The Making of the “Chinese Problem”: Indonesian Local Agencies’ Perceptions of Ethnic Chinese and Communist China, 1950-1979

DIDI KWARTANADA
Independent Researcher
Email: kwartanada@gmail.com

Abstract
When Indonesia gained its independence, it knew almost nothing about its Chinese population of more than 2 million. During the Dutch colonial and Japanese occupation periods, the authorities established offices for Chinese Affairs staffed by sinologists; however, the young Republic of Indonesia did not have such experts. By the early 1950s, the Foreign Ministry set up its “School of Sinology”. The school’s founder was suspicious of Communist China and therefore viewed that Indonesia must be cautious, with the overseas Chinese in Indonesia constituting a “sumber subversi” (source of subversion). Its first class had twenty students and with the conduct of its first class can be regarded as the earliest effort to study China and the ethnic Chinese by the Indonesian authorities.

In the turbulent 1950s and 1960s, the Chinese were considered a problem, and so the term “Chinese problem” (“Masalah Cina”) was created, which then became commonly used throughout the New Order period. This paper explores how perceptions about the Chinese and Communist China were shaped by local agencies during 1950-1979, who the agencies were, and their publications. The paper looks at how scholars, journalists, intelligence bureau and publishing houses contributed to the construction of the perceived “Chinese Problem”. Particular focus is also given to sinology-trained military officer and their works, in shaping perceptions towards the Chinese in Indonesia and also mainland China.

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Introduction

On 16 August 1967, the Acting President of the Republic of Indonesia, Lieutenant General Soeharto delivered his first national speech before the parliament.

In the context of establishing social order, I will give an outline of the Government’s policy in relation to the Chinese problem [masalah Tjina]. I also call upon all the people not to get trapped in activities inclining to racialism.

We should draw a clear line between Alien Chinese (Tjina Warga Negara Asing) and Indonesian Citizens of Chinese descent (Warga Negara Indonesia keturunan Tjina).

Indonesian Citizens of Chinese descent although of Chinese descendents, are Indonesian citizens having the same position, rights and duties...I call upon Indonesian citizens of Chinese descent not to postpone any longer integrating and assimilating into the (original) Indonesian society. ...By doing so, there will no longer be a divide – physically nor mentally – between citizens of Chinese descent and (native) Indonesian citizens.

Alien Chinese will be given the same treatment as other aliens, according to current international practices, without diminishing our vigilance against the possibilities of efforts of subversion and infiltration (Soeharto 1967: 85-86).

1) The original speech is as follows:

“...Dalam rangka mewujudkan tertib-sosial ini, maka kami akan memberikan garis kebijaksanaan Pemerintah yang berhubungan dengan masalah Tjina. Kepada seluruh Rakjat, kami serukan juga agar tidak terjebak kedalam kegiatan-kegiatan yang mendjurus kepada rasialisme. Kita harus menarik garis yang djelas antara Tjina Warga Negara Asing dengan Warga Negara Indonesia keturunan Tjina. Warga Negara Indonesia Keturunan Tjina, meskipun ia keturunan Tjina, tetapi ia adalah warga negara Indonesia yang mempunjai kedudukan, hak dan kewadjiban yang sama. ...Kami serukan kepada warga negara Indonesia keturunan Tjina untuk tidak menunda-nunda lagi
The victorious general inserted the words of a so-called “Chinese Problem” in his lengthy speech on state ideology, politics, parliamentary duties, role of military, international relations and economic plans to attract the nation’s attention. For the very first time since independence, the derogatory term “Cina” is used in an official speech. Soeharto distinguished between “Chinese Indonesians” [Warga Negara Keturunan Cina] and “Foreign Chinese” [Cina Warga Negara Asing], but both using the controversial term ‘Cina’, instead of the previous commonly used term ‘Tionghoa’. While Chinese Indonesians were asked to assimilate into the local society, foreign Chinese would continue to be watched over for possible subversive activities. In short, both groups were seen as being the problem.

Why were the words Masalah Cina so important to be mentioned in a nationwide speech? Why were the Chinese seen as a ‘problem’ (masalah) in independent Indonesia? Soeharto and the Indonesian army firmly believed that Mao’s China supported Indonesian Communist Party in the bloody coup of 1965. Against such a background, how were perceptions of the Chinese and Communist China shaped in Indonesia during the period 1950-1979? Who were the agencies and what were the products? I will look at how scholars, journalists, intelligence bureau and publishing houses contributed to the construction of the “Chinese Problem”. Particular focus is given to sinology-trained military officers and their written works, in shaping perceptions of the Chinese in Indonesia also mainland China.

Historical Background

When Indonesia gained its independence, it knew almost nothing about its Chinese population of more than two million. Dutch policies of racial segregation divided colonial society into three categories, European, Natives and Foreign Orientals, a category stood in the middle of the hierarchy and included Chinese. The Chinese minority were positioned as middlemen among the majority Natives of whom most lived as peasants in rural areas. With their position as middlemen, Chinese could become prosperous, but


2) The use of derogatory term “Cina” was adopted in the Second Army Seminar held in Bandung August 1966. The reason was “to remove a feeling of inferiority on the part of our own people [‘native’ Indonesians], while on the other hand removing the feeling of superiority on the part of the group in question [the Chinese] within our State” [untuk menghilangkan rasa inferior pada bangsa kita sendiri, sebaliknya menghilangkan rasa superior pada golongan yang bersangkutan didalam Negara kita], (Panggabean,1966: 280).
they were hated by the peasants who regarded things related to money as dirty jobs. In times of crisis, the Chinese are often used as scapegoats and accused of being responsible for all the troubles in the society. With views inclined towards ethno-nationalism, few Indonesian political parties in the prewar period were prepared to accept Chinese as full members (Coppel 1983: 3).

