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Warih Aji Pamungkas
Yohanes Paulus Mahadma Khrisna

Aims and Scope:

      PCD Journal of South and Southeast Asia's Power, Conflict, and Democracy Studies is an international refereed journal initiated by the Power, Conflict, and Democracy (PCD) consortium, a collaborative work by the University of Colombo in Sri Lanka, Gadjah Mada University in Indonesia, and the University of Oslo in Norway. It is a journal that comprehensively examines the dynamics of power and democracy, including practices of human rights, popular representation, and public policy, particularly, in Indonesia but still giving a space for comparative studies. Invitation is extended to authors with interest in making comparison experiences in Indonesia with those of the rest of the globe. PCD Journal publishes articles, literature review, field notes, and book reviews in major sub fields of political science, human geography, and political anthropology.

      PCD Journal aims to address some of the most current issues of power, conflict, and democracy in Indonesia with comparative perspective. While the journal is open to all methodological approaches, all submissions are expected to be theoretically grounded. The journal can be of great value to teachers, students, researchers, experts, journalists, and social movement activist dealing with these issues and regions.

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PCD Programme

The state of democracy in the Global South is marked by a striking paradox: while liberal democracy has attained an ideologically hegemonic position through two so-called waves of democracy, the qualities of such democracies is increasingly called into question. The "old" democracies in the global South like Sri Lanka are weakened. Democracy deficits have emerged within constitutional and institutional arrangements as well as in political practices. Further, the "third wave of democracy" is over. "New" democracies like in Indonesia have fostered freedoms, privatisation and decentralisation but continue to suffer from poor governance, representation and participation. Hence there are general signs of decline. Vulnerable people are frustrated with lack of actual influence and sustained elitism. Politicians winning elections often need to foster ethnic and religious loyalties, clientelism and the abuse of public resources. Powerful groups and middle classes with poor ability to win elections tend to opt for privatisation and return partially to authoritarian governance.

Critical questions are therefore asked about the feasibility of democracy in developing country contexts. Some observers say it is only a problem of better crafting of institutions. Others contend that "full" democratisation was premature in the first place and that necessary preconditions need to be created beforehand. Both positions are based on a narrow and static understanding of democracy. While the core elements of democracy are universal, real world democracies develop (or decline) over time and through contextual dynamics; in processes and contexts of actors, institutions and relations of power. Therefore, the crucial task is to analyse the problems and options of expanding the historically "early" freedoms and deficient elements of democracy that fortunately exist in spite of poor socio- economic and political conditions in counties such as Sri Lanka and Indonesia rather than giving up on these freedoms until the other have somehow improved. This is to advance towards the universally accepted aim of democracy in terms of popular control of public affairs on the basis of political equality, and to be able to use democracy to handle conflicts and alter unequal and unsustainable development.

With this in mind, researchers at the University of Oslo (Norway), Gadjah Mada (Indonesia) and Colombo (Sri Lanka) have come together in a collective research—and post- graduate programme. The idea is to pool their research projects and results, and to promote doctoral as well as master studies by way of, first, a joint framework for analysing power, conflict and democracy and, second, a basic electronic peer reviewed journal and report series (published by *PCD-Press*) to the benefit of students, scholars and priorities in the region. Basic resources—in addition to the participants own voluntary work and projects— are provided by their respective universities and the Norwegian Centre for International Cooperation in Higher Education (SIU).

CONTENT

CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS EDITION

Mahbi Maulaya and Nanda Blestari Jasuma

Mahbi Maulaya is from Department of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta.

Nanda Blestari Jasuma is from Department of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta

Irit Talmor and Osnat Akirav

Irit Talmor is a senior lecturer and head of the Logistics Department at Sir Harry Solomon School of Management.

Osnat Akirav is a professor at and the head of the Department of Political Science at Western Galilee College

Muhammad Djindan, Anggalih Bayu Muh. Kamim, and Irwan Harjanto

Muhammad Djindan is a lecturer at Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Anggalih Bayu Muh. Kamim was a researcher at Research Center for Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Irwan Harjanto was a researcher at Research Center for Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Nur Azizah, Azifah Retno Astrina, and Nadlirotul Ulfa

Nur Azizah is a Ph.D Candidate at the Department of Politics and Social Changes, the Australian National University.

Azifah Retno Astrina is a Graduate Student at the Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Nadlirotul Ulfa is graduated from the Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Dias Prasongko and Wigke Capri

Dias Prasongko is a researcher with the Research Centre for Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Wigke Capri is a lecturer and researcher at the Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada

Arif Novianto, Kurnia C. Effendi, and Yuyun Purbokusumo

Arif Novianto is from Department of Public Policy and Management Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Kurnia C. Effendi is from Department of Public Policy and Management Universitas Gadjah Mada.

Yuyun Purbokusumo is from Department of Public Policy and Management Universitas Gadjah Mada.

COVID-19: Cosmopolitanism's Criticism and Proposals

Mahbi Maulaya[1] and Nanda Blestri Jasuma[2]

Abstract

Covid-19 merits a scientific examination from cosmopolitanism, a widely acknowledged, global-nuanced thought. During the pandemic, strong stances of nationalism and xenophobia have been taken, leaving little room for global cooperation in countering the virus, and recognition of human rights has ebbed. Since this reality is opposed to its ideational and normative essence, cosmopolitanism offers its criticisms and proposals. By diving into a cosmopolitan way of thinking, this study criticises the rise of 'health nationalism' in state policies as well as the xenophobia manifested through the blaming of people of Asian—particularly Chinese—heritage for the viral outbreak. Regarding its proposals, cosmopolitanism offers two suggestions: 1) international society must opt to endorse global integration through multilateralism, and 2.) countries should avoid exclusionary health programmes and commit to solidarity-based countermeasures. The underlying arguments of this study are backed by the application of library research and qualitative methods.

Keywords: *cosmopolitanism; covid-19; global integration; nationalism; xenophobia.*

Introduction

At the end of January 2020, the World Health Organisation (WHO) officially declared COVID-19 a global pandemic, a 'public health emergency of international concern' (Schumaker, 2020). As of 28 April 2020, more than 2.8 million cases of COVID-19—including 198,000 deaths—have been reported in 213 countries worldwide.

[1] Department of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. Email: maulayamahbi@gmail.com

[2] Department of International Relations, Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta. Email: nanda.blestri.fisip18@mail.umy.ac.id

Figure 1.
Geographical distribution of COVID-19 cases, worldwide

Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control
(https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/geographical-distribution-2019-ncov-cases)

The COVID-19 outbreak has spread more rapidly and infected more people than the previous two pandemics combined; only 8,000 cases of SARS were reported, with 774 deaths, while 2,519 cases of MERS were reported, with 866 deaths. Despite its prevalence, COVID-19 has a quite low fatality rate, estimated at only 2% (Wang et al. 2020). Importantly, this fatality rate remains an estimate. The percentage of asymptomatic and extremely mild cases is still being researched, as such patients tend not to seek a diagnosis. As such, the actual fatality rate may be much lower.

Table 1.
Fatality Rates and Infection Rates of COVID-19 and Other Epidemics

	Fatality rate (deaths/cases)	Infection rate (per infected person)
Ebola	50%	1.5–2.5
MERS	34.30%	0.42–0.92
SARS	10%	3
COVID-19	1%–3.4%	1.5–3.5
Seasonal flu	0.05%	1.3

Source: Asian Development Bank Report No. 128
(https://www.adb.org/publications/economic-impact-covid19developing-asia)

By the end of March 2020, more than 100 countries had implemented full or partial lockdown measures for the first time in over a century. Publics were put under surveillance, and government policies allowed surveillance technologies to be used to monitor citizens' every activity and change. Social distancing policies were implemented, and people were urged to stay at home whenever possible. Intimate socialisation, such as talking, hugging, kissing, and even hand-shaking, became seen as morbid. As lockdowns were implemented, air traffic rates dropped; many countries even stopped all flights (Dunford et al., 2020). According to David

Spiegel, a professor of psychiatry and behavioural sciences at Stanford University, we are training people to see the world as a dangerous place (Cummins, 2020). This has resulted in new behaviours and created a new culture, and consequently the world will never be as it was. Still, we are facing an emergency when decisions must be made quickly and decisively, and new approaches must be accepted and practised (Harari, 2020).

COVID-19 posits insurmountable obstacles for international actors—state actors, non-state actors, intergovernmental organisations, and even supranational bodies—in achieving their short and long-term objectives. As the virus does not 'pick and choose' its victims, it may not even be far-fetched to deem it a global crisis. International cooperation is the only potential catalyst for fighting the virus. Considering international actors' different anatomies of power, authority, and manoeuvrability, they offer distinctive mosaics of responses when working individually. This reflects on the diverse modus operandi used by actors to achieve their objectives, which may share commonalities but nonetheless serve as distinguishing factors.

Let us take, for example, the state. With the strength of 'infinite' sovereignty, the state can boost its authority and reduce stonewalling in managing its COVID-19 countermeasures. Sovereignty enables states to choose whether or not they will work with other actors (states, international organisations, and private actors) to deal with COVID-19. Some have chosen to reject outside assistance, as seen in Iran's rejection of aid from the United States (United States Institute of Peace, 2020), and the WHO's difficulty making states

follow its guidance (Buranyi, 2020). Arguably, international organisations and institutions, particularly ones that are 'intergovernmental' in nature, are inconsequential to states, whose persistent utilisation of sovereignty in dealing with COVID-19 is unanimously accepted by realism, a school of thought that deifies states' sovereignty.

International society has boldly embraced nationalism and xenophobia. As such, the pendulum has swung in favour of realism, painting a gloomy picture of international organisations and institutions' role and authority in responding to COVID-19. It is therefore interesting to consider and explain the reality of global COVID-19 countermeasures through the lens of cosmopolitanism. The goals of this study are two-fold. First, this article intends to use the concepts of cosmopolitanism to provide theoretical criticism of the world's COVID-19 countermeasures. Second, it aims to offer modest suggestions, again taking a cosmopolitan view, of what international society should do in the future to deal with the virus.

Research Methods

This study is conducted using the qualitative research method, with a case study approach. This methodology enables us to obtain an in-depth analysis of attitudes, events, and social phenomenon (McCusker, 2015). Qualitative research allows researchers to obtain knowledge through understandings and findings (Iskandar, 2009). This study, thus, tries to comprehend COVID-19-related social dynamics and issues to obtain knowledge relevant to the authors' analysis. The researchers also used library research to

collect valid data related to COVID-19 and cosmopolitanism from secondary resources, such as books, journals, websites, government reports, and newspapers (Raco, 2018).

Theoretical Framework: Cosmopolitanism

Cosmopolitanism traces its roots to three events. The fall of the Soviet Union has been seen as the first milestone in the history of cosmopolitanism, and indeed the theory has been seen as the key to realising human rights, upholding democracy, and even strengthening the United Nations. Second, cosmopolitanism has also been driven by the need to encourage international collaboration for addressing environmental issues. Third is globalisation, a significant milestone that always emphasises cosmopolitanism values (Calhoun, 2017). As the world has become intentionally integrated, new challenges have emerged for everyone. These challenges must be accounted for in the cosmopolitan agenda.

Also contributing to the increased attention received by cosmopolitanism is an ongoing concern regarding ethnic warfare (Canovan, 2000). Universalising values, as emphasised by cosmopolitanism, was seen as the best way to deal with these demonised and pardonless conflicts (Catterall, 2011). As the reputation of cosmopolitanism increased, scholarly debate on cosmopolitan issues mushroomed. A surge of writings appeared, and cosmopolitanism has become a subject of much research, debate, and controversy in the social sciences (Inglis, 2012).

Immanuel Kant proposes 'Three Definitive Articles' (Scheid, 2011) that, in short, explain the ideal form of state, the need to form a federation, and cosmopolitan rights. He argues that the republic is the ideal form of state, and that world peace can be realised by developing a worldwide federation wherein people are granted legal protections under international law. As he believes that states are naturally anarchic, he holds that the creation of an international federation is necessary to maintain mutual security (Rauscher, 2017)

Supporting the concepts of cosmopolitanism, in his third definitive article "Perpetual Peace" Kant offers the idea of cosmopolitan rights He proposes a 'universal civic society', in which individuals are treated as subjects and enjoy fundamental human rights. He believes that cosmopolitan rights can ensure that people communicate with each other and work toward realising a world federation. Kant holds that all foreigners have the right to hospitality, and that all individuals may travel freely around the world without facing hostility (Alvian, 2015). He justifies this with the 'right of surface', which holds that humanity enjoyed common ownership long before the land was bound by nation-states. Hence, according to Kant's view of cosmopolitan rights, foreigners who travel through other countries must not be subjected to arbitrary treatment, so long as they come peacefully; in other words, foreigners are strictly forbidden from exploiting native inhabitants. Kant's right to hospitality highlights his view that individuals enjoy political emancipation and equal freedom in the communication process.

In a political context, the concept of cosmopolitanism was recently explored by the scholar Nigel Dower (2007), who argues

that we can see human beings as members of a global legal community. Core to this is the belief that human beings exist in a single 'moral community', seen as having (interpreted) interdependence, shared traditions and norms, and some sort of commitment to the whole. Dower's idea of political cosmopolitanism is oriented towards the thought of what makes someone a global citizen afterwards. It firmly asserts that, in principle, we all have a responsibility towards human beings around the world. Likewise, everyone can commit in various ways to make a difference by becoming involved in acts of global responsibility. Such acts are clearly needed to deal with global issues such as world poverty, environmental damage, war, disease, etc.

The transformation of institutions and practices from state-oriented to global-oriented is necessary for cosmopolitanism to materialise its 'imagined' community. Cosmopolitanism is not merely a free-floating cultural taste, a personal attitude, or a political choice; it is a matter of institutions (Saito, 2011). In this regard, cosmopolitanism favours the institutionalisation of world society through the establishment of inter-governmental and/or international non-governmental organisations. Such organisations would act as bridges for the diffusion of ideas, values, and norms that define people as global citizens. Moreover, such international bodies should later be modified to become more democratic, thereby enabling them to fully support world citizens becoming engaged in foreign policy decisions without including nation-states. Such institutions must advance the realisation of global goals, rather than serve as arenas for accommodating states' interests. Regarding the issue of intervention, institutions should not be rooted in nation-states, but rather premised on the world citizen. This will not only promote global citizenship, but also underpin the idea that the world is a community of humans rather than an aggregation of nation-states.

In a nutshell, cosmopolitanism is rooted in several ways of thinking. First, it argues that too much respect for ethnic and cultural differences undermines attempts to enforce global citizenship and realise universal human rights. Therefore, it tries to abolish such emphasis on nation-states and their differences, both discreet and blatant. Second, cosmopolitanism is often oriented towards establishing transnational work relations; national boundaries, thus, only pose barriers to their success. Third, as implied by its very name—'cosmos' meaning 'whole'—cosmopolitanism stresses true 'universality', and as such cosmopolites are understood as 'citizens of the world'. Fourth, cosmopolitanism no longer adheres to the concept of 'nation'. For explanation, we may turn to a parable offered by Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati. Once upon a time, a cosmopolite said, "*We are more advanced than you.*" They continued, "*We no longer believe in the nation, we believe in humanity, we are Cosmopolitans"* (Recchia & Urbinati, 2009). Fifth, cosmopolites aspire for the subordination of self-regard and self-interest, when required for the betterment of the broader global community (Moore, 2013). Though cosmopolitanism is often perceived by states more as a threat than a boon, since it opposes national identity (Bowden, 2003), its way of thinking must be

given careful consideration by the international society.

Nevertheless, the return of infectious disease has proven a tragedy for the international community. Obstacles to mitigation efforts lie not only in the limited resources of human, state, and international actors, but also in reduced cooperation between them. In this situation, excessive reverence for sovereignty and nationalism, as well as the emergence of xenophobia, have further impaired such cooperation. Having plunged into the depths of cosmopolitanism's ocean of thought, this paper will now identify how cosmopolitanism excoriates countermeasures to COVID-19, as well as the action plans that it advocates for better dealing with the pandemic.

Literature Review

COVID-19 led to cosmopolitanism becoming increasingly notorious within the discourses of international relations. Even before this study's publication, numerous works related to COVID-19 and cosmopolitanism have been published and offered diverse ideas. Igor Calzada believes that the pandemic has brought cosmopolitan globalisation, wherein people have the freedom to move, work, and travel without limits, to the verge of collapse. People now are 'pandemic citizens', an eye-catching term Calzada coins to refer to those who are "*increasingly stuck inside closed nation-states surrounded by contradictory new walls and old borders*". Realising that governments and other organisations could easily abuse citizens' data for unfair or unethical purposes, Calzada's proposes that states and other organisations should be committed to using existing data in a good manner. They must not use the pandemic to justify the weakening of the values of democracy and the abrogation of citizens' rights, regardless of where they are located on the planet (Calzada, 2020).

COVID-19's harmful effect on humanity cannot be separated from globalisation, one of cosmopolitanism's core elements. Tabak (2020) mentions that globalisation is strongly correlated with COVID-19, and underscores that COVID-19 has proven a common threat to all—recognizing neither nationality nor race. Therefore, the validity of national solutions as COVID-19 countermeasures is questionable. Tabak proposes two crucial points that support globalisation as a political discourse in the post-pandemic era: first, states' consciousness of the importance of embracing cooperation to deal with a crisis, and second, the enhanced interconnectedness of humanity.

Hwang Jin-tae (2020) analyses the atmospheres of social stigma in three different Korean cities (Seoul, Daegu, and Gwangju). He concludes that global society must welcome the experiment of cosmopolitanism, which can challenge stigma and providing an essential catalyst for socialising unsocial sociability to fight the virus. Terri-Anne Teo (2020) discusses how economic nationalism gave birth to protectionist government policies, as well as xenophobia and racism. She posits that the ethos of moral cosmopolitanism can have a positive impact on the community. Nevertheless, she emphasises that cosmopolitanism should not be considered a substitute for nationalism, as nationalism has exclusionary properties that are essentially detrimental to social cohesion.

Teo believes that "*moral cosmopolitanism and nationalism are not fundamentally opposed, but are effectively two sides of a coin*" (Teo, 2020).

Compared to this criticism, cosmopolitan proposals have been downplayed. In this light, this paper intends to provide a slightly different approach. Unlike Teo and most other scholars' criticism of 'economic nationalism', this study focuses on the rapid growth of 'health nationalism' and tracks the presence of xenophobia in the everyday life of international society. This study also employs a cosmopolitan perspective to make two major proposals. First, this study holds that cosmopolitanism recommends that international actors endorse multilateralism and emphasise its effectiveness. Second, cosmopolitanism suggests that the international community favour solidarity-based countermeasures over exclusionary health aid.

Discussion

Health Nationalism; How It Makes World's COVID-19 Countermeasures 'Go Down in Flames' in the Lens of Cosmopolitanism

Florian Bieber (2018) has a metaphor "*Like air, nationalism is both ubiquitous and elusive*". Nationalism permeates the global system, as well as the behaviour of states and international society. Over the past few years, a rising tide of nationalism has been seen in every corner of the world. It has deepened and broadened, from the election of Donald Trump (who adhered to the principle of nationalism on a daily basis) in the United States (Rachman, 2018; Crowley & Sanger, 2019; Schertzer & Woods, 2020), the United Kingdom's decision to bring down its flag in European Union's headquarters in Brussels (Serhan, 2019), the nationalist policies of the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe (Surak, 2019, Leheny, 2019), the bold sense of ethnocentrism of India's Narendra Modi (Naqvi, 2020), the rise of Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's nationalism (Kasaba, 2018), the success of far-right parties in the Italian, German and Austrian elections in 2017 and 2018 (Bieber, 2018), the escalation of disputes between the claimants of the South China Sea (China, the Philippines, Vietnam, etc.) (Alfieri & Vukovic, 2018), as well as in South Africa's efforts to impede multilateral bodies such as the International Court of Justice (BBC News, 2017).

"*The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism. Governments of all types will adopt emergency measures to manage the crisis, and many will be loath to relinquish these new powers when the crisis is over*". – Stephen M. Walt (2020)

Walt's argument is probably justifiable. Despite sharing the common problem of COVID-19, states still show no sign of reducing their nationalism, and its spectre continues to underpin their interaction. Other facts further bolster this argument. Take, for example, the 'economic nationalism' that has been broadly discussed in international relations as trade wars have become more common. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the debate now focuses on 'health nationalism'. Governments around the world have struggled to protect their own

health supplies as the novel coronavirus has driven panic buying, hoarding, and even theft (The Local, 2020). As the consequence, to ensure that their health workers and populaces have sufficient supplies to deal with the coronavirus outbreak, several countries have reduced or even stopped the export of medical supplies that are essential for their neighbours' frontline actions and preventive efforts.

Let us consider how such 'health nationalism' has manifested in reality. In early March 2020, a truck full of medical supplies was stopped at the German–Swiss border, after German chancellor Angela Merkel banned the export of protective medical equipment. This truck, carrying 240,000 face masks, was planned to help replenish Switzerland's rapidly diminishing stock (Dahinten & Wabl, 2020). Similar export bans were also issued by the Czech Republic, France, and other European countries (Wynne, 2020) When Italy, the European epicentre of the COVID-19 pandemic, requested urgent medical supplies under a special European crisis mechanism, not a single EU member state responded; indeed, they became even more eager to ban the export of medical equipment, as they feared having the same shortage. This implied that Italy had been abandoned by its European friends (Hall, Johnson, & Arnold, 2020). Over time, however, the European Union tried to encourage its member states to be more receptive to medical tools exports (Guarascio & Blenkinsop, 2020). Ultimately, both France and Germany lifted their export bans (Web24 News, 2020).

Such a gloomy situation also occurred in North America, when the United States refused to send medical equipment to Canada and Latin America. 3M, a multinational conglomerate headquartered in the United States, was instructed by the Trump administration to stop exporting N95 face masks to the Canadian and Latin American markets. This move, critics argued, would result in a crisis of respiratory supplies in Canada and Latin America, where 3M is the paramount supplier of respirators for healthcare workers (Turnbull, 2020). As in Germany and France, the United States justified its decision by citing its desire to secure domestic demands (Forrest, 2020).

It is common for countries to prioritise themselves in world politics. However, when crises affect all, such political intentions have wrought nothing but darkness. Countries' decision to prioritise themselves is misplaced. As argued by cosmopolitanism, human beings are all subjects who possess equal human rights and equal standing as members of the global legal community. Therefore, nation-states must respect human rights (in this case, health rights), and the COVID-19 pandemic must be understood as a global responsibility. In this regard, countries' reluctance to help their neighbours is not only problematic for cosmopolitanism; it is a stumbling block for global society's collective efforts to counter the spread of COVID-19. If the ideals of cosmopolitism are upheld, countries will not need to fear losing their health supplies, as all countries can protect and assist each other. For example, if Country A is having a crisis of health supplies, Country B can send aid. So long as Country B is not in the same situation as Country A, there is nothing wrong with providing assistance. Likewise, when *C*ountry B is experiencing distress, Country

A can provide support and pay a debt of gratitude.

During pandemics, refugees and migrants are the most vulnerable elements of society. Nationalism gives them little room to receive proper treatment or be involved in COVID-19 countermeasures. In most countries, they are over-categorised as homeless populations and face uncertainty in their legal status. In this vein, refugees and migrants often face obstacles when accessing sanitation facilities, healthcare services, and medicines (World Health Organisation, 2020). To alleviate this situation, host countries should include refugees in their national COVID-19 countermeasure frameworks (Husein & Maulana, 2020). In the eyes of cosmopolitanism, ignoring refugees would be a major mistake, as they too have human rights that must be advocated without discrimination. The words of Jacquelyn Corley (2020) deserve to be mentioned in this regard,

"*The coronavirus respects no national borders, nor does it honor some ethnic heritages over others. Thus, segregation and nationalism will only weaken countries who have received refugees*". – Jacquelyn Corley

Xenophobia: Another Stonewall Against Cosmopolitanism

Xenophobia has become an ugly child of COVID-19, even in China, where the first case was reported. As China says that most of its current cases are imported, anti-foreigner stances have become commonplace. In Shanghai and Beijing, foreigners have been prohibited from entering some shops, gyms, and offices. When foreigners stroll outside, locals cover their noses or move away (Qin & Wang, 2020). In the United States and Europe, meanwhile, 'anti-Asian' sentiments have flourished—ironically, at times within the government. For instance, President Donald J. Trump's decision to identify COVID-19 as the 'Chinese virus' (Vang, 2020) provoked anti-Asian sentiments throughout the United States. As a result, numerous cases of physical and verbal violence against people of Chinese heritage have been commonplace. Hate speech has often targeted Asian-Americans as well as Asian-looking foreigners in the United States, reflecting broader stigmas and a belief that a specific country or ethnicity can be blamed for the pandemic. According to L1ght, a company focused on detecting and filtering toxic online content, Twitter has seen a 900% increase in hate speech regarding China and Chinese people (L1GHT, 2020).

In Europe, too, xenophobia has found fertile ground during the pandemic. Matteo Salvini, the League Party Leader of Italy, erroneously connected the COVID-19 to African asylum seekers (Tondo, 2020). In London and the Netherlands, many Asian students have been attacked by locals. This has occurred not only in the streets, where locals have been seen to yell at random Asians, but also in schools (Lau, 2020).

Anti-immigration policies were also evident in Hungary (Mutsvara, 2020). One government official, György Bakondi, linked the pandemic with illegal migration, and thus officially and indefinitely suspended the admission of illegal migrants into the transit zone. The government even prepared to strengthen its borders, not allowing any illegal migrants to enter (Gall,

2020), and this showed us how countries have weaponised COVID-19 to spark the flame of xenophobia and to create fear of foreigners. The coronavirus has exacerbated tensions between locals and immigrants, who have been perceived as carriers of the virus.

