021). However, the question remained of the permit for the IPHPS program designed outside concession land or forest land without a licensing authority. The completeness of the tenure model included access, withdrawal, management, and exclusion rights, indicating that the licensing tenure model was relatively strong in terms of tenure security when it was associated with Schlager and Ostrom's bundle of rights.

The IPHPS program was a rights and resource initiative with a forest tenure model designated for communities. The state formally recognized access, withdrawal, management, and exclusion rights as evidenced by licenses with time-bound management requirements (Kusters et al. 2022). Moreover, continuing IPHPS was restricted to access, use, and utilization rather than ownership or control (Moeliono et al. 2017). According to (Erbaugh 2019), the forest tenure model with the IPHPS program in Indonesia did not provide free entry and exit, and there were no formal mechanisms to contest governmental decisions.

Bundle of Rights based on SFCs Perspective

Although the IPHPS scheme resulted from state policy, implementing these policies generated considerable debate. As the party that accepted the policy became the most opposing actor, SFC assumed the position of the most adversarial actor IPHPS was viewed as a component of the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) agrarian reform and social forestry agenda (Maryudi et al. 2022). However, some parties questioned whether IPHPS was a step reverse in Java's agrarian reform efforts (Rahayu et al. 2022). Some critics of IPHPS believed that this initiative could lead to horizontal conflict with SFC's existing partners, particularly Forest Village Community Institutions (*Lembaga Masyarakat Desa Hutan* or LMDH), as well as the practice of buying and

selling arable land and overlapping management responsibilities between SFC and IPHPS permit holders.

The KPH Malang of SFC had different perspectives on collecting rights and rights holders in the research locations. Based on the interview with KPH Malang, the State/ MoEF should be the owner, while SFC, KPH Malang, and KTH Maju Mapan should be the *proprietor, claimant, and authorized user*, respectively (Table 4). They also believed that the decree (SK) governed only a collection of rights rather than ownership status.

The KTH Maju Mapan managed the IPHPS area within the protected and production forests, a state property regime. This land status constrained the community's right to benefit from the existing forest stands. According to Table 4, the community was authorized users and restricted to enter and collect forest products. In addition, SFC claimed that the land managed by the community contained valuable assets in the form of forest plantations. However, the community assumed that the Decree (SK) of the IPHPS program also legitimated their ownership of the existing forest stands. These contrasting perspectives needed immediate resolution to clarify the tenure security boundaries provided to the community.

Direct and Indirect Benefits

Members of KTH Maju Mapan, as authorized users, had use rights over direct benefits derived from forest areas, as stipulated by the IPHPS decree. These individuals were also permitted to grow timber and non-timber crops simultaneously as part of agroforestry through the Social Forestry Business Group (KUPS), as shown in Table 5. The MoEF, the forest owner, regulated direct benefits regarding forest sustainability. For instance, the land cover in production forest should be at least 50% of forest tree species and a maximum of 20% of annual crops.

Meanwhile, the land cover in the protected forest could be up to 80% of Multi-Purpose Tree Species (MPTS) to stimulate non-timber product utilization. In addition, the KTH Maju Mapan promoted paragliding ecotourism activity.

The KTH Maju Mapan members benefitted from banana, coconut, soursop, jackfruit, avocado, durian, petai, clove, coffee, corn, rice, cassava, and environmental services. However, they gained no benefit from the timber products, such as sengon, as the stands were still immature. In addition, some KTH Maju Mapan members still needed to collect management data to comply with the IPHPS permit requirements, and they continued to manage land without IPHPS permits. The communities benefitted indirectly from environmental protection in the research areas as the agroforestry system required polyculture species,

combining crops and trees to prevent soil erosion. The accumulation of carbon sequestration could contribute to emission reduction and potentially enter the carbon market (Sikor et al. 2017).

Constraints of the IPHPS Program implementation

Some problems emerged during the implementation of the IPHPS program by KTH Maju Mapan, particularly related to SFC's existing assets in the IPHPS permit areas. The problem stemmed from different perspectives between KTH Maju Mapan members and the SFC. The community assumed the IPHPS decree (SK) sealed their position as legal owners of SFC's assets. In addition, communities believed that they had acquired property rights even though it was a 35-year legal right of access. This