### Table 1. Chinese Population Indonesia 1930-1971

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,233,000</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>Dutch</td>
<td>The most reliable census available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>2,200,000</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>Sukarno</td>
<td>Estimation (Coppel, 1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>2,550,000</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>Sukarno</td>
<td>Estimation (Skinner, 1963) based on 1930 census (&quot;Chinese&quot; is not a group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>3,293,000</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>Suharto</td>
<td>Estimation (Suryadinata, 1986) based on 1930 census (&quot;Chinese&quot; is not an group)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Skinner (1963: 492), Coppel (1983; 2) Suryadinata (1986: 96)

The Chinese position as middlemen led certain Indonesians to raise racist questions such:

For though only 2 million strong the Chinese in this country are posing a real national problem, serious enough to be regarded as a direct threat to the economic and political survival of the 80 million autochthonous [sic] Indonesians....one could wonder how in the world it is possible that so small a minority could be so serious a problem to so big a majority, especially while that majority holds unlimited and sovereign power over the country (Muaja, ca. 1960: 5).³

After a prolonged civil war, the communists under Mao Tse Tung took power in mainland China in 1949. A year earlier, Indonesia experienced a communist rebellion in Madiun. It is not surprising that the elite viewed the emergence of the new China with suspicion, as written in the memoirs of Sutan Mohamad Rasjid, head of the Asia and United Nations Bureau in the Foreign Ministry.

...During the Federal Republic of Indonesia [Republik Indonesia Serikat – RIS] era, diplomatic relations with the PRC would be immediately established. The reason was to follow the Dutch. But the young people rejected this. They believed that it was not yet necessary to establish relations with the PRC. We were suspicious of the Chinese at that time. We were not trying to demean them, but they are indeed cunning people, lacking integrity. We must be careful of them....I don’t want to have relations

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³ I am grateful to the late Mr. Harianto Sanusi who kindly provided a copy of this pamphlet.
with China because besides economic reasons as well as security reasons...I remember the first Chinese ambassador to Indonesia ... He turned out to be a former employee or laborer in Bangka ... So it was exactly like the Japanese people who had entered Indonesia previously...But finally we know that they are all spies and have much understanding of the situation in Indonesia ...

When it comes to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, Rasjid wrote:

I like to study the history of Nanyo⁵ or the South...If I'm not mistaken in 1950 there were 14 million Nanyo⁶ in the South, namely in Bangkok, Singapore and other Asia Pacific countries. In our country no less than 3 million people. In history they were called the Fifth Column. They are a source of subversion (Rasjid 1981: 101).⁷

Obviously the young republic had neither sinologists nor experts on Chinese affairs. The Dutch had established the Dienst voor Chinesche Zaken en Oost-Asiatische Aangelegenheden (Office for Chinese Affairs and East Asian Matters) from 1933 to 1935. Earlier, the Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst (Political Intelligence Service, P.I.D) was established in 1916 with its special task

4) Emphasis added. The original text is as follows:

   ...Pada zaman RIS memang sudah akan langsung mengadakan hubungan diplomatik dengan RRC. Alasannya adalah meniru Belanda. Tetapi kaum muda menolak. Mereka berpendirian bahwa belum perlu mengadakan hubungan dengan RRC. Kita mencurigai orang-orang Cina pada waktu itu. Kita bukan hanya mau merendahkan orang-orang Cina, melainkan mereka memang licik, kurang memiliki integritas. Kita harus berhati-hati terhadap mereka...Saya tidak mau mengadakan hubungan dengan Cina karena selain alasan ekonomi juga alasan keamanan...Saya ingat Duta Cina yang pertama untuk Indonesia...ia ternyata bekas pegawai atau buruh di Bangka...Jadi persis seperti orang-orang Jepang yang dulu masuk Indonesia....Tetapi akhirnya kita tahu mereka itu semua mata-mata dan telah banyak mengerti tentang keadaan di Indonesia....

However, Rasjid was incorrect. The "ambassador" he mentioned was actually not lived in Bangka, but in North Sumatra. There, he was an opponent of Japan and a political agitator, mostly among Chinese. Wang Renshu, or popularly known as "Ba Ren"—his literary name—is a central figure in Taomo Zhou´s new book (2019). I am grateful to Mary Somers Heidhues for her comment by email February 24, 2020.

5) Nanyo comes from the Japanese word Nanyang [South Seas], in Chinese it means Southeast Asia.

6) Again, Rasjid—as a self-proclaimed expert on Chinese subversion--made mistake here. I believe he refers to hoakiao (Overseas Chinese) instead of Nanyo .

7) The original text is as follows:

to keep track of foreigner activities, including Chinese. In 1935 the Dienst, which consisted of a Chinese and Japanese department, was changed to Dienst voor Oost-Aziatische Zaken (Service for East Asian Affairs, DOAZ) with the energetic A.H.J. Lovink as its head. An economist by training, Lovink expanded DOAZ into a political and intelligence service (Locher-Scholten, 1986: 12,16,18). Among its staff, the bureau employed sinologists and Chinese translators. It also published confidential reports entitled Mededeelingen van den Dienst der Oost-Aziatische Zaken (Communications from the Service for East Asian Affairs). During the Japanese occupation, the military administration in Java set up an office for Overseas Chinese Affairs (Kakyō Han), under the notorious Toyoshima Ataru, a sinologist.

