

# THE EFFECT OF TOURNAMENT HORIZON, FAULTLINE AND GROUP PERFORMANCE RELATIONSHIPS UNDER DECENTRALIZED SYSTEM

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## ABSTRACT

**Introduction/Main Objectives:** This research integrates the self-categorization and contagion theories to analyze faultlines due to a decentralization system. Besides, this research investigates the inducement of tournament incentives as a control mechanism to mitigate the harmful effects of a faultline on group performance. **Background Problems:** Fiscal decentralization has a crucial role as it stimulates economic growth, enhances the quality of decision-making and escalates performance. However, decentralization by one local government, which consists of various local government departments, may trigger a faultline. This research argues that patterned diversity convenes faultlines that split up a group into antagonistic sub-groups following the attributes affecting the aggregate group performance. **Novelty:** This research provides a new insight, in that decentralization appears to be a double-edged sword. It can elevate the quality of local decision-making, and trigger faultlines between local government departments at other times, affecting the local government's aggregate performance. **Research Methods:** This research uses a laboratory experimental method with a 2×3 between-subjects factorial design. The research design uses the dyad analysis level. **Finding/Results:** The results found that the induction of a tournament scheme with the use of a cumulative ordinal scale for determining group performance encourages the social cognitive activation of individuals, thus encouraging cognitive orientation to optimize compensation and minimize categorization and antagonism. **Conclusion:** A tournament incentive scheme can be induced as a management control mechanism and to encourage the sub-groups to be winners. This resolution is expected to mitigate antagonistic behavior due to faultlines and enhance the optimization of aggregate performance

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## INTRODUCTION

This research integrates the self-categorization and contagion theories to investigate faultlines and their impact on the performance of a government that applies a decentralized system. Furthermore, it examines the effect of inducing a group incentive scheme using a tournament system on the relationship between the faultline and performance, as a social-cognitive activation to minimize antagonistic behavior. Fiscal decentralization has a crucial role in stimulating economic growth, enhancing the quality of decision-making (Carnegie & West, 2005; Moisiu, 2014; Thatcher et al., 2003), and escalating performance (Fornatella & Rossietta., 2014). However, the decentralization system in one local government, consisting of various regional work units (local government departments) may trigger a faultline. Faultlines are, by definition, a hypothetical line that splits up a group into sub-groups under one or two specific attributes (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Meyer & Glenz, 2013; Tian et al., 2016). Besides, several research findings on the private sector indicate that strong faultlines can result in a disparity between the sub-groups and the primary group, inevitably generating the risk of colliding, conflict, poor communication, and no integration between the organizations (Ambos et al., 2016; Bezrukova et al., 2009; Choi & Sy, 2010; Gratton et al., 2011; Jehn & Bezrukova, 2010; Luring & Selmer, 2012; Mäkelä et al., 2012; Tian et al., 2016). Bahargam et al., (2019) argue that faultlines are typical problems confronted by an organization comprising of multiple domains. The risk of faultlines will be increasingly apparent with the application of a decentralized system. The system that allows a government to split up local government groups into local government sub-groups, producing antagonistic behavior, has not yet received much attention from researchers. The local govern-

ment, by giving incentives based on target achievement by a sub-group, can encourage other sub-groups that deliberately set relatively lower targets to increase their performance.

The inevitable faultlines urge the decentralization system to design preventive acts that motivate local government departments, and the local government, to emphasize the aligned objectives. Incentives constitute a control mechanism that an organization uses to improve cognition and performance (Fessler, 2003; Patra et al., 2019). Furthermore, Choi et al., (2016) and Luft (2016) conclude that one can use tournaments to solve incentives and stimulate productivity. According to the tournament incentive scheme, incentives are given based on rank order and the outcome, in the form of either monetary incentives or promotion (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). Hvide (2002) and Ilyana & Sholihin (2021) clarify that tournament incentives will stimulate competition to achieve the observable outcome and later win the compensation. Considering Turner's self-categorization theory (1985), the existence of similar information characteristics and demographic attributes such as level of education, gender, skills, and specific goals will encourage individuals to classify themselves and others. Individual self-perception from membership in social groups gives rise to solid group identities, and this identity becomes important when social groups have particular meanings. . In response to that situation, faultlines can be mitigated by a fiscal decentralization system that induces a tournament scheme using compensation based on the rank order and performance of the respective sub-groups. Hall (2013) explains the methods for faultline management, one of which is the application of reward and incentive structures. Incentives are a management control tool used to influence the behavior of work teams (Towry, 2003). Towry (2003) suggests that based on the

agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), individual incentives will spur individuals to provide more effort for their group when their self-interest is fulfilled. On the other hand, group incentives will motivate group members to be cooperative when group members or sub-groups feel that their goals can be achieved by working together. Tian et al. (2016) and Naranjo-Gill et al. (2012) suggest that group incentives are more capable of encouraging individual efforts to work together and increase the effectiveness of the group's performance than individual incentives are. This is in line with the social interdependence theory (Deutsch, 1949; Johnson & Johnson, 2005; Ghobadi et al., 2017; Haesebrouck et al., 2018), which states how groups have to be interdependent to achieve common goals. Choi et al. (2016) show that repeated tournaments generate the most effort when task complexity is low and high. Thus, through the existence of tournaments it is possible to minimize antagonistic behavior due to a faultline and enhance the aggregate performance of public sector organizations. Therefore, without any additional assumptions rendered by the self-categorization theory and social behavior's activation, this research aims to examine the effectiveness of inducing tournament incentives to mitigate the impacts of faultlines on aggregate performance.

This research uses an experimental method with a 2×3 between-subjects factorial design. This research argues that patterned diversity convenes the faultlines that split up a group into antagonistic sub-groups following the attributes affecting aggregate group performance. Faultlines manipulate two levels, i.e., high and low, whereas tournament incentives manipulate three levels, i.e., grand, repeated, and hybrid. The research findings prove that strong faultlines are inclined to trigger antagonistic behavior more significantly than weaker faultlines do, yielding

more intense performance degeneration. The results also reveal that hybrid tournament incentives improve performance using a group structural system more effectively than the grand and repeated ones do. Besides, inducing tournament incentives can encourage individuals' social-cognitive behavior and mitigate contagion due to the faultlines' impact on performance. Thus, this research contributes a new insight into a mechanism that integrates self-categorization and contagion, and triggers faultlines due to applying the decentralization system in the government context. The decentralization appears to be a double-edged sword. It can elevate the quality of local decision-making, but also trigger faultlines between the local government departments at other times, affecting the local government's aggregate performance.

Furthermore, this research completes other research into sub-groups. Practically, the research findings can be regarded as references to determine the incentive prevailing as an optimal control mechanism that elevates local government's performance. Besides, this research constitutes a reference to design preliminary detection methods and resolutions regarding faultlines, due to the decentralization system. This research is further discussed in the following order. Section 2 deals with the literature review and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents complete research methods from the participants' selection to hypotheses testing. Then, Section 4 has the statistical results and discussion. Lastly, Section 5 has the conclusions, including limitations and implications.

## LITERATURE REVIEW

### Self-Categorization Theory

Turner's self-categorization theory (1985) highlights the assumption regarding individuals' inclination to self-classify and also classify others who may belong to the same category or

group, based on shared attributes. Yang et al. (2020) confirm that faultlines strongly pertain to contagion, which also triggers categorization. In terms of self-categorization, Hogg & Reid (2006) also convey that the relationship between self-concept and group behavior will provide a detailed explanation of a social-cognitive process that will bring about a social identity effect. The self-categorization theory divides group attributes based on the informational characteristics of the details linked to individuals' work, including their jobs, skills, and work experience (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Lapierre & Allen, 2006). A group built upon shared attributes will form a solid social identity due to the categorization process (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1985). The identity should be shown off to corroborate a group's self-esteem (Hogg & Terry, 2000; Turner, 1975) and, in turn, this will influence the group's members to prioritize their group using all available means. The social identity formed due to the categorization process (Tajfel, 1972; Turner, 1985; Hogg & Terry, 2000) forms group values that become inherent in the group's identity, which then wants to strengthen the group's interests and self-esteem. In the context of public sector organizations, the similarity of their attributes leads to the similarity of all the members in a local government department. The accumulation of each local government department reflects the aggregate performance of the local government.

### **Social Interdependence Theory**

One of the management control mechanisms in organizations is the determination of incentive schemes (Kusufi et al., 2020). Bonner & Sprinkle (2002) suggest that the right incentive system's design will motivate individuals to give their best for the organization. Individuals will maximize their efforts when their well-being is fulfilled (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Baiman,

1982; Eisenhardt, 1989; Adi & Sukmawati, 2020). Therefore, individuals tend to be reluctant to do extra work or make more voluntary efforts, which have nothing to do with increasing their personal well-being (Towry, 2003). Social interdependence occurs when the achievement of each group member's goals is influenced by other group members' actions (Deutsch, 1949; Johnson & Johnson, 2005). Perceptions of goal attainment will influence the social interactions among group members and affect competitive and cooperative social group situations (Deutsch, 1949; Tian et al., 2016; Islami & Nahartyo, 2019). In a cooperative group situation, the goals of individuals are interrelated so that there is a positive relationship between achieving the goals. Individuals can achieve their goals if and only if others can achieve them. Therefore, the relationship between individuals' performance achievements can trigger the achievement of organizational performance in the aggregate.

