The Moluccas' Surviving Aristocracy in Indonesian Politics: Fragmentation and Land-based Political Support

The article demonstrates how the Sultanate of Ternate in the Moluccas has survived in post-authoritarian Indonesian politics by analysing the political performances of the Sultan of Ternate and his immediate family members. The success of Sultan Mudaffar Syah in the political arena has contextualised the literature on land-based political economy, something that has largely been neglected. Combining in-depth interviews, observations, and document study, I argue that the Sultan's political achievements were the result of his transforming Ternate's coastal aristocracy into a land-based one, sidestepping the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960 by transferring land management and ownership to indigenous communities while still maintaining economic control. However, his wife and children have failed politically, not only because they are not part of the traditional aristocratic structure (and thus have no control over land) but also because of internal fragmentation.


Introduction
In his famous 'King's Dilemma', Samuel Huntington (1968) argued that the integration of monarchies into modern institutions leaves monarchs with an unfavourable dilemma: promoting reform would eventually result in challenges from reformist cadres, while delaying reform would result in popular protests. There is no place for monarchs in modern political architecture, which allows them to 'rule, but not reign' by limiting them to symbolic and traditional activities.
However, recent scholars have challenged Huntington's argument. Corbett, Veenendaal, and Ugyel (2016) show that monarchies in smaller states have been able to persevere and maintain political power. Based on a review of approximately twenty absolute or semiabsolute monarchical regimes in three small states (Tonga, Bhutan, and Liechtenstein), they argue that the endurance of monarchical power is inversely correlated with state size. First, small states tend to lack revolutions, thereby creating 'institutional fidelity' that helps monarchs to survive. Second, small states tend to have political systems that are 'personalised' to the monarch (rather than dispersed amongst political institutions). In such states, important political figures have multiple social, political, economic, and religious roles.
This article neither neglects nor accepts the above theories. It proposes a new argument regarding surviving aristocracies in electoral politics. Owing to low levels of institutionalisation and high levels of fragmentation, Indonesia's aristocracies and traditional institutionsunlike monarchies, which are dominated by one king-exist at the sub-national level (mostly at the district and sub-district level). Since 1998, aristocrats have tried (with various results) to compete in electoral arenas at national, provincial, and local levels. I argue that their success has depended on their ability to control land, as an economic resource, and to maintain cohesive internal relations. This will be shown using the example of the Sultanate of Ternate, which Sultan Mudaffar Syah transformed from a coastal aristocracy into a land-based aristocracy to sustain his political power. His political support came predominantly came from traditional areas, where land is under his direct control. However, such control cannot be genealogically transferred to his children and wife, as they are not part of the coastal sultanate structure. Lacking the capacity to maintain internal cohesiveness, his family has failed to achieve its political agenda. This finding fills important gaps in the theoretical debate on the political economy, which has largely ignored the importance of land in Indonesian politics.
I will present my argument chronologically, starting with the colonial period but emphasising post-authoritarian Indonesia. To achieve an understanding of local politics in Ternate, I will overview the role of land politics in Indonesia, as well as the political background of Ternate and the formation of the North Maluku Province (where ethnic competition has become a feature of local politics). I will then depict the fragmentation within the royal family, as revealed by members' political party affiliations and trajectories in post-Suharto politics. The next section will lay out this article's argument regarding land-based political transformations, as shown in the political performance of the Sultan and his immediate family members, who have received significant support from areas where the Sultan maintains control of land. I will then conclude this article with a reflective summary of the findings.
To begin, Ternate, an island located in the northern part of the Moluccas, has long been known as the home of four sultanates: Ternate, Tidore, Bacan, and Jailolo (Fala Raha) (Amal, 2010, p. 7). Historically, the strongest and the most influential sultanate in north Maluku has been the Sultanate of Ternate (Hanna & Alwi, 1990). Its palace is located on Ternate Island (37.23 km²), which is dominated by the Gamalama stratovolcano; 56 of 77 villages are in coastal areas, and no settlement is located more than 500 metres from the sea (BPS Ternate, 2014, p. 9).
Early European explorers and merchants first travelled to the Moluccas for spices, especially nutmeg, pepper, and clove. Trade led to colonisation, first by the Portuguese, then by the Spanish and the Dutch (Burnet, 2011). When the price of these spices dropped during the late colonial period, the Dutch concentrated more on the sugar plantations of Java and Sumatra. As such, under Sukarno and Suharto, Ternate was part of Maluku Province (with its capital in Ambon). 2 In 1999, this province was split into Maluku and North Maluku provinces-the first administrative split in post-authoritarian Indonesia.