Convinced that there would be danger from China, Rasjid thought that there must be “Indonesians who were experts on China” (orang-orang kita yang ahli tentang Cina). The following is Rasjid’s story of the Akademi Sinologi (Sinology Academy) which was founded within the Indonesian Foreign Ministry.

....These people must as a minimum understand Chinese. Not only to read and speak but also must be able to write in Chinese characters. When I first opened it, I managed to educate twenty sinologist cadres. The lecturers among others ... was the Dutch Consul in Hong Kong but was willing to come to Indonesia to teach. So we were fortunate. We spread the twenty cadres after graduating widely. But I was disappointed, when I returned from abroad in 1969, the Sinology course I had founded was no longer available. But it didn’t matter because in the Faculty of Letters, University of Indonesia had opened the Department of Sinology. That way our knowledge of China was not closed...

(Rasjid 1981: 116). 

8) Lovink, who was fluent in Chinese, later became The Netherland's ambassador to China during the war and served as the High Commissioner (Hoge Vertegenwoord) who handed over Dutch authority to RIS in 1949. Again, I am grateful to Mary Somers Heidhues for this information by email dated 24 February 2020.

9) The original text is as follows:

According to Dahana and Herlijanto, the emergence of Sinology in Indonesia as an academic discipline only started when Professor Dr. Van der Valk and Dr. Mr. Meijer, founded the Sinologische Instituut (Institute for Sinology) in 1947. Despite their legal education background, the two scientists were fluent in Chinese, and had deep knowledge of Chinese history and culture. As the name implies, the institution they founded was aimed at educating Chinese experts in the sinology tradition. With the assistance of another Dutch sinologist, Dr R.P. Kramers, this institution began to create the first generation of Indonesian sinologists, who were mostly ethnic Chinese, such as Sie Ing Djiang, Li Chuan Siu, Tan Lan Hiang, and Tan Ngo An. In the early 1950s, along with the establishment of the University of Indonesia, the Institute of Sinology was later incorporated into the University of Indonesia’s Faculty of Letters (Dahana and Herlijanto, 2017: 140-141).

Though lasting for only for three years, Rasjid’s Akademi Sinologi was remarkable for three reasons. First, arguably this institution could be regarded as the earliest effort to study China and the ethnic Chinese by Indonesian authorities. Second, while the older Sinologische Instituut’s students were mostly of Chinese descent, the “Akademi Sinologi” students came from non-Chinese backgrounds. Third, the academy’s graduates later held various positions in the foreign ministry such as ambassadors and diplomats. Its first group of graduates consisted of twenty students, and the second had ten. After the academy was disbanded, the students were transferred to the Chinese Department in the University of Indonesia. Abdurrachman Gunadirdja—the first Indonesian ambassador to China after diplomatic normalization in 1990—was a former student from the Akademi’s first graduating class (Gunadirdja: 1989: 491-492)

Following Soeharto’s accession to power, the Chinese in Indonesia were put under the strict control and supervision of the New Order government. In December 1967, President Soeharto issued the controversial instruction concerning Religion, Belief and Chinese Customs. The instruction stipulated that all Chinese religious ceremonies, beliefs and customs should only be celebrated within the family and indoors.¹⁰ Political control over Chinese cultural symbols then expanded with the regulation of Chinese temples (1968) and the prohibition of Chinese characters and Chinese language advertisements (1988) (Stanley, 2006: 210).

Several bureaus were formed to do surveillance. In August 1967, a Special Staff for Chinese Affairs (Staf Chusus Urusan Tjina – SCUT) was established under the presidium to help Foreign Minister Adam Malik manage policy on Chinese issues. However, two month earlier Strategic Operations Command–Territorial Staff (Komando Operasi Tertinggi Gabungan-5 – G-5

¹⁰ The ban on celebration of Chinese festivals was only lifted by President Wahid in January 2000.
KOTI) with military intelligence responsibilities had quickly formed the Board of Contact for Chinese Affairs (Badan Kontak Urusan Tjina – BKUT), a body set up to handle Chinese foreigners under its chairman, Colonel Sukisman, and is discussed below. Several Chinese – Kuomintang figures or those who had anti-communist views – also joined BKUT (Coppel 1983: 166).

In accordance with the development of the situation in the country, in June 1969, SCUT was dissolved and its functions taken over by State Intelligence Coordination Board (Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara – BAKIN). The Head of BAKIN later in 1973 established Coordinating Board for the Chinese Problem (Badan Koordinasi Masalah Cina – BKMC) whose main task was to oversee all ethnic Chinese movements and activities in Indonesia. Meanwhile BKUT was transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Departemen Dalam Negeri – DEPDAGRI) (Stanley, 2006: 208–209; see also Coppel, 1983: 166 and Aizawa, 2011). According to its former head, Brigadier General (Ret.) Sukisman, BKMC is likely a supra-organization, since “...structurally, the BKMC is not within the BAKIN organization. But it is directly under the control of the Head of BAKIN – who reports directly to the president” (“secara struktural BKMC itu tidak ada di dalam organisasi BAKIN. Tapi dia berada langsung di bawah kendali Kepala BAKIN-- yang bertanggung jawab langsung kepada presiden”) (Sukisman interviewed in Tempo, 11 February 2001: 40).

It is not surprising then that the BKMC became an institution feared by the Chinese, because it could involve itself in their economic, education, language, political and even religious affairs. They would try to avoid dealing with BKMC as much as possible. So when the New Order regime was overthrown, one of the main demands of the Chinese was the dissolution of the BKMC.

