
A Power Approach and the Coronavirus Pandemic in Yogyakarta

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ABSTRACT

In Indonesia, a power approach was operationalised in efforts to manage the coronavirus outbreak. In the six months since the spread of the virus began, what can be seen is that this approach has given rise to a behavioral paradox within the community. Tumultuous and clamorous measures were undertaken by the community in the first four months of the pandemic, where the rate of infection was still small. In the following months, when the rate of infection spiked, the community contrarily was as if it was inattentive and indifferent. This study analyzed this behavioral paradox through an analysis of the relation of power using ethnographic, internet, and historic data collected in the north Yogyakarta rural area. Ethnographic data were gathered using the autonomous ethnographic method, while other data were collected from chat groups and online news portals. Considering the gravity of the coronavirus, an alternative strategy is urgently needed. Hamlet closures must be selective, with clear timeframes and known outcomes. Such an approach is a micro lockdown, directed only at the environment and field of activity in which an infected resident is located and undergoing treatment, while life can go on as normal in the surrounding area, following health protocols. Further observations are needed to examine the effectiveness of this approach, as with other things emerging within the community.

Keywords: *covid-19; ethnography; Java; lebaran; pandemic; power relations*

INTRODUCTION

In the six months the Yogyakarta community has been under the pressure of the Corona-19, hereafter the corona epidemic, there arose a paradoxical social response. In the first two months of the epidemic, the community was very disciplined in limiting physical mobility through strict lockdowns. The government made routine announcements via television, social media and banners so that each community would maintain its health by washing hands with soap, using masks and observing social distancing. Studies in several areas show that these measures were effective in stemming the spread of the epidemic (Yun Qiu, Xi Chen and Wei Shi, 2020: 1163; Suppawittaya, Yiemphat and Yasri, 2020: 19). The community responded to these individual policies by conducting village lockdowns, preventing the arrival of outsiders. This discipline was supported by government

policies and formal workplaces by issuing a policy of working from home. An ordered and disciplined lifestyle in facing the epidemic only lasted three and a half months. Since 1 July, at the conclusion of the holiday following the fasting month (*Lebaran Idul Fitri*) the community's attitude became relaxed as it was previously. Meanwhile, at the same time, the rate of the epidemic's spread precisely continued to increase. The community's attitude is truly paradoxical, it is if they closely guarding against thieves when the thieves were weak and far away, but to contrary becoming indifferent when the thief has come to the front yard of the house. How can this paradox be understood?

So far, new research concerning the corona epidemic has been more often viewed from medical and technical community health aspects. A wider view,

concerning epidemics in Asia, has been presented by Caballero-Anthony (2009) but from a perspective very much centered on government, as if the epidemic can be controlled by efficient relations of power practices. The experience of six months of the coronal epidemic indicates that a government-centric approach suffers from many problems and needs to be reviewed. In relation to this, I will

analyze this paradox in community attitudes by taking inspiration from Michel Foucault's views (1982:778):

“It soon appeared to me that, while the human subject is placed in relations of production and of signification, he is equally placed in power relations which are very complex.”

Power here can be defined approximately as a force shaping a subject – mankind with all his behaviours and thinking – so as to comply with the wishes of the controller of the forces. Furthermore, Foucault distinguishes power as disciplining power and normalising power. Disciplining power is conducted by mechanisms of force, people are forced to obey through threats of physical sanctions undertaken by state instruments: legal devices, police and the armed forces. Normalising power is undertaken by a habituating of praxis, management and supervision.

From this perspective, government measures in handling the corona epidemic is indeed very much based on relations of power, even though what was operationalised in March – August was normalizing power: motivation, urging so that the community changes themselves by adopting a behaviour of ensuring bodily health, using masks and not forming crowds. This policy targeted citizens as individuals, impregnated with an aura of neo-liberalism, as though making people free to determine by themselves what is good for them. An aroma of the relations of power wafted out from, among others, government measures to create a militaristic task force institution for epidemic management. In the task force, as appearing in various epidemic management banners and posters, the heads of regional security – the police and military – were given a large role. Although the banners had leadership pictures, uniformed heads and commandants it was accompanied by encouragement in high Javanese which elevates the interlocuter “Let's all wear masks”, immediately a Jogja person can see that the earlier sentence is not an invitation or an offer, but a polite direction which follows the Javanese proverb the higher the position, the more refined the direction.¹⁾ In the Javanese power structure, a harsh direction is only

issued by the lowly ranked, the more lowly the greater the harshness and physicality of the direction. While for the high ranked, it is sufficient for an instruction to be given in a refined way, concealed in a smile or polite gesture (Sartini, 2009: 36; Endraswara, 2010: 76). In relation to these facts, I will further ask, is a power approach appropriate in resolving the social problems of a pandemic? And does a power approach make a contribution to the emergence of a community behavioral paradox?

The aim of this paper is to reveal the tensions which have emerged from the operating of power relations in the handling of the epidemic in Yogyakarta. As disclosed by Foucault himself, the operating of power relations always invites resistance (1982: 220), but from where and how this resistance originates from operating at the empiric level still needs to be identified. In this way, these abstract concepts can become more concrete and help us to understand issues of life present in front of our eyes (Deacon, 1998).

Foucault (1991: 195) adopts Jeremy Bentham's idea of the panopticon as a mechanism for the execution of refined power. Here the holder of power creates a mechanism which makes the object of power feel under supervision and act in obedience although in fact it is uncertain if the supervisor is present. In practice the implementation of power ala the panopticon continues in steps, from the highest holder of power distributed to agents of power at lower levels with smaller spheres of influence. Beginning from state level to hamlets even families. One aspect which is crucial here, agents of power on the lower levels in general have their own interests and values, and are at ready to use every opportunity to wield a greater power. As a consequence the flow of power from high can experience a strengthening because it is operationalised as a basis to develop local power. Apart from this, power interests clearly can stress differences in values. As will be seen in the lockdowns of hamlets later, even opposing social values can be juxtaposed in the context of the growth of local power. In this regard the holders of local power have become very pragmatic like Deng Xiaoping, the Prime Minister of China in the 1980s “White cat, black cat, what does it matter as long as it catches mice?” (Shambaugh, 1993: 457; Whyte, 1993: 523). But conversely, if the execution of central power has the potential to weaken local power in a zero sum game, thus the relations of both currents of power will be characterized by resistance. In facing this execution of power the holder of local power becomes very ideological. They oppose central power using differing interpretations of the same doctrine – interpretations which are more

aligned with their agenda and felt to be more aligned to the local context. The sameness of religious doctrine here can mean the loss of a role in developing synergies.