During Indonesia's struggle for independence in the 1940s, Jabir Syah-the 47 th Sultan of Ternate-refused Sukarno's offer to integrate the Sultanate into the nascent Indonesian republic; this resulted in a soft exile, which lasted until Jabir Syah's death in 1974. At the same time, newly established Indonesian government tried to eliminate the aristocracy. Using a series of land regulations, it prohibited aristocracies from owning land and established ownership ceilings; this allowed the government to claim their material resources. 3 (Andaya, 1993), as well as the sultanates of Bacan and Jailolo. 5 This has had consequences for gubernatorial contestations in North Maluku, as discussed by Wilson (2008).

Land, Political Economy, and Elite Formation
The literature on land and politics in Indonesia is dominated by four themes: land reform and peasants, land law, forestry and environmental management, and land disputes. In the first, writers concentrate on the implications of land reform for economic distributionespecially as related to landless farmers. Most writers (i.e. Sajogyo, 1970;Selosoemardjan, 1962;Utrecht, 1969Utrecht, , 1973 argue that land reform had enhanced the livelihoods of the Indonesian people until it was stopped by President Suharto in the 1970s. In the second, writers focus on Indonesia's legal framework for land 25 villages along the western coast of Halmahera Island. According to Bubandt (2014, p. 126), the name 'Gilolo' (found in Dutch and Portuguese records) was derived from Jailolo and used to refer to the entire island of Halmahera.
issues. Most deal with the Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-Undang Pokok Agraria, BAL), which they see as generally having been reduced by actors (thereby limiting its potential operationalisation). Others have emphasised the Forestry Law, introduced by Suharto in 1967, which covers almost 70% of Indonesia's total area. In the third, scholars have concentrated on forestry and environmental management. Particular focus has been given to the situation since decentralisation began in 2001. Although this resulted in authority over forestry management being delegated to local authorities, it has also created tension between local and national governments. One of the most striking has been a bylaw issued by the Wonosobo Regency Government, which unilaterally stipulated that forest areas previously managed by state enterprises would to be 'communally managed by the people' (Thorburn, 2004). In the last, writers have examined how the overlapping land laws in Indonesia have created conflict in many areas in Indonesia. Land management regulations and policies are unclear, and thus state/corporate actors have often come into conflict with local people/adat communities. The literature on land politics in Indonesia has thus recognised state actors, enterprises, peasants and adat communities, but have not properly considered land as a significant aspect of the political economy in post-authoritarian Indonesia.

Analysis
of Indonesia's elite formation has largely ignored the importance of the political economy of land since the late 1960s, when the Suharto government reduced mass politics to a minimum level and focused primarily on ethnicity, bureaucracy, and military matters. A classic work of Crouch (1979), for instance, argues that New Order elites came from military, technocratic, and bureaucratic backgrounds. Moreover, 'the elite of the New Order was dominated by officers and the Western-Educated technocrats who helped them formulate economic policy'. Gregory (1976) similarly found that New Order-era elites came primarily from three institutions (the military, political parties, and technocracy) and were shaped primarily by four aspects: education, social status, religious background, and ethnic origin. She noted, for example, an underrepresentation of non-Javanese in elite formations. Emmerson (1976) defines Indonesian elites as 'members of the higher central bureaucracy and the national legislature.' In his research, he found that elite culture is an interplay between ethnicity and religion, as well as institutional and organisational background. In post-Suharto Indonesia, Shiraishi (2003) writes that the 'majority of local parliamentarians have a background in New-Order era political parties and youth and mass organization.' Therefore, there is a continuation of New Order elites.
To some extent, this current study might expand on previous studies by Savirani (2004) and Hadiz (2010). Using the cases of North Sumatra, East Java, and Yogyakarta, Hadiz explores the political basis of elite dominance in the context of the localisation of power. He argues that 'successful local elites in Indonesia tend to be those who already have access to substantial material resources as well as some degree of control over instrument of political intimidation.' Local elites use material resources for money politics, as well as for corruption activities. This paper is novel, however, in that it contributes to the literature on land and political economy by showing the importance of land control in the political survival of the Sultanate of Ternate.