Cosmopolitanism promotes an idea of 'global identity', wherein ethnic and cultural diversity are greatly respected, global citizenship is acknowledged, and human rights are protected. This calls for an ideal of unity and equality afterwards. We have seen that COVID-19 is not only a health issue, but also a social one, having been used to justify xenophobia. The world seems to have preferred exploiting fear rather than embracing a global identity. In the short term, xenophobia does not only cause mental and physical harm to certain groups, but also makes them fear seeking help (Ramirez, 2020). In the United States, for instance, enforcement actions—i.e., detention and raids by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)—have resulted in immigrants being unwilling to seek help if they are showing symptoms (Ramirez, 2020). This leaves them vulnerable, as they choose to conceal their symptoms instead of seeking medical care, for fear that it will result in their deportation or prevent them from obtaining permanent residency in the future (McFarling, 2020).

Countering the pandemic requires global action, but if xenophobia still permeates international relations, such action cannot be effectively realised. Global action requires the solidarity of peoples around the world, without any ethnic or national barriers. States must commit themselves not to harming others, but rather helping them respect the essentials of human well-being.

Governments should work to provide proper health facilities to everyone, including foreigners, rather than encourage xenophobic rhetoric.

The transmission of the novel coronavirus will not easily stop if people are treated differently. We are witnessing how immigrants, foreigners, refugees, and certain ethnic groups are at higher risk for not receiving medical care due to xenophobic hysteria. In responding to COVID-19, governments should not use xenophobic policies, but rather guarantee equal and non-discriminatory treatment for all human beings, irrespective of their nationality, citizenship status, or displacement (Zolberg Institute on Migration and Mobility, 2020). Medical aid is essential for everyone, and governments should ensure that they can provide prevention and treatment without discrimination. In the ongoing war with the pandemic, ignoring one aspect of human well-being will effectively block all efforts to stop the transmission.

As mentioned by Tendayi Achiume (2020), the UN Special Rapporteur on racism, on the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: "*Crises like the coronavirus pandemic remind us that we are all connected and that our well-being is interdependent*". This statement reminds us that, as human beings, we have the responsibility to be involved in any disaster mitigation effort, as it has been shown that our essential value as human beings can be best realised through interdependence and shared norms, values, and commitment (Dower, 2007). If states continue to blame particular communities for the virus, any actions to combat this issue will be useless afterwards. Ethnicity and nationality must

not be excuses for not dealing with COVID-19. Social inclusion, justice, and solidarity are needed to establish health protection, and thus focus on any of humans' multi-faceted identities will pose barriers for the creation of a shared commitment to realising global aims.

First Proposal: Global Integration through Multilateralism

COVID-19 is a global calamity, and as such global integration would be the best possible means of addressing it. Global integration will broaden and deepen international society's awareness that humans possess global citizenship, therefore producing a shared identity, commitment, and interest that would improve adherence to human rights. The disease is borderless, spreading widely without concern for national borders. No state can escape the novel coronavirus, and it may even return to countries that considered themselves free of it. States, be they large or small, developed or underdeveloped, rich or poor, share a common interest; to counter this pandemic as soon as possible. To effectively realise such integration, states require multilateral-based cooperation (Ng, 2020).

Multilateralism can be understood as occurring when three or more states that share similar concerns decide to coordinate, standardise, and formalise their actions (Keohane, 1990; Ruggie, 1992). It may be embodied in international treaties or agreements, realised through international organisations and institutions, and be achieved through international conferences and summit meetings. Considering that cosmopolitanism requires the institutionalisation of ideas, such multilateralism may be understood as the means through which global integration, global citizenship, single identity, and parallel commitment can be materialised. By bringing several states to the table, multilateralism would enable them to establish, implement, and administer sets of rules that utilise cosmopolitan ideas to increase synergy in COVID-19 countermeasures. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, multilateralism was facing a crisis as a result of rising cynicism, distrust, nationalism, populism, and authoritarianism (Ng, 2020; Linn, 2018). It has thus become a rare commodity in this day and age. Since multilateralism is paramount for generating global integration, and thus for improving global countermeasures to COVID-19, states must stop impeding its implementation and welcome its cultivation.

Supporting global integration through multilateral means is important. As already stated, COVID-19 calls for a global solution. When states prefer to work alone, their efforts to counter the pandemic can only produce a stalemate. Buckminster Fuller's analogy supports this notion,

"*We have today, in fact, 150 supreme admirals and only one ship – Spaceship Earth. We have the 150 admirals in their 150 staterooms, each trying to run their respective stateroom as if it were a separate ship. We have the starboard-side admirals' league trying to sink the port side admirals' league. If either is successful in careening the ship to drown the 'enemy' side, the whole ship will be lost*". – Buckminster Fuller (1990, in Pegram, 2020)

Rather than work alone or, worse, compete with each other in the name of national interests, we should bear in mind that we are global agents who are working in the name of all inhabitants on Spaceship Earth (Pegram, 2020). In dealing with COVID-19, global society faces two cumbersome issues: food shortages and vaccine distribution. Even before the pandemic, economic recession, extreme weather, and conflict led to 135 million people in 55 countries experiencing acute hunger (World Food Programme, 2020); figures were expected to potentially double by the end of 2020 (Anthem, 2020). Health, needless to say, is a priority. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore that the availability of sufficient healthy food must be a cornerstone of any pandemic response. As such, it is necessary to not only ensure the sustainability of the global food supply chain, but also to ensure that food remains accessible to all (Cantillo, 2020). To accomplish this goal, incisive and inclusive coordination—realized through multilateralism—must permeate international relations. States, being essential in ensuring food availability, should abolish the principal barriers (lack of trust, nationalism, populism, protectionism, isolationism, and authoritarianism) that limit their ability to join or create multilateral responses to COVID-19.

The world now depends on vaccines designed to treat the novel coronavirus. A high quantity of dosages will need to be mass-produced, and therefore collaboration between regulators, industry, and the scientific community will be of utmost importance (Edmond, 2020). Efforts must be made to avert

contamination, scale down transmission, and build herd immunity, as even an effective vaccine is useless if distributed ineffectively. Historically, some states have prioritised their citizens, creating a discrepancy in vaccine distribution both within and among countries (Bollyky, Gostin, Hamburg, 2020). Take, for example, how wealthy nations bought out entire vaccine supplies during the Influenza A (H1N1) pandemic of 2009 (Whalen, 2020, in Bollyky, Gostin, Hamburg, 2020). To prevent a recurrence, states should commit themselves to the equal distribution of vaccines through multilateral means; this could be by giving birth to new international norms, by conducting special multilateral meetings as a coordination step, or at least by obeying the instructions of existing multilateral organisations.

Second Proposal: Prevent Exclusionary Health Aid through Solidarity-based Countermeasures

We are seeing that governments and stakeholders have only been able to consider COVID-19 narrowly, without considering vulnerable members of society such as migrants and refugees. Amidst rampant nationalism and the rise of xenophobic rhetoric, states cannot identify measures for countering COVID-19 without prejudice, and such nationalist approaches to health will be detrimental to certain communities. Furthermore, the idea of prioritising certain individuals runs contrary to the global responsibility to counter COVID-19, as it hinders the implementation of global unity. As they are not considered priorities, certain groups will be absent from health assistance projects. It is these groups—refugees and migrants, in many

cases—who are at the highest risk during the ongoing pandemic.

"If the current pandemic leads to a two or even three-tier mobility system, then we will have to try to solve the problem – the problem of the pandemic - but at the same time, we have created a new problem of deepening the inequalities.". – António Vitorino

This statement (UN News, 2020) clearly denotes the current situation that we are facing today. Several state-implemented policies have given rise to new problems that have yet to be considered. Mobility restrictions, including lockdown policies, may have never been effective countermeasures, and instead may have only harmed migrants. As seen in several states, lockdowns have affected migration processing and the provision of assistance to asylum seekers. On 17 March 2020, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Organisation for Migration (IOM) announced the suspension of resettlement departures for refugees due to mobility restrictions in over 180 countries. As a result, refugees were forced to live in extreme conditions in border camps, where a lack of medical care has left them vulnerable to being exposed to the virus. States, therefore, must ensure that aid reaches migrants and refugees by asserting a solidarity-based solution.

Solidarity is linked to 'universal, moral standards', which allow for the prioritisation of solidaristic action without excluding people based on ethnic and religious considerations (Kapeller &

Wolkenstein, 2013). Such a solution also supports the realisation of interconnection and interdependence, providing a common interest and aim that further buttressed unity (Parsanoglou, 2020). As noted by Kant, the concept of solidarity also encompasses a duty to stand in solidarity to prevent others from coming to harm (Straehle, 2020). Barriers impeding migrants and refugees will only exacerbate the impact of COVID-19, and thus states' responses to the pandemic must include national plans to address the problems. Measures should reach all migrants and refugees, regardless of their legal status, ethnic background, or nationality. All human beings merit equal access to information, health care services, and Personal Protection Equipment (PPE).

In implementing a solidarity-based solution, states should first abolish the policies that hamper migrants and refugees, including travel restrictions and related enforcement actions. Social distancing and self-isolation, for instance, cannot be readily realised amongst migrants due to their lack of access to housing, as well as their continued suspicion of authorities so long as the threat of enforcement actions remains (World Economic Forum, 2020). It is necessary to process migrants and refugees promptly, thereby ensuring certainty for all. States should guarantee that everyone, citizen, migrant, and refugee alike, receives non-discriminatory service. Movement restrictions and border closure measures must comply with international law and be proportionate and reasonable to the aim of protecting public health. At the same time, a solidarity-based countermeasure must ensure that migrants and refugees are treated

humanely and that their rights under international law are respected. Only then can it be ensured that no migrants are left behind.

We should unite to establish equal services that protect human lives. Nationality or citizenship should not determine who receives protection and who does not (Triandafyllidou, 2020). States should not prioritise 'insiders' while discarding 'outsiders', but instead promote solidarity and defend the most vulnerable. This crisis provides a potent reminder that we have a duty not only to local citizens, but to all of humanity.

Conclusion

International society should have faith in cosmopolitanism and its offerings, as its criticisms and proposals offer the most relevant weapons for mitigating the erroneous global actions that have been implemented to tackle the virus almost overnight. States' actions, often reflecting health nationalism and xenophobia, have posed significant—and perhaps insurmountable—obstacles to proper countermeasures. Nationalism and xenophobia are 'powder kegs' that threaten the world's efforts to realise global integration and integrative solutions. Cosmopolitanism would instead, as this paper shows, suggest that international society employ a multilateral approach as the most suitable means of harvesting the fruits of global integration. Moreover, cosmopolitanism emphasises that

society's most vulnerable members, such as migrants and refugees, should receive careful attention. Exclusionary health aid must give way to solidarity-based countermeasures.

Kant offers the idea of cosmopolitan rights in his third definitive article, holding that they "should be limited to conditions of universal hospitality". We admit that the current world order is lacking, or even bereft of, such universal hospitality, being instead of an unsupportive environment replete with bold nationalism and other concepts that divide humans into various factions. This does not mean that cosmopolitanism cannot fit into this era of anarchic world order. Indeed, our proposals to enhance global integration by using multilateral means and avoiding exclusionary health assistance. Solidarity-based countermeasures could create conditions of universal hospitality, and as such these two efforts may help realize cosmopolitan rights.

It is true and inevitable that cosmopolitanism is the reason for the COVID-19 pandemic's explosive growth. The idea of free international travel, as proposed by cosmopolitanism, has contributed significantly to the current crisis. However, cosmopolitanism also proposes a solution, a series of countermeasures that may contribute to disaster mitigation efforts. Cosmopolitanism, it can be seen, can be crucially involved in pandemic countermeasures.

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A New Approach for Allocating a New Party's Budget during an Election Campaign

Irit Talmor[1][2] and Osnat Akirav[3]

Abstract

During pre-election campaigns, parties make great efforts to persuade constituents to vote for them. Usually, new parties have smaller budgets and fewer resources than veteran parties. Generally, the more heterogeneous the party's electorate, the more critical the issue of resource allocation. This paper presents a method for new parties to efficiently allocate campaign advertising resources and maximise voters. The model developed uses the Pareto principle and multi-criteria approach, integrating the party's confidential data together with official open-to-all data. We implemented the model on a specific new party during the intensive political period before the April 2019 elections in Israel, finding that the model produced clear and unbiased results, and this made it effective and user-friendly for strategy teams and campaign managers.

Keywords: *election campaign; Multi-Criteria Decision Making; in-depth surveys; voting patterns; Pareto approach*

Introduction

The pre-elections political campaign of a new party can be compared to the marketing campaign for a new commercial product (Lilien et al., 1992; O'Cass, 1996; Henneberg, 2008). In both campaigns, huge efforts are made to persuade voters (consumers) to choose the new party (product) over better-known ones (Gordon et al., 2012). However, there are some important differences between these campaigns. The first involves the degree of freedom available. Private companies are free to decide when to launch their commercial campaign and when to end it, whereas political parties must conduct their campaigns during a time frame that is dictated by law. Another important difference is related to the timing of the marketing campaign; unlike standard marketing campaigns, the election campaign of a new party is conducted simultaneously with those of all other parties.

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[1] Irit Talmor is a senior lecturer and head of the Logistics Department at Sir Harry Solomon School of Management. She may be contacted at irit.tlmr@gmail.com.

[2] Corresponding Author
[3] Osnat Akirav is a professor at and the head of the Department of Political Science at Western Galilee College. She may be contacted at osnatak@bezeqint.net

In this article, we present an approach for supporting a new party's strategic decisions in budget allocation. Our approach is novel in two regards. First, it utilises a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) methodology and various techniques to weight criteria in the context of political campaigns. Second, our model is tested using a combination of a party's confidential dataset and information from public databases. The advantages of our model are its transparency and simplicity, which make it a useful tool for campaign managers and party leaders. As a case study, we implemented the model during the April 2019 election in Israel.

Voting behaviour

The theoretical literature on voting behaviour has shown that a rational voter may sometimes decide to vote for a candidate or party that is not his or her first preference (e.g., Cox & Shugart, 1996; Farquharson, 1969; Felsenthal & Brichta, 1985). Such voters are traditionally called "strategic voters", in contrast to voters who always vote for their first preference regardless of how others are likely to vote. Farquharson (1969) was the first to propose a model attempting to trace the calculations of strategic voters. His successors examined strategic voting by focusing on entry barriers in multi-member districts (Cox & Shugart, 1996). They showed that voters desert both weak parties and parties that seemed guaranteed to win because they are concerned about wasting their votes.

One must distinguish between the allocation of resources before elections and the allocation of resources afterwards. The former is aimed at persuading voters to

change their preferences, while the latter seeks to retain current voters and increase their numbers (Lazarus & Reiley, 2010; Levitt et al., 1997; Squire, 1995). For example, studies found that constituents increase their support for incumbents when more resources are allocated to their district. To gain this support, incumbents must continuously convince constituents that expenditures in their district are a direct result of the actions of the party or the incumbents.

Studies have discussed this issue extensively, mainly in electoral systems such as the "winner takes all" approach used in the United States. Researchers have also investigated this issue from the point of view of voters, assuming that individual voting preferences are affected by the exposure achieved by candidates and the tone of the coverage (Bartels, 1988; Cohen et al., 2004; Gordon et al., 2012; Shachar, 2009).

Campaign finance and management

Although large and veteran parties face many challenges (Poguntke et al., 2016), they still have advantages over new parties. A large, veteran party has a steady core of loyal voters who always vote for it, can present proof of tangible results to actual and potential constituents, and has a steady federal budget to support its activities. None of these advantages exists for smaller or newer parties. Smaller and newer parties must overcome additional obstacles, such as making themselves known to voters, attracting their attention, and exciting voters in a way that will draw their support. Overcoming these obstacles is very ambitious, but essential for new parties to gain parliamentary seats.

Given these factors, new parties' advertising during their campaign should be as precise and targeted as possible. Achieving this precision is not a simple task, given the abundance of advertising alternatives and their various target audiences.

These are very ambitious goals. To achieve them, the campaign must be very convincing. It must appeal to voters' logic, and to a certain extent their feelings. Given new parties' limited resources, the importance of a campaign focused on voters among whom these goals can be achieved cannot be overemphasised. The model presented in this paper offers a way to translate a theoretical cost–benefit analysis into a practical roadmap for a new political party by prioritising clusters of potential voters using characteristics identified from in-depth interviews.

Obviously, a portion of any campaign's budget should be devoted to data collection. In-depth interviews are useful for achieving this goal. This popular type of qualitative research can collect detailed questionnaires and data from focus groups. Empirical data analysis can then provide the basis for planning the best possible campaign. Ideally, interviews should indicate the party's strengths and weaknesses; help planners understand which issues and ideas the party should emphasise, play down or change; and identify the characteristics of potential voters. Such insights are valuable for all parties, but they are indispensable for smaller, newer parties that lack a voting history and practical experience (on one hand) and must surmount significant budgetary limitations (on the other). Previous studies in political marketing used a combination of in-depth interviews and

historical data regarding parties' vote share and census statistics (to monitor the demographic structure of a constituency) to develop a planning model for political marketing (Baines et al., 2002; Shea, 1996). Yet, the issue of allocating campaign resources is rarely investigated in the academic literature. Snyder (1989) analyses the case of two parties' competition for legislative seats across districts, when the goal of each party is to maximise the expected number of seats or when the goal is to maximise the probability of winning a majority of the seats.

While a new party's decision to launch a campaign may resemble efforts to market a new product, there are some important differences. First is the degree of freedom available. Private corporations are free to decide when to launch their commercial campaign and when to end it, whereas political parties must conduct their political campaigns during a set time frame that is dictated by external circumstances and considerations. Moreover, early elections often occur in Israel, creating a great deal of uncertainty and difficulties in campaign organisations, particularly for new parties. Another important difference is related to the timing of the marketing campaign. Unlike standard marketing campaigns, new parties' election campaigns are conducted simultaneously with those of their competitors. Furthermore, given that voters' (customers') decision is a one-time event that cannot be changed or cancelled, at least until the next election, there is no room for mistakes.

Given these factors, the advertising utilised by a new party should be as precise and targeted as possible during the campaign. Achieving this precision is not a

simple task, given the abundance of advertising alternatives and their various target audiences.

Israel's political system

Israel has a unicameral parliament (the Knesset) whose members are elected by a closed-list system of proportional representation, with the entire country serving as one constituency. Its political system has been described as a hybrid, combining electoral rules, a fragmented party system, and bipolar competition (Rahat & Hazan, 2005; Shugart, 2011).

In the run-up to the elections, parties launch campaigns to persuade voters to support them. Such campaigns are very expensive. To compensate for the fact that some parties have more money than others, the state participates in the financing of campaigns by allocating "funding units" to each party. Each funding unit equals a certain amount of money set by law. The units are distributed among the parties as follows: parties that have gained enough votes to have seats in the Knesset receive a number of units equal to the number of mandates obtained; parties that have not won any seats in the Knesset, but have garnered at least 1% of the votes, receive one funding unit; and parties that have not passed the 1% threshold do not receive any funding units.[4] This method rewards large, veteran parties with proven track records that can afford to run expensive campaigns. In contrast, smaller and newer parties that are not currently serving in the Knesset and/or are embarking on their first political campaign have much tighter budgetary constraints.

All of the 34 OECD countries, except Switzerland, have funding units by law. Hence, the concept that parties should have special budgets for their campaigns during the election is common and well established in democracies. However, compared to the other OECD countries, the parties in Israel receive much more money because of strong restrictions regarding donations to political parties.

The case of Israel, with its proportional representation system, was analysed by several scholars who found that neither political preference nor coalition expectations differ systematically between those who support their most preferred party and those who support other parties (Felsental & Brichta, 1985). Three recent studies convincingly demonstrated how coalition preferences affect the voters' choices beyond party or leader preferences. Blais et al. (2006) showed that, in the 2003 Israeli elections, coalition preferences led one in ten voters to support a party other than the one they preferred most. Similarly, Abramson et al. (2006) demonstrated that, in the 2006 Israeli elections, voters acted strategically to help create the coalition they desired. Bargsted and Kedar (2009) identified the ideological dimension of strategic coalition voting more precisely. They found that leftist voters deserted the Labor Party when the party was unlikely to participate in a government coalition and instead opted for a centrist party, the "lesser of two evils".

Methodology

To determine an effective allocation for a new party's financial resources, we

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[4] *https://www.idi.org.il/articles/25939*

utilised a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) approach. This approach applies a structured process to select the best alternative out of a finite set of alternatives, in accordance with a set of pre-defined criteria. Assuming that decision-makers have the ability to express their opinions on each alternative and regarding each decision criteria, the difficulty derives from the fact that the evaluation and ranking of all alternatives should be done in accordance with all criteria simultaneously.

The MCDM approach and its ranking methods have been the focus of a great deal of attention in the academic literature. Comprehensive and detailed reviews appear in Triantaphyllou (2000); Ishizaka and Nemery (2013); and Zopounidis and Doumpos (2017). This approach is widely used in real-life issues regarding such diverse subjects as economics (Doumpos & Zopounidis, 2014; Wan et al., 2018) and engineering (Liu et al., 2019; Wan et al., 2018). However, it is rarely used in the context of elections or political campaign. A unique example of implementing MCDM to analyse the problem of selecting candidates in e-voting is found in Alguliyev et al. (2019).

The goal of our model is to determine the localities in which a new political party would be best advised to utilise its budget for maximum effect. To the best of our knowledge, the current study is the first to demonstrate the power of MCDM in the context of resource management during election campaigns. Furthermore, the simplicity and clarity of our approach allow campaign managers to easily follow its rationale and use it to make strategic decisions. In the next sections, we will describe the implementation of our approach within a specific case study, step by step.

Case study

Forty parties competed in Israel's 2019 election; 29 of them were new. One such party was "Zehut" (hereafter denoted by the letter "Z"). Although "Z" was unknown at the beginning of the campaign and had few resources, its strategic team was determined to maximise the party's achievements in the election. One issue debated by the team was the allocation of funding among various advertising alternatives (i.e., digital and physical media, press, social networks, etc.). A sub-issue in this context was how to prioritise the allocation of the resources for physical media such as outdoor signage, flyers, and billboards among the different localities. The strategy team asked the author for advice regarding this issue. On this mission, the author concentrated on focusing and ranking, following a five-stage process—shown in Figure 1 and explained hereafter.

Figure 1. Analysis Process

Step 1

Filtering localities

Step 2

Deciding on the criteria for comparing the localities

Step 3

Setting weights for each of the criteria

Step 4

Calculating the nominal and proportional scores of these criteria, for each locality

Step 5

Arriving at a single final score for each locality
To get the ranking list

1. Step 1: Filtering localities

According to official data, there were 1,195 localities in Israel in 2019. Dealing with so many localities was impractical, so we conducted a preliminary, two-stage process to select the main localities on which to focus. First, we identified 145 localities whose electoral profile was homogeneous and very different from the platform of "Z", then removed them from the list. In the second stage, we applied the Pareto principle. The 1,050 remaining localities were sorted in descending order based on the number of voters, until the threshold of 80% of relevant voters was reached. At the end of this second stage, 70 localities remained on the sub-list, consisting of 3.0 million voters (out of about 3.6 million total voters in the 1,050 localities). Each locality on this sub-list had had more than 10,000 voters in the previous elections (two localities had more than 200,000 voters, 14 localities had 50,000 to 200,000 voters, and 56 localities had 10,000 to 50,000 voters).

2. Step 2: Deciding on the criteria

To decide on the criteria, in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were conducted with people who represented the overall political map to discuss the relevant issues. Experts analysed the results and transcripts of these questionnaires, and extracted the criteria from them.

The number of criteria determined in this way depended on the number of characteristics identified through in-depth interviews. We could use the statistical significance of the results to determine their importance. Obviously, it is possible to

add criteria that were not derived from the in-depth interviews, but rather based on experience or rational judgment.

To determine the criteria in our case, we used data that were collected and analysed by a respected research firm hired by "Z". The research firm conducted in-depth interviews with a representative sample of 1,007 people who answered detailed questionnaires, and led six focus groups consisting of 10–15 people each. The firm's experts, together with members of the party's strategy team, analysed the results of the questionnaires and the transcriptions to extract the criteria from them.

The results of the analysis showed that potential voters for "Z" were young, educated, and earned an average salary. In addition, the analysis found that there was a substantial potential electorate among immigrants from the former Soviet Union who came to Israel during the 1990s. Other characteristics, such as previous political orientation or intensity of religious belief, were not found to be meaningful in this context.

3. Step 3: Weighting the criteria

The issue of weighting criteria has been widely discussed in the literature, mainly because this process is strictly dependent on the subjective assessments of decision-makers (Krylovas et al., 2014; Petrovsky, 2001; Saaty, 1977, 1980, 1990; Utkin, 2014). To avoid potential drawbacks, we set weights in two stages. First, we ranked the criteria qualitatively based on the statistical significance levels obtained in the preliminary analysis: the more significant the criterion, the higher it was ranked. Second, we chose the three simple and easy-to-implement weighting techniques that were presented in Barron and Barrett (1996):

a. Equal weights (EW). This is the simplest technique. It is used when the criteria cannot be rated or prioritised, either because of lack of information or because the information indicates that all of the criteria have the same significance. In this case, given N criteria, the weight of each criterion will be 1/N. For example, in the case of four criteria, the weight of each criterion will be 25%.

b. Rank-sum (RS). In this technique, weights are linearly proportional to their significance rank, and their sum is normalised to 1. For simplicity, assume that the criteria are arranged in an order that is identical to their importance (i.e., criterion 1 is ranked higher than criterion 2 and so on until the last, least important criterion indexed/N). In such a case, the formula for the weight of the jth criterion is:

$$w_j = \frac{2(N - j + 1)}{N(N + 1)} \quad (1)$$

In the case of four criteria, their weights would be: 40%, 30%, 20%, and 10%.

c. Rank-order centroid (ROS). In this technique, weights are computed from the vertices of a simplex and their sum is normalised to 1. As before, the order of the criteria is equal to their importance. The formula for the weight of the jth criterion is:

$$w_j = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=j}^{N} \frac{1}{k} \quad (2)$$

In the case of four criteria, their weights would be: 52%, 27%, 14%, and 6%.