The relations of power needs energy to support the success of its execution, in keeping with the adage “there is no such thing as a free lunch”. An extreme example can be taken from the power relations of slavery, where the slave owner has to provide food and guarantee the continuation of the life of the slaves because a slave who does not live and cannot work is of no use (Datta and Bales 2013: 208). For epidemic relations of power, the agents of power need to expend energy in the form of wage subsidies, food or entertainment so that citizens can implement social and economic activity restrictions. Without the ability to give subsidies, then the government relations of power and other agents of power will be just empty talk without force – like the platitudes spread from the mouths of colonial time feudals and *priyayi* (Suhartono, 2001). Subsidies will give rise to obedience and reduce resistance. Despite this subsidies have shrunk, thus the force of relations of power have also collapsed struck by more fundamental physiological and psychological relations in groups of residents.

METHOD

The data I have used in this research I have collected with three researchers in four hamlets (*dusun*) in the rural of on the slopes of Merapi, Yogyakarta: Kaliurang, Ledok, Klepu and Sarjono. Each hamlet has a social character different to the others primarily because of the differences in dominant livelihood in the groups of residents. In Kaliurang the community depends on an economic livelihood primarily drawn from tourist activity. In Ledok the majority of the population are small farmers. In Klepu the majority of the population has no access to farmland and makes a living from providing lodgings, street stalls and laundry services for University of Islam students. The Sarjono hamlet is new, inhabited by newcomers from various parts of Indonesia, and the majority work as government and private officials. The variety of economic backgrounds later had an effect on the variety of responses in facing the epidemic in the groups of residents.

This study uses three types of data: ethnographic, internet and historic. The ethnographic data was gathered using the autonomous ethnographic method, where the researcher was a member of the community who observed and recorded social events in the proximate area, and those events which impacted the researcher, the result of observation and experience were then recorded in field notes. One of the ‘new’ information sources in this




Figure 1. Research locations (D.L. Gumerlar)

research were discussions on whatsapp groups, where group members convey opinions, make comments and give information to other members. Various issues which are perhaps difficult to obtain through interview on the contrary appear in these virtual discussion groups. A primary limitation of this self-ethnographic method is researchers are no longer sensitive to events around them because they feel everything is normal and natural – not worthy of being noticed. Discussion among the researchers can help overcome this weakness, because the researchers can provide suggestions to each other about what data is necessary to be further collected. Historical data concerning the epidemic in Yogyakarta was collected on line mainly by accessing delpher.nl and youtube and other news portals.

Hamlet lockdown

At the end of March 2020 the corona epidemic came to the Jogja community in form of a flood of alarming

information concerning the increasing number of infected people, numbers of recoveries and fatalities. While in fact, the number of corona patients, which were relatively small, were distributed in industrial centers – in the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY) there were 26 corona patients. Both of these aspects made the corona epidemic in Jogja rural communities a distant experience (Geertz, 1973). Most of them did not experience or witness for themselves people who had become corona victims. It was this which possibly pushed the need to create a rite as a mechanism to make an abstract threat, a distant experience, which were in the thoughts to become a threat seemingly real and make people truly feel afraid (see Durkheim, 1995: 34). This situation, as a comparison, was different to the time Jogja rural area was attacked by plague of pests almost half a century ago, where the community directly experienced illness and became victims.²⁾

Youths carried out their tasks of guarding the village with great seriousness. With fierce faces and looks full of vigilance they observed whoever passed

near the village entrance. All the villagers who returned from outside the village to shop were checked for their body temperature, directed to wash their hands and were sprayed with disinfectant. People whose temperature was above 38 celsius were prevented from entering and reported to the village manager as a person with signs of being infected with the Corona virus for further processing at the Community Health Center. Meanwhile people from other villages or areas were firmly refused entry. In addition the village manager conducted routine activities of spraying disinfectant on residents' houses, places of worship even village roads.

Compulsive imitation or a habit of copying other people's behavior occurred in the expansion of the hamlet lockdowns in north Yogyakarta. On a banner, in one of the hamlets which was implementing a lockdown, were the words "Join in the lockdown so as to be like other hamlets" ("Melu *lock down*, ben kaya liyane"). There was just one difference with individual compulsive imitation, which in the view of the experts is a symptom of mental illness, copying the behaviour of other hamlets in the case of this epidemic there was also reciprocity. The residents of one hamlet closed their hamlet and restricted the geographical mobility of other hamlet residents, because they had met with the same measure in the other hamlets.

Clearly the corona epidemic almost brought to a halt Yogyakarta's economic-social activity reaching a nadir. At the end of March 2020 north Yogyakarta's rural area was almost like a dead region. Kaliurang Street, Jogja to Pakem which is usually roaring with the sound of vehicles morning and night became silent. Now and again there was the sound of a village youth's motor bike passing by. The area around the Indonesian Islamic University campus was deserted. The campus was closed, face to face lectures ceased and thousands of students staying near the campus returned home. Meat ball soup stalls, chicken noodles, instant noodles, green bean porridge eateries and various service supply businesses shut their stalls. The attack of the epidemic, which became known to residents through television and social media, was truly effective in arousing feelings of fear and threat within the community as a result many chose to stay quietly at home.

The very close guarding of hamlets and the spraying of disinfectants as before was more a ritual and a realization of the relations of power rather than effective work to ward off the virus. Firstly, the spread of the virus could be managed by home isolation – there was no need to isolate the hamlet. The government health protocols which compelled new residents to depart so as to isolate themselves at home for two weeks was sufficient for this



Figure 2. Hamlet in lockdown (Gregorius Aji)



Figure 3. Outsiders as the personification of the plague (Pujo Semedi)

purpose. Secondly, since the end of March many hamlet residents did not need to go anywhere because their place of work in the market and in the city was closed and the office conducted its work program from the home. Hamlet residents who kept a routine of going in and out were farmers who worked in orchards and rice fields, had almost no risk of being infected by the pandemic. Thirdly, the spraying of disinfectant on the streets, yards and houses is a measure whose effectiveness is difficult to believe in as preventing the spread of the virus because the spraying was conducted in an environment where there were no infections.