Ethnicity, Conflict, and Political Contestation in North Maluku
Initially, northern Maluku was divided between two regencies, which resembled the islands' traditional aristocracies: the Sultanate of Ternate and the Sultanate of Tidore. North Maluku Regency, with its capital in Ternate, covered an area traditionally controlled by the Sultanate of Ternate; Central Halmahera Regency, with its capital in Soa Sio, covered an area traditionally belonging to the Sultanate of Tidore. On 20 March 1999, Ternate City was incorporated in preparation for the creation of North Maluku Province; by law, a minimum of three regencies/cities was required for a new province to be created (Firman, 2013;Fitrani, Hofman, & Kaiser, 2005). Four years later, North Maluku Regency was divided into four regencies: West Halmahera, South Halmahera, North Halmahera, and Sula Islands. Central Halmahera, meanwhile, was divided into Tidore City Islands Regency (with its capital in Soa Sio); the capital of Central Halmahera thus moved to Weda. Therefore, the formation of North Maluku Province was an extension of the traditional power of the Sultanate of Ternate, whose traditional territory covers eight of the ten newly established regencies/municipalities in the province.
The formation of North Maluku Province resulted in power struggles, especially in the matter of appointing its first governor. One political party, Golkar, dominated the parliaments of both North Maluku (then still a regency) and Central Halmahera after winning the 1999 elections. Sultan Mudaffar, who chaired Golkar's North Maluku branch, was the region's main political actor. He soon became seen as the most likely candidate, as he wielded power in both a traditional institution (the Sultanate of Ternate) and a modern political institution (Golkar). However, according to Wilson (2008, p. 47), three other prominent politicians were also pursuing the governorship: Bahar Andili, the Regent of Central Halmahera; Syamsir Andili (Bahar's younger brother), the Mayor of Ternate City; and Thaib Armaiyn, a longserving bureaucrat. Of these four candidates, only Sultan Mudaffar was of Ternate heritage; 6 the latter three are ethnic Makians, coming from a minority group that had dominated North Maluku's bureaucracy and parliament. Ultimately, as argued by Wilson (2008), Sultan Mudaffar's failure to manage ethnic sentiments and horizontal conflicts resulted in him losing the struggle for governorship.
At the time, North Maluku was engulfed by a bloody conflict, one that began as a land dispute but developed into an ethnic and religious conflict. The Sultanate of Ternate was at the centre of the conflict. In 1975, the North Maluku Regency government-citing the danger of regular volcanic activity-had begun relocating the Makians (most of whom were Muslim) from Makian Island to northern Halmahera, the traditional home of the Kao ethnic group (most of whom were Christian) (Burnet, 2011;Duncan, 2014;Wilson, 2008 As an extension of the political struggles between Bahar Andili and Sultan Mudaffar, two sultanates were resurrected: the Sultanate of Tidore by Andili and the Sultanate of Jailolo by Mudaffar Syah. The Sultanate of Tidore, which had existed in a vacuum since the 1960s, was reactivated to challenge Sultan Mudaffar's traditional dominance among the ethnic Ternates, Makians, and other ethnic groups in Ternate, Tidore, and Halmahera. It is thus no surprise that, soon after the coronation, Sultan Djafar Syah of Tidore allied himself with Bahar Andili. In response to Andili's resurrection of the Sultanate of Tidore, Mudaffar Syah recreated the Sultanate of Jailolo in Halmahera, a puppet sultanate that had been destroyed by Ternate in the 17 th century (Bubandt, 2014;Leirissa, 1996).
The defeat of Sultan Mudaffar in the conflict between Pasukan Kuning and worlds, the leader of all human beings and living creatures; it is not restricted to Muslims. The Kolano is seen as the bridge between worlds.
Pasukan Putih thus mirrored his stance in governorship and continued centuries of rivalry. In his quest for governorship, Andili had successfully reduced Sultan Mudaffar's traditional support by exploiting religious sentiments. Afterwards, Sultan Djafar Syah of Tidore received significant support, which enabled him to successfully contest the 2004 election for the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD).
Since then, the governorship of North Maluku has continued to be strongly contested. The first Governor of North Maluku, Thaib Armaiyn, came to power in 2002 with the support of the Indonesian Demokratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, PDIP), the ruling party of the time. Abdul Gafur, a Golkar politician who had also sought the governorship, had received the support of the North Maluku Parliament, but the Central Government had blocked his governorship after Gafur was investigated for alleged bribery. Sultan Mudaffar had been Abdul Gafur's running mate; as such, his aspirations were blocked after the intervention of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (The Jakarta Post, 2002). Ultimately, in North Maluku parliament, Thaib Armaiyn was chosen over Bahar Andili.