### **Tournament Incentive Scheme**

The tournament scheme is an incentive scheme that sequences agent performance in an ordinal manner, and the agent at the top will win the competition (Choi et al., 2016). Hannan et al. (2008) explain that the tournament incentive scheme is set on an ordinal scale based on the outcomes, which are compensated based on the final ranking (Hannan et al., 2008). Tong & Leung (2002) explain that dynamic tournaments are more effective for generating business than static tournaments. Tong & Leung (2002) characterize dynamic tournaments by the number of rounds in the competition, that there is performance feedback, and contestants can change the amount of effort they make during the tournament. In tournaments with multiple periods, these periods can be arranged like a tournament horizon.

A tournament incentive is a system that assesses individuals' performances based on performance outcomes and compensation provision by rank order (Hannan et al., 2008). There are three types of tournaments: grand, repeated, and hybrid (Choi et al., 2016). In the grand tournament, performance and rank order are not sustained to the following tournament period (Choi et al., 2016; Hannan et al., 2008; Tong & Leung, 2002). In the repeated tournament, performance and rank order elicited from the previous period are sustained and taken into account in the current period of the tournament (Choi et al., 2016; Hannan et al., 2008; Tong & Leung, 2002). Meanwhile, in a hybrid tournament, the performance in each period is rewarded, along with the best cumulative performance over all the tournament's periods (Choi et al., 2016). The main difference between the hybrid tournament and the other two is that a more significant proportion of the total money is awarded later in the hybrid tournament. More money allocated in later stages provides more motivation for top players than in repeat tournaments. In particular, after a high performance in the previous stage, top performers increase their subjective probability of increasing their expected future rewards; this motivates even better performance (Choi et al., 2016).

### **Concept of decentralization in local government**

Decentralization is a part of the political, fiscal, and decision-making policy evaluations that are central to local governments (Moisiu, 2014). The three dimensions of decentralization are political, fiscal, and administrative decentralization. Moisiu (2014) argues that of the three dimensions, fiscal decentralization is the most pivotal as a financing transfer must accompany an authoritative transfer. According to Fornatella & Rossieta (2014), fiscal decentralization draws a

clear line between tasks and authorities, in terms of finance. The effectiveness and efficiency of fiscal decentralization are built upon the local government (Alawattage et al., 2007; Kurniawan et al., 2021). As a part of the governance, each local government component is regarded as a unit (sub-group) of the local government, comprising multiple local government departments. The units can trigger faultlines. Faultlines emerge from individuals' self-categorization within an organization that makes them self-classify and classify others into a certain sub-group, because having the same attributes and goals can create convenience for individuals to become part of the sub-group. (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Meyer & Glenz, 2013; Tian et al., 2016).

Fiscal decentralization, with absolute financial authority given to the local government consisting of multiple local government departments, brings about antagonistic classifications between local government departments, as the sub-groups of the local government (major group), in terms of planning and achieving a target. That situation inevitably results in susceptibility and faultlines, which must not be overlooked. Tian et al. (2016) clarify that faultlines can strengthen dissimilarities in the characteristics between sub-groups and the primary group, potentially generating conflicts and degenerating performance (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Tian et al., 2016). Homan et al. (2007) conclude that differences in the perspectives, and diversity in the information that integrates with other multiplicities, may impact harmony or disharmony in the same portion.

Policies granting rights to regions to independently manage and control their resources only sometimes run without problems; there are several negative behaviors caused by decentralization policies, including the risk of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Son, 2022). The

government must prevent the negative impacts of fiscal decentralization by providing incentives to the regions that manage the decentralization system properly. This condition gives rise to inter-regional competition. In their research, Kong et al (2022) show that decentralization will increase competition. Muizzuddin et al (2021) explain that competition can have an impact on organizational stability; therefore the existence of a tournament scheme is expected to encourage the desire to compete and get incentives so that they have an impact on improving performance.