Later Sukisman recalled – after the fall of Suharto – the reason for establishing such an organization was: “..The Chinese problem is not just about politics and government. There are economic affairs, foreign affairs, security. President Soeharto asked for an agency that could cover everything. At that time there was no such agency. [“.....Masalah Cina ‘kan bukan cuma menyangkut bidang politik dan pemerintahan saja. Ada urusan perekonomian, luar negeri, keamanan. Presiden Soeharto minta dicarikan instansi yang bisa mencakup semuanya. Waktu itu tidak ada instansi seperti itu.”].

When he was asked whether such an agency was necessary, Sukisman answered “......Based on what I have observed, in the past the Chinese did not blend in. They tend to be exclusive, so bodies like BKMC were needed.” [“....Kalau menurut pemantauan saya, dulu orang Cina itu tidak berbaur. Mereka cenderung eksklusif, sehingga badan seperti BKMC diperlukan.”] (Tempo, 11 February 2001: 40).
Printed Materials on *Masalah Cina*

A compilation of printed materials on *Masalah Cina* and Communist China from 1950s-1979 is in table 2. However, due to limitations of space, not all of these materials are discussed in this preliminary paper but are indicative of the need for further detailed historical analysis on *masalah Cina*.

The printed materials comprise books, journals, magazines and reading courses from my personal collection. Most of these sources have a standpoint that there is a *Masalah Cina*, while only few of them provide an opposing view.

Three central themes are common to most of materials relating to *Masalah Cina*. First, that the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are disloyal and unassimilated citizens, economic animals and communist China’s fifth columnists. This negative perception however, neglects the role of the *peranakans* and *totoks* who participated in the Indonesian struggle for freedom (Kwartanada 2017: 351-365). Second, the rise of the People’s Republic of China is seen by certain elite in the Indonesian government (such as Rasjid) as the “red menace” whose main agenda are spreading communism and manipulating overseas Chinese loyalty for its benefit (see further Zhou, 2019). This view also appeared in the West, and also from Soviet academia, who called overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia a “a Peking Tool” (Andreyev, 1975). Third, the suspicion towards the ethnic Chinese and the PRC is the result of the escalation of Cold War tensions in Southeast Asia, where Indonesia was bound up in superpower rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer’s *Hoakiau di Indonesia* (1960) (see Table 2) is the most famous example of a progressive Indonesian intellectual’s work. When the nation condemned the Chinese and the PRC following the execution of Presidential Regulation (*Peraturan Presiden*) no. 10/195911 which severely disrupted the lives and livelihoods of many Chinese Indonesians, Pramoedya compiled his letters to Chen Xiaru –his translator for his visits to China – concerning the history and contribution of *hoakiau* (overseas Chinese) to Indonesia. Skinner (1963: 497) commented that this book “is an effective piece of argumentative journalism which illustrates the enlightened view of a small group of sophisticated intellectuals”. Shortly afterwards the book was banned and its author was jailed.

Academia played an important role in shaping perceptions, especially sinologist and anthropologists. W.D. Sukisman, a sinology trained army officer was the most prominent figure in this field (discussed below). Sukisman stands out from his fellow military and intelligence officers, being a capable, productive writer and also translator (he speaks English, Chinese

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11) The law prohibited foreign nationals from doing retail business in rural areas and required them to transfer their businesses to Indonesian nationals by 1 January 1960 or relocate to urban areas. Sukarno approved this regulation.
Table 2. Selected Titles on Communist China and Chinese Indonesians (1950s-1979)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Author (and Translator)</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Publisher</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ca. 1957</td>
<td>Badan Pekerja KENSI (Kongres Ekonomi Nasional Seluruh Indonesia), Pusat (All-Indonesian National Importers Congress)</td>
<td><em>KENSI Berdjuang</em> (KENSI Fights)</td>
<td>Djakarta: Djambatan</td>
<td>Collection of anti-Chinese writings and speeches by the leading indigenous importers and businessmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1958</td>
<td>Soeripto Putera Djaja</td>
<td>Subversif Asing di Indonesia: Ungkapan Kegiatan Agen-agen dan Kaki Tangan Asing untuk Mengatjau Indonesia (Foreign Subversives in Indonesia: Revelations of the Activities of Foreign Agents and Accomplices to Destabilize Indonesia)</td>
<td>Surabaya: Grip</td>
<td>Includes a detailed chapter on Kuomintang subversive activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ca. 1960</td>
<td>Abraham Johannes Muaja</td>
<td>The Chinese Problem in Indonesia</td>
<td>Djakarta: New Nusantara</td>
<td>The only work in English.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Pramoedya Ananta Toer</td>
<td>Hoa Kiu di Indonesia (The Overseas Chinese in Indonesia)</td>
<td>Djakarta: Bintang Press</td>
<td>A defense of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia by a leading leftwing author. It was subsequently banned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>15 June 1963</td>
<td>Soeripto Putera Djaja (chief ed.)</td>
<td>Skets Masa (magazine) “Masalah Tiong Hoa di Indonesia” (The Chinese Problem in Indonesia)</td>
<td>Surabaya: Grip</td>
<td>Skets Masa is a popular weekly from Surabaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>Puspa Vantasy</td>
<td>“Kebudayaan Orang Tjina di Indonesia” [Culture of the Chinese in Indonesia] in Koenjjaraningat (ed.). Manusia dan Kebudajaan di Indonesia (People and Cultures in Indonesia)</td>
<td>Djakarta: Djambatan</td>
<td>From second print on, the word “Tjina” in the title was changed to “Tionghoa”. Reprinted almost 20 times, the latest reprint found by the author is dated 2002. Reading material for Sekolah Stat dan Komando (SESKOAD) (Army Command and Staff College) in 1979 (see #17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Title (in English)</td>
<td>Title (in Indonesian)</td>
<td>Place of Publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>------</td>
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<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>W.D. Sukisman</td>
<td>Masalah Cina di Indonesia</td>
<td>(The Chinese Problem in Indonesia)</td>
<td>Jakarta: Yayasan Penelitian Masalah Asia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1976</td>
<td>B.P. Paulus (ed.)</td>
<td>Masalah Cina: Hasil Penelitian Ilmiah di Beberapa Negara Asia dan Australia</td>
<td>(The Chinese Problem: Academic Research Findings in Several Asian Countries and Australia)</td>
<td>Bandung: Karya Nusantara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Oct 1979</td>
<td>Puspa Vasanty</td>
<td>Kebudayaan Orang Tionghoa Indonesia</td>
<td>(Culture of the Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia)</td>
<td>SESKOAD (Army Command and Staff College)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A prominent sinologist of Chinese descent, who had a close relationship with the Army, Dr Lie Tek Tjeng, is discussed below. Journalists and certain publishing houses were integral in reviving anti-Chinese campaigns.