In 2007, the North Maluku elections commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah Maluku Utara, KPUD Malut) denied Sultan Mudaffar's candidacy after he failed to receive the support of parties representing 15% of parliamentary seats (based on the 2004 elections); shortly before the deadline, one party-with less than 1% of votes-had withdrawn its support for Mudaffar. Several days of rioting, involving the Sultan's loyalists and centred on the Baabullah Airport, followed.
Even though Sultan Mudaffar won his challenge in the Constitutional Court, he could not participate in the election, leaving incumbent Thaib Armaiyn and Abdul Gafur to continue their rivalry (Bubandt, 2014).
Ultimately, KPUD Malut declared that Thaib Armaiyn-backed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Democrat Party (Partai Demokrat, PD)-had won over Abdul Gafur-supported by Vice President Jusuf Kalla's Golkar Party-the winner by a margin of 900 votes. This decision, however, was annulled by the Indonesian Elections Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), citing concerns of vote rigging-including two members of KPUD Malut. After KPU conducted a recount, it declared Abdul Gafur the winner. This case, however, was far from over: the Constitutional Court ordered a recount in three regencies. After fifteen months of 'double governorship', the central government intervened for a second time, installing Thaib Armaiyn as governor through Presidential Decree No. 85 /P 2008 (Nurhayati, 2008). KPUD Malut's appeal was denied by the Constitutional Court (Christanto, 2009).
Vote rigging continued in the 2013 governor election. As a result, the Constitutional Court blocked the winner of the second round, Ahmad Hidayat Mus (Regent of Sula Islands Regency), and mandated new elections in seven districts in Sula Islands. Abdul Ghani Kasuba, the incumbent deputy governor, was thus appointed Governor of North Maluku for the 2013-2018 term.
The political history of North Maluku since its creation in 1999 shows that ethnicity has been an integral part of local politics. The people of Ternate lost a series of political contests against candidates from other ethnic backgrounds. Also influencing this loss was fragmentation within the sultan's family, as will be discussed in the following section.

Political Fragmentation in the Sultan's Family
Even though Sultan Mudaffar failed to gain executive office, he readily received support in national legislative elections, representing North Maluku. The Sultan's legislative performance since 1998 was been a continuation of his performance during the Suharto's New Order. Sultan Mudaffar began his political career as a member of Parliament of Maluku in Ambon (serving from 1971 to 1977). After this term's conclusion, he was chosen as heir apparent (Sultan Muda) of the Sultanate of Ternate, but the members of the royal family I interviewed said that he rejected the position and chose to work for various private companies in Jakarta. In 1986, he was inaugurated as the 48 th Sultan of Ternate, a position that lacked any significant influence after decades of inactivity. His profile increased as he reactivated the adat communities under his domain, and again when he represented North Maluku in the MPR from 1998 to 2002, during the North Maluku conflict (Anggoro & Nara, 2010  The participation of the Sultanate's family members in the 2014's election, in which only Sultan Mudaffar was successful, was a clear example of internal fragmentation within the family. Rather than choose a prominent political party as their vehicle, members of the aristocracy were targeted by small and short-lived political parties that required the support of traditional leaders to increase their popularity. Neither PPDK and PP, which were used in 2004, passed the parliamentary threshold for the 2009 election; both dissolved shortly after the election. Boki Nita had successfully represented the party of then-president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in 2009, but suffered from the massive loss of support for the party after massive corruption was reported. Boki Nita's selection of different political parties represents internal conflict, both between Boki Nita and Sultan Mudaffar's other wives and children and between Boki Nita and the adat community. This conflict peaked when, two years before the Sultan's death, she made a claim regarding a 'twin sultan' that challenged the most important aspects of Ternate's maledominated Islamic society. As a result, both 13 Islam has had significant influence on the history and politico-social structure of the adat communities and the Sultan's children banded together to oppose Boki Nita. 13 Several other incidents have been detrimental to Boki Nita's relationship with adat communities. First, she built a 'women's mosque' next to Grand Mosque (Sigi lamo), the Sultanate's second-most important site after the palace. Second, she has positioned herself as equal to the Sultan, extending the palanquin tradition to include not only carrying the Sultan to Sigi Lamo but also to carry herself to the 'women's mosque'; in this, the Sultan's palanquin is used. The third source of conflict has been her reshaping of the Sultanate's structure, which is seen as going against centuries of tradition. This has resulted, for instance, in the displacement of the Sultan's brother, Kapita Lao Effendi Syah.