One matter is clear, the ritual of closing and patrolling the hamlets was successful in changing the reality of the epidemic which originally was a distant and abstract experience to become a closer and evident reality in the form of outsiders, that is anyone who was not known as a resident of the hamlet itself. In keeping with this ritual scenario all outsiders are carriers of the plague and must be prevented from entering the hamlet. The spraying of disinfectant on houses and yards more resembles the conveying of a message which is continually repeated that the threat of the epidemic is not just news from a distant place but something whose existence is very real in the here and now.³⁾

For about two or three weeks the narrative of outsiders as the carriers of the plague, and must be prevented from entering the hamlet, was sustained. Everyone who passed in front of the hamlet was observed coldly. But in the fourth week, the influence of the narrative of the outsider as a threat began to fade – perhaps because indeed few people came or passed through the hamlet. At the time indeed everyone reduced their journeys to other places or meetings with others to a minimum. At the time the enthusiasm to guard the hamlet began to wane, and it is

unclear who began it, a new narrative emerged of there being disturbances from thieves. The narrative went as follows: a gang of thieves in a truck was dropped off in an adjoining village, then they spread out and stole harvested rice still left in the fields, and livestock though only taking the thighs, fish in ponds, there were even thieves as bold to burgle houses. All these types of thieves were only imaginary creations, no different to Lex Luthor in the Superman comic or Gareng in a shadow puppet show. Each story about a thief was furnished with the operative words “there was news that” and without a first hand account. The narrative of the thieves became evermore terrifying – mainly me who who usually cycled around the village dangling a camera – because later there was an additional story that during the day the thieves had sent a spy to the hamlet to photograph houses which would become the targets for theft. The hamlet residents were struck by a moral panic and saw people whom they did not know as a threat (Semedi, 2014). The effect was the ritual to close the hamlet which had begun to lose spirit, was re-energized.

At the beginning of the May however, lockdown corona patrols were done continuously. The energy from the moral panic of the thieves only lasted a month. At the end of the month the guarding of the hamlet and roadblocks had relaxed. The roadblock which had earlier been guarded 24 hours a day by the youths were now guarded by young women, junior and senior high school students, who sat in boredom continuously sweeping the screens of their mobile phones. At night the number of young men who did patrols continued to drop away. Young men and husbands who were earlier diligent in patrolling, eventually also got bored of freezing each night in the open air. Women complained that the corona patrols of three shifts imposed a large burden of household finances. Moreover now the household finances were in a parlous situation, revenue had fallen or even temporarily stopped while expenses continued unabated. One by one households began to abandon their responsibilities to provide a quota of food. In June ever fewer guards were guarding, posts which were earlier busy began to be quiet even several were totally empty.

Lebaran, the post-fasting month holiday, seemed to be the climax of the ritual of guarding against corona. As in previous years, two days before *Lebaran* people came in droves to shop at Pakem market. To prepare for market day the market manager had issued a strict regulation to traders that they use a mask and those who violate this would be expelled from the market. The traders complied likewise the shoppers, all wore masks. Although it was compulsory to maintain distancing it was




Figure 4. The Spread of Corona in the Special Area of Yogyakarta (DIY) 20 March – 4 September 2020. Source: Corona-19 Task Force (www.covid-19.go.id)

often ignored, but the atmosphere of the Lebaran market in Pakem brought in the civil community which had been disciplined in maintaining individual and community health under the threat of the corona epidemic. Lebaran passed quietly, there were no large fasting month gathering (*Ied*) in the mosque or at a field. There were no groups to perform the ritual of seeking forgiveness from elders, or coming in droves to visit older relatives and neighbours.

A week after Lebaran it seems a feeling of boredom and an economic standstill within resident circles could no longer be endured. There was a fragmenting of views among the hamlet residents, those who urged that people remain cautious and those who wished to immediately, and must, proceed as before. The passing of Lebaran and the espousing of the new term ‘new normal’ by the government and various other parties, was interpreted by residents as a sign and statement that the situation had returned to normal. At the end of June the blockades, which had closed off the entry to the hamlets, were removed and the signs which had forbade foreigners from entering the hamlets brought down.

The dismantling of the road blocks was as if it was

an order for many people that the epidemic had passed and life had returned to normal. Beginning at that moment also, people returned to freely moving in and out of the hamlets and undertaking work activities as it was before prior to the lockdown. Some of the residents remained vigilant and wore masks each time they left home to shop or meet with others. Some still observed distancing when speaking with friends and neighbours. But others were conducting activities as normal, without masks, without distancing, forgetting to wash hands although many shops, stalls and public facilities made these available. One essential matter which meant life in north Jogja was still not back to normal was the continued closure of higher education campuses in the area. Thousands of students who usually made life dynamic and the economy turn in the area were still absent. A feeling of boredom in being in lockdown, an urge to return to work and months of living under a virtual threat made the community relax its vigilance. Life went on as normal, as if there was no problem at all.

The graph (figure 4) shows how in a period of 24 weeks since 20 March, the total number of residents

who were exposed to the corona virus in the Yogyakarta Special Region, rose quickly from 26 people to 1525 people. In the meantime community vigilance to the epidemic in contrast declined from its very high level, with the isolation of the hamlets to a normal life as if there was nothing of concern. It is not something that is strange I believe if the graph above shows that the rapid increase occurred at the end of July, at the time people considered that the period of epidemic alert finished together with the passing of the fasting month and Lebaran. After Lebaran both collective actions of isolation, organized by the hamlet managers, and individual actions of healthy behaviors sponsored by the government, had a basis in the relations of power and collapsed struck by feelings of boredom, a crisis of freedom, a limitation of energy and internal conflict.

Riding on the Wind: Herjuno and Toyo Strengthen Local Power

The accepting of the idea of hamlet isolation by residents is possibly related to a long tradition in Java which places the hamlet as an independant socio-political unit, or using Eric Wolf's (1957) term "closed corporate society". The hamlet lockdown can also be seen a community response to the government's approach directing the community to individually face the epidemic using masks, washing hands and not congregating. This individual approach did not accord with normality in the hamlet where people positioned themselves as an integral part of the community, neighborhood and kinship system (Strathern, 1988; 2014). For them it was absurd in the extreme to live in a hamlet and limit social contact with neighbours and kin, because neighbours and kin are their everyday social network. For residents of the community who work in the office and can communicate by internet, isolation perhaps does not become too much of a problem (de Vos, 2020: 1). But for residents of a hamlet, self-isolation only gives rise to social and psychological stress which precisely makes for cases which become increasingly problematic (Oliveira dan Rossi, 2020:16).

Closer observations also show that the hamlet lockdowns also had a political dimension, as Judith Schlehe (2010: 119) found out in the aftermath of the 2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta that "there is often somebody who benefits from other peoples' feelings of insecurity". Hamlet isolation began from an idea of one or two hamlet residents who are known by residents for being assertive: both because of a superior social position as a hamlet manager or economic position as a rich resident who usually acts as a sponsor of hamlet activities. During

a Ledok Hamlet (Dusun Ledok) residents' meeting at the end of March, Herjuno who is a rich resident – an owner of an extensive tract of rice fields, a fuel pump businessman and a builder contractor – directly voiced the view that in the interests of the safety of the hamlet, the hamlet must be closed. Herjuno is not a hamlet manager, but as a person who is known as being philanthropic (*loma*), generous in helping out with hamlet activities and residents, his voice is listened to and agreed to by the community. Herjuno directly mobilized his economic resources and paid for the establishment the road block and a fully equipped patrol command post at the hamlet's main entrance. Each night he also gave funds for food which certainly was happily received by the young men.