During the New Order, very few books were available for academic reference. As seen in Table 2, some of the main sources for writing academic exercises were written by non-academics, or intelligence officers like Sukisman. It is not surprising then with the historical backgrounds described above, such studies portray Chinese as the problem. Several characteristics...
found these works are: suspicion of the Chinese as fifth columnists of Communist China (as an effect of the Cold War) and negative stereotypes (exclusive, economic animals who have no loyalty to Indonesia). Therefore to solve the Chinese problem, they had to be assimilated, remove their Chineseness (including changing Chinese names to native names) and becoming model Indonesians citizens.

A Sinologist in the Intelligence Service: W.D Sukisman

One of the most cited studies on the Chinese during early New Order period is *Masalah Cina di Indonesia* (The Chinese Problem in Indonesia, 1975) by Colonel W.D. Sukisman (1925-2018). He was a Javanese born in Boyolali, Central Java in 1925 who for most of his life was involved with Chinese affairs. Showing significant aptitude, he was selected by the Japanese to study in Japan during the Pacific War, where he met Yoga Soegama, a future important figure in Indonesian intelligence (an institution where he was later much involved). Upon returning to independent Indonesia he was attracted to sinology, and went on to get a degree in this field from the University of Indonesia. As a military officer fluent in Chinese and with a deep knowledge on that particular group, Sukisman’s career saw him undertake positions in intelligence as Director of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Descendants (Direktur Urusan Asing dan Keturunan Asing – BKMC, all in BAKIN), diplomatic circles (as Consul General in Hongkong), and education (as Rector of Darma Persada University, the only private university during the New Order that had a department of Chinese Language and Literature since 1987\(^\text{13}\)). Witnessing seven presidencies and three political era, Sukisman passed away in 2018.

It turned out that *Masalah Cina di Indonesia* was warmly received, and then within a few months it was reprinted. As an intelligence officer, Sukisman was wary of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, whom he suspected of being China’s fifth column and perceived them as people who did not want to let go of their chineseness. He wrote “...one thing that is usually fiercely maintained [by the Chinese] is their cultural relationship with the land of their ancestors ... each Chinese always feels proud of Chinese culture”.\(^\text{14}\) He adds, that the Chinese are “incorrigible opportunists”.\(^\text{15}\)

...In fact, most of the Chinese population in Indonesia are traders

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\(^\text{13}\) Darma Persada’s secure its permission to open Chinese program not from the Ministry of Education, but from the State Intelligence Agency BAKIN. See further “Jurus Cina di Semanggi”, *Tempo* 4 Juli 1987.

\(^\text{14}\) Original text is:

“....satu hal yang biasanya dipertahankan mati-matian adalah hubungan kebudayaannya dengan negeri leluhurnya....setiap orang Cina selalu membanggakan kebudayaan Cinanya.”

\(^\text{15}\) This term is taken from Hanifah (1972: 253)
and businessmen who in gplace more importance on material benefits than standpoints of ideals and loyalty to the state. Therefore they are very opportunistic, whom the Indonesian people have given the nickname 'chameleon' (bunglon)... those whose skin changes according to the color of the place they occupy .... (p. 59). 16

To show proof of this perspective he added a photograph of a “boss-looking Chinaman” on p. 60 (Figure 3) with the following caption: “Starting with wearing short pants, this Chinese person raised himself up to become the biggest entrepreneur in the Riau Islands. He was the one who became the source of a thousand and one problems in the community” (italics added). 17 A

16) Original text is:

...Sesungguhnya, sebagian besar dari penduduk Cina di Indonesia adalah kaum pedagang dan pengusaha yang pada umumnya lebih mementingkan keuntungan materi daripada segi-segi ideal dan loyalitas terhadap suatu negara. Oleh karenanya mereka itu amat oportunistis, yang oleh masyarakat Indonesia diberi julukan "bunglon"...yang berubah-ubah warna kulitnya sesuai dengan warna tempat yang dihinggapinya ...