The most significant internal conflict, which has deeply influenced the political performance of her children with the Sultan, was the nomination of two boys (claimed to be Boki Nita's sons) as 'twin sultans' (Kolano Maduro). In 2013, Boki Nita-then 41 years old-claimed to have delivered twin boys fathered by 77-year-old Sultan Mudaffar. On September 11, 2013, when the senior twin Ali Muhammad and junior twin Gajah Mada were three months old, Ternate Sultanate. See, for instance, Andaya (1993), Lay (2001), Putuhena (1980). the boys were declared were declared the 'twin young sultans' (Kolano Maduro) by decree of the Sultan (Jaib Kolano). Until the boys reached the age of majority, Boki Nita would act as regent. Through this decree, the succession processes in the Sultanate of Ternate were transformed by introducing the Javanese concept of crown prince (Sidik, 2013;Usman, Husain, & Saraha, 2014). It eliminated the role of the Bobato 18, concentrating political and economic power in the hand of the Sultan and forcing an inland aristocratic structure on Ternate. This internal conflict significantly affected the political performance of the Sultan's family in the 2014 election.
Boki Nita's influence ended when the Sultan died in February 2015; the people of North Maluku were loyal only to Sultan Mudaffar. In January 2015, when the Sultan was spending his last days unconscious in his deathbed, a new Kapita Lao-the son of previous Kapita Lao, Effendy Jabir Syahwas inaugurated. Boki Nita was refused access to the Sultan when he was being treated at Pondok Indah Hospital in Jakarta; she was likewise prevented from joining her husband's funeral in Ternate (Malut Post, 2015). Two weeks later, her queen title (boki) was rescinded (Marwoto, 2015); her supporters in the Sultanate's structure were removed; and a new Bobato 18, traditionally responsible for choosing the next sultan, was established (Kasman, 2015). In August 2015, Boki Nita was investigated for suspected identity fraud regarding her twin sons; ultimately, she was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. Her political career thus ended with the death of her political patron.
Boki Nita's attempted abolishment of the Bobato 18 was a perfect example of her incapacity to understand the politicoeconomic relations within the Sultanate.

The eighteen delegates represented by
Bobato 18 were the leaders of the adat communities integrated into the Sultanate of Ternate. Unlike the centralised political system in Java, the Sultanate of Ternate was a federalist sultanate that depended heavily on the adat communities spread around Ternate and the surrounding islands. This will be explored below.

From coastal to land-based aristocracy
The sultanates and kingdoms of Southeast Asia have been variously identified as coastal and land-based (Bastin & Benda, 1968;Wolters, 1970). The coastal aristocracies of Indonesia are characterised by the 'absence of land property'; they rely on trade and fishery products, orient their palaces toward the sea, are ethnically heterogenic, and utilise a decentralised power structure. As such aristocracies rely on their control of harbours, their facilities, and the flow of goods, land property is not an important element of their economic and political power (Siddique, 1977). Coastal aristocracies tend to build up their navies to protect their interests. Naval chiefs are very important in their aristocratic structure, and most are either members of the inner family or the aristocracy.
On the contrary, inland aristocracies strongly emphasise agriculture, and water farming is an important political and economic element. Siddique (1977) characterises the agrarian proto-state as being characterised by social division (court and peasantry), court control over the agrarian economy, the absence of a substantial land-owning class, and administrative power being channelled through an appointive quasi-bureaucratic nobility. Wittfogel (1967), in his classic work, notes that the largest aristocracies are hydraulic societies and civilisations that depend on water systems for rice field irrigation. The Unlike agrarian societies, which develop small-scale irrigation systems, hydraulic societies exert significant control over water-up to and including creating flood control systems.