Table 1 lists the four criteria, in descending order of importance, along with their weights using these three techniques.

Table 1: Criteria, criteria definitions, and weights in each technique

#	Criterion	Definition	EW	RS	ROC
1	**Age group**	Rate of people ages 20−34 in locality	0.25	0.4	0.52
2	**Country of origin**	Rate of people in the locality who are immigrants from the former Soviet Union	0.25	0.3	0.27
3	**Educational level**	Rate of highly educated people in locality	0.25	0.2	0.15
4	**Income**	Gap, in absolute value, from average income in locality	0.25	0.1	0.06

4. Step 4: Calculating the nominal and proportional scores

Next, we calculated the nominal scores of the localities based on each criterion. In many cases, the MCDM score matrix was created based on expert evaluations or brainstorming (e.g., pairwise comparison). The complexity of this process, the difficulty of maintaining internal traceability, and the subjectivity inherent are key arguments made by critics against the MCDM method and the AHP process (Asadabadi et al., 2019; Noghin, 2001). However, as we noted in the previous section, these shortcomings are avoided in our case, because the score matrix was objectively calculated using independent external resources. First, we extracted the demographic and socioeconomic data of localities throughout Israel and the information on voting patterns from official Israeli websites (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2018; Results of the 20th Knesset, 2015). We also used other popular public databases (Hovav, 2017; Results of the 2015 Elections, 2019). Second, we normalised these nominal scores by using the revised analytic hierarchy process (Belton and Gear, 1983). A proportional score of the ith-criterion in the jth-locality is the quotient of the nominal score divided by the maximum score calculated in this criterion, namely:

$$y_{ij} = \frac{x_{ij}}{\max_j\{x_{ij}\}} \quad i = 1,2,\ldots N \qquad (3)$$

where N is the number of criteria, x_{ij} is the nominal score of the ith-criterion in the jth-locality, and y_{ij} is the relative score of the ith-criterion in the jth-locality.

For example, to calculate a locality's score regarding the "age group" criterion, we first obtained the percentage of residents aged 20−34 in each of the 70 localities; the maximum value in this criterion was 28.7 (in the city of Tel Aviv-Jaffa). We then used this value to calculate the proportional scores of all 70 localities according to Equation 3, to get their

proportional scores. Thus, the nominal score of Acre (24.9) was normalised to 0.87 (=24.9/28.7), the nominal score of Afula (22.3) was normalised to 0.78, and so on. We repeated the same process for all criteria, to get normalised scores. The list of nominal and normalised scores of the 70 localities is found in Table A.1 in the appendix.

5. *Step 5: Arriving at a single score for each locality and ranking localities*

The last step was to calculate the final scores of the localities. Various models are available for aggregating the multi-criteria weights and scores of alternatives into a single score. In our study, we used the classic and popular weighted sum (WS) model. According to this model, the final grade of an alternative is obtained by multiplying the grades for each criterion by the weight of the criteria, namely:

$$Final\_Score(j) = \sum_{i=1}^{N} w_i y_{ij} \ \forall j \qquad (4)$$

Table 2 lists the top 10 localities using each weighting method.

Table 2: Ranking obtained through each weighting method

Rank	EW		RS		ROC	
	Name of locality	**Score**	**Name of locality**	**Score**	**Name of locality**	**Score**
1	Ariel	82.8%	Ariel	86.7%	Ariel	90.0%
2	Haifa	80.5%	Haifa	80.0%	Haifa	82.4%
3	Nesher	79.1%	Nazareth Illit	78.2%	Nazareth Illit	79.7%
4	Carmiel	75.0%	Nesher	76.0%	Tel Aviv Jaffa	78.8%
5	Nazareth Illit	74.9%	Tel Aviv- Jaffa	75.1%	Sderot	75.7%
6	Tel Aviv-Jaffa	74.6%	Carmiel	74.1%	Nesher	75.6%
7	Maalot-Tarshiha	70.8%	Maalot-Tarshiha	72.5%	Maalot-Tarshiha	74.5%
8	Beer Sheva	69.6%	Arad	71.3%	Carmiel	73.5%
9	Arad	69.3%	Sderot	70.6%	Arad	72.6%
10	Ashkelon	68.7%	Kiryat Yam	69.7%	Beer Sheva	70.7%

It can be seen from the table that the same eight localities were ranked in the top ten of the three methods, and that only twelve localities were ranked in all three methods. Thus, we recommended that the party's strategic team focus its efforts on these twelve localities. The full scores and rankings are listed in Table A.2 in the appendix.

Results

The elections were held on 9 April 2019. None of the new parties that competed reached the 3.25% threshold required to obtain a seat in the Knesset. "Z" received 2.74% of the votes; only one other new party received more votes (3.22%, which was also below the threshold) (Results of the 21st Knesset, 2019). There are several explanations for this failure, all of them based on the fact that voting patterns depend on many variables, some of which arise only a few days or a few hours before election day—or even during election day. Nevertheless, it should be noted that "Z" started its campaign with the support of only 0.4% of voters but ended the election with 2.74% of the votes.

Analysis of the results revealed that "Z" received more than 3.25% of the votes in 20 of the 70 localities on our sub-list, and more than 2.74% of the votes in 47 of the localities. In our focused list, the party gained much better results: 8 and 13, respectively.

Table 3. Number of localities that gave "Z" more than the required threshold of votes and more than average votes

	Sub-list	Focused list
Number of localities	70	15
Vote percentage > 3.25%	20	8
Vote percentage > 2.74%	47	13

This outcome is particularly striking when considering that, as a new party, "Z" had no core of voters or previous empirical data on which to base decisions about how to allocate its resources for maximum effect. Thus, the model provides a simple, valid tool for making data-driven decisions about allocating resources that can be easily updated for future election campaigns.

Discussion

In this article, we present a model based on multi-criteria decision making for allocating funding during elections. The novelty of the present method lies in its use of the revised analytic hierarchy process in the context of political campaigns and use of input data that combines information from a confidential dataset and public databases. Furthermore, both the weighting techniques and weighted-sum model are characterised by their simplicity and clarity. Thus, campaign managers can easily follow the model's rationale. Using only basic mathematical tools, they can tweak the model to determine how changing the preferred criteria impact the original results.

The transparency of the suggested methodology is a valuable advantage for campaign managers. Given the enormous pressure that they face during campaigns, a simple, user-friendly dynamic tool that helps them make unbiased decisions about how budget allocation may be very useful for them.

The method is particularly relevant for small and/or new parties that have no established voter base and no previous data with which to make decisions about allocating their limited resources to achieve the best results. Comparisons of various methods for weighting criteria demonstrated that the RS and ROS techniques produced results that were closest to the actual outcomes of the election. Although the model is applicable to all parties in general, it is more relevant and even urgent for new parties, due to the extra obstacles they must overcome: the absence of a steady core of loyal constituents, the lack of proven political achievements, and the non-existence of federal funding. We maintain that our model can help new parties cope with these challenges by directing their budgets efficiently and rationally.

One can argue that a model for resource allocation should address expectations about the spending behaviour of competitors or, at the very least, consider how variations among competitors affect the strengths and weaknesses of the current model. Although it is outside the scope of our research, future studies can include consideration of this factor when analysing expenditure decisions made during political campaigns, such as responses to the behaviour of competitors and advertising on traditional media versus on social networks. Furthermore, future research can make additional refinements, such as by identifying the voting patterns of neighbourhoods or mixed localities, and by building a more focused and effective map of priorities when allocating campaign budgets. In addition, given actual elections results, different weighting techniques and/or criteria combinations may be tested to improve the model's performance.

Table A.1. Nominal and relative scores for the main localities (arranged in alphabetical order)

Name of locality	Ages 20–34		Country of Origin: Former Soviet Union		Highly Educated		Income	
	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score
Acre	24.9	0.87	17.6	0.48	13.95	0.22	6787	0.73
Afula	22.3	0.78	22.4	0.61	19.19	0.30	7446	0.80
Arad	21.1	0.74	32.3	0.88	25.14	0.39	7139	0.76
Ariel	28.4	0.99	35.4	0.96	29.65	0.46	8342	0.89
Ashdod	19.2	0.67	29.6	0.80	23.40	0.37	7997	0.86
Ashkelon	20.9	0.73	29.4	0.80	25.79	0.40	7633	0.82
Bat Yam	18.3	0.64	34.7	0.94	22.39	0.35	7016	0.75
Beer Sheva	22.0	0.77	25.8	0.70	27.20	0.43	8291	0.89
Beit Shean	22.2	0.77	5.2	0.14	11.22	0.18	6990	0.75
Beit Shemesh	20.5	0.72	17.1	0.46	25.38	0.40	6569	0.70
Carmiel	19.3	0.67	35.0	0.95	30.80	0.48	8347	0.89

Name of locality	Ages 20–34		Country of Origin: Former Soviet Union		Highly Educated		Income	
	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score
Dimona	21.7	0.75	16.4	0.45	11.21	0.18	8252	0.88
Eilat	24.4	0.85	21.3	0.58	16.73	0.26	7634	0.82
Gan Yavne	18.1	0.63	9.0	0.24	30.34	0.48	10943	0.83
Ganei Tikva	14.9	0.52	4.9	0.13	49.04	0.77	13436	0.56
Gedera	15.4	0.54	8.8	0.24	35.27	0.55	11462	0.77
Givat Shmuel	19.0	0.66	9.4	0.26	61.10	0.96	12470	0.66
Givatayim	20.7	0.72	7.7	0.21	59.67	0.93	12207	0.69
Hadera	20.3	0.71	24.1	0.65	25.45	0.40	8297	0.89
Haifa	27.3	0.95	23.4	0.64	42.27	0.66	9603	0.97
Herzliya	18.3	0.64	11.8	0.32	47.21	0.74	11532	0.76
Hod Hasharon	16.6	0.58	6.7	0.18	53.51	0.84	13179	0.59
Holon	18.3	0.64	17.0	0.46	25.98	0.41	8806	0.94
Jerusalem	23.6	0.82	8.2	0.22	27.66	0.43	7119	0.76
Kadima-Zoran	17.3	0.60	7.3	0.20	48.70	0.76	12316	0.68

Name of locality	Ages 20–34		Country of Origin: Former Soviet Union		Highly Educated		Income	
	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score
Kfar Saba	16.1	0.56	11.9	0.32	45.25	0.71	11751	0.74
Kfar Yona	18.0	0.63	8.6	0.23	40.98	0.64	10504	0.87
Kiryat Ata	20.6	0.72	17.4	0.47	19.87	0.31	8308	0.89
Kiryat Bialik	18.6	0.65	21.6	0.59	27.95	0.44	8843	0.95
Kiryat Gat	22.9	0.80	24.0	0.65	16.71	0.26	6670	0.71
Kiryat Malachi	25.5	0.89	15.7	0.43	10.86	0.17	6018	0.64
Kiryat Motzkin	18.3	0.64	22.4	0.61	29.01	0.45	9359	1.00
Kiryat Ono	14.8	0.51	6.9	0.19	46.62	0.73	13664	0.54
Kiryat Shmona	23.8	0.83	15.1	0.41	16.84	0.26	7221	0.77
Kiryat Tiv'on	16.1	0.56	5.3	0.14	51.91	0.81	12175	0.70
Kiryat Yam	18.8	0.65	35.3	0.96	21.97	0.34	7346	0.79
Lod	21.9	0.76	21.4	0.58	17.08	0.27	6943	0.74
Ma'ale Adumim	21.5	0.75	15.4	0.42	29.90	0.47	8936	0.96
Maalot-Tarshiha	22.6	0.79	30.9	0.84	23.88	0.37	7745	0.83

Name of locality	Ages 20–34		Country of Origin: Former Soviet Union		Highly Educated		Income	
	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score
Mevaseret Zion	20.8	0.73	9.2	0.25	40.37	0.63	11504	0.77
Migdal Haemek	20.2	0.71	24.5	0.67	20.68	0.32	6931	0.74
Modi'in Maccabim-Reut	18.9	0.66	10.5	0.29	57.98	0.91	14217	0.48
Nahariya	18.2	0.63	20.1	0.55	28.95	0.45	9176	0.98
Nazareth Illit	22.9	0.80	36.8	1.00	27.92	0.44	7101	0.76
Nesher	21.6	0.75	28.0	0.76	42.09	0.66	9403	0.99
Ness Ziona	15.0	0.52	6.6	0.18	36.95	0.58	12814	0.63
Netanya	18.7	0.65	27.5	0.75	29.22	0.46	8275	0.89
Netivot	22.9	0.80	11.8	0.32	15.78	0.25	6314	0.68
Ofakim	24.8	0.86	20.2	0.55	11.17	0.17	6405	0.69
Or Akiva	21.2	0.74	29.8	0.81	18.37	0.29	7117	0.76
Or Yehuda	21.7	0.76	14.3	0.39	17.17	0.27	7827	0.84
Pardes Hana	17.0	0.59	12.5	0.34	34.58	0.54	10013	0.93
Petah Tikva	17.5	0.61	18.8	0.51	35.67	0.56	9910	0.94

Name of locality	Ages 20–34		Country of Origin: Former Soviet Union		Highly Educated		Income	
	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score
Raanana	17.3	0.60	19.0	0.52	55.60	0.87	12229	0.69
Ramat Gan	21.2	0.74	11.7	0.32	45.00	0.70	10679	0.86
Ramat Hasharon	14.5	0.50	4.9	0.13	55.69	0.87	13937	0.51
Ramla	24.4	0.85	19.2	0.52	10.39	0.16	6990	0.75
Rehovot	18.6	0.65	16.1	0.44	40.04	0.63	10187	0.91
Rishon Le'zion	20.2	0.70	18.8	0.51	31.18	0.49	9976	0.93
Rosh HaAyin	22.3	0.78	5.5	0.15	32.40	0.51	10105	0.92
Sderot	26.8	0.94	25.3	0.69	16.29	0.26	6962	0.75
Shoham	19.2	0.67	4.2	0.11	63.85	1.00	14726	0.42
Tel Aviv Jaffa	28.7	1.00	14.0	0.38	48.73	0.76	10808	0.84
Tiberias	21.1	0.74	12.4	0.34	12.46	0.20	6227	0.67
Tirat Carmel	22.1	0.77	16.5	0.45	12.70	0.20	7357	0.79
Yavne	21.2	0.74	10.3	0.28	22.42	0.35	9619	0.97
Yehud	17.8	0.62	5.7	0.15	33.01	0.52	11030	0.82

Name of locality	Ages 20–34		Country of Origin: Former Soviet Union		Highly Educated		Income	
	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score	Nominal Score	Relative Score
Yokneam Illith	17.5	0.61	21.1	0.57	40.35	0.63	10779	0.85
Zefat	21.7	0.76	12.8	0.35	19.16	0.30	5862	0.63
Zichron Yaakov	16.7	0.58	10.7	0.29	53.19	0.83	13492	0.55
Maximum nominal score	28.7		36.8		63.9		9336 (average)	

Table A.2. scores, ranking and voting percentage for "Z"

Name of locality	EW		RS		ROS		Voting percentage for "z"
	Nominal score	Rank	Nominal score	Rank	Nominal score	Rank	
Acre	57.3%	45	60.7%	33	65.9%	33	2.1%
Afula	62.1%	31	63.4%	21	66.4%	21	3.2%
Arad	69.3%	9	71.3%	8	72.6%	8	2.8%
Ariel	82.8%	1	86.7%	1	90.0%	1	7.4%
Ashdod	67.5%	14	66.9%	15	67.4%	15	2.8%
Ashkelon	68.7%	10	69.3%	11	70.5%	11	3.5%
Bat Yam	67.1%	15	68.4%	13	68.6%	13	2.9%
Beer Sheva	69.6%	8	69.1%	12	70.7%	12	4.3%
Beit Shean	46.0%	70	46.2%	67	51.4%	67	2.4%
Beit Shemesh	57.0%	47	57.5%	43	60.0%	43	3.4%
Carmiel	75.0%	4	74.1%	6	73.5%	6	3.2%
Dimona	56.5%	51	55.9%	48	59.5%	48	3.2%
Eilat	62.7%	30	64.8%	18	68.9%	18	4.0%
Gan Yavne	54.4%	59	50.3%	61	51.5%	61	3.7%
Ganei Tikva	49.5%	66	45.7%	69	45.3%	69	2.1%
Gedera	52.5%	62	47.4%	65	47.3%	65	3.1%
Givat Shmuel	63.5%	29	60.0%	37	59.6%	37	3.8%
Givatayim	63.9%	28	60.7%	31	61.2%	31	2.1%
Hadera	66.3%	18	64.9%	17	66.0%	17	3.0%
Haifa	80.5%	2	80.0%	2	82.4%	2	2.3%
Herzliya	61.5%	32	57.5%	42	57.4%	42	2.1%
Hod Hasharon	54.7%	58	51.2%	60	51.0%	60	1.9%
Holon	61.2%	33	56.9%	44	57.5%	44	2.7%
Jerusalem	56.1%	54	56.0%	47	60.1%	47	2.7%
Kadima-Zoran	56.1%	53	52.1%	59	52.2%	59	2.1%
Kfar Saba	58.4%	43	53.8%	55	53.0%	55	2.2%
Kfar Yona	59.4%	38	53.7%	56	53.8%	56	3.1%

Name of locality	EW		RS		ROS		Voting percentage for "z"
	Nominal score	Rank	Nominal score	Rank	Nominal score	Rank	
Kiryat Ata	59.8%	37	58.1%	40	60.4%	40	2.9%
Kiryat Bialik	65.5%	22	61.8%	26	62.0%	26	2.8%
Kiryat Gat	60.7%	35	63.9%	19	67.6%	19	3.4%
Kiryat Malachi	53.3%	60	58.3%	39	64.4%	39	3.6%
Kiryat Motzkin	67.5%	13	62.9%	22	62.7%	22	2.9%
Kiryat Ono	49.2%	67	46.2%	68	45.9%	68	1.8%
Kiryat Shmona	56.9%	48	58.4%	38	62.9%	38	3.3%
Kiryat Tiv'on	55.4%	55	50.1%	63	49.4%	63	1.9%
Kiryat Yam	68.6%	11	69.7%	10	70.0%	10	3.1%
Lod	58.9%	40	60.8%	30	64.0%	30	3.1%
Ma'ale Adumim	64.8%	27	61.4%	28	63.1%	28	5.0%
Maalot-Tarshiha	70.8%	7	72.5%	7	74.5%	7	3.5%
Mevaseret Zion	59.4%	39	56.8%	45	58.6%	45	2.2%
Migdal Haemek	61.0%	34	62.1%	25	64.2%	25	3.0%
Modi'in Maccabim-Reut	58.2%	44	57.8%	41	58.3%	41	2.8%
Nahariya	65.4%	25	60.6%	34	60.5%	34	3.1%
Nazareth Illit	74.9%	5	78.2%	3	79.7%	3	3.8%
Nesher	79.1%	3	76.0%	4	75.6%	4	3.3%
Ness Ziona	47.7%	69	44.1%	70	44.5%	70	2.4%
Netanya	68.6%	12	66.5%	16	66.4%	16	3.0%
Netivot	51.1%	63	53.3%	57	58.2%	57	2.5%
Ofakim	56.8%	49	61.4%	29	66.7%	29	3.2%

Name of locality	EW		RS		ROS		Voting percentage for "z"
	Nominal score	Rank	Nominal score	Rank	Nominal score	Rank	
Or Akiva	64.9%	26	67.2%	14	69.3%	14	3.5%
Or Yehuda	56.3%	52	55.7%	49	59.1%	49	2.3%
Pardes Hana	60.0%	36	53.9%	54	53.7%	54	2.8%
Petah Tikva	65.5%	23	60.3%	36	59.7%	36	2.9%
Raanana	67.0%	16	63.9%	20	62.4%	20	2.4%
Ramat Gan	65.4%	24	61.8%	27	62.7%	27	2.7%
Ramat Hasharon	50.4%	65	46.7%	66	45.8%	66	1.2%
Ramla	57.1%	46	60.4%	35	65.5%	35	2.6%
Rehovot	65.5%	21	60.7%	32	60.5%	32	3.1%
Rishon Le'zion	65.8%	19	62.5%	24	63.4%	24	2.8%
Rosh HaAyin	58.8%	41	55.0%	50	57.7%	50	3.2%
Sderot	65.6%	20	70.6%	9	75.7%	9	4.4%
Shoham	55.1%	57	54.4%	52	55.2%	52	3.0%
Tel Aviv Jaffa	74.6%	6	75.1%	5	78.8%	5	2.0%
Tiberias	48.4%	68	50.1%	62	54.4%	62	2.5%
Tirat Carmel	55.1%	56	56.1%	46	60.1%	46	3.1%
Yavne	58.4%	42	54.6%	51	57.2%	51	3.0%
Yehud	52.8%	61	48.0%	64	49.2%	64	2.3%
Yokneam Illith	66.5%	17	62.7%	23	61.8%	23	3.6%
Zefat	50.8%	64	53.0%	58	57.2%	58	3.3%
Zichron Yaakov	56.5%	50	54.3%	53	53.9%	53	2.1%

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The Politics of Civil Society Forms: Urban Environmental Activists and Democracy in Jakarta[1]

Muhammad Djindan[2], Aggalih Bayu Muh. Kamim[3], Irwan Harjanto[3]

Abstract

Despite the ongoing debate regarding how and to what extent civil society enhances democratic practices, it is generally agreed that there is a reasonable link between civil society and democracy under certain conditions. This paper aims to explore the politics of civil society forms and understand their contribution to the maintenance of democratic practices in Jakarta. Building on a neo-Tocquevillian understanding of civil society, this article analyses urban environmental activists' strategic adoption of voluntary associations and environmental spin-off campaigns as forms of civic engagement to improve public policy. This paper asks how and to what extent these forms of civic engagement provide alternative understandings of civil society's efforts to promote local democracy. We argue that urban environmental activists' spin-off campaigns and voluntary associations represent a particular form of civil society politics, and thus provide different routes to understand local democracy by facilitating diagonal accountability mechanisms. However, further analysis found that the forms adopted by urban environmental activists suffer horizontal and vertical accountability problems similar to those frequently found in more established forms of civil society (e.g. non-government organisations). Nonetheless, the discussion in this paper illustrates civil society's ingenuity in pushing for democratic practices amidst Indonesia's 'democratic recession'.

Keywords: civil society; democracy; environment; forms; strategy.

Introduction

The role of civil society in democracy is one of the most studied topics in the literature on political science. The seminal publication of Diamond (1994) pushed political scientists to further investigate the potential role of civil society in promoting democratic values. In Indonesia, this has led scholars to spend their time investigating various forms of civil society, such as social movements (e.g., Nyman, 2006) or scrutinising civil society through the works of non-governmental organisations (e.g., Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, & Rapp, 2010; Hadiwinata, 2003). Other scholars have held that the most appropriate interpretation of civil society's role in Indonesia lies in mass faith-based organisations such as Muhammadiyah (e.g., Fuad, 2002) or Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) (e.g., Bush, 2002).

The choice to focus and emphasise particular forms of civil society is somehow linked to the malleability of civil society as a concept. Civil society is often defined as encompassing everything except the state and market, and thus is quite expansive (Jensen, 2011). There is nothing wrong with such an open-ended idea of civil society, so long as the analysis is sensitive to the different configurations of power relations between various civil society entities (Hadiz, 2004). Although previous studies have offered an often synonymous understanding of civil society and unstructured activism in Indonesia (Harney & Olivia, 2003), the use of the lens of civil society to understand informal activism—especially this activism's implication for democracy—remains limited in the literature. This article scrutinises urban environmental activists' use of voluntary associations and spin-off campaigns in

Jakarta. It asks how, and to what extent, these forms of civic engagement provide an alternative understanding of civil society and its efforts to promote local democracy.

Using two Jakarta-based organisations—the voluntary association *Koalisi Pejalan Kaki* (literally Pedestrian Coalition, henceforth KPoK) and the spin-off campaign *Koalisi Penghapusan Bensin Bertimbal* (literally Coalition to Abolish Leaded Gasoline, henceforth KPBB)—this paper aims to explore the politics of civil society forms and their contribution to the maintenance of democratic practices. Jakarta has been chosen because the city is often considered the centre of civil society activities in Indonesia (Antlöv, Ibrahim, & Tuijl, 2006; Lay, 2017). Data collection was conducted between October 2020 and June 2021. Primary data for this paper were collected through online interviews with KPoK and KPBB activists, while secondary data were collected by reviewing relevant literature, including news stories, social media campaign posts, and other documents available online.

Despite receiving little acknowledgement in key publications regarding the environmental movement and environmental non-government organisations in Indonesia (e.g., Nomura, 2007), we argue that urban environmental activists' spin-off campaigns and voluntary associations represent particular forms of civil society politics, and that they provide an alternative route for understanding local democracy through their ability to facilitate diagonal accountability. Aside from expanding the horizon of civil society in Indonesia, this discussion is important given the bleak assessment of democracy in Indonesia (Mietzner, 2020). In a way,

scrutinising civil society activities outside the major non-government organisations and the other 'usual suspects' is necessary to advance the idea of a more contextually grounded democracy (Santoso & Tapiheru, 2017). Furthermore, without totally rejecting critical assessments of democracy's current state in Indonesia, this article proposes maintaining 'cautious optimism' (Weiss, 2020) regarding environmental activists' creativity in pushing for democratisation.