### **1. Hypotheses Development**

Faultlines trigger a relational relationship and contagion behavior in sub-groups (Lau & Murnighan, 1998; Yang et al., 2020). Individuals tend to integrate themselves into groups of people that are similar to them, due to their specific attributes (Turner, 1985). Several studies confirm that faultlines in sub-groups may degenerate group performance (Bezrukova et al., 2009; Mutmainah, 2020; Thatcher et al., 2003). Patterned diversity, based on different social and information categories, appears to produce conflicts in the connectedness and tasks between sub-groups. As a sub-group comprising individuals with specific informational characteristics that are different from other local government departments, these departments encourage their members to only focus on the sub-group's orientation. That condition may cause faultlines that can split up a group into sub-groups due to a specific antagonistic attribute and may have aggregate impacts on the performance standards of the primary group. Sub-groups, which may set a low work plan to achieve the target more quickly, can reduce the aggregate performance of the local government. The first hypothesis proposed by this research is:

H1: In a group that applies a structurally decentralized system, its group performance will

be lower in a high faultline condition than in a low faultline condition.

Tournament incentives allow for a competitive system that is expected to elevate performance (Casas-Arce & Martínez-Jerez, 2009; Choi et al., 2016; Luft, 2016). Deutsch (1949) assumes the social interdependence that group members have becomes the driver of competitive social situations because of social interactions. Individuals belonging to a sub-group with the same category will create a solid social identity, enhancing the interaction to show off the sub-group's pre-eminence (Mäkelä et al., 2012; Tian et al., 2016). Referring to the social interdependence theory, the structural tournament scheme's design for sub-groups (local government departments) will encourage more optimal performance to achieve the target of a sub-group, which in aggregate can impact the performance of the major group. Choi et al. (2016) convey that the hybrid tournament can escalate performance to a greater degree than the other two tournaments can, due to its compensation procurement based on the previous and current periods (Choi et al., 2016). In that way, the sub-group structurally competing with the other sub-groups within a single major group can trigger aggregate work motivations. Local government departments, as a sub-group, attempt to optimize the compensation, and earn higher compensation than those earned by other local government departments. Furthermore, a different motivation of achievement exists between local government departments, due to differences in the amount of compensation set by the respective tournaments, which impacts the energy that continues to decline in the hybrid, repeated and grand tournaments. The second hypothesis proposed by this research is:

H2: In a group that applies a structurally decentralized system, its group performance will be higher with hybrid tournament

incentives than with repeated or grand tournament incentives.

Faultlines in a sub-group will have two contradictory impacts on the interaction between a sub-group and the primary group (Lau & Murnighan, 1998). First, individuals who share the same category will form a strong social identity and intensify their interaction to show off their competitive pre-eminence (Mäkelä et al., 2012; Tian et al., 2016). Second, fiscal decentralization will establish the primary group, the local government comprising multiple sub-groups or local government departments. Local government departments will interact with other local government departments and the local government's primary group. Attempts made to show off the competitive group's pre-eminence will affect the respective group members (Ambos et al., 2016; Luring & Selmer, 2012; Mäkelä et al., 2012). Tournament incentives designed for a competitive system can encourage the local government to give and optimize a higher compensation than that given and optimized by other local governments. This act may have a further impact on individuals' compensation and faultline mitigation. Furthermore, hybrid tournaments that offer higher compensation may induce more strongly than repeated and grand tournaments can. The

description of the research model is visualized in Figure 1. The third hypotheses proposed by this research are:

H3: A tournament incentive scheme moderates the impact of a faultline on the performance of a group that applies a structural decentralization system.


H3a: In a group that applies a structural decentralization system, using the hybrid tournament scheme, sub-groups with low faultlines will show better performances than those with high faultlines.

## METHOD, DATA, AND ANALYSIS

### 1. Experimental Design

This research applied the experimental laboratory method with a 2×3 between-subjects factorial design. The research design used the dyad analysis level. This research required participants to be under a structural working system in which local government departments were regarded as a sub-group of the major group, the local government. Bezrukova et al. (2009) and Zhang et al. (2017) tested the faultline using the archival method. However, their tests only caught the presence of a general faultline. Meanwhile, Tian et al. (2016)

**Figure 1.** Research Model



explained that differences in the faultline's effect could have a different effect on the gap between the groups. Thus, to complement the previous research this research explicitly considered manipulating the faultline's effect into two levels, i.e., high and low. Meanwhile, tournament incentives were manipulated into three levels, i.e., hybrid, repeated, and grand. The experiment took 45 minutes to finish. Finally, this research used multiple periods to adjust the predicted number of periods within one fiscal year and to generate an internalization of the tournament. Table 1 represents the condition of the respective groups.

