THE IMPROVEMENT OF KAMPONG AS AN INSTRUMENT TO MITIGATE FLOODS IN SURABAYA

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ABSTRACT

The improvement of kampong – a residential area Inhabited mostly by the lower class in a town or city - was one of the efforts to prevent flood in the city of Surabaya. The effort was not only related to its contribution to minimize the flood but it also had many aspects. The serious attention to kampong improvement from the Dutch colonial government only appeared in the second decade of the 20th century. When the city of Surabaya was occupied by Japanese troops from March 8th, 1942 until the independence revolution, the attention to the kampong improvement stopped and many kampongs were destroyed by the war. An effort to restore them resumed in 1950s when everything returned to normal. To intensify the program of kampong improvement, the W.R. Supratman project was launched following the establishment of Kampong Improvement Project (KIP). One of the criteria to determine a kampong that needed to be restored is whether it was always flooded or not. Nevertheless, the kampong improvement did not really solve the flood problem thoroughly. However, an evaluation shows that this project has made a significant contribution to minimizing the flood in the city of Surabaya.

Keywords: flood, kampong improvement, Surabaya


Kata Kunci: banjir, perbaikan kampung, Surabaya

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INTRODUCTION

Long before the Dutch colonial administration had control over this region, Surabaya had grown and become one of the important cities in Nusantara (the Indonesian archipelago). It was developed when H.W. Daendels became the Governor General of the Netherlands East Indies (January 5th, 1808 – May 15th, 1811). During the period of this 36th Governor General, Surabaya was made to be a small European city. It had been developed into a trade and port city. Various kinds of city infrastructures were built, such as Post Highway (Grote Postweg) connecting Java Island’s northern coast cities, extending from Anyer to Panarukan (Handinoto, 1996:36-37; Husain, 2010:16).

Nevertheless, Surabaya, one of the big cities in Nusantara, that is divided by the Mas River, surrounded by other smaller rivers is always flooded. The flood is not a new phenomenon. In his two books published in 1931 and 1936, G.H. von Faber revealed that every year Surabaya faced flood whenever the Brantas River and its streams overflowed. Therefore, an advisory commission was established in 1811. This commission suggested three solutions to mitigate the flood in the city of Surabaya, i.e. (1) widening of Porong River to channel the water of Brantas River in order that it does not flow into the rivers in Surabaya, (2) making canals, gutters, and drainage; and (3) directing the water from the city rivers to the floodgate of Wonokromo through Wonokromo canal. The canal that is often called the Jagir River was built in 1856 and completed in 1898 (Faber, 1936:169).

Meanwhile, there are several causes leading to floods taking place during the post-colonial era. They are, among others things, high rainfall commonly in of January and February, the silting up of drainage and boezem Morokembangan that were built by the Dutch administration, the sedimentation of the Mas River, the so-many illegal shelters along the river banks, the blockage of drainage due to the garbage accumulation, and the breakage of a number of pumps (Dick, 2002:226-227). Nevertheless, based on the earlier sources obtained, the floods that took place in the 20th century were much worse than those in the previous period.

Since the colonial era, efforts to solve the flood have been made. They are, among others things, normalizing rivers, building drainage, improving the existing drainage, providing water pumps, improving kampongs, etc. Kampong improvement as one of the efforts to solve the flood in the city of Surabaya is an interesting point to notice because it is not only related to how significant it is to solve the problem but the project also has something to do with many aspects. During the colonial era, for instance, kampong improvement, more popularly called kampung verbetering, faced the problems of not only the limited fund but also the land status of the respective kampongs. Therefore, in addition to being aimed at discovering the contribution of kampong improvement from one period to another, the flood mitigation in the city of Surabaya, this article is also aimed at discovering several aspects related to problems that have existed since the colonial era up to the present. This article is divided into five parts, i.e. (1) kampongs improvement during the colonial era; (2) kampongs during the Japanese occupation and independence revolution; (3) kampongs improvement between 1950 and 1965; (4) kampong improvement after 1965 until the establishment of W.R Supratan Project and KIP-Urban; and (5) kampong improvement and flood.