17) Original text is:

"Mulai dengan bercelana pendek orang Cina ini mengembangkan dirinya menjadi pengusaha terbesar di Kepulauan Riau. Dialah yang menjadi seribu satu persoalan masyarakat".
check on Google Scholar shows that This book despite its outdated content and approach, is still cited in recent academic articles.18

**A Forgotten Sinologist: Lie Tek Tjeng**

Dr Lie Tek Tjeng was a prominent but now largely forgotten sinologist. A peranakan Chinese, he had close relationship to the Army, especially Lieutenant General Soewarto, Commander of SESKOAD (1966-1967), who was regarded as a military intellectual. When the Army held the remarkable Second Army Seminar in 1966, they also discussed *Masalah Cina* and two Chinese were asked to present their opinions, one of them is Lie (Coppel 1983: 86-87). The papers of the two speakers were not included in the proceeding of the seminar. Fortunately, Lie later published his papers twice. The first time as a limited publication from his office at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences *(Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia - LIPI)* in 1971 (Lie, 1971). Six years later, his works became more accessible when he published them in two volumes, *Studi Wilayah Pada Umumnya* (especially Vol. 1, 1977). Interestingly, aside from his paper presented at the Second Army Seminar, Lie also included his memorandums on *Masalah Cina* to General Soewarto.

According to Charles Coppel, Lie’s chief innovation was to urge that the term *Hua-kiau* should not be applied to all overseas Chinese but should be restricted to those who held Chinese citizenship. The appropriate term for an Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent was *Hua-i* (Coppel 1983: 86). Lie’s *Studi Wilayah* was reprinted in 1981.

Born in Padang, West Sumatra (1931), Lie Tek Tjeng studied sinology at the University of Indonesia and was among the first generation of Indonesian sinologist. In 1956 he obtained his MA in Regional Studies East Asia and Ph.D in History and Far Eastern Languages (1962), both from Harvard University. In mid-1967 he was sent by SESKOAD to Singapore and Malaysia to study the racial problem. Throughout his life, he worked as researcher at LIPI and also as lecturer in the Command and Staff Schools of the Indonesian Army, Navy and Air Force (Lie 1972: 25). He passed away in 2009.

**Anthropologists**

In early 1971, the most prominent Indonesian anthropologist Professor Koentjaraningrat received a grant to compile a book on diverse Indonesian ethnic groups. Such a book had never been written before. Koentjaraningrat brought his best students from University of Indonesia along into the project.

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Interestingly, he also commissioned Puspa Vasanty (most likely a Chinese) to contribute a chapter on “Orang Tjina” (term used in the first edition, 1971). The result is the book, *Manusia dan Kebudayaan di Indonesia* (People and Cultures in Indonesia (1st edition 1971) which has become a classic (18th printing was in 1999), and is one of the best selling social sciences books in Indonesia.

Dede Oetomo (1989: 53) commented on Vasanty’s work as “a brief and sketchy ethnography...on the Chinese in Indonesia in general...which is mostly based on available literature”. However, if we place this work in the contextual time frame of the New Order – which tended to be anti-Chinese – Vasanty’s writing can be seen as a good introduction, neutral and non-judgmental. There was no such other informative work at the time.

Interestingly, when Vasanty's essay was first published in 1971, it used *Tjina* instead of *Tionghoa* (Vasanty, 1971). However, in subsequent publications the latter term was used. The editor, Professor Koentjaraningrat, to his credit chose to go against the main current of the time, a time when the authorities tended to choose the term *Cina*.

Surprisingly, Vasanty’s work was later reprinted as reading material for SESKOAD Regular Course Selected Study Program in 1979. Unfortunately very little information is available on Vasanty’s work, such as the earlier work, “Istilah kekerabatan pada orang Tjina Hokkien di Indonesia” (Kinship Terms for the Hokkien Chinese) published in *Berita Antropologi* (1969: 38-41). It is most likely this article originated from Vasanty’s undergraduate thesis.

A work with a wider scope was written by an anthropologist from the University of Padjadjaran in West Java, Hidajat Zaenal Mutakin (1977, 1993), *Masyarakat dan Kebudayaan Cina di Indonesia* (Chinese Society and Culture in Indonesia). It aimed to fill in the gap of the lack of an anthropological source on Chinese-Indonesians, but this book lapses into stereotypes and feelings of suspicion for instance he wrote more clearly about Communist China’s unscrupulous relationship with Chinese in Indonesia

....Chinese people, both those who have become Indonesian citizens and those who are still foreigners, still show an exclusive pattern of life. Such an attitude will continue as long as the PRC, continuing to foster these emigrants according to the PRC pattern, whatever path taken (Hidajat Z.M 1993: 146).

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19) The above mentioned work of Hidajat – who was likely a Sundanese – appeared earlier than *Masalah Cina di Indonesia* (Bandung: Lembaga Kebudayaan Universitas Padjadjaran, 1976). This researcher has never seen this earlier work.

20) Original text is

......Orang Cina, baik yang sudah menjadi WNI apalagi yang masih WNA, masih tetap menunjukkan pola kehidupan yang eksklusif. Sikap demikian akan tetap bertahan selama RRC, terus membina para perantau ini menurut pola RRC, apapun jalan yang ditempuhnya.
In its discussions of political loyalty this book tends to be judgmental without the support of accurate data.

“...The Chinese descent minority group, according to current records (1977), are approximately 3 (three) million in number. Of this number, the orientation for most of them is still in doubt towards Indonesia’s socio-cultural life, both those who are already Indonesian citizens, moreover those who are still foreigners or those who are still in doubt or haven’t made their choice. (Hidajat Z.M, 1993: 5).²¹

In brief, this book is a perfect example of New Order scholarship, similar to Sukisman’s *Masalah Cina*. However, Hidajat’s book has been reprinted (1993) and is still cited in recent academic works.²²

### A Racist Journalist: A.J. Muaja

One of the few anti-Chinese pamphlets written by Indonesian in English is *The Chinese Problem in Indonesia* by A.J. Muaja. According to the noted anthropologist G.W. Skinner (1963: 496), this book is a “sophisticated piece of anti-sinicism published in English, most probably for the benefit of the Western economic advisors to the Indonesian government”.