A rather similar story also unfolded at Klepu Hamlet. Only here the strong voice was that of Toyo, the head of the hamlet, that in the interests of the hamlet's residents the hamlet must be closed. The residents nodded and just agreed. How else could it be, closing hamlets had indeed become the mode everywhere and hamlet lockdowns were heard to be very effective and aligned to the spirit of the residents who wanted to complete it collectively, together. Apart from that they were also reluctant to debate with Toyo, who since young, was known to be often stubborn, intransigent. On arriving home from the meeting they met with complaints of the women. You met with the Kadus (*Kepala Dusun*, Head of the Hamlet), he is stupid, how could you agree. Gee, later on if you go to shop or work at the neighbouring hamlet, how is it? How can people not be allowed to shop, not allowed to work?" In the morning, Toyo straight away gathered in the resources and people to close the hamlet. The one and only connecting road to Sarjono Hamlet to the south was blocked by bamboo and dry coconut fronds, likewise the thoroughfare to Kaliurang Road on the western side. One entrance way to the north was set aside which would be controlled by a picquet. There were not many residents who came to carry out Toyo's instructions and the road block at the front of the hamlet was put together with whatever was at hand along with a small tent belonging to the hamlet. In the first week the patrols proceeded each night, but in the second week the road block was left to be picqueted by Toyo himself and several other residents. The following week, there was no picquet, it had dispersed.

Apart from the reluctance of the residents to follow the Head of the Hamlet, Toyo, the quick passing of the corona patrol in Klepu was connected with the refusal of the women to provide food for the patrollers. An important economic source in Klepu were the student lodging houses and the food stalls, which with the arrival

of the epidemic, immediately declined. Without food and no longer being able to equate a picquet to a pleasant place for young men to gather and faced with the iron law of economics Toyo who was usually outspoken was truly unable to do anything. The project of upholding Toyo's local power through the road block picquet fell apart within only two weeks. Klepu Hamlet, which was without a picquet, had no visitors not because of Toyo's authority or the effect of the picquet, but indeed because there were no outsiders who had reason to come to Klepu.

In Ledok Hamlet the objection of the women to the burden of supplying food to the patrollers occurred rather recently, in the middle of June. Ledok's economic situation in the period of the epidemic was better than Klepu's because most of the Ledok residents were farmers and their economy did not experience a heavy shock as a result of the epidemic. Nevertheless, it remained an additional burden, which was not light, to provide food for 10 patrollers once every three days. Facing a situation which threatened the continuation of his influence, Herjuno directly took over the responsibility of supplying an allocation of food for the patrols. For him, maintaining the continuation of the patrols which had been initiated by him in a residents' meeting, was far more valuable than the cost of food for 10 patrollers each night. In the end the patrols continued, although from week to week the patrollers become fewer and fewer and ever more people grumbled bearing the difficulties of the hamlet lockdown.

Shortly afterwards the arbitrary relations of power struck back at Herjuno, which in the interests of his own business, was forced to breach the hamlet lockdown regulations which he had created himself. So that his business could keep going, Herjuno had to make trips to several cities in Indonesia, and one time at the end of a trip to Palembang, Herjuno got a positive reaction test to corona. It is not certain from whose mouth this news spread rapidly causing unrest in Ledok residents' circles. They were confused as what to do about Herjuno, to allow Herjuno to stay in the hamlet they were scared of catching corona, they were also not so bold also to evict Herjuno. Feeling uncomfortable with the whispering of neighbours, Herjuno issued a broadcast on the hamlet's whatsapp group that he had a corona test reaction, but that did not mean he was infected with corona and thus residents should stay calm. According to health protocols Herjuno should self isolate at home, but it seems in Herjuno's view the reputation and authority in the eyes of the residents was more important. Rather than isolating, two days later Herjuno tried to win over the residents by procuring a leather puppet show (*wayang kulit*) of Dalang Seno Nugroho (2020) as a gift to hamlet residents.

A similar fate struck Toyo. A week out from Lebaran, Toyo had a headache, his sibling Toyib who had become a member of the military in Surabaya suddenly came home for Lebaran. Toyib brought a health certificate from the doctor, but the residents so far felt they had become an object of power. Toyo hit back at rejecting Toyib's visit. Unanimously the residents stated that the regulation forbidding entry was valid for everyone. Toyo was confused and ran off to see the village head, who then decided that Toyib could enter the Klepu hamlet and stay with Tono but everyone in Toyo's house must isolate. But as is Toyo's character, although having to isolate, with a look of no guilt and sin, happily strode off to join in Friday prayers and chat with childhood friends. Looking on, his neighbours commented "The head of the hamlet should be tied down, so as not to wander off everywhere."

The discussion above shows how the upholding of relations of power demands being consistently firm to all subjects. But this principle is not always undertaking through the isolation of a hamlet. The implementation of local power hooked onto to emerging large issues, so as to hit back at the interests of the initiator. Rather than getting stronger, Herjuno's relations of power on the contrary were seriously eroded because he failed to align the relations of power given over the issue of the corona epidemic with his business relations. If Herjuno, without wavering upheld the epidemic relations of power, then he would have had to sacrifice his business interests and cease going anywhere. Likewise with Toyo. The strengthening of the relations of power as the head of the hamlet split apart because the earlier epidemic relations of power could not be aligned with kinship relations. If Toyo consistently followed the epidemic relations of power, then he would have had to refuse his siblings visit. In facing up to the residents's talk, Toyo calculated should the lockdown continue to be implemented thus socializing among relatives certainly would certainly cease.

Playing with fire, Haji Nakulo maintain the well being of the mosque

As with Herjuno and Toyo, Haji Nakulo the manager of the Suci Rejeki prayer house in Sarjono Hamlet also rejected the individualisation of hamlet residents. But in contrast to Toyo and Herjuno, Haji Nakulo operationalised a relations of power which resisted government measures. Drawing on the discourse of "maintaining the well being of the mosque" Haji Nakulo rejected the Minister of Religion direction (SE Np. 15/2020) and continued to conduct prayers for worshippers at five times in the prayer house.