## 2. Participants

The research participants were students who concentrated on public sector accounting and had already passed the course of Public Sector Accounting 1 and 2, Public Sector Financial Accounting, and Public Sector Management Accounting. By the two criteria, the students were expected to have been equipped to understand the work situation and the systems of financial implementation and control applied in the working world. Furthermore, we had several plausible reasons for selecting accounting students from public sector courses as substitutes for the practitioners. Firstly, according to Chen

**Table 1.** Experimental Design

		Tournament		
		Repeated	Hybrid	Grand
Faultline	Low	Group 1 (20 participants; 10 dyads)	Group 2 (20 participants; 10 dyads)	Group 3 (22 participants; 11 dyads)
	High	Group 4 (20 participants; 10 dyads)	Group 5 (20 participants; 10 dyads)	Group 6 (20 participants; 10 dyads)

\*Source: Processed data, 2021

**Table 2.** Participants' Demographics

Note	Item	Total
Participant data	Initial data	156
	Did not pass manipulation check & incomplete response	17
	Passed manipulation check	139
	The data passed the manipulation check that was issued because the data pairs did not pass the manipulation check	17
	Total data for processing	122
Participants' Demographics		
Gender	Male	23
	Female	99
Age	19 y.o	16
	20 y.o	74
	21 y.o	30
	22 y.o	2
GPA	0.00-2.50	3
	2.51-3.25	64
	3.26-3.75	41
	3.76-4.00	14

\*Source: Processed data, 2021



et al. (2015), selecting students as substitutes for the practitioners is reliable in social science studies. Besides, Sumiyana & Sriwidharmanely (2020) argue that students with advanced accounting knowledge can act as substitutes for the practitioners. Secondly, Trapp & Trapp (2019) clarify that students are less likely to have an insight into the performance evaluation system, which is commonly used in the working world.

Marvel (2015) explains that using scholars as experimental research subjects can produce reasonable estimates for conducting a public sector performance analysis. Moreover, scholars have replicated key experimental findings from political science and social psychology, suggesting that these samples make valid estimates (Berinsky et al., 2012). Consequently, they are inclined to propose opinions that are detached from social desirability biases. Thirdly, it avoids the possibility of bias in the research findings due to inadequate manipulation, as the effect of the practitioners' uncontrollable experiences. Accordingly, we have a great deal of confidence in our use of students as substitutes for the practitioners. Finally, the total number of participants engaged in this research was 156, but 17 could not answer the manipulation check correctly. The total number of participants was thus 139. Finally, as the analysis level used was a paired analysis, the data of the failed pair could not be used, although the data met the criteria for manipulation. That meant the total data that would be used for hypotheses testing were 122.

### 3. Measurement and Operational Definition

This research had three variables. Faultlines were the independent variable, tournament incentives were the moderating variable, and performance was the dependent variable. As the independent variable, Faultlines constituted a condition when the same demographic and other

informational attributes brought about the formation of sub-groups within a group. In this research, faultlines were manipulated into two treatments, i.e., high and low. In the high faultline condition, all the sub-group's members were responsible for the answer's correctness. Thus, when a sub-group and its members made five mistakes in the Type-1 assignment and more than five in the Type-2 assignment, the sub-group and its members were sanctioned by losing 40% of the total compensation they were due to receive. Similarly, in the low faultline condition, the aggregate sub-group members were responsible for the answer's correctness. In this condition, when a sub-group and its members made five mistakes in the Type-1 assignment, and more than five in the Type-2 assignment, the sub-group and its members were sanctioned by losing 10% of the compensation they were due to receive.

The moderating variable of this research was tournament incentives. Tournament incentives allowed a sub-group to compete with the other sub-groups and become the winner, and the members would thus be eligible for a prize or ancillary compensation. In this research, the tournament incentives were manipulated into three treatments, i.e., the grand, repeated, and hybrid. In the grand tournament, a sub-group's performance was assessed based on its cumulative performance from all the assignment periods. In the repeated tournament scheme, a sub-group's performance was evaluated based on its best performance in every consecutive period. Moreover, sub-group performance assessments were based on the best performance in every consecutive period and the cumulative performance from some periods in the hybrid tournament scheme.

As the dependent variable of this research, performance was the outcome of finished work, i.e., the tasks and responsibilities of a sub-group

in a certain period. In this research, a sub-group's performance assessment was based on the total number of correct points collected by the sub-group during the experiments. Meanwhile, the performance measurement was based on the design of the assignment given. Performance was measured using an interval scale, which is a scale that uses numbers to award points to a range of levels, starting from a low level and going to a high level (Sekaran & Bougie, 2016). Performance was assessed based on the number of points collected from the correct answers given by the respective sub-groups.