As noted in the earlier quotation from Muaja, he states his negative perceptions of the Chinese. Further negative perceptions that appear in this pamphlet are as follows.

The law in Indonesia guarantees a member of this minority group the same rights and duties as any other autochthonous (*sic*) Indonesian citizen. Before the law a citizen of Chinese descent is entitled to the same treatment as any other Indonesian citizen. But in the eyes of many indigenous Indonesians this law has little if any foundation. The average Indonesian still cannot conciliate himself with the idea that a fellow citizen of Chinese descent is and can really be an Indonesian like himself.

They set up their own schools, clubs, associations, etc., they restricted intercourse with other sections of the native population, stuck strictly to the old Chinese traditions and kept aloof from any social or political problems of the native people. Though in reality they were permanent residents of

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²¹ Original text is...

...Golongan minoritas keturunan Cina ini menurut catatan pada waktu ini (1977) kurang lebih ada 3 (tiga) juta orang. Dari jumlah ini sebagian besar masih diragukan orientasinya terhadap kehidupan sosial-budaya Indonesia, baik mereka itu sudah masuk WNI, apalagi mereka yang masih WNA atau pun mereka yang masih ragu-ragu atau belum bisa menentukan pilihannya.

²² https://scholar.google.com/scholar?cites=17507459878042678262&as_sdt=2005&sciodt=0,5&hl=en
Indonesia, and though they had their main sources of living in Indonesia, they formed a complete community of their own. The ghettos to which the Jews restricted their daily lives, could be compared to the special living quarters which the Chinese built for themselves in many towns.

Many Indonesians think [1] the first step the Chinese could take to show a serious will to remain and become Indonesian citizen is to change their Chinese name into Indonesian names. As long as they are unwilling to do even this symbolic act it will be difficult to erase the prejudice of the autochthonous (sic) Indonesians against them (Muaja ca. 1960: 6, 10, 36).

Skinner (1963: 496) has noted that Muaja’s booklet brought together “the relevant arguments, modes of thinking, prejudiced beliefs, and myths which typical Indonesians collectively manifest”. In the eyes of Muaja, the Chinese are an unassimilable and selfish group, economic animals who only care about themselves. In short, for Muaja, the Chinese are indeed a problem for the nation.

Despite his popularity as the author of The Chinese Problem in Indonesia, we almost knew nothing of A.J. Muaja. By luck, when he passed away, there was a brief obituary written on him. Abraham Johannes Muaya (using new spelling) was the national news agency ANTARA’s senior journalist. In the celebration of the Press Day of 2010, along with his senior fellows, Muaja received “Kartu Pers Nomor Satu” (Press Card Number One) from President Yudhoyono. A Christian, he was born in Bandung, West Java, on 1934 and passed away in 2012. He had been working at ANTARA for 58 years (1954–2012) and was ANTARA’s Chief Editor from 1986 to 1993. Muaja was also a contributor to the OPEC News Agency (Nurul, 2012).

**Anti-Communist Publisher: New Nusantara Publishing Company**

The best example of an anti-communist publisher is “New Nusantara Publishing Company”, which published a serial entitled Kewaspadaan Nasional (National Vigilance). The serial has strong anti-communist tones, and among its enemies were: Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI), Red China and of course, ‘the fifth column’ namely overseas Chinese in Indonesia.

Scanty information available on the publisher, which might related to a daily newspaper with similar name, Nusantara (Mengapa 600 Djuta ca 1959:3). The books published were either anonymous or used

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23) According to Tempo (18 September 1971: 52), this daily was published by Jajasan Nusantara, owned by a businessman, Hasan Sastraatmadja (also known as Hasan Kalimadu),
Javanese-sounding pseudonyms such as Sabdo Pangon, or Satya Damar, and with no address of the publisher and no publication date. New Nusantara also published *The Chinese Problem in Indonesia* by A.J. Muaja (see above).

From about ten titles of *Seri Kewaspadaan Nasional* (National Vigilance Series) at least three of them contained anti Mao’s China cum anti-Chinese remarks.24

1. (Anonymous) *Indonesia antara Dua Blok Raksasa* (Indonesia beween Two Giant Blocs) (ca. 1959) consisted of some articles, of which two are summarized here.

- “Watak Nasional Bangsa Tionghoa” (National Character of the Chinese)
- “Hubungan Ekonomi RRT dengan Asia Tenggara dan Asia Selatan” [PRC’s Economic Relations with Southeast and South Asia):

Peking was striving very hard to get support from overseas Chinese. The planned expansion of trade wanted to be carried out it is supposed would be through local Chinese traders ... Even though there was a political breakdown between overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, but more and more of these people have been attracted by PRC propaganda and because of being given the opportunity to benefit ... ... Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia actively contribute their energy to expand PRC’s trade with Southeast Asian countries.

(Indonesia antara Dua Blok Raksasa ca, 1959: 23)

2. Sabdo Pangon (pseudonym), *Angkatan Muda Tiongkok* (China’s Youth) (ca. 1960)

with its well known chief editor, Tengku Dzulkifli Hafas. Address: Jalan K.H. Hasjim Ashari 33 A, Jakarta. It started in 1957, was banned in 1960 and later reappeared. Hasan told Tempo that Nusantara is an anti-communist paper. Therefore, it is no surprise that part of the Kewaspadaan series consisted of journalistic reports.