At the same time, it should be noted that voluntary association and spin-off environmental campaigns in urban settings are relatively forgotten in discussions of civil society for reasons that are not related directly to its inherent democratic quality. Rather, their omission is triggered mostly by practical concerns. For example, scholars simply focus on the most obvious entities that can be easily understood as representative and uncontested manifestations of civil society. In the context of civil society and environmental activism, it is easier and more obvious to discuss popular non-governmental organisations such as WALHI, KEHATI, etc. This problem is exacerbated by the tendency to study environmental issues that are perceived as occurring mostly in rural areas (e.g., Lee Peluso, Afiff, & Rachman, 2008). This is not to say that the focus or choices of previous studies are wrong; rather, we reckon that it is time to end the simplification and take voluntary associations and spin-off campaigns as subjects of inquiry.

Alagappa (2004) explains that contemporary understandings of civil society fall into two major categories: neo-Tocquevillian (or liberal-democracy) and the New Left. Where New Left scholars examine civil society by emphasising its role in preventing the expansion of state and capitalist market forces into the social realm, the neo-Tocquevillian tradition does not necessarily see the state or market as intrusive (Alagappa, 2004). In the neo-Tocquevillian tradition, civil society does not simply safeguard the interests of society but balances the interests of the state and market with those of society. As such, many of the academic works that use a neo-Tocquevillian lens focus on civil society's contribution to democratisation within state institutions—particularly in policymaking.

At the core of the neo-Tocquevillian notion of civil society is the notion of civic community, which refers to the "patterns of civic involvement and social solidarity" (Putnam & Leonardi, 1993: 83). Unlike studies that emphasise social capital as the most important tenet of the neo-Tocquevillian tradition (e.g. Alagappa, 2004; Edwards & Foley, 2016; Siisiainen, 2003), this paper focuses more on the notion of 'civic community' because it is concerned directly with the way scholars interpret the boundaries of civil society. Putnam and Leonardi (1993) identify the civic community as having several characteristics, i.e. civic engagement; political equality; solidarity, trust, and tolerance; and associations. Although these components are equally important, this paper—drawing from the case of KPBB and KPoK—will focus primarily on the question of association, as the social structure that facilitates cooperation (civic engagement). The other three characteristics are discussed only as starting points.

The paper proceeds by explaining KPBB and KPoK as "horizontal networks of

civic engagement" (Putnam & Leonardi, 1993: 176). Subsequently, KPBB and KPoK are analysed within the context of Indonesian civil society to understand these movements' political forms within the broader typology of such movements. Afterwards, matters of accountability and urban environmental activism are elaborated to understand the movements' potential for and pitfalls in enhancing democracy at the local level. This article concludes by summarising the overall discussion.

Spin-off campaigns and voluntary associations

Putnam emphasises the importance of associations and social networks in practising and reinforcing the norms and values of the civic community. To do so, associations must be horizontal, "...bringing together agents of equivalent status and power" (Putnam & Leonardi, 1993: 173). As will be explained below, KPBB and KPoK provide examples of distinctive social structures that facilitate civic engagement 'internally' (amongst members) and 'externally' (throughout the broader polity) (Putnam & Leonardi, 1993).

KPBB was conceived in 1996, after environmental NGOs such as WALHI and Yayasan KEHATI strategized different means of advancing environmental protection in Indonesia. Interviews with one activist revealed that, during that time, activists started to develop a plan for managing air pollution—one of Indonesia's most pressing environmental problems. Some activists were subsequently tasked with adapting and operationalising this strategic plan in an urban context, and these activists chose to focus on controlling air pollution through traffic and transportation management. To tackle this issue, it was then agreed that the environmental NGOs would establish a coalition—under the banner of the Coalition to Abolish Leaded Gasoline (KPBB)—that focused on abolishing leaded gasoline.

Despite tracing its roots to environmental NGOs, KPBB has such a niche focus that its activists sought to build and strengthen an identity independent of their parent organisations. Taking into account KPBB's very specific focus and flexibility in defining its advocacy strategies, as well as the interim nature of its form, it is fair to say that the coalition has become a sort of spin-off campaign for urban environmental activists. Even years later, KPBB remains very active, at least through the activists who continue to carry its banners during discussions with various parties in Jakarta. As observed in other cases by Harney and Olivia (2003), activism can create vibrancy in civil society organisations; as such, regardless of its nature as a spin-off campaign, KPBB has as much value in facilitating civic engagement through activism as more established organisations.

To understand the environmental issues involved in urban traffic management, KPBB draws extensively from existing academic literature. To support its cause, it even conducts independent studies and collects secondary data. From these studies, by citing studies that elucidate air pollution's effect on the health of urban populations, KPBB has made explicit some implicit problems, including the exponential growth of motor vehicles in Jakarta, the increased fuel consumption of these vehicles, and the severity of air pollution (Cohen et al., 2005).

At the core of their position is the ambition to develop a more sustainable form of urban mobility. This requires a fundamental change in city dwellers' behaviour, from mobility practices that depend heavily on fossil fuels to ones that reduce or limit the use of gasoline, as well as promoting more environmentally friendly modes of transportation (such as public transportation) over the more individual mobility choices popular among the public.

From a presentation given by a KPBB activist, it is apparent that they understand the structural barriers that limit the public's willingness to embrace more sustainable mobility practices. In other words, they do not simply attribute the unsustainability of urban mobility problems to the city's population, but rather lament the public policy directions that contribute to air pollution in Jakarta. Therefore, in addition to conducting public campaigns, KPBB has actively criticised local government policies that undermine their cause and promoted the improvement of public urban transportation management. This is another important trait of neo-Tocquevillian civil society that can be observed in KPBB.

One of the most significant results of KPBB's advocacy to improve public policy is the adoption of Car Free Day (CFD) in Jakarta, a policy that was later followed by Indonesia's other major cities. It started by limiting motor vehicle access to some of Jakarta's streets during holidays. Taking into account activists' familiarity with public street demonstrations, they began their campaign by unilaterally closing several streets in Jakarta and campaigning to raise public awareness. Such efforts were not successful; the authorities immediately reprimanded the activists for disrupting the busy traffic of Jakarta's major streets.

Regardless of such setbacks, KPBB activists believed that successful street closure would set a precedent for limiting the number of vehicles, thereby reducing air pollution in the city. In a further bid to promote this policy, in 2001, KPBB held several meetings with Jakarta's municipal administrators and proposed a CFD programme that also included public awareness campaigns. Although their ideas were not well received by the Office of Transportation in Jakarta, this did not stop them from continuing to promote their ideas to government authorities.

One KPBB activist recalled that, at that time, the Coalition worked with the Directorate of Traffic Management Control at the DKI Jakarta Police to increase clean energy uptake in public transportation. Through these activities, KPBB floated its CFD idea to the police leadership. Activists argued that temporary street closure and public awareness campaigns would also benefit authorities, as it would provide them with an arena to promote safe and responsible driving to the general public. Such a creative frame suited the interests of the Jakarta police, and they agreed to begin implementing a CFD policy on 22 September 2002.

During the initial implementation of CFD, KPBB received financial support from the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) and other international organisations. By 2004, KPBB began to limit its involvement in the direct arrangement of CFD and transfer this role to the Jakarta municipal government. To attract crowds, the government began providing free entertainment and shows for visitors; street vendors also began selling

various food and non-food items to visitors. Today, CFD activities on Sudirman and Thamrin Streets—though initially seen as another disturbance by Jakarta's citizens—bring together thousands of bicyclists and pedestrians. These activities offer an important social venue for holidaymakers as well as a profitable source of income for street vendors.

Despite the Jakarta government's adoption of CFD, KPBB activists are still far from satisfied with the programme's implementation, as the current manifestation does not reflect the public awareness campaign that had been originally proposed. According to a KPBB activist, CFD has been reduced to a ceremonial and recreational event without any educational value. Instead of providing a venue for public education, CFD is sometimes used by political elites as an arena for demonstrating their strengths (Santoso, 2018). Perhaps the most famous example is the 'Action to Defend Islam' (commonly known as the 212 Movement) during the 2016 gubernatorial election, which took place in and around the CFD area (Susilowati, Yunus, & Sholeh, 2019). Moreover, activists have yet to see any serious improvement in public infrastructure development, let alone improved urban mobility in Jakarta. This has led KPBB activists to explore other avenues for continuing their agenda and developing a more sustainable urban transportation management policy.

This has included the aforementioned Pedestrians' Coalition (KPoK), established on 22 July 2012 in conjunction with public transportation users in Jakarta. According to our interviews with one of its founders, KPoK is a voluntary association established by people who frequently use Jakarta's public transportation. This includes activists who were already members of KRLMania (a community of commuter line users) and environmental activists deemed by their peers to have expertise in matters of sustainability.

The decision to form KPoK was a culmination of activists' collective disappointment with the difficulties they faced when walking from their homes to commuter line stations or from said station to their offices. It is quite common in Jakarta to see motorcycles that drive on the sidewalks rather than remain stuck in the city's frequent traffic jams. This situation is further aggravated by street vendors' competition for the same roadside spaces.

Against this backdrop, KPoK was established to ensure that pedestrians' rights on the streets are taken into account by policymakers and respected by others. To do so, it has directed several campaigns at other users of the city streets. For example, KPoK often conducts public campaigns on Friday afternoons to raise awareness about pedestrians' rights on the streets by gathering their members (Antara, 2018). It has also developed an application for pedestrians to submit complaints about the difficulties that they encounter when walking. At the same time, social media campaigns play an important role in raising public awareness about pedestrian rights by exposing the problems faced by pedestrians (such as the misuse of sidewalks by motorcyclists). KPoK activists believe that walking is the most basic means of transportation, and can be performed by almost everyone. Although not urban residents can buy a motorcycle or automobile, most can use their legs to

move from Point A to Point B by simply walking.

KPoK activists became the centre of public attention in 2008 when they uploaded a video to YouTube showing one of their activists who, while campaigning for pedestrians' rights on a city sidewalk, was hit by a motorcyclist offended by the campaign (Mardiastuti, 2008). On this occasion, the coordinator of KPoK clarified that the activist in the story had already reprimanded motorcyclists politely about their misuse of pedestrian spaces, but the harassment continued, ultimately resulting in the incident. Another incident that highlighted the tense and adversarial relationship between activists and motorcyclists, who are often seen as violating the rights of pedestrians, occurred when activists deliberately used the seats of motorcycles parked on zebra crosses to walk across these intersections (Nanda, 2021).

As with KPBB, KPoK has also actively pushed the local government to pay greater attention to the well-being of pedestrians. KPoK's policy agenda revolves around improving infrastructure for pedestrians by improving the sidewalks of Jakarta. Through an independent study, for example, KPoK identified more than 100 areas that are deadly for pedestrians, and noted that only 900 kilometres of Jakarta's 7,200 kilometres of road have sidewalks. KPoK also criticised the local government's policy of allowing street vendors to use sidewalks and pedestrian zones in South Jakarta (Kusumaputra, 2018). Through their informal networks, activists also tried to push the members of the provincial legislature to allocate funds for pedestrian development in Jakarta. As a result, the government of Jakarta promised to build approximately 2,600 kilometres of sidewalk.

Compared to KPBB, which consists mostly of environmental activists, KPoK's membership is relatively broad. Its members include public transportation users from all walks of life, from lecturers in private universities, IT staff in private companies, to professionals with full-time jobs. KPoK has managed to broaden its support base partly by building its agenda around practical grievances that public transportation users in Jakarta face every day. KPoK's voluntary nature is also emphasised by identifying its members as volunteers. Activists also claim that they often use their own financial resources, free time, and skills for KPoK activities, without receiving any compensation in return.

To some extent, the different settings of KPBB and KPoK illustrate the need for flexibility in urban environmental activists' responses to the dynamics of their situation. This includes the ability to reinterpret their values (i.e., sustainability) and identify new focuses to broaden support for their cause. They managed, for example, to translate the very technical problem of leaded gasoline into the topic of pedestrian rights, which was more appealing to the urban population. Furthermore, though KPBB mainly involved environmental activists with very limited social support (for elaboration of this problem, see Nomura, 2007), it remedied this problem by reaching out to the emerging group of middle-class pedestrians. In other words, the problem of limited representation—prominent in environmental NGOs and movements in the Global South—was rectified through the establishment of KPoK. At the same time,

inviting further participation from specific groups such as pedestrians from various walks of life increased KPoK's legitimacy in front of the policymakers (Rother, 2015).

Notwithstanding these differences, KPBB and KPoK have two significant similarities. First, both emphasise activism, thereby representing civil society's role in ensuring the diagonal accountability of the state (Mietzner, 2020). Second, both have taken the theme of sustainable transportation and mobility as their core norm. As such, both voluntary associations and spin-off campaigns can be understood as forms of urban environmental activism that use similar strategies for conducting public policy advocacy. To further locate this urban environmental activism within the broader literature on civil society in Indonesia, the next section analyses these coalitions' position vis-à-vis more established understandings of civil society in the literature.

The politics of civil society forms

Rother (2015: 8) contends that "when organisations choose one of these labels for themselves, it might be not only to identify who they are, but also to distance themselves from others: for example, self-proclaimed grassroots migrant domestic worker organisations in Hong Kong explicitly distance themselves from the 'NGOism' of other migrant organisations." In this sense, each claimed identity—be it an organisation, an association, or a grass-roots movement—serves as a boundary-defining terminology. This section shows that KPBB and KPoK have not simply taken random forms, but rather made deliberate choices. To explore this point further, it is useful to start with Beittinger-Lee's (2013) typology of civil society in Indonesia.

Disregarding the concept of 'uncivil society', which is beyond the scope of this article, Beittinger-Lee (2013) identifies three models of civil society in Indonesia, based on their potential role for political change: 1) civic associations, professional associations, etc.; 2) development NGOs, tolerant religious organisations, etc.; 3) movements and non-government organisations. She held that the first and second models are both politically ambivalent, while the third model is pro-democratic, reformist, and fosters political change. The distinction between the first and second models is made based on their capacity to affect political change: the first model "may benefit the building of social capital", whereas the second "foster[s] civic virtues and empowerment" (Beittinger-Lee, 2013: 117). It is obvious that, according to Beittinger-Lee (2013), the civic values deemed to be most potent for political change are attributed to the third model of civil society. The first model, meanwhile, is relatively less likely to generate political change, and the second model falls somewhere in between.

On the surface, urban environmental activism such as KPBB and KPoK seems to fit Beittinger-Lee's first model of civil society. KPBB is a spin-off campaign that, from an institutional standpoint, does not seem well-suited to the traditional definition of development (Hadiwinata, 2003) or environmental NGOs in Indonesia (Nomura, 2007). Meanwhile, KPoK is seen ostensibly as a mere voluntary association. Furthermore, these urban environmental activists do contribute to fostering social capital via their civic engagement and activism. However, the results of such

environmental activism should not be reduced to simply 'fostering social capital', as explained in the first model of civil society. KPBB's ability to advocate for CFD, despite its shortcomings at the later stages, demonstrated that these activists could instigate concrete policy changes, which became even more important after CFD policies were subsequently adopted by Indonesia's other major cities. KPoK's advocacy, similarly, increased the local government's commitment to accelerating the pedestrian development of Jakarta. Its objective of improving and realising pedestrians' rights through volunteer activities was also replicated in other cities; KPoK activists note, for example, that similar voluntary associations have emerged in cities such as Yogyakarta and Bandung. Furthermore, urban environmental activists' ability to alternate between KPBB and KPoK demonstrated their strategy's potential for policy change. As such, placing KPBB and KPoK within Beittinger-Lee's first model of civil society does not really do justice to the ingenuity of their urban environmental activism.

Observers have criticised civil society in Indonesia for several reasons. For example, directing their criticism primarily towards the second model of civil society, Antlöv et al. (2010) mention that civil society in Indonesia has several acute problems such as 'overreliance on confrontational strategies' and 'inability to cooperate to leverage impact'. Similarly, and again focusing on the second model of civil society, Antlöv, Brinkerhoff, and Rapp (2008) lament that civil society operations are heavily dependent on international donors, which results in most NGOs collapsing once they can no longer secure funding. In the context of KPBB and KPoK,

however, such criticism does not seem applicable. In promoting CFD policies and budget allocation for pedestrian development, both KPBB and KPoK worked closely with the state institutions. Neither shied away from working with authorities to leverage their impact, and thus did not rely solely on confrontational strategies. Furthermore, KPBB continued its activism even after it stopped receiving foreign funding (i.e., from UNEP). KPoK has gone even further, mostly funding its own campaigns and advocacy independently. These experiences suggest that it would be problematic to include KPBB and KPoK in Beittinger-Lee's second model of civil society.

To frame their third model of civil society, Beittinger-Lee borrows the distinction between development (*pembangunan*) NGOs and social movement (*gerakan*) groups made by Hadiwinata (2003). Where development NGOs focus on "improving equity and people's participation by promoting small-scale business and professional management in partnership with the government", social movement groups typically have "the goal of strengthening, empowering, and mobilising the grassroots for popular resistance against injustice" (Beittinger-Lee, 2013: 60). Neither KPBB nor KPoK could be said to fit this description. To start, neither necessarily has a legitimate claim to represent environmental social movement in Indonesia vis-à-vis other environmental organisations that explicitly convey their environmental principles to the public. Furthermore, rather than using the discourse of 'resistance' and 'injustice', KPBB and KPoK enjoy close collaboration with authorities, including the police—who

are essentially expressions of the state's banal authority in Jakarta's busy streets. In other words, the third model of civil society, which draws mostly from New Left understandings, does not fit KPBB and KPoK well. These coalitions are much more suitably understood as part of the liberal neo-Tocquevillian civil society.

Turning to a point made by Rother (2015), it is fair to say that the forms of KPBB and KPoK do not neatly fit into any of Beittinger-Lee's models of Indonesian civil society. This could be explained as part of urban environmental activists' strategy of defining their activism while simultaneously distancing themselves from the more traditional notions of (environmental) civil society in Indonesia. The environmental activists of KPBB and KPoK took forms that presented their activism as surpassing that expected from the first model of civil society. At the same time, environmental activists also demonstrated that they do not suffer the same problems as the second model of civil society, and—in contrast to the New Left-leaning third model—employed a liberal approach to activism. These urban environmental activists' strategies could be interpreted as part of a liberal–progressive experiment in an urban setting, as demonstrated in another case. As in a case studied by Savirani et al. (2021), Jakarta's urban context, with discontent middle-class youths who are supportive of popular environmental causes, made it possible for environmental activists to experiment. Such an experiment would be difficult in rural settings, predominantly because of the relative absence of middle-class professionals in such areas (Ito, 2011).

This analysis does not intend to portray KPBB and KPoK as ultimate forms of liberal civil society, or as silver bullets for democratisation in urban contexts. It simply seeks to point out that, despite being compatible with neo-Tocquevillian civil society, KPBB and KPoK do not sit well with the existing typology of Indonesian civil society. Both manifest as strategic choices made by the urban environmental activists to define and distance themselves from the other civil society entities. As will be discussed below, it is worth noting that both KPPB and KPoK suffer several of the accountability problems that characterise broader Indonesian civil society.

Accountability and Democracy

Discussing civil society in the Global South, Bryant and Bailey (1997) make an important distinction between those that work on environmental issues and those that focus on more general questions of development. While development NGOs try to increase the productivity of society and ensure that marginalised communities are better integrated into the economy, environmental civil society has the normative stance of conserving or protecting the environment (Bryant & Bailey, 1997). Sometimes, this position has placed environmental civil society at odds with communities oriented towards exploiting natural resources for development regardless of its environmental effects. Comparing environmental NGOs in the Global North with those based in Indonesia, Nomura (2007) also notes differences in terms of resource mobilisation. Most environmental NGOs in the Global North have the ability to anchor their activism in the domestic community, and they thus receive individual donations or support through business activities (e.g., charity shops and

the second-hand markets established by environmental NGOs). On the other hand, environmental organisations in the Global South do not yet to have the ability to mobilise resources from the broader domestic community, and rely mostly on foreign donors (Nomura, 2007). The combination of environmental NGOs' relatively weak linkages and their occasional position at odds with broader development discourses have raised legitimate concerns about their representation of and, in turn, accountability to the broader polity.

The issue of public representation is more apparent in the case of KPBB, which consists mainly of urban environmental activists, than in KPoK, which mobilised a broader section of urban public transportation users. Unlike KPoK, which claims to fund its activism independently, KPBB has received financial support from international donors in some of its advocacy agendas. As such, it is reasonable to question the extent to which KPBB's activism represents the aspirations and concerns of the broader Jakarta community, and to which extent they merely reflect the objectives of international donors. For example, when facing setbacks in its promotion of CFD policies to the Jakarta government, KPBB chose not to expand its popular support (thereby increasing representativeness and legitimacy) but to reach out to another state agency. Furthermore, despite having stimulated policy output through advocacy, KPBB also acknowledged that it lost the battle to use CFD to transform the urban community's mobility practices, and thus failed to realise its goal of conducting public awareness campaigns and improving efforts to reduce air pollution in

Jakarta. This can be seen as a consequence of KPBB's inability to establish vertical accountability (through popular support) in advancing its cause (Newell & Wheeler, 2006). As such, KPBB's promotion of the CFD policy suffered from the same elitist tendencies that are often found in more traditional civil society organisations (Hadiwinata, 2003); indeed, KPBB's elitist tendencies and problems with vertical accountability could even be considered graver, as at least development NGOs have an obvious basis in particular marginalised communities and promote the relatively less contentious norm of developmentalism.

As we have discussed above, the form taken by KPoK was designed to solve these problems of representation and vertical accountability. By appealing to pedestrians, who were deemed to be marginalised in Jakarta society, KPoK sought to increase popular support for its cause. Rather than using purely environmental concerns as the basis for its norms and activities (as in KPBB), KPoK generated support through the rights-based approach that is commonly employed by development NGOs and does not directly oppose the ideas of developmentalism and modernisation. Nonetheless, despite its relative success in cultivating the participation of urban pedestrians, KPoK's activism also resulted in adversarial reactions from the motorcyclists and street vendors who used the sidewalks for their own interests. Such tensions, regardless of the substantive debates between KPoK, street vendors, and motorcyclists regarding 'the appropriate' use of sidewalks, indicate that KPoK's campaign failed to secure horizontal accountability (Newell & Wheeler, 2006). In

other words, by strengthening its own basis to support its advocacy, KPoK also diminished its accountability toward other social groups that were actively competing to claim their rights over the city's sidewalks. Such problems with horizontal accountability are common in more established development NGOs (Harney & Olivia, 2003).

Understanding KPBB's vertical accountability deficit and KPoK's problem with horizontal accountability offers an understanding of the trade-off between the particular forms of civil society adopted by urban environmental activists and accountability problems that arise from this choice. A spin-off campaign with a representation problem had vertical accountability issues, while a voluntary association with fewer problems of representation faced problems with horizontal accountability. Arguably, Jakarta's urban environmental activists did not necessarily choose one form over another in their work; rather, they employed these forms simultaneously, depending on the situation. Furthermore, these urban environmental activists' willingness to adopt different forms of civil society demonstrated their capacity to ostensibly address the criticism directed toward more traditional forms of civil society.

Discussing Indonesia's transition to democracy more than a decade ago, Heryanto (2004) noted that detached foreign analysts and Indonesian scholars or activists who were actively involved in democratisation held diverging views about the fate of democracy in the country. Foreign analysts, he wrote, tended to be more sceptical about the future of democracy in Indonesia than Indonesian scholars, who were generally more optimistic. Although changes have occurred, such discrepancy seems to persist today. Claims of "illiberal democracy" in contemporary Indonesia are prominent among foreign analysts (e.g. Bourchier, 2014; Diprose, McRae, & Hadiz, 2019; Hadiz, 2018), while Indonesian scholars—despite understanding the risk of particularism—continue to plea for a contextual and more substantial measurement of democracy (e.g. Santoso & Tapiheru, 2017).

In this matter, we believe that the argument of Heryanto (2004) holds merit. He explains these disparate analyses by noting that foreign analysts, most of whom come from already established democratic countries, hold different understandings of democracy than Indonesians who had just been freed from Soeharto's New Order. Indonesians tend to understand democracy as "social change that is more immediate in effect, concrete in manifestation, and short-term. Understandably such considerations are prompted by a sense of exigency in their living circumstances. In other words, their conception of democracy is a lot more modest, and they demand a lot less from the process of democratisation in comparison to their distant observers" (Heryanto, 2004: 69). To some extent, this argument provides a basis for understanding the Jakarta government's commitment towards CFD policies and pedestrian activities as part of the urban environmental activists' 'success' in policy advocacy: facilitating diagonal accountability has been chosen as a more modest way of realising democracy in Indonesia.

Nonetheless, while recognising such modesty, we can also argue that

Indonesian scholars and activists have recently been more cautious in understanding the current state of democracy in the country. As Santoso and Tapiheru (2017) warn, there are serious risks in using particularism as a 'blank check' for practising democracy; this has been demonstrated, for example, in our discussion of KPBB and KPoK, whose activism suffered from deficits in vertical and horizontal accountability. Indonesia's democratic future, at least from the point of view of the civil society elaborated in this paper, is neither bleak nor rosy. This paper concurs with Weiss (2020): by delving deeper into the heterogeneous forms of civil society, their creativity, and their strategies, we maintain a 'cautious optimism' that civil society can still contribute to Indonesia's democratisation.

Conclusion

To conclude, this article's discussion of KPBB and KPoK has highlighted the ingenuity of (liberal) civil society in performing urban environmental activism in Jakarta. Understanding these urban environmental activists' strategies is necessary to interpret the politics of civil society forms, which problematise the existing typology and illustrate its limitations in describing contemporary Indonesian civil society. As demonstrated above, analysis using a neo-Tocquevillian framework can provide an alternative understanding of civil society's strategies amidst the ubiquitous 'democracy deficit' often cited to explain the situation in Indonesia. Theoretically, this paper highlights the relevance and value of the liberal neo-Tocquevillian approach in exploring civil society's inclusivity by focusing on associations that facilitate civic engagement. By scrutinising the politics involved in the forms of civic engagement, their potential and pitfalls for democracy can be explored.