The actions of Mbah Haji – as he is called in the hamlet – seems reckless in view of the spreading of virus directly from person to person, as a consequence of congregating having great potential to spread the virus. Here Mbah Haji seems as if he was playing with fire, *deep play* (Geertz, 1973).⁴⁾ By guarding and strengthening values considered important, Mbah Haji took very risky steps, if successful he would win thus be an extraordinary person but if he failed then everything would be lost. Mbah Haji undertook his activities with the support of the discourse of upholding religious doctrine, which in Indonesia is indeed considered as a matter of utmost priority. But as revealed by Gary Lease (1994: 474): “Make no mistake about it: religions are about power, about the power to be given you and about the power which controls you”. Operationalizing religion in everyday life is operationalising the relations of power, and the ever greater the number of people involved in the congregation the ever greater the power which is operationalised. From this perspective, Mbah Haji’s playing with fire was a wagering of something which for him was very valuable, truth and goodness, as guided by religion.

Mbah Haji is a good person, genuine and very much likes to help neighbours. However since entering retirement he has immersed himself in religious activities which are in essence a field of power relations. Mbah Haji’s complaint about the loosening of the congregation’s socializing comes from the genuine conscience of a person who does not dissemble. It is just that because the complaint is placed in the field of power relations so Mbah Haji’s good intent and feelings become largely inseparable with the desire to organize other people.

Mbah Haji, appointed by the residents as the manager of the Suci Rejeki *Musola*, prayer house, directly activated a program to mark the reading of the Al Qur’an from start to end for the first time (*kataman*). The original program, conducted periodically, was increased to become a monthly program after afternoon prayers (*ashar*) in the musola. Who knows where the idea originated from, when the epidemic struck approaching the fasting month, Mbah Haji invited the congregation to a *kataman* online seven times. Each candidate was requested to register, then Mbah Haji divided up chapters (*juz*) of the Al Qur’an which had to be read by each participant, one participant had a minimum of one chapter. After reading the allocated section, each participant was requested to report to Mbah Haji: “Completed Mbah”. If at the deadline for the reading there was a participant who had not reported, Mbah Haji requested its completion via the whatsapp group “Mas Wakijan, request chapter 23 be completed”. Collaborating

with Haji Jafar who was indeed known as generous, Mbah Haji applied an awards system for obedient members. After the *kataman* the participants were sent a food parcel. This step certainly did not escape the attention of those residents who did not get a package and in effect the awards system divided Mbah Haji’s congregation from those outside the congregation.

In practice during the period of the epidemic Mbah Haji made the Suci Rejeki Musola an exclusive domain which had the effect of strengthening the power relations which he had developed. The musola which was originally a House of God which was open to all, under Mbah Haji’s epidemic regime become a special place for the manager and his small congregation. Entering the second month of the hamlet pandemic isolation clearly became focussed on the place of worship and Mbah Haji was not left behind. The dividing screen between the male and female congregation in the Suci Rejeki Musola changed its function to become an announcement board. “While the musola was only for the congregation of permanent residents to pray. Not for students. Not for the public.” Entering the Fasting Month Mbah Haji added a regulation: “In accordance with government direction Suci Rezeki Musola this year will not hold (1) breaking the fast together; (2) Ramadan evening congregation prayer (*shalat tarwih*); (3) fasting month congregational Al Qur’an readings (*tadarusan berjemaah*); (4) commemoration of the day of the Al Qur’an’s descent from heaven (*peringatan nuzulul Al Qur’an*); (5) extended prayer readings (*itikaf*), and; (6) in particular for the permanent congregation our activities will continue as normal “The permanent congregation referred to in the announcement comprises Mbah Haji,




Figure 5. Limiting the congregation (Pujo Semedi)

Haji Japar, Haji Kirun, Abah Amin dan Joni – young men of the adjoining hamlet whatever their situation will be taken up by Mbah Haji as the musola teacher. All these five indeed regularly prayed five times as a congregation. Mbah Haji's power over the sphere of worship is also seen in his story, how on one particular day he shoed away two 'foreigners' who joined in noon prayers and later sat to rest. "Gentlemen, sorry this musola is only for residents only." Both of these worshippers immediately apologized and left."

When one of the residents asked of the risk of conducting congregational worship each day, in the middle of the pandemic, Mbah Haji explained that they had worshipped as a congregation since the beginning of the epidemic – eight weeks or more – and not even one person of the five worshippers was sick "it means we are all healthy and praying as a congregation is safe to be continued". The exclusiveness of the congregation continues to indicate that the meeting of Haji Nakulo epidemic regime with the government relations of power is not going smoothly. A week out from Lebaran Mbah Haji's resistance to government regulation was increasingly evident, the musola manager was determined to conduct Lebaran worship which had a significant chance of the crowding of residents. The idea of these gatherings had been rejected by residents when Waluyo, the head of Dusun Sarjono proposed the idea of the hamlet exchanging greetings of forgiveness (*halal bihalal*) in keeping with previous Lebarans. The residents, including Mbah Haji himself, said that these activities have a risk of spreading the epidemic and the head of the hamlet backed down.

Perhaps learning from the case of the rejection of the Head of Dusun, from the outset Mbah Haji had made regulations that the end of fasting (*Idul Fitri*) those who pray will be selected. Participants who are permanent hamlet residents, not student lodgers, not small children with participants having to register. There were only eight resident couples who registered for these end of fasting prayers (*Ied*). Other residents chose to following direction of avoiding crowds, but they also did not put obstacles in the way of Mbah Haji's agenda. Regardless, the residents who did not register were convinced that worshipping is a command from God, and they were rather worried also if this refusal of Haji Nakulo's agenda would be misinterpreted as refusing God's command. Both Waluyo the Head of the Dusun and Mbah Haji as the musola manager organized the public, but with moral positions which were very different. As the manager of the worldly domain, the power of the Head of the Dusun, Waluyo was very sensitive to residents' opinions. Whereas as the

manager of the House of God, although also appointed by the residents, Mbah Haji was accepted as holder of the mandate as a facilitator for the implementation of God's commands. Mbah Haji very much understood this and skilfully operationalized his semi-sacred position to its limits so as to uphold values he considered true. The residents readily challenged the Head of the Dusun Waluyo but they did not do so or at least chose to stay quiet if Mbah Haji took the initiative to organise this and that on behalf of the musola.

On the day of Lebaran from 6am Mbah Haji was ready in the musola while reciting "God is Great" through his own loud speaker. Every few moments, this reciting was punctuated with an announcement calling the faithful: "All Suci Rejeki musola worshippers it is 6.15am...later we will say Ied prayers at 7am. Those ladies and gentlemen who will do Ied prayers let's get ready". At an interval of 10 minutes later the reminder was continuously repeated, until finally "Please hurry up, Ladies and Gentlemen...we have only 10 minutes before Ied prayers". It was if Ied prayers was a type of bus or train which will depart on schedule. Finally Mbah Haji announced "Worshippers our time to go for Ied prayers is 3 minutes, please hasten".