The political structure of Ternate Sultanate was never designed as a landbased aristocracy; it was intended for a commercial aristocracy, one that strongly emphasised naval power and benefited greatly from the geographical conditions of Ternate. Geographically, the palace faces the sea and has its own port; together with its surroundings, known as Dodoku Ali, have been the sultanate's most important infrastructures for centuries. Second, Ternate's military forces (now the palace guard) are under the command of the Kapita Lao (the captain of the sea), a position traditionally held by the Sultan's brother. This Kapita Lao was traditionally responsible for both maritime trade and security, and thus the position was one of the most important in the sultanate. Third, institutionally, the Sultanate of Ternate has no special section for recording and managing land issues. Such issues are handled by the General Secretary of the Sultanate (Tuli Lamo), which is also responsible for many other affairs. The Tuli Lamo is required to possess a mastery of both Arabic and the Ternate language, further emphasising the importance of trade. Fourth, Ternate has no rivers and only limited fertile land on the slopes of Mount Gamalama. As such, it could not possibly create the hydraulic society described by Wittfogel (1967); indeed, before rice was imported, sago was the staple foodstuff in Ternate. Finally, traditional activities and rituals have emphasised the sea. This includes Kololi Kie, a ritual that involves circling the island by sea.
In the 1950s, during the reign of Sultan Jabir Syah, the Indonesian government replaced Ternate as the ruling sea trade authority. During this period, Ternate's sultanate was dismantled and inactive. Sultan Jabir Syah had been close to the Allies during the Indonesian National Revolution (1945)(1946)(1947)(1948)(1949), and was the only Sultan who was 'saved' by the Dutch when the Japanese invaded in 1943. After his return to Ternate in 1945, Sultan Jabir Syah served as commanding officer of Netherland Indies Civil Administration (CONICA), leading a regional detachment of the Dutch-run semi-military organisation. During the United States of Indonesia era, when Maluku was part of the State of East Indonesia, Sultan Jabir Syah not only refused to become part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia but also sought to buttress his position by creating a coalition between the sultanates of eastern Indonesia (Amal, 2010). After independence, President Sukarno exiled the Sultan to Jakarta, where he held an idle position (Pejabat Tinggi Diperbantukan) 14 under the Minister of the Interior. He visited Ternate only a few times before his death (Djaafar, 2005). When his son, Sultan Mudaffar, reactivated the Sultanate in 1986, it had already lost access to the economic revenue produced through trade.
Land, therefore, was its only available means of controlling its adat subjects.
The Sultanate of Ternate has traditionally enjoyed a political basis at the village and district level, wherein adat communities pledge their loyalty to the Sultanate while simultaneously positioning themselves as his subjects. The Sultan chooses their leaders to serve as his vassals, but at the same time grants them rights in the succession process. Traditionally, the Sultan is chosen by an eighteen-member council known as Bobato 18 (Bobato Nyagimoi se Tufkane). Members consist of adat communities, and collectively represent the 41 clans (soa) of Ternate 15 (Leirissa, 1996;Soelarto, 1976). During succession, it is the highest institution in the Sultanate of Ternate, and responsible for choosing the next sultan (Syah, 2009, pp. 6-7). It may choose the next Sultan from any of the late Sultan's sons and grandson, following the male hereditary line. Its decision is only deemed valid if its meetings are attended by the Kapita Lao, even though he has no voice. There is thus a mutually reciprocal relationship between adat communities and the Sultan: the Bobato 18 chooses the new sultan from among the late Sultan's sons and grandsons, then become the subjects of this new sultan. 15 The Bobato 18 council consists of eighteen adat communities, which are identified with different names based on their territorial area: five kimalaha (Marsaoli, Tomaito, Tomagola, Tamadi, and Payahe), four fanyira (Jiko, Jawa, Tolangara, and Tabala) and nine sangaji (Tamajiko, Malayu, Limatahu, Kulaba, Malaicim, Tobolen, Tafmutu, Tafaga, and Takafi). 16 See the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), Law No. 5 of 1960.
The unity between the Sultan and adat communities is evident in many ways. The Sultanate's emblem, the Limau Gapi (a two-headed eagle with a single heart), symbolises two leaders (i.e., the Sultan and the adat communities) with a common interest. Similarly, the people of Ternate often make cones of 'yellow rice' topped by an egg. The rice symbolises the people (bala), while the egg symbolises the Sultan (kolano); it thus indicates that the Sultan can only stand with the support of the people. Unity is further underscored by the colour of the dish: inside the white egg is yellow yolk, and inside the yellow rice is white rice (Syah, 1998). The unique 'democratic' form of the Sultanate of Ternate is quite unlike that of Indonesia's other sultanates, and has been perceived as the origin of Indonesia's political structure-or, at least, during the New Order era , when the president was chosen by the MPR, just as the Sultan of Ternate is chosen by the Bobato 18 council.