The conclusion reached in this paper echoes Ding and Slater (2020), who argue that it is necessary to connect the literature on democratic backsliding with the literature on institutional change theory. They note that one of the latter's most important insights is that "institutional complexity and multiplicity provide opportunities for political entrepreneurs to foster institutional change" (Ding & Slater, 2020: 64). In this context, the politics of civil society forms illustrate the complexity of Indonesian civil society, including the means through which urban environmental activists have acted as political entrepreneurs and seized opportunities. In this sense, we can see not only the 'democratic decoupling' caused by increased electoral quality and decreased rights protection, as argued by Ding and Slater (2020), but also show that urban environmental activists—more of their ambiguous impact on democracy—can nevertheless foster institutional changes.

With such a broader understanding of civil society and its forms, previous investigations of Indonesian civil society's declining capacity to prevent democratic backsliding (i.e., Mietzner, 2020) seem to paint only a partial picture. The cases of KPBB and KPoK show that civil society can still create diagonal accountability in both the executive and legislative branches of the provincial government. Furthermore, these urban environmental activists seem to be less influenced by the tendency towards 'politico-ideological polarisation' that has increased partisanship and

contributed to the declining democratic quality of political institutions.

It is worth noting that the spin-off campaign and voluntary association in this paper are only two examples of recent evolutions in civil society activism in Indonesia. Similarly, these political forms are not unique, nor can they be claimed to represent the origin of politicised forms of civil society. Different forms of activism that are parallel to the cases elaborated in this paper could be drawn from the realms of animal rights activism (Resolute, 2017), open data/transparency activism (Purwanto, Zuiderwijk, & Janssen, 2018), etc. Such activism shows similar tendencies, yet at the same time has its own particularities that deserve to be investigated. As this paper highlights only the most basic aspects of civic engagement, with a particular focus on association, a deeper analysis of solidarity, tolerance, and trust—all important traits of the neo-Tocquevillian tradition—is necessary. Just to provide an example in the context of this paper, the role of 'trust' in urban environmental activism in Jakarta is not necessarily limited to facilitating collaboration between individual members of KPBB and KPoK, as described by Putnam and Leonardi (1993), but also relevant to explaining these environmental activists' decision to work with formal political institutions at the local level through their public policy advocacy agenda (Siisiainen, 2003).

Another direction that warrants further consideration is the contribution of Indonesia's emerging information technology infrastructure to civil society activism in the country. Despite its middle-class and urban biases, internet-based and social media campaigns have heavily characterised environmental activism in recent years (Kurniawan & Rye, 2013), and thus a certain politics of form must arise at this particular conjuncture. Moreover, there is a growing literature on the relationship between the internet and social media (on the one hand) and democracy and social movements (on the other), as well as several cases where the internet/social media have been instrumentalised by civil society organisations and activists to foster policy changes by mainstreaming particular discourses. Further endeavours in this direction may help scholars obtain a deeper understanding of the contingent nature, potential, and pitfalls of civil society and the politics of their forms.

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Leadership and City Waste Policy: A Case Study of Waste Management in Depok City, West Java Province, 2014–2017

Nur Azizah[1], Azifah Retno Astrina[2], Nadlirotul Ulfa[3]

Abstract

This article aims to ascertain the role of a local leader in the transformation of waste management in Depok City, West Java, between 2014 and 2017. In 2005, Depok was identified as one of the dirtiest cities in Indonesia; by 2017, it had successfully transformed itself and received the Adipura Award for Indonesia's cleanest city. Based on qualitative fieldwork, we argue that Depok's waste management was transformed through a series of policies made by the mayor in conjunction with the Government of Depok City between 2006 and 2016. The example of Depok shows that formal leadership plays an important role in encouraging the emergence of innovative policies to address public problems. In this case, the vision of the leader was translated into policy and implemented by bureaucratic institutions, thereby driving important changes in the region. Further contributing factors included credibility, protection from opposition, and access to resources. We also emphasize the importance of leadership in giving direct examples to local communities on how we understand waste; how we reduce, reuse, recycle, and participate. The leader's ability to consolidate his ideas within the broader community, as well as his commitment to sustainable change, become the main driver of his policy performance.

Keywords: *city waste; leader; leadership; policy performance*

Introduction

This article focuses on the transformational role of a local leader in managing waste problems in Depok, West Java, Indonesia. Within the context of decentralization, Depok transformed itself from one of Indonesia's dirtiest cities into one of the cleanest. The success even earned the city national recognition for being the cleanest and the best environmental management city in 2017.

[1] Ph.D Candidate at the Department of Politics and Social Changes, the Australian National University

[2] Graduate Student at the Department of Political Science, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

[3] Graduated from the Department of Politics and Government, Universitas Gadjah Mada

This article seeks to show that, despite the various challenges faced by the local autonomous government in overcoming its waste management problems, Depok succeeded in showing that decentralization provides local leaders with space for innovation. Local leaders' ability to utilize resources at the local level and accommodate environmental civil society interests was key aspects to solving the city's waste management problems.

The issue of waste management was chosen for several reasons; *first*, although authority over waste management has been delegated to local authorities, these authorities have acted variously in carrying out this responsibility. *Second*, despite being a form of public service like education and health, waste management is considered an unpopular issue with which the public has limited awareness. Thus, for waste management to be a common concern, it was necessary to raise community awareness of the issue. *Third*, waste issues tend to grow along with the population, and overcoming these issues— such as by identifying renewable approaches to waste management— requires effort from various parties (Kerstens et al., 2016a).

In Indonesia, discussing the management of urban waste is important for several reasons. First is population growth. In 2017, 55.2% of Indonesia's population lived in urban areas, with an average growth of 1.31% per annum (World Atlas Forum, 2018). Second, population growth is inexorably linked with waste generation. In 2014, Indonesia produced 175−176 thousand tonnes of waste a day (Wibowo, 2016); local governments only had the capacity to handle 40−60% of this waste (Dethier, 2017: 75). The

mismanagement of waste can cause serious environmental damage, which in turn will threaten the health of urban communities.

Pursuant to Law No. 23 of 44 on Regional Government and Law No. 18 of 2008 on Waste Management, and following the tenets of decentralisation and local autonomy, local governments have the authority to handle waste issues within their territory through the Office of Public Works and Spatial Planning and the Office of Environmental Affairs. As such, every region (regency/city or province) in Indonesia has a role in and responsibility to manage waste. This includes household waste, waste similar to household waste (i.e. waste originating from commercial areas, social facilities, or public facilities), and specific (hazardous) waste. This article focuses on the management of household waste, which we argue, requires greater societal involvement. The fact that every city in Indonesia has an equal role and responsibility in managing waste does not mean that all regions have achieved the same results; only 50% of local governments have shown themselves capable of handling waste problems (Dethier, 2017).

Local governments' inability to manage waste issues has been attributed to "the lack of infrastructure and low environmental awareness" (Concord Consulting, 2015: 29) as well as budget limitations and the absence of experienced workers (Dethier, 2017: 83). However, some local governments have successfully managed waste issues; one of these is the City Government of Depok. Identified as Indonesia's dirtiest city back in 2005, Depok

received its first Adipura Award in 2017.[4] Since 2014, the City Government of Depok has issued various policies on waste management. One of these was household-level waste sorting, which not only educated communities on the importance of sorting waste but also showed the government's commitment to building Waste Banks in approximately 500 districts in the City of Depok. This policy encouraged citizens to change their mindset, from viewing waste as a problem to viewing waste as a resource with economic value, and underscored the importance of proper waste management. None of these could be realised without good leadership and the active participation of the communities. The city's waste management not only led to national acknowledgement, but also resulted in Idris Abdul Shomad—the Mayor of Depok, 2016–2021—being named Innovative Mayor of Indonesia by the MNC Group ("Dua Penghargaan Bergengsi Untuk Kota Depok," 2018). The reasons for Depok's success managing its waste, thus, requires further exploration.

Literature Review

A handful of articles have focused on the importance of leadership in the innovation of public service in Indonesia. Luebke (2007) argues that, within the context of local policies, the variable of local leadership is more significant than societal pressure. Luebke conducted his research using surveys and in-depth interviews, conducting multivariate regression with data from 200 districts to see the effects of societal pressure for

good governance and government leadership in creating regional policies that support business climate (Luebke, 2007). Luebke found that government leadership played a more significant role in creating business-friendly policies. Local leaders have the capacity to drive change in coalitions and oversee the bureaucratic apparatus. These studies show that the leadership dimension plays a very strong role in bringing about and implementing innovative and sustainable ideas (Luebke, 2007).

However, several studies show that, where governments lack the capacity to handle waste, informal actors have room to thrive. One study conducted in Badung Regency, Bali (Bruce & Storey, 2010) showed that government waste services were not optimal, especially when serving the lower-class members of society. Consequently, informal waste "services" (managed by scavenger networks) rapidly emerged and reduced demand for governmental waste services (Bruce & Storey, 2010). Informal agents' waste management activities in Badung Regency were seen as more efficient, sustainable, and practical, especially because it was supported by the economic value of the waste itself. In general, Bruce and Storey (2010) highlight the importance of informal agent networks in the provision of waste services, as relying solely on the government to solve such problems could only further display its dysfunction. Similar arguments come from Nas and Jaffe (2004), who show that informal agents play a major role in waste management in many developing countries (including Indonesia).

have successfully maintained cleanliness and managed their urban environment.

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[4] The Adipura Award is granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry of the Republic of Indonesia to Indonesian districts or cities that

As governments lack the capacity for waste management, these informal agents are considered potential government partners for handling waste (Nas & Jaffe, 2004).

Sopha and Haryoto (2016) also highlight governments' minimum capacity for waste management. Based on their research in Yogyakarta City, waste management conducted by the government has been unable to optimally manage its waste collection points (Sopha & Haryoto, 2016). Supriyanto (2016) also discusses the condition and position of government institutions in waste management in Bantar Gebang, Bekasi (Supriyanto, 2016). Several regions have cooperated with the Bekasi government by providing waste disposal sites in several regions. However, this cooperation has been ineffective due to weak institutional structures, uncertain functions, limited coordination, and unstructured duties and roles (Supriyanto, 2016). Others emphasise the weakness of the technical and financial aspects that influence the government's waste management and sanitation policies (Kerstens et al., 2015; 2016b). It is important to involve various stakeholders and non-technical factors when it comes to an increasing quantity of waste (Zurbrügg et al., 2012).

How leaders collect resources, mobilise agents, and consolidate their interests within the context of waste management is the focus of this article. The government of Depok's policy is interesting for further study, especially in matters of leadership. Participatory waste management policies require leaders who can move and inspire society. These policies need to be studied in relation to how leaders push their policy agendas while simultaneously guiding their

implementation. Using the framework offered by Smith (2007), four leadership variables will be reviewed in this article: development of vision, utilisation of credibility, protection from opposing parties/lack of support, as well as the use of leaders' access to support the proposed changes.

Apart from those four variables, in her research in Mexico, Grindle (2007) found that four factors determine regional governments' ability to carry out their responsibilities effectively and efficiently: public leadership (political leaders' capacity when mobilizing resources), healthy and balanced competition in public elections, capacity of the bureaucratic apparatus, and civil society participation. Considering political leaders' capacity as an important factor in relation to their capacity to develop new ideas (innovations), the ability to drive regional resources to implement ideas, create coalitions between various actors, and choose strategic policies to achieve new policy agendas even in situations that are not beneficial for the development of these new ideas (Grindle, 2007). From the four factors identified by Grindle, public leadership is one of the strongest factors determining the success of decentralisation, mainly as related to the emergence and development of ideas/innovations and the capacity and efforts that support the realisation of these innovations.

Using Grindle's (2007) framework, three variables outside of leadership will provide the context in this article: competition in local elections, the bureaucratic apparatus' capacity in implementing policy, and the participation of civil society. These three variables will

contextualize the social and political arena, which will either support or hinder the policy agenda proposed by the political leader. While taking into account non-leadership variables, however, the leader nonetheless plays an important role in consolidating various actors with heterogeneous interests to ensure the success of the policy.

Methods

This research employs the qualitative method using a case study. This study limits itself to the waste management policy of the City of Depok between 2014 and 2018. This scope is marked by the passage of Local Regulation No. 5 of 2014, which formally signified the implementation of a more institutionalized waste management policy while simultaneously showing the legislature's support for this legal product. Data were collected through a desk study and in-depth interviews. Through desk study, this research explored the regulations of the local government (including the Mid-Term Local Development Government Plan), online mass media articles, journal articles related to the topic, and relevant books. Supplemental data were collected through interviews with key informants from the local government, as well as the former Mayor of Depok City, local journalists, academics, and community activists.

Results

Population Growth and Waste Issues in Depok City

Due to its proximity to the national capital, the development of Depok is closely related to the development in Jakarta. Consequently, Depok is involved heavily in Jakarta's issues. In 1999, Depok emerged as a new node in the Greater Jakarta Region (popularly known as Jabodetabek), along with Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi. Each of these cities is inexorably tied, and all share similar problems: overpopulation, congestion, settlement problems, and waste. The explosive growth of Jakarta has turned Depok into a residential space for those who work in Jakarta.

Depok is an area with several fundamental characteristics. *First*, Depok is torn between Jakarta and West Java. It is a suburban area, functioning as a dormitory town for Jakarta while simultaneously existing as an independent city in West Java. *Second*, Depok is part of the Jabodetabek Region, and the city thus helps solve Jakarta's problems—waste management, transportation, and other public facilities. *Third*, and related to the second point, Depok has seen rapid population growth, and this in turn has increased the amount of household waste produced.

Depok was made an independent city in 1999 through Law No. 15 of 1999 in accordance with a proposal by the governments of Bogor District and West Java Province. This was deemed necessary to improve services in this area, including strengthening its position as the capital city's buffer zone. However, development was relatively slow, as the government was more concerned with administrative matters than infrastructure (Irsyam, 2015). As such, Depok had a hard time becoming a centre for growth, becoming more of a dormitory town instead (Irsyam, 2015).

After Depok became an independent city, its population growth was extremely high. Within a period of ten years, between 2000 and 2010, the city's population increased by 66.84%. According to the 2000 census, Depok was home to 1,160,791 people; by the 2010 census, the population had reached 1,736,565. Although Depok—which covers an area of only 200.29 km^2—was designed for a population of no more than 800,000 people (Sumandoyo, 2018), it is predicted that Depok would become Indonesia's second-most crowded city (after Jakarta) by 2045.

Depok's population density has led to other problems, such as congestion, settlements, and especially increased waste volume. For example, in 2004, Depok produced 3,376 m^3 of waste every day (Suryanto & Widjadjakusuma, 2005: 45); this had increased to 4,617 m^3/day by 2010. It is projected that, by 2025, Depok will produce 7,126 m^3 of waste every day (RPJP Kota Depok, 2006–2025). Waste management was sub-optimal, and the Cipayung Landfill—owned by the Depok Municipal Government—was overfilled. In 2005, Depok was thus named one of Indonesia's dirtiest cities (DetikNews, 2005). Sub-optimal management of the Cipayung landfill caused conflict between the government and the surrounding community.

Residents of Cipayung were among the most active in voicing their concerns regarding the city's poor waste management; this is quite understandable, as they were the ones who were directly affected by the unhealthy environment caused by the accumulation of waste. In 2008, residents of the Cipayung Park Complex, Sukmajaya, Depok, seized the waste management location. Developed by

the city with the hope of earning an Adipura Award, the construction—which was done on a water-catchment area—resulted in flooding in the rainy season as well as foul odours that affected residents' health (Liputan6, 2008).

Waste Management Policy in Depok City, 2005–2017

Within a decade of being named one of Indonesia's dirtiest cities, Depok had managed to transform itself into a pilot city for a waste management and sorting programme (Suara Pembaruan, 2015; Kompas, 2017) per Depok Bylaw No. 5 of 2014 on Waste Management. It was also through this programme that Depok received an Adipura Certificate twice, in 2013 and 2015. The peak of its success was realised in 2017, when Depok received the Adipura Award for the first time (SindoNews 2017).

The waste sorting programme was one of the leading programmes implemented by Nur Mahmudi Ismail, Depok's two-term mayor (2006–2011, 2011–2016), of the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS). He developed this policy in response to Depok's identification as one of Indonesia's dirtiest cities in 2005, a year before his election (*Jakarta Bisnis*, 2015). This policy was continued by Mohammad Idris, who was elected Mayor of Depok for the 2016–2021 term. Having previously served as deputy mayor under Ismail, Idris persistently promoted his "Zero-Waste City"—a slogan referring to the local government's ability to manage 100% of waste. This slogan has been controversial, as despite its successes, as by 2016 Depok was only able to manage 56.22% of the

1,286 tonnes of waste produced every day (Paramita, Murtilaksono & Manuwoto 2018: 108).

Although Depok received its Adipura Award under the leadership of Idris, it cannot be denied that Ismail played a significant role in the city's receipt of the award. Indeed, assessments for the 2017 Adipura Award were carried out the previous year, during Ismail's leadership.

Depok's efforts to reform its waste management system began during Ismail's first term. Ismail, who had an educational background in the food sector, tried to reform the waste management system, which had long relied solely on landfills (final disposal sites) and open dumping practices. Such practices had many negative implications, considering the limited area available for the increasing volume of waste. It was exacerbated by the unaccommodating waste management system. Waste should have been processed using a sanitary landfill system, instead of simply dumped at a final disposal site (landfill). As a result, foul odours were inevitable in surrounding communities, as were illnesses such as respiratory infections (*Suara Pembaruan*, 2006; Pokja AMPL 2006a). In response, the Ministry of Environmental Affairs sent a letter to the Depok Municipal Government in May 2006 urging the closure of the Cipayung final disposal site by 2007; it could only be extended if management was improved (*Suara Pembaruan* 2006; Pokja AMPL 2006a).

In response to this letter, NMI and the Depok Municipal Government developed a policy that aimed to change the dominant waste management paradigm, abandoning open dumping in favour of a 3R+P paradigm; reduce, reuse, recycle,

participate (RPJMD Kota Depok 2006–2001: 78). This approach sought to reduce and resolve waste problems at the source: the household level. This was expected to not only reduce the volume of waste entering the landfill, but also to facilitate the reuse and recycling of waste into products such as compost, briskets, and electric energy (RPJMD Kota Depok 2006–2011: 78); none of these could be done without active community participation.

In 2006, NMI developed the Integrated Waste Processing and Management System (Sistem Pengolahan dan Pengelolaan Sampah Terpadu, SIPESAT), which was introduced through waste management units in various residential and industrial areas, as well as markets and other public areas. Five years were allocated for its initial implementation, with as many as ten to fifteen waste management units being added every year (RPJMD Kota Depok, 2006–2011: p. 78 & 84).

Three approaches were designed for the implementation of SIPESAT (Kompas 2006; Pokja AMPL 2006b). *First*, reducing the volume of waste entering Cipayung and other final disposal sites (landfills). *Second*, changing earlier mindsets regarding waste management, which involved several stages: pile, transport, dump, process, value. As part of this approach, local government established waste processing units (thereafter, WPUs) to handle organic waste within residential and industrial areas as well as markets and other public areas. In those WPUs, local government local government will process organic waste into compost. *Third*, at the community level, an approach known as "waste sorting" was implemented. This was considered the most important phase of

the waste management process, as communities must be aware of the importance of sorting waste and actively participating on the household level.

Regarding the second approach, the establishment of WPUs began in 2008–2009, during which time five or six WPUs were established. In the beginning, waste sorting was still conducted on the spot, and thus more time was needed to recycle inorganic waste and compost organic waste. This began to change in 2013, thanks to cooperation between the Depok Municipal Government and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, which brought environmental activists and administrators to conduct a comparative study of waste sorting in Osaka, Japan (Hermansyah, personal communication, July 27, 2018). As a result, in 2013, the waste sorting programme began to be implemented in many households.

To strengthen the formal and legal aspects of this policy, Local Regulation No. 5 of 2014 regarding Waste Management was issued. This regulation reinforced government efforts to reduce the volume of waste that entered the final disposal site through waste sorting by identifying the specific types of waste to be sorted at the household level. With community participation, the amount of waste entering the Cipayung disposal site could be reduced by ensuring that other waste was sent to WPUs and waste banks.

While organic waste is sent to WPUs, non-organic waste with economic value is sent to waste banks (Depok Municipal Government, January 2016). However, unlike WPUs (which are managed by the government), waste banks are mostly managed by the private sector—including local communities and private organisations/foundations. Interestingly, the establishment of waste banks in Depok has been used primarily to symbolize the success of government involvement and participation in sorting the waste. Between 2012 and 2016, approximately 450–500 waste units were established, with an average of six staff per unit. However, only 75% were claimed to be active (Hermansyah, personal communication, July 27, 2018; Supariyono, personal communication, July 27, 2018).

Village waste banks are all under the coordination of the Main Waste Banks, which are located in each sub-district. Under the leadership of Ismail, 360 waste banks were active, with a combined capacity of approximately 2–3 tonnes per day. These waste banks were spread throughout seven of the eleven sub-districts in Depok: Sukmajaya, Beji, Cimanggis, Tapos, Cipayung, Cilodong, and Sawangan (Housing-estate 2018). From waste, each Main Waste Bank can earn approximately 300 million rupiahs in profit per month (Hermansyah, 2018). Main Waste Banks are provided transport facilities by the City Government, with supplemental funding from corporations (through corporate social responsibility, or CSR), foundations, and private citizens (Hermansyah, personal communication, July 27, 2018; Housing-estate, 2018).

Cooperation between the municipal government, corporations, and waste management foundations in Depok began in late 2013, when Shell—through its SUPEL (Shell for Environmental Conservation) programme—cooperated with the Semai Karakter Bangsa Foundation to support the establishment of waste banks. It provided operational assistance in the form of garbage trucks, digital scales, computers,

workshops, and other infrastructure facilities (Wulandari, 2013).

We found that the city government never took part in waste management activities. Local leaders' interests in these waste banks often became evident only at the end of their terms, when waste banks were used as campaign objects—as seen in the 2014 legislative election (Hermansyah, 2018). This can be seen from the fact that, of the 2,000 waste banks expected to be established in 2014, fewer than 25 per cent had been completed by the end of Ismail's second term in 2016.

The problem was not merely the availability of waste banks, but also the failure of socializing the importance of waste sorting within the local community. The lack of a market, thus, limited the sustainability of this program and the products it produced (Noorwendo 2018). This is also the reason the number of active waste banks dropped drastically, to fewer than 100 units today.

Discussion

Formal Leadership in the Management of Urban Waste

The success of the Depok Municipal Government in managing waste between 2006 and 2017 can be seen in various achievements, such as Depok being designated a pilot city for waste management by the Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs in 2015 (Antara, 2015), receiving Adipura Certificates in 2013 and 2015, and receiving the Adipura Award in 2017.

Likewise, the performance of the Depok Municipal Government was also recognised by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Since 2010, the Ministry has assessed the performance of every provincial, regency, and municipal government. The results of these assessments were first released in 2012 (based on their performance in 2010); on this list, the Depok Municipal Government ranked eighth nationwide (Kepmendagri No. 100 – 279 of 2012). The Depok Municipal Government maintained this rank until 2015, when it was ranked seventh (Kepmendagri No. 120 – 10421 of 2016); by 2017, it had dropped to thirteenth out of Indonesia's ninety-three municipal governments (Kepmendagri No. 100 – 53 of 2018). Nevertheless, the achievements of the Depok Municipal Government under the leadership of Mayor Ismail can still be considered relatively good.

Notwithstanding these achievements, several of the programmes implemented by the mayor were quite controversial. One was his 2013 campaign on using one's right hand to eat and drink, which was encouraged through billboards and posters posted on streets throughout Depok. This policy was designed to promote local character building. However, the government opposed the programme, viewing it as a waste of funds. Ultimately, the programme was not conducted intensively (Thenu, 2018; Widodo, 2015).

Another policy was One Day No Rice (ODNR), implemented in 2011. Outlined in Depok Mayor Circular No 500/1219-Economy and later revised through Depok Mayor Circular Number 500/1688-Economy. This policy was related to the vision and mission of Depok Municipal Government for the 2011–2016 period, specifically its first and second visions: "The Realization of an Advanced and Prosperous Depok" and " The Realization of Economic Independence among the People

through Local Potential" (Widodo, 2015: 201). This policy was implemented, among things, by eating non-rice (and non-flour) foodstuffs in governmental offices (including canteens) every Tuesday. This policy sparked resistance within the bureaucracy itself as well as the community (see Isma'il, 2012: 21−24). Furthermore, the fact that this policy was "only" issued through a mayoral circular underscored its lack of political legitimacy, as it had minimal support from the legislature. Nonetheless, this policy was retained until the end of Ismail's second term in 2016.

Judging from these two controversial policies, it can be inferred that Ismail was a leader with the courage to take risks on policy decisions, so long as they were in line with the visions and values he upheld. He did not seriously consider oppositional views, including those related to Depok's waste management policy.

Ismail used the title 'dirtiest city' as one of his major narratives in Depok City's Five-Year Development Plan for 2006−2011 (RPJMD Kota Depok, 2006−2011):

"… the increased population of Depok from 1,374,000 in 2005 to 1,667,000 in 2011… it is predicted that, in the future, the pressure on the environment will become increasingly heavy, in line with the growth of the population of Depok. Such pressures can be felt by the people of Depok as serious problems, taking the form traffic congestion, environmental damage, environmental hygiene problems, and waste" (RPJMD Kota Depok, 2006−2011: 74).