After all the worshippers had gathered, Haji Nakulo first made a speech explaining the background of Ied worship in the musola "As the manager I am not willing to see this musola sink in this epidemic and have no worshippers to prosper this musola." This manifesto shows how the religious discourse was operationalized by Mbah Nakulo to exercise relations of power: the execution of power which he had implemented so far for religious commands, not his own personal desires. Its strengthening became increasingly conspicuous when Mbah Haji firmly organized the implementation of the praying: "Follow the law of prayer which I obey, our prayer will be done in lines close together. Later when our prayers are complete we will have distancing again".

In the end the Lebaran prayers which had been conducted at Suci Rejeki Musola⁵⁾ with dozens of worshippers went smoothly. After praying the worshippers went directly to their own homes. In keeping with Lebaran activities in the musola went on as before, Mbah Haji, Haji Japar, Haji Kirun, Abah Amin routinely gathered for prayer five times. Only now they no longer wore masks as prior to Lebaran. When Doctor Candra gave a reminder on the Whatsapp Group that health protocols should be complied with, Haji Japar immediately responded with "all talk and no action". When doing morning exercise around the hamlet Doctor Candra indeed sometimes also forgot to wear a mask.

The success of conducting Idul Fitri worship gave Haji Nakulo encouragement to hold a larger combined activity and with the potential to give rise to crowding, the carving up of the sacrifice on the Day of Sacrifice (*Idul Adha*) holiday. Mbah Haji's boldness to continually play with fire was very much based on the fact that after four months of undertaking worship as a congregation under the pressure of the epidemic not one resident in Sarjono Hamlet was infected. This fact was interpreted by Mbah Haji as everything was going well in the hamlet. Anticipating that the situation would still have to be controlled, Mbah Haji, a regulation for carving up of the sacrifice was issued that this time only two cattle would be provided by the musola manager, not three as is usual. Apart from that, a special team would be formed for the slaughter and carving up of the meat, not everyone would be permitted to participate. Furthermore the meat of the sacrifice would be divided up collectively to be given to the community. With this procedure it was hoped that the butchering activity would not give rise to crowding.

Not all the residents were in agreement with Mbah Haji's plan. Doctor Tarjoko suggested via the Whatsapp group the butchering of the sacrifice be done by a butcher at a slaughter house as proposed by the government. But Haji Kirun, a permanent congregation member, immediately responded that this method was not in accordance with the Islamic law (*syari'ah*) of the carving up of the sacrifice. So it continued, the butchering of the sacrifice, but only the permanent congregation members and their wives would participate in the hamlet activity which was usually a very busy one. Meanwhile other residents, even those who had contributed to supplying the sacrificial animals, only dropped in for a moment then returned to their respective homes. Two weeks after the carving up of the sacrifice, Mbah Haji invited the residents to a combined lunch in the musola with a menu of sauteed cattle head (*tongseng kepala sapi*) – the quota of the sacrifice committee. But as with the butchering, only the family of the permanent congregation came and a large plastic tub of *tongseng* was left over, a great amount.

Discussions within the hamlet residents' circles revealed a view that Haji Nakulo's activities in the musola as being highly risky. However, they were not able to do much, because Mbah Haji, Haji Jafar and Haji Kirun always responded with a moral and religious argument and if answered had the potential to cause a dispute. One the key statements which was often expressed by the permanent musola congregation was: "visitors to the markets and malls were just silenced, people going to the mosque were on the contrary warned, chastised."

It is very likely Haji Nakulo and his congregation

only intended to conduct activities which they were convinced as being true and good. The problem here is the implementation of what they are convinced of being good and true is accompanied by the principle "because of that goodness and truth is urged upon other people". Apart from this, the implementation of values which are considered true and good are conducted in the public domain, which are constructed and allocated for the public. On this very point, Mbah Haji was involved in a practice of power relations, firstly through the acquisition of physical public space to be used exclusively for his mission and group; secondly, by allocating social space for the worshipping group and non-worshipping group with awards for the worshipping group.

In fact collective activities in Dusun Sarjono had long been in decline, unlike the 1990s to 2000s. The worshippers for evening prayer (*maghrib*) and late evening prayer (*isyah*) at the musola were mostly student lodgers, not permanent residents who had begun to age and their children had moved to live in other places. Many permanent residents, who were getting on in age, felt weary of joining in hamlet activities. They preferred to sit doing activities in their houses without being disturbed by this or that regulation made by their neighbours. For them the government's neo-liberal direction, with individuals having to ensure their own cleanliness, wear a mask, keep physical distancing and not congregate felt appropriate. Meanwhile the permanent residents of young age, such as Kusumo who owns an electronics good shop and schools both his children in the Islam boarding school is also uninterested in Haji Nakulo's collective activities. "It is grandparenting duties. Just let it go."

To September 2020 the situation in Dusun Sarjono was fine, there was not any spread of the virus which emerged from Mbah Haji's activities, although the courage of the residents shrank because at the end of August there was a neighbour in the hamlet across the road who had been infected by the virus and was admitted to hospital. Mbah Haji's religious activities with his permanent congregation continued but without any signs of increased membership. Mbah Haji's sincerity in conducting prayers as a congregation in a critical period under the threat of a pandemic and debating government regulations, indeed had the potential to increasingly convince the hamlet residents of the importance of these activities – with the potential follow-on effect of increasing respect for his family name and Mbah Haji's power relations. The strengthening of Haji Nakulo's relations of power so far could not be said to be successful, not because of obstacles of the natural relations from the epidemic, and government power relations, but because Dusun Sarjono's

desire and energy for collective activities had dissipated. Relations of power always need followers, subjects who are happy or even unwilling to be disciplined and made the target of regulations. As in an economic atmosphere, which is increasing neo-liberal, and where the age of the population is ageing a subject of this type is dwindling in Dusun Sarjono. Using Anna Tsing's terminology (2005), Haji Nakulo's power project is like the wheel of a car, only moving in place because the resident's passive attitude negates the potential of friction which allows the car to move. Nevertheless, Mbah Haji's activities, to an extent, played a part in relaxing community vigilance, with a routine of conducting worship as a congregation, gathering at Mbah Haji's musola and spreading a message "there is no problem at all with the corona epidemic, the proof is we are safe". With the arrival of the new teaching year, one by one the student lodgers came to Dusun Sarjono and calmly prayed as a congregation in the musola without health protocols.