LIMITED IMPROVEMENT: KAMPONG IMPROVEMENT DURING THE COLONIAL ERA

Between the end of 19th century and 20th century, a number of kampongs inhabited by the native people of the city were susceptible to flood.1 The attention that the colonial administration paid to the condition of kampongs in Indonesia, including the ones in Surabaya, first appeared in the second decade of 20th century. According to Amir Karamoy, it was not clear why the colonial administration suddenly paid attention to the lives of kampong people. However, it was assumed that it was related to the development of political ethics in The Netherlands. Another assumption was that the healthy kampong was very important for the colonial society, was of primary importance for the colonial administration itself (Karamoy, 1984:25).
Such an assumptions, particularly the latter, is understandable because in the second decade of 20th century there were so many epidemic diseases overwhelming the city, especially malaria and bubonic plague. For example, in March 1915, the gemeente of Surabaya ordered to unload a kampong in Kali Mas SS (Staatsspoor) that infected plague epidemic. As a substitute, a new kampong was established in the area. According to the city administration, the unload of the kampong was the only way to wipe the plague out of the area (Pewarta Soerabaya, 26-3-1915). In January the following year, eleven people or so, including one European, were found infected by the plague disease. Five of them finally died (Pewarta Soerabaya, 7; 15 and 24-1-1916).

To prevent several diseases from becoming epidemics and to maintain the health of people, it was in 1916 that Plaatselijk en Gezondheidsidents-P.G.D. (Local Health Agency), a part of the Provincial Health Agency of East Java, was established (Tantri, 2010:52; Faber, 1936:289). Following the eradication of diseases in 1920, the kampong improvement in the city of Surabaya was programmed in 1924 by allocating f600,000 for repairing drainage and water channels. In the following year (1925), a more systematic kampong improvement began to be implemented by building new drainage, bathrooms, water pump stations, and public washing spots and toilets. To finance all these repairs and constructions, the city administration allocated f100,000 annually (Faber, 1936:156; Silas, 1982:9).

A more perfect kampong improvement was also implemented by the city administration after the issuance of guidelines made by the Technical Division and People Health Agency (Technische Afdeeling van de Dienst der Volksgezondheid) in 1927. The guidelines stated that a half of the improvement cost would be provided by the agency. The improvement made during this period comprised of two things. The first was the drainage improvement. The improvement was made up of the installation or construction of new drainage connected with the existing drainage in the city. The improvement did not only deal with the kampong drainage but also with bathrooms, washing spots, and toilets. The second was the road improvement. The improvement was in the form of dividing the road for vehicles and pavement (Faber, 1936:156). The kampong improvement was only limited to the kampongs belonging to the “government”, but did not cover the kampongs situated on private land although the kampongs were located on the gemeente area. The improvement of kampongs situated on private land was the responsibility of the land owner. However, the government encouraged the land owner to make any improvement.

In addition to the cost, another constraint gemeente faced in improving kampongs was that there were so many autonomous kampongs under the authority of the city administration. In other words, there was dualism in managing the region. According to von Faber, the idea to abolish autonomy kampongs had been long in the mind of gemeente. Still, because of being absorbed in improving the kampongs under their authority, gemeente could not manage to realize the abolishment (Faber, 1936:162). To the city administration, the unification in management would make it easier to handle the dirty and unhealthy environment. However, this effort was challenged by the people, including those belonging to volksraad. In view of the native people, such unification was just an effort of gemeente to show how they work for the native people. In addition, they were suspicious about this effort as a means of increasing the city income by charging various taxes (Basundoro, 2013:258; Swara Oemoem, 15: 25-10-1930; Swara Oemoem, 15-11-1930). A number of challenges from the people ended with the issuance the government decision No. 21, dated October 21, 1930 and it was effective as of January 1, 1931. With this decision, all kampongs were managed by gemeente Surabaya. The decision also ended the dualism in managing kampongs that had been in existence in the city of Surabaya (Silas, 1982:10; Faber, 1936:162).

Meanwhile, 590 hectares of government kampongs and 100 hectares of private ones had been improved until 1931. The kampong drainage and sanitation improvement was made to be taken into the main priority. In 1932, the work began by improving the area located between two riverbanks, i.e. the one located on Citadel Straat and Handel Straat. It covered an area of 69 hectares, in
which two large kampongs were located, i.e. Ampel and Nyamplungan. It cost around £283,940 to improve the area (Faber, 1936:161).