#### **4. Manipulation and Experimental Procedures**

The experiment's design followed the research objectives with a structural system in which individuals were regarded as sub-groups or local government department members under the primary group, which was the local government. Participants were randomly placed in a manipulation condition. The design of the assignment in this research referred to Haesebrouck et al. (2015) and Tian et al. (2016) with some modifications. The modifications were made to stylize the design with the research context and to conceptualize the public sector so that the students could quickly internalize them. The assignments in this research were in the form of crosswords and simple questions regarding the public sector.

The experiments were designed to be conducted in pairs. The participants were randomly paired and could not independently select their partners, minimizing faultline biases. The participants were assigned to act as either the superior or the subordinate in a local government department. They were informed that they had to play either the superior or the subordinate of the local government department.

The governance system was structural, by placing the local government department as a sub-group and the local government as the major group. The experiments were conducted over several periods of time with seven assignments, which comprised of three crossword assignments as the learning effect and four assignments regarding accounting in the public sector. The local government department was informed that the work achievement of the sub-group would be assessed and compared to that of the other sub-groups to earn the ancillary compensation.

The instrument's validity was identified in two stages, i.e., through Focus Group Discussion (FGDs) in which lecturers and consultants at the local government level were engaged, and through a pilot test with the same procedures as the experiment. The procedures comprised of eight steps. The procedures were filling the informed consent included in the respective instrument packages, explanation of the experiments assignment by experimenters, distributing instruments randomly to elevate the power of the research's outcome, doing assignments, manipulation check, fulfilling the demographic information, collecting data, and debriefing.

#### **5. Manipulation Check**

Checking was rendered on the respective manipulations to ensure the participants could internalize the manipulations they were given (Rohma, 2022). Three questions in the manipulation check used on the participants were whether the participants would be requested to confer the critical answers to other members of a sub-group, whether the participants would get a consequence if they provided the wrong answers, and what the compensation system was. Any wrong answer indicated the participants' inability to understand the manipulations made. Accordingly, partici-

pants failing the manipulation check had to be excluded from the testing.

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This research randomly placed the participants in their respective manipulations. The randomization aimed to minimize hypothetical biases that might have occurred due to the different demographic characteristics of the participants. Therefore, although randomization had been conducted in the instrument's division, we also performed Pearson's chi-squared test, as indicated in Table 3, to analyze the level of the randomization's success.

**Table 3.** Randomization of Participant Characteristics

Demographic characteristics	Person chi-square	Sig
Superior's Age	11.392	0.724
Superior's Gender	10.144	0.071
Superior's GPA	15.525	0.414
Subordinate's Age	12.649	0.629
Subordinate's Gender	4.874	0.435
Subordinate's GPA	17.357	0.067

\*Source: Processed data, 2021

The analysis of the randomization showed that, overall, the individuals' demographic characteristics have a p-value  $> 0.05$ . This proved the efficiency of the randomization and revealed no significant differences between the treatment groups. Also, it indicated that significant differences in performance were not due to the different demographic characteristics of the respective treatments given. By these means, we were confident about proceeding to the hypotheses testing. Furthermore, the manipulation check data also passed the randomization testing for the likeliness of biases in the research outcome, because the subjects' different characteristics had been minimized. The hypotheses testing of this research employed two-way ANOVA requiring residual normality and

homogeneity assumption test fulfillment. Therefore, Table 4 indicates the result of the assumption testing regarding homogeneity and residual normality before the hypotheses testing.

**Table 4.** Assumption

ANOVA's Assumption		Sig
Normality	Kolmogorov-Smirnov	0.445
Homogeneity	Levene's test	0.390

\*Source: Processed data, 2021

Table 4 indicates that the score of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was  $p > 0.445$ . This showed that the data's residuals were normally distributed, implying that the normality assumption had been fulfilled. Meanwhile, Levene's test produced  $p > 0.390$ , which indicated homogenous variants and no homogeneity issues. Overall, the analysis proved the fulfillment of the classical assumption testing, confirming that the data exerted had fulfilled all the best, linear, unbiased, and estimated standards to perform the hypotheses testing with confidence. The hypotheses were tested using two-way ANOVA. Before testing the hypotheses, a descriptive analysis was carried out to see the pattern of the data. The results of the descriptive analysis are presented in Table 5.