An analysis of these conditions was provided in the government's policy missions, namely the second one: "Building and Managing Good, Equitable, and Sufficient Infrastructure Facilities". This was to be achieved by, among other things, improving the waste management of final disposal sites (landfills) through a reduce, reuse, recycle, and participate paradigm, managing waste at its source, and repairing the sanitary landfill mechanisms in Cipayung (RPJMD Kota Depok 2006−2011: 78). To achieve this goal, the municipal government sought to establish an average of 10 to 15 locations every year (RPJMD Kota Depok, 2006−2011: 84).

Ismail's vision and mission of managing the issues of waste continued during his second term (2011−2016), albeit to a different degree. The new RPJMD explicitly stated that waste management services were only able to handle 38% of the city's waste in 2010; that public participation in implementing 3R-P (as proposed in the 2006−2011 RPJMD) was still lacking; and that waste had reached the rivers of Depok (RPJMD 2011−2016: 65). This implies two things; *first*, although improvements in waste management had been proposed, government-provided waste services were not yet able to handle 40% of the city's waste; as such, the 2006−2011 plan had not been realized.

At the same time, this narrative also indicates that the Depok Municipal Government had political will in the issue of waste management, as shown by the inclusion of said issue in the third mission of the government strategy. However, compared to the 2006−2011 RPJMD, the narrative was arranged using more generic terminology.

How can leadership discourses explain what happened in Depok? Based on a study by Grindle (2007), local governments' performance is influenced,

among other things, by public leadership. This variable includes: the capacity to develop new ideas (innovation), the ability to mobilise regional resources to implement ideas, the ability to establish coalitions between various actors, and the ability to make strategic policy choices to support the achievement of the new policy, including situations that are not beneficial for the development of the new idea (Grindle, 2007).

Waste is not a popular public issue. As such, as long as waste issues are still seen as latent, local governments will focus on issues such as education and public health. Ismail thus tried to change the situation by using his professional background in the food sector and his position as the former Minister of Forestry and Agriculture to influence and determine the Depok municipal government's policy priorities in the areas of environmental hygiene and waste management.

Pressure from external parties, such as the Ministry of Environmental Affairs and the National Human Rights Commission, as well as persons living near the Cipayung landfill, thus served as policy input. One of the outputs was the target of decreasing the volume of waste by providing waste processing units in various areas, as written in the Depok RPJMD for 2006–2011. The government sought to build 17 WPUs, each with the capacity to handle 30 m^3 waste per day, in 2006. Each WPU cost 880 million rupiahs to build (Masaharu, 2006); as such, reaching the target required significant resources, 15 billion rupiah in the first year. Strong political support would be necessary to obtain such funds through the local budget, given that the disbursement required both executive and legislative support.

Ismail also depended on SIPESAT for his waste management mission, the implementation of which required active community participation. However, ensuring such participation was a challenge of its own. In a survey conducted by BPPT in 2008, fewer than 5% of the 307 respondents (50 of whom were Depok residents) often sorted their waste; for comparison, 38.2% of respondents stated that they seldom sorted waste, while 34.2% said that they never sorted waste (Widodo & Susanto, 2009, p. 332). Although this study was not exclusively conducted in Depok, at the very least it shows that the public had limited involvement in public waste management. As of 2016, only 185 neighbourhood units (of 859 in Depok) actively sorted waste. This unfavourable sociological context was the Depok Municipal Government's biggest challenge for implementing SIPESAT.

The lack of public interest in sorting waste pushed Ismail and the Depok Municipal Government to organise various campaign and socialisation materials to ensure the successful development of WPUs and SIPESAT. A free waste collecting programme was also offered for members of the public who conducted waste sorting, while waste banks were developed to encourage communities to see the economic aspects of waste.

However, efforts to mainstream these waste banks cannot be considered successful, despite the increased amount of waste sorted. By the end of Ismail's second term, only 400–500 waste banks had been established—far short of the 2,000 banks targeted. One obstacle was the limited change in public perceptions of waste. Communities preferred to pay monthly fees (to private waste collectors or

the government) rather than sort their household waste (Supariyono, personal communication, July 27, 2018).

The above data indicate that leaders' vision is important in driving local changes; however, more is needed to ensure that policy ideas and innovations are implemented. In the framework offered by D.J. Smith (2007), another important variable is the utilisation of the leader's credibility. This can be seen in Ismail's waste management programmes. With his educational background and experience as a government minister, Ismail had relatively high political credibility. Although the losing candidates of the 2006 and 2011 elections caused political 'disruptions' at the beginning of his leadership (both in the first and second terms), Ismail's status as the local leader of the Prosperous Justice Party supported his credibility.

Support from the Regional Representatives Council of Depok was also necessary for Ismail to realise his vision and mission. This can be seen, for example, in the approval of the large amount of money needed to develop WPUs. Apart from this, the passage of Local Bylaw No. 5 of 2014 regarding Waste Management can also be seen as political support for the city's waste management policy. Access variable paved the way for various policies, as also seen in the support of private parties (such as Shell) for the programme.

Community Leaders' Role in Waste Management

Waste management is not, in fact, an area for formal leaders (read: state/local government actors). Households, as active waste-producing units, must also be taken into account. This research shows that the participation of residents and community members is extremely decisive, and thus discussion regarding leadership at the non-formal/community level is important.

One of the community leaders we met was Baron Noorwendo, the founder of the *Warga Peduli Sampah,* (Residents for Waste, WPL) Community. Located in Pitara Village, Pancoran Mas District, Depok, the community's activities include waste banks and recycling. The WPL waste bank was officially established in 2008 and was inspired by the Gemah Ripah Waste Bank community in Bantul, Yogyakarta.

Noorwendo's vision for WPL is not limited solely to waste banks. He and his wife, Sri Wulan Wibiyanto, have a great vision of spreading benefits to and improving the welfare of the residents of the area surrounding their home. Beginning in 2006, the couple began various efforts to increase the livelihoods of themselves and their family. They saw that Depok was shifting away from being a rural area, becoming an urban city with high unemployment rates. Various socio-economic "experiments" were conducted, such as building libraries and providing scholarships; however, these programmes did not last. Only in 2008, after exploring the potential waste in their environment and learning from the Bantul Waste Bank, did Noorwendo decide to establish waste banks through WPL (Noorwendo, personal communication, July 26, 2018).

Even as WPL has continued to open new waste banks, its banks have served as pilot projects for hundreds of similar banks in Depok (Noorwendo, personal communication, July 26, 2018). With their credibility as waste bank activists, Baron Noorwendo and Sri Wulan Wibiyanto have acted as references, resources, and

motivators in Depok and surrounding areas. Their success led the Head of the Pancoran Mas District to invite the couple to speak on sorting waste as a means of receiving an Adipura Award (Guitarra, 2014; Mubarok, 2016; Noorwendo, personal communication, July 26, 2018).

Various community efforts for waste management, such as those by Baron Noorwendo and Sri Wulan Wibiyanto, show how non-formal actors bring a bottom-up nuance to such activities. Without depending on government assistance, non-formal leaders have worked to realize their specific visions. It is these visions that give them the credibility to participate in waste management activities. At the same time, non-formal leadership is strengthened by non-formal leaders' access. Armed with their credibility, capacity and commitment, Baron Noorwendo and Sri Wulan Wibiyanto opened surrounding residents' access to the economy through workshops and recycling activities.

In the end, the presence of these non-formal leaders became (either intentionally or unintentionally) catharsis for the government's waste management policies. Without non-formal leaders, government policies could not be implemented optimally. At the same time, however, the presence of community-based non-formal leaders can be used by formal leaders to garner political support—especially near the general election (Hermansyah, personal communication, July 27, 2018; Noorwendo, personal communication, July 26, 2018). Sometimes, non-formal leaders even attempt to gain formal power; Baron Noorwendo capitalised on his popularity to run in the Depok Municipal Legislative Election of 2014, though he lost.

Conclusion

Various studies have shown the importance of leadership in successful government performance. Grindle (2007), Luebke (2007) and Rahman et al. (2018) emphasise the importance of political (local) leaders in bringing about policy innovation within the region. Rahman et al. (2018) found that, in the context of Depok, Ismail exhibited great leadership practices, during which he relied heavily on his background as a professional researcher (Rahman et al., 2018).

Under Ismail's leadership (2006–2016), the Depok government made various achievements. For example, in 2006, the government created SIPESAT; in 2014, it passed Local Bylaw No. 5/2014 about Waste Management. These programmes led Depok to receive Adipura Certificates twice, in 2013 and 2015, which played an important role in guiding Depok towards its first Adipura Award in 2017. Moreover, the leader's commitment towards realising a clean city can be seen in the five-year development plan, which later translated into missions, programmes, and policies (conducted by the City of Depok's Office of Environment and Sanitation).

Aside from formal leaders, community leaders also play an important role in achieving policy purposes, especially concerning waste management and waste sorting at the grassroots level. In this case, community leaders serve as activists, helping and empowering local residents through waste banks. Although formal and community leaders acted separately at the beginning, eventually they cooperated and supported each other. Together, they sought to ensure the sustainability of the local government's programmes.

However, both formal and community leaders had their own challenges. The largest challenge was the different perceptions of formal leaders (bureaucrats and politicians) and community leaders/members. Even more challenging was transforming public mindsets regarding waste to embrace the 3R+P: reduce, reuse, recycle, and participate. Therefore, leaders' ability to consolidate their ideas and commit towards sustainable change was a major driver of policy performance.

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Leading With Compassion: A Story of Women Grassroots Leadership Amidst COVID-19 and Coastal Flooding[1]

Dias Prasongko[2] and Wigke Capri[3]

Abstract

This article elaborates on two important elements of women's leadership. First, it explores how leadership theory has abandoned its masculine perspective in favour of a "more feminine" one. The COVID-19 pandemic, a crisis that crippled the socio-political structure, has contributed to this shift. Second, the experiences of grassroots leaders who are active in the domestic sphere have begun to be considered, as has their increased activeness in the public sphere during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, studies of women's leadership are highly elitist; such a paradigm is problematic, as it prioritises formal power structures and ignores the grassroots leaders who play a central role in maintaining the social order. This research finds that the pandemic has provided a valuable impetus not only for studies of formal elites but also women at the grassroots. Women have become highly powerful agents in the domestic sphere during the pandemic, and even expanded their agency into the public sphere. Women leaders have facilitated the implementation of government and community crisis response measures at the grassroots level.

Keywords: leadership, women, COVID-19, domestic sphere, agency

Introduction

The dominant narrative that prioritises male leadership has strongly influenced leadership theory, with its concepts, terminology, actions closely associated with men. Masculine biases permeate the knowledge structures and institutional practices of society. This dominance is clearly reflected in various studies and historical records that emphasise the importance of men as kings, military commanders, politicians, and scientists. As such, it is not surprising that leadership has commonly been identified with masculinity, with terms such as "great man" and "big man" (Stogdill, 1948; Rost, 1991; Northouse, 2004). However, over time, the idea of exclusively masculine leadership has slowly been disrupted. A series of crises have contributed to this disruption, including in the theorisation, conceptualisation, and practice of leadership. The idea that leaders must be assertive, aggressive, authoritative, and even muscular has given way to the idea that leaders must be empathetic, caring, and compassionate, willing to listen to others and heed their advice.

The latest report from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2021) indicates that, in 2020, women accounted for 25.5% of legislators around the world—the highest since the organisation published its first report. In the past two years, academic studies into leadership, women, and gender have increased significantly. A search of journal articles published between 2018 and 2020 found that the number of indexed articles on gender, women, and leadership increased fourfold.[4] According to Google Scholar, for example, approximately 49,0000 articles with these themes were published during this period.[5]

Women leaders and their role in the public sphere have likewise drawn increased public attention. Several, such as Angela Merkel in Germany and Jacinda Adern in New Zealand, have become the highest elected officials in their government. During the COVID-19 pandemic, women leaders have been praised for developing appropriate and well-targeted policies for mitigating the pandemic and its effects. Reviewing data on infection and mortality rates in 144 countries worldwide, Abras, Fava, and Kuwahara (2021) found that the nineteen countries led by women generally had fewer cases and deaths per million people than countries led by men.

In Indonesia, women have played a relatively prominent political and economic role, as reflected in the appointment of President Megawati Soekarno Putri, Minister of Finance Sri Mulyani, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi. Nevertheless, discourses regarding women's leadership have been limited to formal political and economic leaders: heads of government, corporate presidents, and directors of international organisations (Aldrich, & Lotito, 2020; Johnson, & Williams, 2020; Sojo, Wood, Wood, & Wheeler, 2016).

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[4] A search of SCOPUS-indexed journal articles using the keywords "gender", "women", and "leadership" returned 527 articles from 108 journals for 2018. This had increased to 635 articles by 2020.

[5] A search was conducted through Google Scholar using the keywords "gender", "women", and "leadership". Results were filtered to only return items published between 2018 and 2020.

In practice, the majority of leadership positions are occupied by men. In Indonesia, for example, women accounted for only 22% of the House of Representatives' 575 members after the 2019 election; this represented only a one per cent increase over the 2014 election. Following Indonesia's simultaneous elections in 2018, only 9.06% of Indonesia's 342 local leaders were women; the previous year, it had been 5.90%.

A study by Esarey and Chirillo (2013) found that women leaders tend to enjoy a better reputation than male leaders, including higher levels of public trust and lower levels of corruption. Women leaders likewise issue different public policies than their male peers. Although various studies have shown that women leaders are no less effective, their lack of formal representation remains a major challenge.

Women's leadership was widely discussed when the financial crisis erupted in 2008. The year prior, McKinsey and Company (2007) published an interesting study of 89 European corporations that found that companies that involved more women in their leadership tended to perform better than companies that did not. After the crisis, a plethora of studies asked the same question: would the collapse of the Lehman Brothers have occurred had the same company been the Lehman Sisters? (Kristof 2009; Lagarde 2010; Morris 2009; van Staveren, 2014). In subsequent years, countries around the world began replacing their male bank executives with women. As noted by van Staveren (2014), women have become the leaders of the Central Bank of Spain, the Central Bank of Iceland, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Federal Bank of the United States, and the International Monetary Fund (van Staveren, 2014).

As with the financial crisis of 2008 and the Southeast Asian monetary crisis of 1997–1998, the COVID-19 pandemic has created new spaces for women leaders. Academic and popular discourses have regularly highlighted women's role in pandemic mitigation. The COVID-19 pandemic has been more than a health crisis; it has had a domino effect on economies and political systems worldwide. In Indonesia, 137,156 deaths have been attributed to COVID-19 since it was first detected in the country in March 2020 (Our World in Data, 2021). It has also had a detrimental effect on the national economy; a report by Statistics Indonesia (2021) notes that, in 2020, the Indonesian economy experienced negative growth of 2.07%. During the same period, the unemployment rate increased to 7.07%; in other words, 9.77 working-age Indonesians were unemployed. Employers throughout the country also cut back on their employees' hours (Statistics Indonesia, 2021).

Johnson and William (2020) write that, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, previously male-dominated spaces have been made open to women. A study conducted by Abras, Fava, and Kuwahara (2021) found that, between January and July 2020, infection and death rates were lowest in the nineteen countries led by women: Belgium, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Nepal, New Zealand, Singapore, Serbia, Slovakia, and Trinidad and Tobago.

The success of these women leaders has drawn significant media and academic attention (Aldrich & Lotito, 2020; Freizer et

al., 2020; Windsor et al., 2020; Zenger & Folkman, 2020). Discourses have focused on women's leadership styles, which differ significantly from those of men: women leaders tend to lead with love, to listen to others and heed their advice. As such, they are better prepared for risk management. Studies by Aldrich and Lotito (2020) and Windsor et al. (2020) concur that women leaders are capable of embracing their femininity while simultaneously dealing with public expectations.

This article explores two important aspects of women's leadership. First, it explores how leadership is being redefined, with masculine biases giving way to understandings that accept feminine approaches. Although other political contexts have influenced this shift, the current crisis and its socio-political effects have been major drivers of the redefinition of leadership. Femininity, rather than being associated with weakness, has become seen as strength. Where women were previously precluded from leadership due to prejudice, in recent years there has been increased emphasis on empathy, compassion, and willingness to accept feedback from others—all of which are foundational for risk management.

Second, focus has shifted away from formal leadership in recent years, with many scholars instead looking to the grassroots leaders who are active primarily in the domestic sphere. Such writers view the traits employed by women elites as being "borrowed" from their everyday domestic lives: in the domestic sphere, women are often involved in communal activities; use compassion to manage their households; listen carefully to others; practice fiscal management; and minimise risks to their families and communities.

To realise these goals, this article uses the case study method to reveal the reality of women's leadership at the grassroots level. This method was chosen because it was best suited to unique geographic conditions, social structure, and interpersonal interactions of the location, and thus most capable of obtaining a descriptive and analytical understanding of the phenomenon under investigation. For this purpose, data were collected through interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs) with twenty-five women and five men in Tambak Lorok, North Semarang District, Central Java. Both interviews and FGDs were facilitated by technology, including the digital platforms WhatsApp and Zoom. The authors also asked the participants to submit their everyday experiences, pictures, and videos. This community was chosen because its members experienced two crises simultaneously: tidal flooding and the COVID-19 pandemic. As such, the pandemic has exacerbated their already difficult situation.

At the community level, women's leadership facilitates the effective and efficient implementation of public policies even as it promotes the welfare and health of the community. Taking the COVID-19 pandemic as its context, this study investigates how women have taken a central role in the ongoing crisis and elucidates their leadership experiences.

Tambak Lorok is located in northern Semarang, along the northern coast of Java. As a coastal community, it frequently experiences tidal flooding, which is known locally as *rob*. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, men mostly worked as fishermen, factory workers, and labourers, while women often sold goods to

supplement their families' incomes. Both men and women were involved in diverse social, economic, and political activities. However, following the closure of factories and other places of employment due to the pandemic, women became their families' main providers.

As COVID-19 continued, several "women activists" took control to ensure the stability and welfare of their community, becoming agents who introduced community members to mitigation protocols and promoted the implementation of these measures as a means of curbing the spread of COVID-19. Women's involvement in this process marked their emergence as leaders in a time of economic instability. To better understand this process, this article seeks to expand the understanding of leadership by showing how women are involved in and contribute to their community.

The Old Story of Male Leadership

For decades, studies in such fields as management, psychology, and business have sought to conceptualise and define leadership. However, academics have yet to agree upon a shared definition (Bass & Stogdill, 1990; Winston & Patterson, 2006, Silva, 2014). Studies of leadership have understood it diversely, from the biological and genetic (Johnson, Vernon, & McCarthy, et al., 1998) to the behavioural, from something inherent to particular characters and personalities (Larsson & Vinberg, 2010) to something that can be learned (Murphy, Elliott, Goldring, & Porter, 2007). More recently, studies have offered alternative models of leadership.

Many concepts of leadership have been proposed over the past century. For

ease of discussion, the authors propose four categories: great man theories, behaviouralist theories, transactionalist/transformationalist theories, and feminist leadership theories.

Theories that explicitly associate leadership with men fall under the first category (Stogdill, 1948; Rost, 1991; Northouse, 2004). Such theories understand leadership as something special, inherent to individual men, and passed hereditarily (Zaccaro 2007). As it is hereditary, it cannot be possessed by simply anyone. Thomas Carlyle was a major proponent of this theory, which he advanced through his studies of the heroism and heroic worship associated with important leaders. Such individuals have something special that distinguishes them from their followers (Van Wart, 2003; Bass & Stogdill, 1990; Judge, Ilies, Bono & Gerhardt, 2002). According to Jogulu and Wood (2006), men are prioritised in such theories, as they are the ones who have wielded the greatest social, political, and economic power.

The authors hold that "great" or "big man" theories are problematic as they draw exclusively on the social and political paradigms of the Global North. Although these theories are built on different assumptions and realities than found in the Global South (where matriarchal societies are more common), they have nevertheless influenced how leadership is understood in southern nations.

Behaviouralism contrasts sharply with the "great" or "big man" theories, as it describes leadership not as inherent to specific individuals, but as a learned behaviour (Farahbaksh, 2007). It discusses leadership as derived not from specific character archetypes, but rather as

something observed and ultimately learned. This theory holds that, to become a leader, one must behave in accordance with a specific set of guidelines. As such, one can receive leadership training or participate in programs designed to promote leadership behaviours. Many mainstream theories on leadership are built upon the foundation laid by behaviouralism.

Owing to the paucity of women leaders in the United States during its development, this theory was biased in favour of male leadership styles. However, in recent years it has recognised and accommodated the stylistic differences between men and women leaders. Hearn and Parkin (1986: 38) found that the adjectives used to describe leaders ("competitive", "aggressive", "dominant") are commonly associated with men. Similarly, women who occupy leadership positions are often described with terms that connote masculinity. A doctoral thesis prepared by Taylor (1973) contrasted the distinct characteristics of male and female leadership, finding that men tend to be oriented more towards direct leadership while women are more skilled with administrative matters. Interestingly, Taylor noted that respondents (most of whom were men) expressed a desire for more women leaders in the education sector.

More recently, the theories of transactionalism and transformationalism have focused not on individual leaders and their particular behaviours and styles (as "great"/"big man" and behaviouralist theories) but more general characteristics. According to Bass (1990), transactional leadership is marked by two factors:

workplace organisation and a focus on those persons who perform best.

Transactional leaders often rely on rewards and punishments to incentive improved performance. Leader promise an exchange: those who perform best and create results will be rewarded, as will those who loyally follow their leader (Goethals & Hoyt, 2016: xi). Such a model, however, is not always effective, and it may indeed be counterproductive; transactionalism relies heavily on leaders' continued control of resources, with which they can reward their followers (Bass, 1999: 21; Bass & Bass, 2008; Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987: 649). Often, rewards are beyond the purview of leaders; wages and promotions, for example, depend not on leaders' whims but individual qualifications, organisational guidelines, and seniority.

Transformative leadership, meanwhile, refers to a model wherein leaders actively urge their followers to participate in diverse processes (Goethals & Hoyt, 2016: xi). It is marked by the ability to direct others and accommodate their interests, thereby ensuring that they are willing to work towards social transformation (Bass, 1990). Efficiency is important, as only then can collective goals and social transformations be realised (Burns, 1978, in Stewart, 2006). According to Bass (1990), although transformative leadership often relies heavily on charisma, it also calls for intellectual stimulation and rational problem-solving.

Burns (in Stewart, 2006) writes that transformative leadership emerged in response to the excessive emphasis on power in leadership. In reality, leaders not only wield authority, but also act as agents of public morality (Burns, 1978, in Bass & Bass, 2008). Leaders must thus cultivate

the potential of those they lead while simultaneously ensuring that their individual needs are met and public spaces are open to their participation.

Bass (1990) clearly distinguishes between transactional and transformational leadership. According to Bass, transformative leadership is marked by charisma, inspiration, intellectual stimulation, and individual consideration. Conversely, transactional leadership is marked by contingent rewards, management by active exception, and management by passive exception, and a laissez-faire approach to decision-making.

Moving Beyond Male-Biased Leadership: A Feminine Way of Leadership

Alternative approaches to leadership have emerged in response to traditional leadership's failure to realise true social change. Traditional models of leadership centre on individual leaders and their ability to "lead from the front" (as well as organisational culture and leadership styles), while alternative models emphasise the ability to mobilise and inspire (Bennis, 2009, in Martin, 2018; Avant, 2011). According to Latham (2014), the shift away from traditional leadership has also been driven by the significant gap between the theory of leadership and its actual practice, as well as the differences between the perspectives of academics and practitioners/consultants.

Underpinning alternative and non-traditional views of leadership are feminist understandings of gender. Alternative models of leadership seek to promote equality, ensuring that women have the space to represent themselves by becoming leaders. Many prominent women

leaders have emerged in recent years, including in the fields of politics, economics, and education (Carli & Eagly, 2001; UN Women, 2021, Catalyst, 2020; Hinchlifee, 2021). Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that women leaders continue to be doubted. They face discrimination and *stereotyping*, and are even frequently compared unfavourably to male leaders, even though they must balance their careers with their family/domestic lives (Levitt, 2010; Goethals & Hoyt, 2016, Eagly & Heilman, 2016).

In recent years, leadership theories have been challenged to integrate the feminine aspects of leadership that have long been neglected (Valentine, 1992; Jogulu et al, 2006; Chin, 2004, Brown & Irby, 1994; Duffy & Trautman, 2002). Beverly J. Irby (2002), reviewing 24 leadership theories, found that women's experiences have frequently been excluded from leadership theories. Instead, women are frequently positioned as objects when theories are implemented and modelled. According to Eagly, Wood, and Diekman (2000), this situation is reflected in the theory of social roles developed by Alice H. Eagly in 1987, wherein women were identified as part of the "community" rather than individual agents with the ability to make their own decisions. Women are associated with warmth and compassion, and thus with interpersonal relations; men, conversely, are associated with individual strength and assertiveness. It is these individual qualities that have long been associated with leadership (Cejka & Eagly, 1999).

An alternative understanding of leadership, rooted in the extensive debate between femininity and masculinity (i.e. gender stereotypes), was offered by

Gutierrez and Lewis (1995). They note that, according to feminist leadership theory, it is important for leaders to act holistically. They must not make their decisions based on gender stereotypes, as such stereotypes tend to ignore the diversities of gender. Lorraine M. Gutiérrez and Edith Lewis identified feminist leadership as having six main characteristics:

1.   Recognising the importance of using a gender perspective to understand issues and find solutions.

2.   Recognising the importance of listening to others and empowering women to resolve their own issues.

3.   For empowerment, it is best to cultivate a shared awareness of the importance of including others and accommodating their diverse roles.

4.   *The personal is political:* leadership styles and community administration must employ a bottom-up approach.

5.   Feminist theory must be built upon the belief that "diversity is power". It must thus recognise such diverse factors as age, generation, race, skin colour, social class, ability, education, talent, and sexual orientation.