Running Out of Energy

A third response to the relations of power operationalized by government came from the lower levels of the community who sought a living outside of the agricultural sector and had to be close to others when working, such as market traders and tourist service providers. Immediately after there was news of an epidemic and hamlets in north Jogja were busy establishing a lockdown, market activities immediately declined. Buyers were reluctant to come to the market, likewise some traders in Pakem Market. But this situation only lasted three days. After that one by one the traders began to open their stalls and buyers also began to come although in numbers that were not that many.

The cleanliness of the environment at the market was far from satisfactory, each transaction always produces rubbish which is temporarily kept by the sellers – or sometimes just strewn about. The density of people in the market is also very high. The market managers and the traders very much understand how these conditions have great potential to spread the epidemic. They imposed an order as best as they can by following health protocols: providing water for hand washing with soap, keeping a distance between stalls so as avoid jostling. Perhaps because it is indeed normal, although there were announcements that buyers form a queue which is distanced in an extended line, they kept crowding and jostling. Traders know this breaks the health protocol but they are reluctant to supervise the buyers whose numbers are far fewer than on normal days.

"If I supervise them, they would not be happy rather just shift to another trader", explained one of the vegetable traders. A coconut milk trader made clear: "It's difficult Uncle, there's no need to organize this and that, the buyers are already very few. If supervised they would instead not stay".

Apart from the trading in the market, there are many sellers of vegetables and everyday essentials who sell moving through the local area. They depart for the market at 3.30am, buying from large traders, then at 7am are roaming from hamlet to hamlet which have become customers. Roaming sellers (*bakul eyek*) are often assessed by the hamlet managers as having high potential to become spreaders of the epidemic, and their movements are confined to the hamlet entrance. When trading at the hamlet entrance, the sellers' behaviors are in fact no different to the time prior to the epidemic. Although many buyers wear masks, they keep crowding to get served first. When I asked about the risk of being infected with the virus when selling, a female seller gave a very pragmatic answer that the choice she faced was to sit quietly at home and the certainty of no income or keep making efforts to conduct business in the market with the possibility of being exposed to the virus: "Yes, I choose to do business Uncle so as to still have an income, to the extent possible I follow the health protocols and hopefully will stay safe."

A business sector which has truly come to a standstill, struck by the corona epidemic, is the tourist sector experienced by the majority of the population of Dusun Kaliurang. For almost the last 10 years, since the 2010 Mount Merapi eruption subsided, the Kaliurang community enjoyed a new source of livelihood which was quite rewarding in the form of the Merapi lava tourist travel service using open top jeeps. The tourist response to this service was clearly very good and the demand continued to go up. Within five years from commencement, travel tourists, who were only served by several jeeps jumped to 800 jeeps, which were organised into the Kaliurang and Cangkringan groups. On holidays, tourism services could get up to 800 million rupiah per day and became a very good source of income for the population. A jeep driver could enjoy an income of around 2.5 million rupiah per month which was often added to by tips from passengers. While the jeep owners could get more than this total.

In their reflections, the 2010 Merapi eruption which was rather terrifying was the opening for a new livelihood which was greater than the previous period. Until 2010 one of the sources of income of the majority of the Kaliurang population was from keeping milk

cows – which was begun by their older generation from 1955 with support from the Livestock Office. Milk cows provided a steady daily income, because in general each household kept at least three cows. Grass for feed was collected from the fields on the slopes of Merapi, up to two hours walk from the hamlet. The milk was sold collectively to the SGM processing factory in Yogyakarta via a livestock cooperative. Due to the income from these cows, many Kaliurang residents have been able to school their children until reaching academies and tertiary institutions. In 1996 this enterprise was dealt a heavy blow by a Merapi eruption which burnt down the Animal Husbandry Office's centre of excellence for cow management and some of the grass fields on the slopes of the mountain. After the eruption subsided the livestock farmers returned to continue their business with a reduced number of livestock – because of the shrinking of the grass field. Some of the population left to transmigrate to South Sumatra. Another blow to the livestock farmers occurred when Merapi erupted again in 2006, some of the grass was again burned and covered in lava. The heaviest blow occurred when the 2010 Merapi eruption burned almost all the grass field on the mountain slope. After that a large number of the livestock farmers sold their cows and shifted to a business of tourist jeeps. “Now our cows have diesel for food, no longer grass...ha ha ha”, joked a young male Kaliurang jeep driver.

The banter and happiness of the jeep tourist service suppliers were stopped by the corona epidemic. Upon the news of the epidemic spreading at the end of March the Sleman Regency Government immediately tourist activity in Kaliurang. The area was not closed, people still could come but tourist services were suspended in the interest of everyone's health. The suspension of tourist services immediately made Kaliurang quiet and the income of tourist service suppliers felt to nothing to the end of June. Without work, the Kaliurang tourist service providers were forced to sit idly. When I asked whether they had other activities, their answer was: “Yes, just rolling around like a melon brother”. They just shifted about a little without producing anything. When I asked the jeep owner what their situation was, their answer was even more affecting: “My God bleeding from the nose, hemorrhaging brother”. Without the income from tourist activities, to continue living is by government assistance programs, using savings and if in a tight corner by loans from friends. The situation of Kaliurang jeep drivers is rather different to the Cangkringan jeep drivers. In Cangkringan many jeep drivers transitioned to become sand minders in Adem River located at the edge of the village.

After Lebaran, with the circulating of the term ‘new normal’ in the mass media and social media, the Kaliurang community was divided in its opinion. The East Kaliurang group held to an idea of closing Kaliurang to tourists. The West Kaliurang group stated it wanted to re-open tourist services. Because there was no meeting point, each group proceed with its own plan. The result was the entry to east Kaliurang was closed by the residents, while the route to west Kaliurang remained open. But two weeks later the road blockade in the east was dismantled, perhaps because the residents observed that even without a blockade Kaliurang remained without visitors.

The differences of view also occurred in the tourist jeep supply circles. The implementation of the health protocols from the the Tourist Office, each jeep was only allowed to carry three passengers, not the usual four. The cost of the jeep was also reduced by 20 percent. In early August when one or two groups of tourists began to come to Kaliurang they objected to one jeep having only three people. One of the reasons was that often four people comprised a family and they did not want to be separated, or leave one of the family in the jeep terminal. The result was the drivers were forced to make an adjustment, for a jeep to carry four passengers. But this adjustment made other passengers, who were not family, jealous. Weary of debating with passengers who were still rare, the drivers finally chose to return to the old pattern of one jeep of four passengers.