**Table 5.** Statistics Descriptive

Tournament	Faultline	Mean	Std. Deviation
Repeated	Low	46.30	10.382
	High	37.50	7.059
	Total	41.90	9.749
Hybrid	Low	53.20	10.250
	High	38.10	9.949
	Total	45.65	12.516
Grand	Low	38.00	5.692
	High	37.30	4.739
	Total	37.67	5.141
Total	Low	45.58	10.736
	High	37.63	7.299
	Total	41.67	9.971


Source: Processed data, 2021

**Table 6.** Hypothesis Testing

Variables	F	Sig	Mean Difference
<b>Dependent: Performance</b>			
Faultline	14.896	0.000	Low: 45.833 High: 37.633
Tournament incentive	4.774	0.012	Grand: 37.650 Repeated: 41.900 Hybrid: 45.650
Tournament* Faultline	3.886	0.026	
Faultline*Hybrid Tournament	16.583	0.000	Low: 53.200 High: 38.100
R Squared	0.366		
Adj. R Squared	0.309		

\*Source: Processed data, 2021

**Figure 1.** Interaction Plots



\*Source: Processed data, 2021

The results of the descriptive analysis showed that the group performance was greatest during the hybrid tournament condition, with a low faultline of 53.20. Meanwhile, the lowest group performance was in the grand tournament condition, with a high faultline of 37.30. Meanwhile, the results of the descriptive analysis for each manipulation showed that, on average, in tournament scheme conditions, the highest performance was in the hybrid tournament

condition, at 45.65 with a standard deviation of 12.516, followed by a repeated tournament scheme of 41.90 with a standard deviation of 9.749, and a grand tournament scheme of 37.67 with a standard deviation of 5.141. In addition, the results of the descriptive analysis also showed that, on average, under faultline conditions, performance tended to be greater under low faultline conditions of 45.58 with a

standard deviation of 10.736, than under a high faultline with a standard deviation of 7.299.

The results of the descriptive analysis showed that there were differences in the average data patterns that aligned with the hypotheses. However, further testing of the hypotheses was required to determine whether there was a significant difference in the average treatment. The results of the hypotheses testing are presented in Table 6 and visually presented in Figure 1. The results of hypotheses testing in Table 6 revealed that the faultlines impacted performance ( $F = 14.896, p > 0.000$ ). On average, performance was inclined to be higher in the sub-group with a low faultline condition, by 48.833, than in the sub-group with a high faultline condition, by 37.633, so H1 was supported. Furthermore, Table 4 shows that tournament incentives impacted performance ( $F = 4.774, p > 0.012$ ). On average, the highest sub-group performances were achieved using the hybrid tournament, by 45.560. Moreover, the sub-group performances using the repeated tournament were 41.900. This implied that H2 was also supported. Further analysis indicated the interaction between faultlines and tournaments on performance ( $F = 3.886, p > 0.026$ ), indicating that H3 was supported. Furthermore, testing exerting syntax ANOVA revealed that sub-group performance in low faultlines was inclined to increase to a greater extent than in the condition of high faultlines, after being induced in the hybrid tournament ( $F = 16.583, p > 0.000$ ). With the hybrid tournament, sub-group performance tended to be higher in low faultlines by 53.200 than they were in the condition of high faultlines by 38.100, proving that H3a was supported.

The analysis revealed that high faultlines triggered degradation in sub-group performance more significantly than low faultiness did. This analysis is aligned with Tajfel's social identity

assumption (1974) that the sense of belonging to a sub-group, established under specific attributes (e.g., responsibility or other attributes), triggers the sub-group's members to corroborate the social identity of their sub-group and reluctantly communicate and interact with other sub-groups, including in the condition of faultlines due to responsibility toward their work. The stronger the identity of the sub-group, the more reluctantly they communicate and interact with other sub-groups, since the members of the sub-group nurture a desire to reinforce their sub-group's identity and focus on their responsibilities instead of their own, and other sub-groups', aggregate responsibilities. This is in line with Tian et al. (2016) who stated that a sub-group convened due to a certain responsibility would allow its members to make more effort in the interest of the sub-group and it made them reluctant to contribute to the interests of other sub-groups. Faultlines split up a group into some antagonistic sub-groups under the same attributes, impacting aggregate group performances.