Table 5. Direct benefit

No.	The name KUPS	Business Category	Commodity
1	KUPS block-1	agroforestry development	sengon, corn
2	KUPS block-2	agroforestry development	sengon, corn
3	KUPS block-3	agroforestry development	sengon, upland rice
4	KUPS block-4	agroforestry development	sengon, cassava
5	KUPS block-5	agroforestry development	sengon clove, coffee
6	KUPS block-6	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
7	KUPS block-7	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
8	KUPS block-8	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
9	KUPS block-9	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
10	KUPS block-10	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
11	KUPS block-11	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
12	KUPS block-12	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
13	KUPS block-13	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
14	KUPS block-14	agroforestry development	sengon, coffee
15	KUPS block-15	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
16	KUPS block-16	agroforestry development	sengon, coffee
17	KUPS block-17	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
18	KUPS block-18	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
19	KUPS block-19	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
20	KUPS block-20	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
21	KUPS block-21	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
22	KUPS block-22	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
23	KUPS block-23	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
24	KUPS block-24	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
25	KUPS block-25	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
26	KUPS block-26	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
27	KUPS block-27	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
28	KUPS block-28	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
29	KUPS block-29	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
30	KUPS block-30	multipurpose tress species	durian, petai, avocado
31	KUPS block-31	tourist development	environmental services
32	KUPS block-32	multipurpose tress species	durian, petai, avocado
33	KUPS block-33	multipurpose tress species	durian, petai, avocado
34	KUPS block-34	multipurpose tress species	durian, petai, avocado
35	KUPS block-35	multipurpose tress species	durian, petai, avocado
36	KUPS block-36	agroforestry development	sengon, cengkeh, coffee
37	KUPS block-37	multipurpose tress species	elephant grass
38	KUPS block-38	agroforestry development	sengon, clove, coffee
39	KUPS block-39	multipurpose tress species	durian, clove, coffee
40	KUPS block-40	multipurpose tress species	durian, clove, coffee
41	KUPS block-41	Tourist development	environmental service

situation occurred because the community still needed more IPHPS-related information and understanding. This situation often caused tension in various IPHPS recipient locations (Ota 2019). IPHPS had additionally rendered community organizations, which were previously heavily reliant on the SFC, increasingly dependent on external partners (local NGOs) (Agung et al. 2020). Even though the agreement between farmers and IPHPS had yet to be finalized, the MoEF had issued a new regulation entitled Forest Areas with Special Management (*Kawasan hutan dengan Pengelolaan Khusus* or KHDPK). In addition, numerous obstacles to implementing the IPHPS program still needed to be clarified, including the procedure for sharing net gains, the removal and payment of land tax, the land tax penalty, the boundary of the permits in the fields, and capacity building on land management of the farmer group members. Some members of the farming groups continued to cultivate crops, such as sugarcane, violating regulations.

The fact that the obligations for the IPHPS permit holders had yet to be implemented had become an impediment to the implementation of the IPHPS program. Numerous NGO community groups conducted socialization regarding violations of the applicable IPHPS regulations. For instance, many individuals assumed that the land was certified, leading to the possession of private ownership rights. These individuals were granted 35-year land use rights in the community's decree, which had to adhere to forestry regulations. The community believed they could control the land for 35 years using the IPHPS license. Despite their complete control over the land, they disregarded forestry regulations. Furthermore, the community misunderstood that the timbers should be preserved instead of taken down. The incorrect perspective occurred when the objective was to increase food production. An increase in food production could facilitate community prosperity, ultimately leading to the negligence of the environment.

Land tax differed from revenue sharing. Land tax was non-tax income (BPJ), the allocation of land management results. The land tax for the IPHPS permit areas was approximately IDR. 13,000.00 to 15,000.00 per square meter annually. In 2019, The KTH

Maju Mapan had a tax burden of IDR. 75,404,000.00 with a fine of IDR. 3,016,160.00. In 2020, it had a tax burden of IDR. 79,389,640.00 with a fine of IDR. 9,526,757.00. The fine increased in 2021, amounting to IDR. 15,888,700.00. KPH Malang of the SFC had collected taxes and fines on KTH Maju Mapan three times within three years. However, KTH Maju Mapan still needed to pay as they considered collecting taxes inappropriate for insufficient benefits from managing forest areas to warrant taxation. As an illustration, the land management benefits from all KTH Maju Mapan members for a single year were inadequate to meet the tax obligations for the initial year.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there have been significant changes in access since the establishment of PHBM and the Social Forestry program in the SFC working areas through the IPHPS scheme. The concept of property rights showed that IPHPS ensured ownership despite the degraded forest conditions of the allocated land. Furthermore, community groups had access to essential resources, such as timber and non-timber. KTH was considered the owner of the entire bundle of rights, except for the right of alienation, as it was not allowed to sell or lease. Although the tenure model in this program was a 35-year permit, it was relatively strong in terms of tenure security when linked to the concept of property rights. The IPHPS permit holders should comply with the bureaucracy and regulations made by the government in managing forests within the context of community-based forest management. However, there still needed to be more flexibility in managing their forest resources. The previous SFC forest management authority became an institution with ownership status, and the state retained considerable authority over forest management (Ribot 2002; Larson & Ribot 2004; Gilmour 2012). This research also suggested that SFC and KTH Maju Mapan had distinct perspectives on their rights. The KPH Malang of SFC assumed the position of both proprietors and claimants, while KTH Maju Mapan was the authorized user. They believed that IPHPS permits only control sets of rights and not ownership status. Therefore, SFC still owned the forest stands on the IPHPS permit areas managed by

KTH Maju Mapan. This research suggested that the IPHPS implementation allowed for a substantial increase in community access and security of tenure. However, KTH management practices should still adhere to procedures and regulations set by the government. The bureaucratic culture was still evident, as seen by the Ministry of Forestry's unwillingness to give authority over timbers. At the same time, SFC, who had been managing it for a long time, believed it still had rights to the assets.

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