The unique structure of Sultan-adat relations in Ternate have been economically and politically beneficial in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Economically, customary land is not subject to the 1960 BAL, 16 and as such adat communities have maintained access to and control of land. 17 Moreover, even though the BAL abolished land ownership for current and former sultanates, its framing of customary land was open to exploitation. In the case of Ternate, the sultanate has had the authority to use land through cocatu (royal decrees granting land to farmers while maintaining adat ownership). Many of the adat communities affiliated with the Sultanate are spread throughout the previous North Maluku Regency, but the strongest support has always come from Ternate.
Based on Ternate's customary law, the sultanate's land is the land that is managed and controlled by the Sultan but not owned by him. 18 Even though the Sultanate of Ternate has historically relied on maritime trade and naval might, it has created rigid regulations related to agrarian issues. First, it distinguishes between coastal/sea management and management. The former is permanent, while the latter may be either temporary or permanent; individuals must exercise several temporary before being granted permission to permanently manage land. In some areas, the sultanate's people still guard the land. Such a practice has been used for centuries.
The Sultanate of Ternate divides maritime affairs into three categories, based on distance from the coast. The first is Ngolo Sahe, covering the coastal areas where people normally swim. Adat communities can harvest oceanic products in this area, including seaweeds, crabs, prawn, fish etc. Secondly, the deeper areas, where people cannot swim and fishermen require nets, is called Ngolo Ngido. Last is the open sea, called Ngolo Lamo. Such management is important in mediating disputes between fishermen, especially as modern equipment has been used. Larger boats are only allowed to operate in Ngolo Lamo, while more traditional fishermen can exploit Ngolo Ngido using simple nets and rods.
Adat communities receive temporary land rights based on the assumption that land was previously a forested area controlled by the Sultanate of Ternate. Temporary land usage rights begin with Tolagumi (cutting the rope), which is related to the traditional belief that designated forests were owned by the spirit world and that special ceremonies were necessary. This process must be approved by the Sultan in his capacity as Kolano, master of the seen and unseen worlds. By making offerings, adat people officially 'cut the rope' between the spirit world and designated forests. Tologami mostly involves communities. The second right is safa right ('cutting and peeling'), which allows the adat community to exploit forests by cutting and peeling the outer parts of trees, or by collecting resin; felling trees is not permitted. In this system, the first person to peel trees is the first to receive temporary rights. Third are Ruba Banga (forest opening) rights, which provide individuals with the right to fell trees and cultivate more economically viable crops (Taib, Soetarto, & Tonny, 2010). Permanent land usage is fully under the control of the Sultan, as Kolano, but may be transferred to adat communities. Even though land is under the control of the sultanate, adat rules prohibit the Sultan from owning land individually (Asyhari, 2008). The Kolano receives two types of rights: Aha Kolano and Raki Kolano. The former is mainly used for food security, while the latter is used for other economic purposes. Only sago palms (metroxylon sagu) may be planted on Aha Kolano land, while other crops may be cultivated on Raki Kolano land. Both can be transferred to individual and adat ownership by decree. Before such a decree may be issued, the adat community or individual must be part of the sultanate's traditional structure and demonstrate their loyalty. The cocatu includes detailed administrative information about the land, including its size 19 and borders, as well as the name of the sultan and the subject. Signed and administered by the Tuli Lamo, this document has no time limit to its usage rights. Most Aha Kolano and Raki Kolano rights have distributed to adat communities since the 15 th century.
The lands distributed to the adat communities may be owned by communities or individuals. Communityowned lands, known as aha soa, are managed by village chiefs, known as fanyira or kiemalaha. However, such rights have yet to be recognised by national law (Asyhari, 2008 The Sultanate uses depa for land measurement. It is approximately the hand span of a 1.7-meter-tall adult male. Ten depa is equal to one taran (Asyhari, 2008).
Aside from the non-palace lands discussed above, the Sultanate of Ternate also has control over its palace land.  (Seputar Malut, 2014). Boki Nita threatened to mobilise adat forces (bala kusu sekanokano) to occupy Hypermart (Kabar Timur, 2014). Although this threat was never realised, it was sufficient for Hypermart to sell of its stock at deep discounts and close its store-only months after its grand opening. It re-opened a few days later.