The analysis showed that the hybrid tournament incentive enhanced performance more significantly than the repeated or grand ones did. This research is aligned with that of Casas-Arce & Martínez-Jerez (2009), Choi et al. (2016), Faravelli et al. (2015), in that tournament incentives can escalate performance. The hybrid tournament increases performance more significantly than the repeated or grand ones do. Both hybrid and repeated tournaments have the "clean slate" feature, facilitating participants to achieve their peak performance regardless of their performance in the previous period (Choi et al., 2016). Meanwhile, in the hybrid tournament, the clean state feature has short-run and long-run achievements, intensifying the effort as cumulative work offers a larger price, motivating the business actors (Choi et al., 2016). This research showed that the grand tournament has

the lowest performance average. It can happen that in a grand tournament, zero or little progress in the early period will influence individuals' expectation of winning in the following period (Casas-Arce & Martínez-Jerez, 2009). However, winning in the first period will quickly make individuals feel complacent (Berger et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2016; Tong & Leung, 2002), impacting a degradation in their performance effort and motivation.

The analysis indicates that tournament incentives moderate the impact of faultlines on performance. This finding aligns with the assumption of the self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985) regarding individuals' tendencies to self-classify, and classify others, under a specific group under the exact same attributes. Individuals forming a sub-group that uses tournaments to earn the optimum compensation can trigger other sub-groups to optimize their performance, impacting the aggregate group performance. This finding is strengthened by Knippenberg et al. (2004) as they found that individuals who share the same attributes will establish a group and assume that attribute likeness has a positive impact on the group, leading to positive work outcomes. Inducing tournaments that emphasize ordinal incentive procurement based on the outcome leads to degradation with an antagonistic tendency, due to different attributes toward responsibility between sub-groups, thereby improving performance.

Further analysis may examine the effectiveness of hybrid tournaments in inducing the negative impact of faultlines on performance. However, the resolution is in line with Choi et al. (2016) that high performance from the previous period may encourage individuals to elevate their subjective probability to increase the future prizes that are expected to motivate their performance. Furthermore, the roles of the

hybrid tournament, which is divided using an ordinal scale with the best cumulative performance from all the tournament's periods, encourages individuals to focus on their sub-group's performance orientation and optimize their compensation, minimizing any antagonistic behavior between sub-groups.

## CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION

This research explains that individuals participating in an organization will inevitably experience a behavioral contagion that impacts their work behavior, thereby triggering faultlines. The phenomenon may lead to a negative impact and thus require a preventive control system. This research investigates the vague aspect of the decentralization system, which can trigger faultlines in local governments, and the enforceable mitigation attempts. Besides, this research points out that decentralization can result in faultlines that split a group up into sub-groups, which later triggers antagonistic behavior between the sub-groups and impacts the local government's aggregate performance. A tournament incentive scheme can be induced as a management control mechanism to encourage the sub-groups to be winners. This resolution is expected to mitigate antagonistic behavior due to faultlines and enhance the optimization of aggregate performance.

This study has several implications. Theoretically, this study provides knowledge about the impact of the relationship between faultlines and tournaments on performance. First, a low faultline has the potential to drive higher performance than a high faultline does. Different faultline effects have different effects on performance. Second, hybrid incentive schemes are more effective in driving performance than repeated and grand incentive schemes are. The existence of inducing incentive

schemes can minimize the negative impact of the faultline on performance.

Practically, the findings of this study are expected to provide knowledge to government organizations about how they can use tournament incentives to minimize the negative impact of faultlines to boost performance. In addition, organizational leaders can also be inspired to implement tournament schemes that can boost performance, so that local government departments can produce better performance.

Similar to other studies, this study also has several limitations which provide opportunities for further research. This research used a pair analysis level and hence does not consider some individual factors, such as the risk preference of the respective individuals. Meanwhile, risk preference is an individual's innate characteristic that may impact his/her behavior and the decisions he/she makes. Besides, this research studies faultlines but does not consider individuals' social aspects. Luft (2016) mentions that individuals will be inclined to compare their and their rivals' social factors and attempt to stand higher than, or equal with, the members of the same group or of the other groups when under a competitive condition. The role of social comparison can accordingly be studied further.

Furthermore, this research negates the measurement of the levels of self-esteem in individuals or sub-groups. Meanwhile, Hogg & Terry (2000) propose that the shared score within a group will become a preeminent or showed-off group score, to corroborate group self-esteem. It is aligned with the assumption of the self-categorization theory. Without any ancillary assumption, this research focuses on informational classifications only, without considering self-esteem that probably appears due to categorization. Therefore, future researchers may consider the possibility of dissimilarities in the levels of self-esteem

between groups that trigger faultlines, which impact performance. Also, future research should consider coping behavior that is potentially contagious, thereby bringing about categorization and other structural preventive control actions, such as position rotation and preventive action regarding an individual's cognitive aspects.

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