6.   Feminist theory must employ a holistic approach, one that recognises the emotional, spiritual, physical, environmental, creative, and intellectual as essential for working with women.

While Gutierrez and Lewis ascribed a holistic approach to feminist leadership, Helgesen (1995) understood it as relying on a "web of inclusion". Helgesen emphasised the importance of conceptualising leadership not as a hierarchy, but as a "web" of communication systems. Helgesen

writes that both men and women may be involved in their communities.

Chin (2004) writes that feminist leadership is characterised by a collaborative effort to realise an egalitarian society. Leadership is not individual, but shared. Meanwhile, Raelin (2003) described feminist leadership as a dynamic approach to leadership that is built upon the foundation of community and compassion. Raelin identified "four C's" of leadership practices: concurrent, collective, collaborative and compassionate.

This study understands women leaders as having distinct styles and concerns, which differ from those of male leaders. To cite De La Rey (2005), alternative/feminist leaders are aware of gender and its influence on morality. They tend to be more open, participative, communicative, and willing to involve others in realising collective goals (Goethals & Hoyt, 2016; Carli & Eagly, 2011, in Goethals & Hoyt, 2016).

In this study, leadership is understood not as a purely individual or inherited quality. Leadership emerges through social processes that distribute power within the community (De La Rey, 2005). It is a social process that creates spaces in which all persons may actively participate in discourse and dialogue. As such, leadership serves not simply to achieve the goals of the individual, but to transform the individual interests into collective ones.

Looking Closer at the Grassroots

The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic have been felt in diverse sectors. For the residents of Tambak Lorok, the pandemic has had significant health and

economic consequences. Along with waste, the tidal flooding experienced by the community brings bacteria and disease, which can exacerbate the health effects of COVID-19. At the same time, the pandemic has caused a significant slowdown in the economy. Stay-at-home orders have limited fishermen's ability to sail, while factories and other employers have dismissed much of their workforce. For the residents of Tambak Lorok, the crisis is not a global or national one; it is close to home, affecting their families, friends, and neighbours.

Of the twenty-five women and five men interviewed, 97% had lost their main source of income. Interviews indicated that 98% of respondents lived in households where the man was the main breadwinner; the remaining 2% of respondents were single mothers. As men lost their livelihoods during their pandemic, women thus sought alternative sources of income (often informal ones) to ensure their families' continued wellbeing. By trading wares and operating kiosks, women became their families' main source of income. This transformed the dynamics of their families, and this enabled women to take on leadership roles. The extent of this leadership varied between families:

"My husband can't go to sea, so I am the one earning money for food, cleaning shells and whatnot. For a kilogram, I can get Rp 2,500. But yeah, I don't only get one kilogram; every day, I take at least Rp 25,000 home." (N, woman, 2 September 2020).

"I happened to already have a shop, a variety store left by my parents. So since my husband's company went bankrupt during the pandemic, I've spent my time working that shop." (W, woman, 3 September 2020).

"I normally earn supplemental income at home by washing clothes, running a laundromat. But now, during the pandemic, few people send their clothes to me for washing. So I sell what I can, cakes and whatnot. If I succeed, well that is good. My husband, he isn't working… he was fired in March 2020. Now he stays at home, not sure what kind of work he wants." (Wt, woman, 4 September 2020)

The women identified as N, W, and Wt are three of the eighteen women who earn less than Rp 500,000 per month. Of the twenty-five women informants, twenty-four had had some form of income before the pandemic. After the pandemic, however, they were the ones who had to ensure their families' continued survival. As such, they became their families' main breadwinners, and thus took on an important leadership role.

On average, women informants earned less than Rp 17,000 per day. They attempted to save this money, even as they paid for their families' everyday expenses. They were the ones who bought rice, paid for water, and purchased the cellular data that their children needed for online schooling.

"No matter what, my children need to eat, go to school, because now they need internet data, right?" (N, 2 September 2020)

To support her family, S promoted her husband's furniture during communal activities.

"My husband, see, works with furniture, selling furniture. Our income dried up between March and June, because nobody was buying furniture. Normally, my husband could pull in some Rp 10 million per month. During the pandemic, Alhamdulillah we've still been able to pull in Rp 750,000. Yeah, I don't work, but I manage the money. So the other day, when I participated in a Community Welfare program in a neighbouring village, I tried to sell my husband's wares." (S, woman, 4 September 2020)

For S, the pandemic was a time to take control of the household. As her husband's furniture orders dried up, she began searching for new customers. S saw an opportunity to sell new products to new customers, who would be willing to purchase her husband's relatively inexpensive furniture. To incentivise customers and increase sales, she also began offering an instalment plan; this had the additional benefit of providing her with a continuous income stream.

As women have taken on leadership roles by becoming their families' main breadwinners, their compassion has enabled them to avoid feeling burdened by their situation. They see their new leadership roles as manifestations of their love for their husbands and children, taken to ensure their continued survival.

Such resilience was not found amongst the five men interviewed in Tambak Lorok, nor most informants' testimonials regarding their husbands.

Male residents have felt significant mental burdens due to the social construct that "forces" men to act as leaders and associates their masculinity with their ability to provide for their families. Many men spend their time outside the home; they find it difficult to witness their wives' continued efforts to support their families, as they feel that they have failed as providers.

"I haven't gone to sea for four months now. Yeah, if I don't go to sea, I can't sell any fish, and it's difficult. The money at home, my wife earns it. Me, I'm confused about what I should do. I can't give her any money, so I just wander about." (A, man, 8 September 2020).

Also important during the pandemic have been efforts to distance families from the threat of COVID-19. Women have been at the vanguard, protecting their families by ensuring that masks, hand washing facilities, and hand sanitiser are available; washing their families' laundry; and providing clean water. Due to tidal flooding, the latter has been particularly difficult.

"So, every day, when we wake up, there's another flood. So I have to cook, iron the clothes, and after the flooding has subsided, I clean the house. The tidal waters are dirty, right… they sometimes bring garbage and whatnot into the house. If we're lucky, it'll bring the yellow [human feces] with it. After the floods, we can't use our washrooms, and so we can only clean after the water subsides. Only once things are clean can I take care of other things." (N, woman, 6 September 2020)

The tidal flooding that affects Tambak Lorok every morning has significantly affected the community's responses. In the evening, residents take action to anticipate the morning flood. They park their motorcycles on high ground, mostly near the market, and secure their belongings in the highest parts of their homes.

Many studies have highlighted how the pandemic has imposed additional burdens on women. The residents of Tambak Lorok who earn less than Rp. 500,000 per month lack the financial resources necessary to purchase masks (be they medical-grade or cotton). One informant, W, made masks for her family. However, she has been unable to supplement her income by selling these masks at the market; due to the difficult economic situation, residents are unwilling to purchase items that they can make themselves.

"Masks, I make them myself from fabric. I've never bought medical-grade masks. Once, I got some from the Red Cross, but afterwards I made masks from scrabs and unused clothes. If my husband leaves the house, I remind him to wear his mask. My children too". (Wt, woman, 6 September 2020).

The sluggish economy also limited residents' ability to access hand sanitiser and clean water. Bottled drinks and *hand sanitiser* became luxuries, and thus appropriate souvenirs. Women showed their compassion by highlighting the joy they felt at seeing their families' reactions.

"Wah, I'm happy when I receive hand sanitiser and masks from community activities. As take-homes, you see. Oh, I also bring home bottled drinks for my children, take-homes for them too."

In "great" and "big man" theories of leadership, women are understood as community-minded, and thus lack the agency of individualistic male leaders. In feminist theories of leadership, meanwhile, women are understood as practising shared leadership within a "web of inclusion".

Women not only took leadership roles within their families, but also within their community. With their peers, they worked to overcome tidal flooding and the pandemic, serving as the vanguard of pandemic mitigation measures. Women greatly facilitated efforts to protect their community from COVID-19. Women were the main drivers of health protocol implementation, as they identified themselves as ensuring the continued well-being of their families. They promoted masking, hand washing, routine exercise, and proper nutrition as means of buttressing the immune system. Through such activities, women ultimately advanced not only the welfare of their families, but also that of their community.

Women's exemplary leadership role can be attributed to their health knowledge, which tends to be superior to that of men. Most of the women interviewed viewed themselves as "health agents", as they were actively involved in promoting government programs. Many of them had previous experience in programmes designed to promote maternal and paediatric health, such as the Integrated Service Post and

stunting prevention programmes. It is thus not surprising that these women were concerned not only for the well-being of their families, but also the broader community. Conversely, men tended to focus on their own problems and their jobs.

For example, T acted not only as the backbone of her family of five—her three children and husband—but also as a community activist involved in the Integrated Service Post programme as well as the local fishermen's association, political group, and administrative mobilisation team. She is thus acknowledged by her community as a woman who has used her interpersonal communications to promote the betterment of the community, both through social and political activities.

During the pandemic, T actively promoted adherence to government-implemented health protocols. She even worked together with the sub-district and district government, going door-to-door to promote health protocols designed to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Working together with L and W, T also distributed supplies that had been provided to the community by government and private actors. One of these women, L, submitted a photograph showing that the Integrated Service Post programme had continued. The women were observing proper health protocols, and wearing boots to avoid the floodwaters.

Women's communicative and persuasive abilities were foundational for their efforts to promote proper health protocols amongst the people of Tambak Lorok. Domestic values were expanded into the community through women's particular approach to leadership. In so doing, the public interest was advanced.

Through their particular activities, women showed that they were capable of managing public affairs even in times of crisis. To promote proper health during the COVID-19 pandemic, women transformed individual practices into community ones, thereby facilitating the realisation of shared goals. The respect enjoyed by these women facilitated their efforts to promote shared values within the community.

At the same time, women exhibited the value of care commonly associated with feminine leadership. Both their economic activities and social activities departed from the principle of care, having been designed to ensure the wellbeing of their families and their communities. In the face of continued stereotyping, women employed the principle of care to advance the community's interests during the COVID-19 pandemic. Feminine values were thus inexorably intertwined with women's efforts to collaboratively promote the betterment of the community.

Conclusion

Leadership has long been understood as hierarchal, both in male-biased and feminine leadership theories. Although it has been hoped that feminist theories of leadership would embrace people of all races, skin colours, ages, and social classes, in practice studies using such theories have continued to focus on elite women. It is thus necessary to re-examine the concept of leadership and recognise the importance of domestic leadership at the grassroots.

At the grassroots, women's leadership abilities have enabled them to maintain solidarity within their families and communities during the ongoing COVID-19

pandemic. Women's leadership has provided them with an important means of upholding the social construct, one that requires further examination. At the same time, it is important to further investigate the effect of the ongoing crisis on the leadership, mental health, and masculinity of men.

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The Politics of Virtue for Capital Accumulation: CSR and Social Conflict in the Construction of the Indocement Factory in Pati, Indonesia

Arif Novianto[1], Kurnia C. Effendi[2], Yuyun Purbokusumo[3]

Abstract

Discourses about Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) are generally understood as goodwill and social virtue. Using a case study of CSR Indocement in Pati, Central Java − Indonesia, this research shows that the CSR activities of Indocement since 2012 are not based on a business or corporate social virtue model but was primarily aimed at facilitating the accumulation of capital through an expansion of a cement factory. First, most of the CSR Indocement programs in Pati failed to bring about empowerment to the local communities. Second, CSR Indocement programs primarily involved the village elites in order for them to influence the communities to accept the expansion of the cement factory in their locality. Third, even though CSR Indocement programs failed in terms of empowerment programs, they were able to weakened the opposition from the communities regarding the expansion of cement factory using the funding from the CSR programs.

Keywords: capital accumulation, CSR programmes, social conflict, politics of virtue

Introduction

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) paradigm began to emerge and become part of the public discourse in Indonesia in the mid-2000s (Rosser & Edwin, 2010, p. 3). Earlier, however, the concept had been debated lengthily. First operated by multinational companies in 1995, CSR is defined by Smith (2003) as companies' environmental and social responsibility towards the outside world. Businesses have become the richest and most powerful institutions in the world, according to Korten (2001), and thus their every decision must take responsibility for the common interest. The European Union

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[1] Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

[2] Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

[3] Department of Public Policy and Management, Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Indonesia

Commission, meanwhile, defines CSR as a concept through which companies voluntarily integrate social and environmental concerns into their business operations and interactions with stakeholders (Chrowter & Aras, 2008, p. 11).

In its development, CSR has become a widely discussed part of a public discourse. Indonesia became the first country to regulate CSR through its laws and regulations (Rosser & Edwin, 2010). After that, governments at the provincial and district/city levels sought to create regulations governing the implementation of CSR for every company in their region.

Before CSR discourses became common among stakeholders, throughout the 1970s liberal and neo-liberal academics debated the concept of corporate social responsibility. Friedman (1970), who represented the liberal position, opposed the initial concept of CSR. He argued that companies did not require virtue, and CSR programmes went against companies' interest of reaping profits. This is because companies' operations contribute directly to local society through their taxes, job creation, economic growth, and, ultimately, community welfare. When regulations require CSR activities, he argued, it would endanger the free market.

CSR programmes began to be implemented by multinational corporations in the mid-1990s, due not only to internal company virtues but also pressure exerted by international Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, international NGOs campaigned against the social and environmental impacts of multinational companies such as Nike, Nestle, and Shell, especially in third world countries. For example, Shell faced strong criticism from activists and NGOs about its involvement with the Nigerian government regime in suppressing the Ogoni people and the execution of human rights leader Ken Saro-Wiwa. In 1997, Shell made a public commitment to social and environmental responsibility as well as sustainable development (Angelis, 2005). CSR has thus been used by companies to deflect the criticism of activists and NGOs, restore companies' reputation, and reduce government threats (Haufler, 2001; Florini, 2003).

Criticism of CSR has also highlighted the fact that companies only focus on the issues and stakeholders that they consider important for their activities and their interests (Banerjee, 2011; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Companies' decisions when making CSR decisions are considered dangerous "because managers are assumed to know what is best for society" (Buchholz & Rosenthal, 2004, p. 145).

In the above-described context, CSR becomes legitimate if its use is to maximise profits and value for shareholders (Mackey et al., 2007). Friedman's fear that CSR would interfere with the maximization of profits has not come to fruition. Rather, CSR has helped these companies earn a higher profit as it has allowed more diverse actors in society (state, private, and civil society) even as it has brought new challenges to the process of capital accumulation. De Angelis (2005) revealed that capital accumulation in the neoliberal era requires a new regulatory system for managing conflicts between actors, such as through governance and CSR. It seeks to use these mechanisms to create social stability and encourage

lasting capital accumulation, facilitate capital expansion, and deal with the social conflicts caused by the production process.

In its concepts and practices, CSR—rather than stemming from the intent to improve things—is actually used to advance capital interests, as can be seen in the conflict over the construction of a cement factory in Pati, Central Java, Indonesia. CSR programmes generally target communities affected by business processes. However, in the case of PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa, a cement producing company that was acquired by the German company Heidelberg Cement (hereinafter abbreviated as PT Indocement), the CSR programme has been operated in an area designated for extractive industries. PT Indocement operates twelve cement factories in various parts of Indonesia, and since 2010 it has had plans to construct a factory in the Pati District (*Kabupaten*), Central Java. However, this plan has yet to come to fruition, as it is still in the planning stage and working to attain a license (Novianto, 2016). Nevertheless, it has developed various CSR programmes in preparation for and anticipation of the new venture. This has happened in two sub-districts, Tambakromo and Kayen. PT Sahabat Mulya Sakti (SMS), which is a subsidiary of PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa, is likewise trying to expand.

Indocement's CSR programmes in Tambakromo and Kayen began at the end of 2012, two years after the planned expansion first faced massive community rejection. A social movement was established in Pati to thwart the expansion efforts of PT Semen Gresik (PT SG) in Sukolilo Subdistrict. There has been a lengthy history of resistance, near Tambakromo and Kayen Subdistricts between 2006 and 2010 (Novianto, 2016), and against PT SMS between 2010 and 2020.

Indocement's CSR programmes in Pati District, according to Christian Kartawijaya (President Director of PT Indocement), were intended to develop the community closest to the factory and adhere to applicable legal regulations (Jateng Post, 18 July 2016) so that the factory could be constructed. As Christian acknowledged, Indocement's successful CSR in Pati District has been recognised by stakeholders in Central Java, such as the Governor of Central Java, the Regent of Pati District, and the Central Java CSR forum. Its CSR programmes, like those of other companies, have been intended to facilitate community development in areas of environment, infrastructure, health, education, livelihood, local economy, and women's empowerment. CSR aims to present the company positively to stakeholders and consumers, to show itself as generous. It is thus an effective business strategy (Ganescu, 2012; Nakib, 2011; Porter and Kramer, 2006).

Instead of receiving the positive appreciation of the people of Tambakromo and Kayen Subdistricts, Indocement's CSR programmes have faced resistance. This has occurred in part due to communities' activities against Indocement, which have included deterrence, eviction, destruction, and even exclusion (social sanctions) of people who have accepted aid from the company (Novianto, 2016). Opponents to the company's CSR perceive it as a form of image politics, one used to seduce, influence, divide, and bribe the community to agree to the construction of a cement

factory. For that reason, they have rejected not only the construction of a cement factory but also its CSR programmes.

The company's CSR activities have provided it with a "social license to operate" and enabled it to show its stakeholders that its business management is accountable (Hilson, 2012. p. 34). CSR, therefore, has enabled the company to secure both acceptability and legitimacy from the local community and the government. It means that Indocement's CSR initiatives in Pati can be viewed as an effort to obtain a social license to operate. In this paper, we consider the process of capital accumulation through the dynamics of CSR. We seek to contribute to the theoretical meaning of CSR through Indocement's CSR programmes in both "unaffected areas" and "new areas to be built". Furthermore, it seeks to understand CSR programmes as weapons used by companies to counter local resistance or at least undermine and divide social movements, thereby facilitating the process of capital accumulation.

Theoretical Framework

The Accumulation of Capital and the Contradiction that Comes with It

From a political-economic perspective, the law of the motion of capital holds that companies will seek and find new spaces to accumulate profits. This happens because, in the market system, capital holders are forced to continuously accumulate capital; should they fail to do so, they may be defeated by their competitors or even fall into bankruptcy. Schumpeter (1942) describes the process as "creative destruction", that is, a competition that forces ineffective,

inefficient, and uninnovative capital out of the competition circuit. In contrast to Schumpeter, Shaikh (2016) argues that capitalism's competition process does not operate perfectly. Not all capital owners compete fairly; the competition process runs in real terms, with each actor seeking to lower prices, cut wages for workers, increase working hours, and obtain cheap raw materials, thus enabling them to win the competition and expand their market share. According to Shaikh (2016), competition is the central regulating mechanism of capitalism, which allows some capital to accumulate, some to stagnate, and some to lose.

Capital is accumulated not only to win inter-capitalist competition but also to respond to internal contradictions—the crisis of underconsumption, overproduction, and falling profit rates. According to Harvey (2001; 2006), it is necessary to employ a spatio-temporal fix to solve the crisis of capitalism through temporal suspension and geographical expansion. It goes through the production of space, the territorial organization of entirely new divisions of labour, the opening of new and cheaper resource complexes, and the opening of new areas as spaces for dynamic capital accumulation.

However, capital accumulation almost always faces limitations and obstacles. The movement of capital is always hindered by obstacles, such as societal rejection and natural boundaries (Li, 2007). Public rejection arises when the public judges capital expansion to be detrimental. Capital cannot discipline everyone, as all individuals have their distinct preferences. While nature has its limits, these are the limits at which

ecological destruction will destroy life on earth. Before reaching this absolute limit, it is therefore necessary for communities to resist potentially detrimental activities.

Faced with various limitations and obstacles, capital may use coercive power and discursive power to get rid of these barriers. Coercive power is a technique used to discipline and remove barriers, which may involve (for example) coercion through security forces or non-state actors. However, in a modern society that uses disciplinary power (rather than sovereign power), coercive power tends not to be the main method used (Foucault, 1991). Rather, discursive power tends to be prioritised by the ruling class due to its subtlety and ability to shape the behaviours of the public. However, in practice, these two powers intersect and move together. As written by Marx (1993) in his work *Grundrisse*:

"… capital will always strive to break down every spatial barrier, that is, to exchange and conquer the whole earth to become a market… it must destroy this space with time… to reduce the rotation time of capital."

Political strategies are the main tools used by the ruling social class to direct human behaviours and shape public awareness. Discursive power is built with narratives, discourses, and ideals of goodness, so that the targeted subjects voluntarily agree to the interests of capital accumulation, even though these interests are actually detrimental to them. However, because they are not aware that they have been harmed, those who are hegemonised produce and reproduce narratives, discourses, and discourses that harm them. One form of discursive power is the creation of positive images, for instance

through CSR programmes. Furthermore, CSR is used not only to build discourses of goodness but also to minimise social conflict by dividing political opponents and removing obstacles.

Methods

This research is a case study that uses qualitative and quantitative post-positivistic thinking. We used a post-positivist approach to emphasize the argumentative nature of the critical method, as well as its more deliberative-discursive style, a continuous openness to criticism and movement toward a deeper truth. The post-positivist approach is supported by qualitative methods such as ethnography, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, group interviews, informal interviews, and policy review. To address the research problem, the researchers combined in-depth interviews and participant observation with a literature study. The researchers lived in and spent forty days in the community, twenty days amongst those who accepted Indocement's CSR and twenty days with those who rejected it, in both Tambakromo and Kayen, Pati. Other key informants in this research were a representative of Indocement in Pati and local government officers in the village, subdistrict, and district level. We used an ethnographic approach to collect data and information as an attempt to develop "ethnographic sensitivity" (Yanow & Geuijen, 2009, p. 254). Following Pader (2006), we used ethnographic sensibility to obtain a better understanding of the action and actor dynamics involved.

For forty days the researchers fed, slept, and worked together with

communities in the conflict area. To make it easier to obtain data, consider the pros and cons and ongoing social conflict, the researchers divided the data collection period into two periods. During the first period, the researchers lived in the homes of people who received Indocement's CSR programme for about twenty days. During this period, the researchers conducted formal and informal interviews and conducted participant observation. During this period, we conducted formal interviews with 32 respondents. During the second period, the researchers lived in the homes of opponents of the factory in Pati Regency for twenty days. During this period, the researchers conducted formal and informal interviews with informants who opposed the continued development of PT SMS. The researchers also observed participants during their community actions against the cement factory, made notes on the results of their deliberations and daily activities, and conducted participant observation.

After the data collection process was completed, the researchers collected, sorted, and analysed the collected data. Cross-checking was used to verify data, with reference to the pertinent literature. The researchers visited key respondents multiple (two, three, or even four) times to triangulate data. Informants were asked follow-up questions, consulted for clarification, or asked to confirm discrepancies. In this study, researchers conducted formal interviews with fifty-eight informants:

A. Government Actors: 10 people

B. PT Indocement Actors (involved in Indocement CSR): 3 people

C. CSR recipients: 20 people

D. Community Opposed to Factory Construction: 19 people

E. Ordinary Community Actors: 6 people

For research and publication purposes, we disguised the informants' names and villages/hamlets of origin, as well as the name of several organizations in Tambakromo and Kayen Subdistricts.

Results

a. Background of Indocement CSR in Pati

Planning and preparation for Indocement's CSR programme in Tambakromo and Kayen began in early 2012, when the company's CSR field team conducted mapping and sought individuals who would accept its programme. PT Indocement assigned the team from its Bogor factory to handle its CSR programmes in Pati, as the factory was not yet completed. Between 2010 and 2017, PT SMS sought to fulfil the legal requirements for factory construction, which included the need to build a consensus in the affected community. Novianto (2016) explained that, during the licensing process, PT SMS obtained Environmental Permit No. 660.1/4767 from the Government of Pati District on 8 December 2014, after it completed a four-year Environmental Impact Analysis. At the time, PT SMS was cooperating with PT Mitra Adi Pranata even as it faced strong rejection from the community. After the permit was released, members of JMPPK (*Jaringan Masyarakat Peduli Pegunungan Kendeng* / Community Network Concerned for the Kendeng Mountains) filed a lawsuit in the Semarang State Administrative Court, which ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. Afterwards, the Regent of Pati and PT SMS appealed at the Surabaya Superior Court (PTTUN). On 14

July 2016, the PTTUN Surabaya Judges Council accepted the appeal. This, in turn, was appealed by the plaintiffs, and the Supreme Court ultimately rejected the appeal on behalf of the public.

In running its CSR programme in Pati, PT Indocement argued that such activities were part of their social responsibility. PT Indocement and its team stated that CSR was used for community empowerment, and thus stemmed solely from the company's benevolence and desire for sustainable development. PT Indocement dismissed the idea that its CSR activities were motivated by a desire to achieve a community consensus and reduce resistance. According to PT Indocement, the company's development is necessary to not only improve its economic well-being but also ensure the company's social and environmental responsibility. In that context, CSR was a form of goodwill, akin to a divine benevolence given only to help humanity.

To show its virtue, CSR Indocement highlighted various awards as a measure of goodwill and success. Comparative studies and mass-media reports were used to convince the public of the company's goodwill. It listed its awards, such as the 2015 and 2016 Indonesia Green Awards, held by the La Tofi School of CSR (a consultant institution), as well as its workshops and training activities (PT Indocement, 2015 & 2016). It also referenced an award it received from the Ministry of Industry in 2015, i.e. the Green Industry Award, as well as recognition of its Water Preservation Programme given by

the Ministry of Social Affairs – Corporate Forum for Community Development (CFCD) on 10 August 2015. The Women Farmers Group (KWT) received an award from the Pati Regency Government for its efforts to inspire female farmers and the Kaligawe Flat Farmers Group in Semarang was awarded first and second place for the Healthiest Flats in Semarang.