Many of my informants claimed that, at the time, Boki Nita required financial support to finance her 2014 election campaign. She was always the Sultanate's representative in negotiations regarding Hypermart, while the Ternate City Government wanted to directly discuss the matter with Sultan Mudaffar. Ultimately, however, this case did not bolster support for Boki Nita, but was detrimental to her public image among voters in southern and central Ternate (many of whom benefited from Hypermart). The case seems to have stagnated after July 2014, not only because of Boki Nita's disappointing electoral results but also because of the succession scandal. The Hypermart case show how members of the Sultan's family failed to control land access during their political activities, as will be elucidated below.

From Land Control to Ballot Box
To measure political support in Ternate is to understand the interplay between ethnic and geographical boundaries. During the province's early years, land, ethnicity, religion and communal conflict was used by politicians to improve their political support or to undermine their rivals (Duncan, 2014;Klinken, 2007;Wilson, 2008

Source: Ternate City Elections Commission, April 2014
A similar trend was identified in the 2014 election, wherein Sultan Mudaffar again received the support of the Sultanate's traditional area; running amongst 32 candidates, he received 30% of all valid DPD votes in Ternate. In the newly formed Hiri Island District, long home to Sultanate loyalists, Sultan Mudaffar received an enormous 89% of valid DPD votes, while Boki Nita (running amongst 36 candidates) received 60% of all valid DPR votes. In North Ternate, Sultan Mudaffar received more than half of all valid votes. In North Maluku constituency, Boki Nita received 25,685 votes and Hidayat received 5,108 votes, but neither received a seat. Boki Nita received 2,500 fewer votes than Mohammad Yamin Tawary, running with the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional, PAN).

The above figures show that Sultan
Mudaffar's political support came from areas where he controlled traditional land. In order to maintain political support, he used both the material basis of land and traditional practices. In terms of land control, he continued the traditional practice of distinguishing between temporary and permanent rights. Meanwhile, in terms of traditional practices, he used both kololi kie and gura gam to meet with his loyalists. Unlike other politicians, who must finance their visits to communities, adat communities considered Sultan Mudaffar's visits an honour. With the acknowledgement of cocatu as a means of transferring ownership and registering it in the national land system, this material relationship became stronger.
On the contrary, the capacity to turn land into political support was not transferred to Hidayat or Boki Nita. Hidayat did not receive control of land rights, as he is not sultan, while Boki Nita-as shown previously in the Hypermart case-has had no capacity to use land issues for her electoral benefit.

Conclusion
This article discusses one of few surviving aristocracies in Indonesian electoral politics, which exists within a newly formed province where ethnic identities remain strong. It demonstrates how the Sultanate of Ternate has been relatively successful in its political endeavours. Before his death in 2014, Sultan Mudaffar had won every electoral competition he contested since the beginning of political reform. His wife and immediate family, meanwhile, have a mixed record. I argue that Sultan Mudaffar's individual success stemmed from his capacity to transform land control into political support, as shown in the electoral results from areas traditionally under his control. His family failed to achieve a similar level of success, owing both to their inability to control land and internal fragmentation within the family. Rather than establish political coalitions and dominate local politics, family members have used newly formed political parties to gain support amongst the ethnic Ternate. This paper gives an alternative answer to the King's Dilemma advanced by Huntington (1968), wherein monarchies would lose their influence as a result of modernisation and reform. The case of Ternate shows that, in a multi-ethnic society where the dominant ethnic group is struggling to maintain political supremacy, the Sultanate is seen as the cornerstone of their efforts to defend their ethnic interests. During the formation of the North Maluku Province, the ethnic Ternate had lost political control even though Sultan Mudaffar played a prominent role in the province's creation. Both the Sultan and adat communities benefited; the Sultan received political support by controlling traditional land use, while the Ternate people were able to defend their access to traditional land-an important part of their identity and livelihood.
Moreover, Corbett, Veenendaal, & Ugyel (2016) argue that personal attachment is key to the survival of small monarchies. I argue that, even though monarchy personalisation is important for accumulating political support and ensuring the survival of the monarchy, it cannot be analysed without considering the politico-economic relationship between leaders and their people. By analysing the political history of Ternate more deeply, this article suggests that material resources are also key to the survival of the aristocracy.
This article contextualises classical works on feudal society, wherein land is the primary resource in almost all feudal structures. Although feudal structures have been replaced by democratic institutions in modern democracies, this paper suggests that land control and democracy might be intertwined, where political support is accumulated through the combination of land access and loyalty to traditional leaders.