24) It doesn’t mean that Kuomintang Taiwan is sterile from black campaign, see among others Djaja (1958).
The Indonesian nation at its current level, faces a problem of PRC’s power, a giant power, which is geographically separated only by the Malacca Strait from us. The future of the PRC is determined by its present younger generation. That is also the case with Indonesia. Are Indonesian youth aware of their historical task for the future, in defending their homeland against the possibility of aggression from the PRC, which is currently forging its younger generation, ...to rule the world, where Indonesia is included in this, to make real its power objectives! Therefore, ...the outcome of Sabdo Pangon’s pen hopefully is to motivate the Indonesian young generation to rise up and be aware of their historical call to save the Indonesian homeland from the possibility of enormous Chinese power, which is currently forging its youth for its historical tasks, communizing the continents of Asia and the world, including Indonesia...

(......Bangsa Indonesia pada tingkat sekarang menghadapi suatu masalah kekuatan RRT, yang merupakan kekuasaan raksasa, yang geografis hanya terpisah oleh Selat Malaka dengan kita. Masa depan RRT ditentukan oleh angkatan mudanja yang sekarang, Begitu djuga halnya dengan Indonesia. Sadarkah angkatan muda Indonesia akan tugas sedjarah untuk masa depan, dalam menghadapi pembelaan tanah airnya terhadap kemungkinan agresi dari RRT, yang dewasa ini sedang menggembleng angkatan mudanja, ......untuk mengusai dunia, dimana Indonesia termasuk didalamnya untuk dididikan tujuan kekuasannya! Karena itu, .....buah pena Sabdo Pangon ini mudah-mudahan mendjadi pendorong bagi angkatan muda Indonesia untuk bangkit dan menjadari panggilan sedjarahnya untuk menjelamatkan tanah air Indonesia dari kemungkinan kekuasaan raksasa RRT, yang dewasa ini sedang menggembleng angkatan mudanja untuk tugas sedjarahnya, mengkomuniskan benua Asia dan dunia, termasuk Indonesia...) (Angkatan Muda Tiongkok, ca. 1960: p.2).

3. [Anon.] Mengapa 600 Djuta Rakjat RRT Bergerak ke Selatan? Untuk: Tanah, Beras, Timah dan Kekajaan Alam (Why Did 600 Million China’s People Move Southward? For Land, Rice, Tin and Natural Resources) (ca. 1959) (Figure 6)

.... Today the Indonesian people faces a reality of the possibility of history repeating itself with an invasion from our North.... The PRC after consolidating itself for the past 10 years is showing evidence of a compulsion to expand. ... The people of Indonesia has no other way than to be aware of the necessity to strengthen total national defense, to consolidate existing forces that have shared interests in defense against what we can call the "Red Dragon menace".
(....Dewasa ini rakjat Indonesia menghadapi suatu kenjataan kemungkinan akan terulangnya kembali sedjarah penjerbuan bangsa-bangsa di sebelah Utara kita. ...RRT setelah mengkonsolidasikan dirinjia selama 10 tahun terakhir ini telah menunjukkan bukti keharusan untuk berekspansi. ...Bagi rakjat Indonesia tak ada djalan lain daripada menjadari bahaja itu dengan keharusan untuk memperkuat pertahanan nasional yang bersifat total menghimpun kekuatan2 yang ada yang mempunjai kepentingan bersama didalam rangka pertahanan terhadap serangan bahaja, apa yang kita sebut "bahaja Naga Merah" ini.”) (Mengapa 600 Djuta ca, 1959: 3-4).

A similar and reoccurring theme from these three sources above is the “Red Dragon Menace”, that China is preparing its youth to invade Indonesia. Therefore, Indonesian youth must also be well prepared to defend their homeland.

Conclusion

This preliminary paper discovered seventeen printed materials on the ‘Chinese Problem’ from 1950s–1979. They were published during both the Sukarno and Soeharto periods. A few have a sympathetic view towards Chinese Indonesians, but most are negative. The latter have been successful in strengthening the classic stereotypes of ethnic Chinese as economic animals, unassimilated and a self-centered group who only care about themselves. Negative views were also applied to Communist China (‘Red China’) as a permanent threat to the nation, as they were preparing to invade and would communize Indonesia.

These perceptions of ethnic Chinese and communist China, up to 1980, were shaped by a combination of the work of academia (sinologists and anthropologists), journalists and publishing houses.

An official speech at the National Resilience Institute (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional – LEMHANAS) from 1981 entitled “Studying the Chinese Problem to Enhance Indonesia’s National Resilience” (“Mempelajari Masalah Cina untuk Meningkatkan Ketahanan Nasional Indonesia”) was delivered by Major General Sri Hardiman. Among the points he makes are: Indonesian public opinion is that the Chinese control the economy and they are also suspected as Chinese communist sympathizers. Recently B-class political prisoners who were under government detention following the 1965 attempted PKI coup were released, and there were fears that the Chinese community would help the former prisoners to “come back” (Hardiman 1981: 3-4). This was the common perception among the government and military
at the height of the New Order era.

This paper has focused on the shaping of perceptions towards Chinese Indonesians in the Sukarno and Soeharto periods; however, the evolution of these perceptions needs further detailed research. The indications are that the same prejudices and perceptions, identified in this paper from of a half century ago, have been resurrected recently, as part of a powerful political agenda found among political parties and their supporters to rally support from the masses in contemporary Indonesian politics (see Fealy and Ricci, 2019).

Almamater, 6 Februari 2020

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