Prapto[4], who was part of the Indocement CSR field team, said that the company is always required to benefit the environment (Interview, 23 May 2017). As such, although the cement factory in the Kendeng Mountains of Pati District has not been completed, the CSR programme has nonetheless provided evidence of corporate goodwill and social responsibility. Even the failure to expand operations was no problem, the main thing goal was community empowerment and public betterment. A similar view was expressed by Barkah (a member of Indocement's CSR team), who said that he ran the CSR programme solely to empower the community (Interview, 19 May 2017).

When we contacted Subejo, a member of Indocement's CSR Field Team, he said that the CSR programme was intended to express PT Indocement's sincerity (Interview, 14 May 2017). According to Subejo, PT Indocement did not ask recipients to support the cement factory after these communal improvements were made. He shared a slogan that he thought represented the reality of CSR: "Always give without remembering". He argued that both Tambakromo and Kayen Subdistricts were

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[4] All respondents' names and village names in this article are anonymized or not their real names. This is what the author did to provide

security for the respondents, because social conflicts still occur at the research site.

chosen because of the potential for empowerment therein. Wonokromo Village has the resources to potentially meet the needs of the community, while Banyuadem Village in Kayen Subdistrict has significant tourism potential. Subejo also said that the CSR program team chose to implement the programmes in Tambakromo and Kayen Subdistricts because of the community's demands.

b. Resistance to CSR Indocement

Indocement's CSR programme, though labelled as goodwill, sincerity, and social virtue, did not always result in community openness. The community has exercised acts of deterrence, eviction, destruction, and even exclusion (social sanctions) against Indocement. Opponents of Indocement's CSR activities have seen them as tools for seducing, bribing, and pitting people against each other, thereby facilitating the construction process.

Between 2012 and 2014, PT Indocement used "crawling strategies" to conduct CSR stealthily and secretly. Locals were not open to livestock programmes, infrastructure development, or anything explicitly labelled CSR. Based on our review of online mass media coverage, in 2012 and 2013, information about Indocement's CSR in Pati was not readily available. After 2015, however, information about Indocement's CSR programmes in Pati became widely available on online news portals. There have been changes in public options.

Prapto said that, when they first tried to socialize the CSR programme, they did so in secret due to the community's strong rejection. Rini, a resident of Wonokromo Village, Tambakromo Subdistrict, who received a water pump, said that when the

team first came to her home in 2013 they did so secretly. Rini revealed that:

"Initially, when the CSR team in Wonokromo Village first entered my house, nobody wanted to accept them. No one. When they wanted to walk here, enter the village of Kertajaya, they were chased by people. The people brought pointed bamboo spears. Really... Then finally, I was okay with that. I met them in Semarang, and then at Java Mall... Then, at the meeting place, there were only three people invited (Interview, 16 May 2017)."

When planning and implementing CSR programmes with community members, the first discussions are often held elsewhere due to the strong resistance. Only after beneficiaries are convinced to be brave can they facilitate CSR programmes and pave the way for their implementation in their respective villages.

Tarmin, a resident of Karanganom Village, Tambakromo, revealed something similar to Rini (Interview, 2 June 2017). Tarmin, who served as the representative of Karanganom Village, was the first person who dared to bring the Indocement CSR team into his village. Previously, he had been recruited by Broto, a thug who was hired by PT Indocement to recruit residents of Tambakromo and Kayen Districts to support the factory. Tarmin first met the PT Indocement Team at Hotel Pati in 2014, after which he was offered the programme. Not long afterwards, the Indocement CSR team was invited to visit his home. His house was soon surrounded and attacked by people who knew that a CSR person from Indocement was visiting.

One of Rini's neighbours, Sulisningsih, also a resident of Wonokromo

Village, said that Indocement's CSR was rejected because the community rejected the cement factory. They did not want their living space threatened and damaged by the mining corporation (interview, 3 June 2017). The same thing was expressed by Poniman (a resident of Wonokromo Village), who described Indocement's CSR as a political game and described it as being designed to undermine the opponents of the factory.

Mulyo, a resident of Kertajaya Village, Tambakromo, said that he would continue leading efforts to expel Indocement from the village if she found out that someone was working with them (Interview, 7 June 2017). For him, the CSR activities in Pati were inappropriate. The cement factory had yet to begin operations, yet its CSR programmes were ongoing, seemingly to bribe the community to support the cement factory—or at the very least not openly oppose it.

The crawling strategy used by Indocement's CSR team allows it to infiltrate the community, which created a strong basis for opposition to the cement factory. The strategy was to minimize community opposition to the cement factory, thereby ensuring that its programmes worked optimally. Some programmes were recognized by opponents of the factory, as explained by Novianto (2016, pp. 301–304):

"(...) On 16 December 2014, there was tension in the Tambakromo Subdistrict Government Office because there appeared in front of a banner containing an invitation to join the Indocement CSR program. The Counter-Cement Factory Movement (CCFM) was conducting hearings with the Head of Tambakromo Subdistrict, so the banner was lowered.

Then, on 7 June 2015, the CCFM from Karanganom Village rejected the making of cages for peacocks (a CSR Indocement programme). The community blocked the truck carrying the peacock cages and went to the Karanganom Village hall to meet the Village Chief to cancel the planned peacock breeding.

On 25 September 2015, the community opposed the opening of a factory in Bangunrejo Village. This was voiced by Formaba (Bangunrejo Community Forum), which was involved in the Bangunrejo Village Hall. Information showed that the head of Bangunrejo Village received CSR from Indocement—three sacrificial goats—on 24 September 2015.

At the grand recitation programme in Kertajaya Village on 20 December 2015, Tambakromo was protested by community members who opposed the building of the cement factory. The prayer recitation programme, which brought together four religious leaders, was allegedly funded through Indocement's CSR programme.

Then, on 19 March 2016, opponents came to the Tambakromo police station and Kebonwangi Village office because there was information that an annual member meeting of the Ambararum Cooperative—which had been funded by PT Indocement through its CSR programme—would be held in Kebonwangi Village. According to the annual report of PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa Tbk, the Ambararum Cooperative was used as an indicator of PT Indocement's successful CSR management in Pati. However, it turned out that many local community members did not agree with and even rejected the Ambararum Cooperative, which was funded through Indocement CSR funds (Boemi Mahardika, 03/20/2016)."

Sarijo, a resident of the Sidomulyo Hamlet, had been actively involved in opposition to the cement factory, including boycotts and efforts to expel Indocement's CSR programmes. He believed that CSR was part of the company's efforts to divide the community. The same view was voiced by Junaedi (a resident of Banyuadem Village):

"That is the right of Indocement's CSR, [to decide] where the money will be poured. However, what we need to ask is, whose money is that? The company has not yet constructed its factory in Pati, yet a large amount of money has flowed. It certainly has a purpose. The point is, it is clear that they aim to pit us against each other. Who can be influenced by these CSR funds? Automatically, those who receive it will assume that those who reject it are his enemy. Moreover, Indocement will create enmity between those who receive CSR assistance and those who don't; it has colonized them (Interview, 31 May 2017)."

Members of society who reject Indocement's CSR believes that this programme is not an act of goodwill, one intended to improve society and promote prosperity. Rather, they see CSR as giving the company regulative power, making a positive image, and causing conflict. They rejected Indocement's CSR, likening it to a dangerous disease outbreak. Indocement's CSR, they argue, is meant to poison the community and facilitate its capital expansion.

c. Five Years of Indocement CSR Programmes

Tarmin, who was one of the representatives in Karanganom Village, admitted that he was surprised by Indocement's CSR activities. He was simply offered and accepted CSR support. Nevertheless, he felt that some programmes were quite strange, with unclear importance and benefits, including the catfish, biogas, and tree nursery programmes. Tarmin was asked by Indocement's CSR team to find twenty people who were willing to make catfish ponds, dig biogas wells, and install tree nurseries, and work them for fifteen days. Each female worker received Rp 60,000 per day, while men received Rp 75,000 per day. Tarmin had difficulty finding people who wanted to work, but after five days interest increased. "After all, how does it work? Just chill, relax, and play. There's only a need to be serious if someone from Indocement's CSR team comes. Then, they take pictures. After that, we relax again. At 2 p.m., we go home," said Tarmin (Interview, 2 June 2017). According to him, it was like paid unemployment, which made many people finally want to join and work, including former members of CCFM.

According to Indocement's CSR report, the programme referred to by Tarmin was the Centre for Training, Research, and Community-Based Empowerment (*Pusat Pelatihan, Penelitian, dan Pemberdayaan Berbasis Masyarakat*, P4BM). This programme consisted of five main activities: counselling, agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and biogas. In the CSR report, PT Indocement (2016) stated that it was designed to promote "community empowerment by maintaining the value of togetherness and cooperation."

Claims of the P4BM programme's "community empowerment" and "cooperation" were voiced by Indocement CSR when problems emerged. Conditions in the field were different. The community participated in P4BM's five activities not to

improve cooperation but to access the money made available by Indocement. "Community empowerment" did not occur, as the P4BM programme eventually stalled and was enjoyed only by a handful of people (such as Tarmin).

Tarmin was the first person in Karanganom Village, a village that became the basis of CCFM, who dared to openly accept the Indocement programme. Courage is what made him privileged in the eyes of Indocement's CSR team. He did not need to make proposals, plan activities and budgets, calculate program challenges, or map targets, as he was the one who was offered the programme. Tarmin received funds from Indocement in 2014 and 2015; in 2016, he no longer received any money.

In 2017, Indocement's CSR field team changed, being made the responsibility of those at the Bogor and Cirebon factories. In early 2017, these new teams visited Tarmin's house to introduce themselves and photographed the results of the previous programme. After selling two of the cows received through Indocement's CSR programme, Tarmin bought two cows for himself. These cows were also photographed by the Indocement CSR team. Tarmin said with a laugh that the cows had been sold, but it would be acceptable if the new cows were identified as coming from the CSR programme.

The last of the P4BM programmes involved biogas. Indocement's CSR team sought to utilise the goats and cattle owned by community members for integrated activities. Goat and cow dung could be used as an alternative energy source and as a fertilizer. Indocement's CSR team recruited a professional from Semarang to manage the biogas programme. They worked with various equipment, building

two wells for livestock manure on each side of the catfish ponds on Tarmin's land. Within a week, it was clear that the programme was not working. The biogas programme had failed for many reasons, but mainly because the fire from the biogas could not be ignited.

In addition to the P4BM programme, Tarmin also benefitted from a *musholla* (prayer site) development programme. Regarding this programme, Tarmin felt cheated by Indocement. In September 2015, Tarmin was appointed by Indocement's CSR to support the completion of the *musholla* in his village. He then bragged to his fellow villagers that he would build a mosque. Astuti, a CCFM member in Karanganom Village, learned that a new mosque was being built using Indocement funds, and shared this information with his community. Residents who refused to support the cement factory would not assist in the building of the mosque (Interview, 2 June 2017).

In September 2015, Tarmin was provided Rp 7 million in programme funds; he was promised that he would receive an equivalent amount at the end of the year. However, these funds never arrived. "However, until the twelfth month, it was nothing but a promise. Wow, what if it doesn't happen, even after I've boasted about it," said Tarmin. Finally, Tarmin used his own funds to finish the mosque, as well as a little from his friends. Other members of the community were unwilling to help, due to their different views. Tarmin supported the cement factory, while the surrounding community mostly rejected it. The total amount spent constructing the 5 x 7-metre *musholla* was Rp 70 million, while Indocement only provided Rp 7 million in CSR support.

From the beginning, Indocement's CSR team sought to not assist in the development of the mosque directly. However, in the company's documentary video, it claimed that the mosque built by Tarmin had been fully the fruit of the company's programme. For community members, *musholla* are public places, and they will not use anything built with Indocement funds. Although Tarmin had used mostly his own funds, few were willing to use the *musholla*. Residents who were close to the mosque preferred going elsewhere, no matter the distance.

Staggering Cooperatives from Indocement

Wonokromo Village in the Tambakromo Subdistrict has a quite interesting pattern of social relations. Neighbourhoods typically have funds that can be borrowed by residents if there is an urgent need. Indocement's CSR team assessed this as providing the potential for cooperatives. The "Cooperative Village" programme was launched by Indocement to develop this potential. The CSR team brought together representatives of thirty-two neighbourhoods in Wonokromo Village for training to teach them about cooperative principles and governance. The training involved experts on cooperatives from Yogyakarta.

To accommodate these potential cooperatives, Indocement's CSR team sought to develop a cooperative that is engaged in savings and loans. Of these neighbourhood cooperatives, only one gained legal recognition: Jaya Karsa Cooperative in Wonokromo Village. When Jono first joined the Jaya Karsa Cooperative, he served as secretary. He told me that, after every meeting, he was given some money (Interview, 3 June 2017). However, less than a month after starting this position, he chose to leave. Jono considered the cooperative to be used for the interests of PT Indocement, to facilitate its efforts to build its factory in Pati and to manage its public image. According to company records, the Jaya Karsa Cooperative has a hundred members; however, only three are active. Others are listed simply because they are members of neighbourhood associations that are involved in savings and loans (with a principal savings of Rp 50,000 and mandatory savings of Rp 5,000 per month).

The process of legally developing a cooperative (one incorporated and registered in the Pati Cooperative Office) was supported with Rp 2.5 million from Indocement's CSR team; another Rp 4 million was provided for the construction of a cooperative office. This did not mean, however, that these efforts resulted in active membership. Around 2014, thirty-two neighbourhoods in Wonokromo Village were given Rp 3 million by Indocement's CSR team with the purpose and objective of establishing a revolving fund. This is one part of the "Cooperative Village" programme initiated by Indocement. Several neighbourhoods rejected the money, as it came from PT Indocement. Others protested because they received less than Rp 3 million; some of the money had been taken by village elites.

After almost three years, the "Cooperative Village" programme did not work. The three million rupiah received from Indocement was used in several neighbourhoods for infrastructure development rather than for establishing a cooperative. Prapto stated that the cooperative programme's ultimate goal was to make the community independent, and this had yet to be achieved until 2017

(Interview, 23 May 2017). Production cooperatives such as Jaya Karsa Cooperative have been unable to be independent, and thus they continue to feed on funds from Indocement. Meanwhile, the Sartika Cooperative in Simolawang Village, Tambakromo, began making itself into a production cooperative in 2017, after previously involving itself solely in savings and loans. However, the cooperative ultimately collapsed. Two other cooperatives have likewise failed to transform themselves into production cooperatives. Catur (the advisor for the Sartika Cooperative) argues that funding was still lacking. While Indocement's CSR team was faced with a tighter budget in 2017, they sought to improve the sustainability of the programme.

In Indocement's annual CSR report document and presentation documents (PT Sahabat Mulia Sakti, 2016), the company wrote that Dalimin (the chairperson of the Ambararum Cooperative) had achieved the highest level of success in the CSR programme, becoming what was termed a "local hero"—one who had successfully developed a CSR programme and has shared its virtues with the wider community. The Ambararum Cooperative, thus, was identified by Indocement CSR as its most successful programme.

When we first met, Dalimin talked about the goodness and virtue of Indocement's CSR as if there were no gaps. This was also true when we met him for a second time. At our third meeting, about two weeks later, Dalimin was joined by Nurahman, an advisor to the Ambararum Cooperative and a wealthy businessman in Kebonwangi Village whose land was used by Indocement's CSR team for its trial plantation. In a rather elevated voice, Nurahman said that he had expelled Indocement's CSR team at the end of 2016; as such, Indocement's CSR team did not dare set foot in his house (Interview, 9 June 2017). Nurahman considered the Indocement's CSR team as interested only in "making a name", giving minimal funds to the Ambararum Cooperative while claiming to have built it from the beginning. Nurahman said that Indocement was stingy but asked more from the community, especially after the team from PT Indocement's factory in Cirebon took over. Dalimin additionally denied that he was called a local hero by Indocement's CSR team, especially since the Ambararum Cooperative had been established even before the company's arrival.

After Nurahman spoke bluntly, Dalimin also began to open up. He said that, although the funds provided by Indocement's CSR team were not much, the company subjected him to significant pressure and he was viewed negatively by his community. He was labelled an agent of PT Indocement, and it was claimed that all of his assets were provided by Indocement through its CSR team. On 23 July 2015, his house was assaulted by hundreds of people, many of whom were CCFM members. His garden and yard were ravaged, and he was threatened with death if continued to work with the Indocement CSR team.

Indocement's claim to the Ambararum Cooperative's success makes one question the true story. The Ambararum Cooperative was first formed as a savings and loan unit in 2011, entering production (agriculture and plantation) in 2015; one of these activities was supported by Indocement through its CSR

programme. As of 2017, the Ambararum Cooperative's plantation unit remained dependent on the company, as it was still trying to work on new vegetables (such as butternut squash and okra). Through its CSR programme, Indocement provided them with assistance in the form of training and research. In its efforts to become a production cooperative, the Ambararum Cooperative is still lagging; large-scale production has yet to occur.

To further develop the Ambararum Cooperative, Indocement's CSR team has sought to integrate it with other CSR recipients, such as the Wonokali Cave development programme. In 2016, the Ambararum Cooperative made paving blocks to be purchased by Indocement and used to repair infrastructure facilities in the Wonokali Cave. The paving block was marked with PT Indocement's logo in the centre: three circles, representing Semen Tiga Roda (PT Indocement's business branch).

No Programme Sustainability

During the five years that the Indocement has operated its CSR programme in Pati, approximately ninety programmes have been initiated. Of these, data from Indocement shows that only two have been sustainable: the Ambararum Cooperative and the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy.

"Two people have appeared on the sustainable empowerment track, Mr Dalimin (Ambararum Cooperative, with 400 members in eleven villages and even Pati Township) and Mr Martono, the manager of the football training group (100 members) (PT Sahabat Mulia Sakti, 2016)."

Dalimin and Nurahman rejected the claim that the Ambararum Cooperative's progress was due to Indocement's CSR activities.

Meanwhile, Martono is the main manager of the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy, which began to take shape in 2010. Between 2012 and 2015, Bagas was a member of the Academy and a student at State Junior High School 1 Tambakromo. He said that he attended the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy because the school required its students to participate in extracurricular activities, including Scouts (Interview, 29 May 2017). Since its inception in 2014, Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy has relied on contributions to fund continued operations. Martono said that he and two other trainers, who work as sports teachers at State Junior High School 1 Tambakromo, were not paid and trained students as a form of dedication (Interview, 17 May 2017). Contributions are sought when members seek to join tournaments out of town or to buy training equipment.

Between August and September 2014, Indocement's CSR team collaborated with the Regency Association (*Asosiasi Kabupaten*, ASKAB) of the Football Association of Indonesia (*Persatuan Sepak Bola Seluruh Indonesia*, PSSI), Pati to hold an association football tournament on the Tambakromo District field. The Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy was involved in the tournament. During planning sessions, representatives from Pati were treated with food and received pocket money.

After the 2014 ASKAB tournament concluded, the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy began to communicate with Subejo, a representative of Indocement's CSR team. The company provided assistance in the form of balls (branded with Indocement's logo), strategy boards, costumes, training vests, and cones; each

member received an Indocement CSR shirt emblazoned with the words "Community Empowerment Cadre." Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy received funds to attend three football tournaments. First, in February 2015 participated in the tournament in Trangkil, Pati. The Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy first used its new uniforms. After finishing the tournament, Martono was interviewed by several journalists, who asked why he was wearing a shirt branded with Indocement's logo. This was the first time that Martono had been interviewed by many journalists simultaneously. Indocement also provided participants with vehicles, accommodations, food, and pocket money.

Second was the Aditya Cup tournament in Semarang, the capital of Central Java. This tournament was organised by Indocement, and the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy was invited to participate. In this tournament, players again wore uniforms bearing the logo of PT Indocement. The Aditya Cup Tournament provided players with a new experience. Bagas said that, for the first time he slept in a luxurious hotel, ate at a restaurant where he could choose his food, and, when the tournament was over, he received Rp 100,000 in spending money. Usually, when participating in tournaments, players must pay for their own accommodations. During the Aditya Cup tournament, Martono was again interviewed by reporters, who again asked questions about the Indocement's logo. "When asked about using the logo, I answered the question. How come it was not different? Why must it first be about the CSR?" asked Martono.

The third tournament, the ASKAB U-16 trophy tournament, was held at Joyo Kusumo Pati stadium. At the tournament,

the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy again wore uniforms emblazoned with Indocement's logo. Martono said that the local community began to recognise that the academy had been supported by Indocement through its CSR activities.

In addition to covering accommodations and training equipment, Indocement's CSR team also provided the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy's trainers with pocket money. Beginning in April 2015, trainers were provided with an allowance of Rp 50,000 each after every training session. The academy practised three times a week, on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. As such, on average twelve practices were held every month, and trainers received an average of Rp 600,000 per month. However, Martono stated that, after Indocement's CSR managers changed in April 2016, trainers were no longer provided pocket money. This was acceptable, he said, as the academy was already running well before the company became involved. When corporate funding ceased, he found alternate funding to ensure the academy's continued operations. The dynamics of its trips illustrate how Indocement's CSR team only became involved when the Kusuma Bangsa Football Academy was already established, and it operated relatively well with informal management. Having provided pocket money, accommodation costs, and training equipment, Indocement's CSR team claimed that it had transformed Kusuma Bangsa into a successful empowerment cadre—even though the situation on the ground was not that simple. Indocement only provided financing, and thus the continued existence (or absence) of CSR funding did not affect their ability to continue to operate.

Failure of the Livestock Programme

The livestock programmes conducted by Indocement, through which goats, cows, ducks, and catfish were provided to residents through CSR activities, have not been successful. These programmes thrive when recipients benefit directly. Data from Indocement's 2016 CSR presentation shows that the livestock programme was unsustainable (PT Sahabat Mulia Sakti, 2016). We met five people who had received livestock from Indocement's CSR team. Tarmin and Ringgo said that the catfish programme failed due to flooding; Indocement doubted this, as they did not believe that floods could occur in highland areas. While Yuwono was able to benefit from his cattle, the results of the nursery program were negligible.

The goat, duck, and cow programme experienced a similar fate. Most participants identified this livestock as being for them as individuals, failing to recognize their social responsibilities. Individuals thus used the animals as they saw fit: eating them, selling them, or doing whatever they pleased. When providing livestock to residents, Indocement's CSR team did not emphasize that these animals were to be used for the benefit of the community. Livestock was given to people who wanted it, and thus part of the company's crawling strategy for dealing with public resistance.

Indocement's CSR programme did not realize noble goals. Rather, the company used pragmatic approaches that ultimately advanced the goal of capital expansion in Tambakromo and Kayen Subdistrict. The CSR team did not consider programme sustainability as the main goal

but sought mainly to obtain public support for its factory.

Discussion

Indocement's CSR consciously sought to create goodwill and contribute social virtue. In the document "Plan for the Construction of a Cement Factory in Pati: PT Sahabat Mulya Sakti 2016", five stakeholders were identified as supporting this CSR discourse: the mass media, local government, academics, NGOs, and the community (PT SMS, 2016). Good relationships and ongoing discourse were constructed by involving these stakeholders, with PT Indocement as the controller or coordinator.

These CSR activities were part of PT Indocement's discursive power. In discursive power, virtue discourses are used mainly to shape the behaviour of targeted groups. Discourse construction serves as a "mask", one created to shape the interests, habits, and ideals of target groups. This process is based on the belief that, as individuals are artificially organised, they "do what they should do" (Scott, in Li, 2007). Discursive power is attained when the target group internalises and reproduces discourses that reflect the interests of the authorities, even when it harms them and threatens their futures.

Indocement's CSR team sought people who were willing to accept their programme using a persuasive approach. They did not contractually require recipients to become pro-cement agents, or at least leave CCFM. They sought to ensure that prospective recipients would accept their programme sincerely. Indocement's CSR team wanted to create the impression that its programmes had no

interest other than community empowerment.

In terms of their political attitudes, Indocement's CSR recipients fall into three categories. First, those who do not, and thus are apathetic. Recipients in this category did not know that the programme came from Indocement, as the company's CSR team tacit and unspoken tactics—what we identified as a "crawling strategy"—between 2012 and 2014. Second, those who knew that they had benefitted from Indocement's CSR programme but remained apathetic. Third, those who knew about Indocement's CSR activities, asked to be involved, and positioned themselves as supporters of the cement factory. It is members of this last category who became involved in discursive conflict with those who opposed the factory, at times recruiting citizens to become pro-cement factory agents.

Indocement's CSR programme in Pati Regency contradicts its narratives of goodwill. On the one hand, they talk about goodwill, sincerity, and social virtue; on the other hand, they talk about the intent to expand their cement operations. Their selection of Tambakromo and Kayen Subdistricts for CSR was also closely related to their goal of expanding their capital.

Finally, we conclude that, in the five years that Indocement's CSR programme operated in Pati District, it failed to empower the community. It was unable to create local heroes, even as it faced strong resistance from the community. The company thus used particular strategies and tactics to cultivate support. Ultimately, however, most supporters were village officials, village leaders, and thugs, or individuals who were motivated not by efforts to empower the surrounding community but by the desire to improve their own situation. They recognise that they are being used by Indocement, and thus seek to use it to their benefit.

Conclusion

Indocement's main goal with CSR was to build a consensus so that the community would approve the expansion of its capital. On that basis, its main goal is not to create a prosperous and empowered community. Indocement's CSR team sought to implement programmes in each of the eleven villages closest to the planned factory. Programmes have begun operations in nine villages; the remaining two, Swakarso and Banyuurip, are strongly associated with CCFM and have been unwilling to accept the company. There has been little concern for whether the person who runs the programme has the intention and social responsibility to advance the welfare of the community. There is instead a desire to ensure that the community accepts the programme and reduce horizontal conflict.

From the explanation above, it shows that Indocement's CSR programme—which has nearly ninety programmes in total—has been unable to empower the community. However, Indocement has successfully used its CSR to divide its opponents or at least minimize resistance. Politically, Indocement's CSR programme has been intended mainly to remove barriers to capital accumulation.

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