In the third week of August, the community had a long holiday of a week, from Independence Day on the 17th followed two days later by the Muslim New Year. At the time the government had relaxed the travel permissions, and as a consequence hundreds of cars streamed out of Jakarta and other large cities bringing carrying millions of passengers home or to take a tour to another destination. The week progressed as a Lebaran replacement holiday in July which had been cancelled by the epidemic. In the third week of August Yogyakarta was flooded with tourists. The sky about the city which in the previous four months seemed clean, in several days was made purple again by carbon from car exhaust pipes. Kaliurang also felt the flood of tourists. Tourist jeeps which were previously idle in this week were in high demand. A driver posted his feelings of amazement on his WA group “Gee have we really returned to a normal situation?”. Money flowed into Kaliurang. “Essentially yep like Lebaran, the guest are many”, a food stall owner said. However, the flood of money only continued for a week, after which the situation contracted. Two weeks later even the government broadcast that the epidemic infection figures had rapidly increased and Kaliurang

tourist activities had officially closed again. Jeep drivers no longer came, leave groups of cyclists, motor bike riders and the community around Jogja to come to Kaliurang providing some livelihood for the food stall owners.

This analysis above shows how in community circles those who work with providing tourist and trade services, residents' geographical mobility restrictions became a threat to the continuation of their economic activities. Here the relations of power of government and the hamlet managers to overcome the epidemic by closing tourist destinations or slowing market movements coming face to face with residents' most basic relations, that is relations of the fulfillment of life needs. In the relations of the fulfillment of life needs a mechanism of demand and supply proceeds. Women who are subject to hamlet lockdown need everyday essentials, roaming vegetable sellers provide supplies. In the tourist sector, this mechanism brought together the needs of the food stall owners to obtain an income with the needs of residents for free space as compensation for work and being isolated at home. This meeting of two requirements went ahead in a zone of relations of life which were fundamental and regulations which were very difficult to penetrate, because people were urged to operationalize any means so these basic needs were met. Underlying the regime of controlling the epidemic, the fulfillment of fundamental relations went on in a grey social zone, between legally mandated regulations and morals to preserve the continuation of life.

CONCLUSION: A FAILED DISCIPLINING

The earlier discussion shows how the operating of the relations of power in overcoming the spread of the coronavirus in Yogyakarta lost its energy. If looked at again, the disciplining of residents as the aim of an approach of power, thus the mission of the application of the relations of power in the first six months of the pandemic in the city was unsuccessful. Even when strengthened by those who held power in the hamlets, the relations of power operationalized by the government remained unsuccessful in disciplining residents. The first obstacle came from agents of local power whose relations of power were weakened by the government's steps, and the second obstacle came from the clash between the relations of power with physiological, psychological and biological relations of power – in other words economic and social pressure – in residential circles. On paper, the resistance could be overcome by the accommodation of these competing interests, but these matters brought consequences of payments and regulations which it seems

could not be met by the government. Lockdowns or the closing of areas, as exemplified by the closure of hamlet areas on their own, clearly was very fragile because the sponsors of hamlet closures had no strength to bear the consequence of this policy. They could only give orders but were not able to cover the economic and social costs of these orders.

Returning to the paradox of community behavior in facing the pandemic, where they were alert when it was more present as news and distant experience but contrarily indifferent and as if without care when it was visibly present: the infection of neighbours and relatives. Usually, people feel afraid of facts and close experience, not news and distant experience. For the north Jogja community, the pandemic first arrived as a flood of news, which gave rise to moral panic rather than close experience. The flow of news was also directly followed by the operating of relations of power that limited residents' movements. When the pandemic truly arrived and became a close experience, residents were already fatigued with the approach of power. They were ostensibly unconcerned and indifferent toward the threat of the disease, because their sensitivities to the dangers were blunted by the relations of power. Rather than make people vigilant, the approach of power instead made people lose sensitivity and become indifferent to the threat. Considering the gravity of the coronavirus, an alternative approach that is socially more effective needs to be immediately formulated.

Technically, the closure of an area and quarantining it is a social solution that is quite effective in facing the danger of a pandemic spreading via humans. The problem of the closure of the hamlets in Yogyakarta in the early months of the coronavirus pandemic was that it was not directed at a clear target and without certainty of a time limit, consequently giving rise to boredom and heavy economic consequences for residents. The hamlet lockdowns were no different to shooting a fly which may not be present with a cannon. More damage occurs than benefits that clearly can be selected. In this case, Javanese relativity of "it may be like that but don't be like that" (*ngono ya ngono ning aja ngono*) perhaps can become a reference: the closure of the hamlet can be done, but must be selective, rather than arbitrarily closed moreover only as the execution of the relations of power. The limited closure of the area and this field since October has become a discourse in Indonesia. A micro lockdown, thus is the trendy term, is only directed at the environment and field of activity in which one of the residents is indeed infected and treated until the infection has been managed, while in the area other activities of

life go on as normal, following health protocols. A further observation is needed to examine the effectiveness of the approach and resistance, as with other things emerging within the community.

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ENDNOTES

- 1) The Javanese proverb *sabet jaran, dhupak bujang, printah lurah, semon mantri, esem bupati* has various versions, but its meaning is more or less the same, a horse trainer commands with the whip, a foreman with a kick, a village head with direct order, a senior official with a parable, for the regency head it is sufficient to smile and utter a few sentences (Poesponingrat, 2008).
- 2) After spreading from Malang to every corner of Java from 1911 and taking 81,599 lives, finally in 1922 the pest plague arrived in the Jogja rural area. In Kaliurang in 1924 there were 10 victims, and in 1929, when there was an improved cleanup of housing there was still one more victim, a young Dutch woman who died (Otten, 1924: 241; Bataviaasch, 19-01-1925; Het Nieuws, 02-01-1925; 04-11-1929).
- 3) A fear so real was awakened by various social scenes which inevitably forced people to accept the existence of the threat. Based on my observations in April my hamlet community and those surrounding it were assailed by a moral panic. They experienced an extraordinary fear as a result taking an illogical attitude, a consequence of a threat of something which considered real. The fear which spread through all levels of the community is related to the observations of P.M. Laksono (2020) who took steps to calm people by inviting them sing the poem "Abate the Plague" ("Sirep Pageblug"). Certainly those who were made calm were made so by this poem not the corona virus, but mankind assailed by fear, terror and panic.
- 4) 'Main api' (playing with fire) is my translation of the concept *deep play* proposed by Jeremy Bentham (1871: 106) and operationalised by Clifford Geertz (1973) to analyse cockfighting in Bali. In Indonesian the concept of *deep play* is usually translated literally as 'permainan mendalam', but I feel 'main api' is a more accurate translation.
- 5) Suci Rejeki Musola was erected in 1993 as a hamlet public

facility, the cost of construction was met by the residents but not with an exclusively religious perspective. Apart from being used for the five daily prayers the musola is also for residents' meetings, women's social gatherings, patrolling, sport, children's games, independence day, and also marriages.

- 6) Pertana. 2020. DetikNews.

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