**KAMPONG AND ITS IMPROVEMENT DURING POST COLONIAL ERA UNTILL 1965**

During the Japanese occupation, the kampung improvements carried out by the Dutch colonial government actually stopped. On the contrary, efforts to face the coming war were intensively made. What they did was not related to activities to improve city facilities. They focused on strengthening defense by digging land for protecting themselves from bomb attack (*Soeara Oemoem*, 22-1-1941; 24-8-1941). Pada saat pendudukan Jepang, perbaikan kampung yang dilakukan oleh pemerintah kolonial Belanda benar-benar berhenti.

From Japanese occupation until the independence revolution (Frederick, 1986:115), all efforts to improve kampongs stopped completely. In addition On the contrary, a lot of kampongs were damaged by because of the war. One of the kampongs that was were badly damaged by because of the war was Wonokromo. Before the Netherlands began the war against Japan, Wonokromo had been prepared to be a very sturdy as a defense area. According to an analysis, the southern part of the village would become the entrance for the Japanese troops into the city of Surabaya. Therefore, a hundred of people’s houses located in Wonokromo, stretching from the west of the bridge to Karangredjo and extending for about 1,500 meters in length, were scorched earth. The people of the respective area were removed to safer places. After the war was over, they moved back to the area of Wonokromo but they could not find their houses since they had been leveled to the ground. Therefore, they built shacks along both sides of Brantas River on the west of the bridge to shelter. Consequently, the kampung of Wonokromo turned into a dirty area. Before the war, it was not so damaged (*Harian Umum*, 4-8-1950).

In addition to the aftermath of war, the destruction of kampong was also caused by the fast population growth. In 1950, the population of Surabaya was 714,898 people. By the end of 1950s, the population of Surabaya had almost reached up to nearly 1 million people. According to Silas, the people of low economic level contributed mostly to the population growth. One of the consequences was that the kampongs kept growing. They were getting wider and wider because of the emergence of “illegal kampongs” and the population density as well. However, such a condition was not accompanied with the ability of the city government to serve the growing number of people because of the limited budget (Silas, 1982:13).

In the condition of limited budget, the government, under the coordination of City Public Work Agency, was making a kampung improvement little by little in the context of emergency measures. The improvement was not only made by the government but also by the people in a more limited scale. In 1950, for example, the city government was planning to improve a number of kampongs, such as Gubeng, Klingsingan, Ketandan, Kebangsren, Keputran, and Pacarkembang. All those kampongs cover an area of 17.50 hectares. The budget allocated to improve them was Rp 600,000,-. In addition to improving kampongs, the government also allocated some fund to buy the land for the construction of drainage in Greges, PlasoBogen, Oro-oro, Gersikan, karanggayam, and Pacarkembang. All the land needed for the construction of drainage was about 100 hectares (*Suara Rakjat*, 28-4-1951). However, because of the limited budget, several new kampongs were just improved in the following year.

Meanwhile, in the 1952 Kampung Improvement Plan proposed by the City Public Work Agency, in that time headed by Ir. Tan GioknTjiauw, the kampongs that were in need of improvement covered an area of 1,000 hectares or so. The number of them was 76 kampongs. Of all those kampongs, 27 of them, an area of about 408.77 hectares, were found standing on the land belonging to the private. It cost between Rp 40,000,00 and Rp 50,000,00 to improve one hectare of the area. The cost did not include the one for making the main drainage and supporting drainages. It was estimated that the budget allocated for the kampung improvement was
Rp 2,000,000,00 annually. Therefore, it was not impossible to complete the kampong improvement project in 20 years.7

Another constraint that made the kampong improvement hard to realize was related to the land purchase. The land would be used for making drainage and roads. A lot of large areas were not equipped with the main drainage for water sewage. In addition, it was really difficult to improve the land without its “verhang” and the one located on lower parts. To realize it well, “hemaling” equipped with electric water pumps was needed (Obor Surabaya, 12-9-1952).

It seemed that such constraints did not make the people of the area withdraw their obsession to have their kampong improved. It was proven with the so many proposals submitted by the people living in the kampongs both on the land belonging to the government and private. The people whose kampong was written on the list of the 1952 Urgent Kampong Improvement could not wait to have their kampong improved. On the other hand, those whose kampong was not included on the list kept on submitting proposals to the government to have their kampong improved soon.

In addition to the problem of limited budget, the kampong improvement also faced another problem related to the status of the land. According to the government, it was the land owners who were responsible for the improvement of the kampong situated on private land. Meanwhile, they did not have enough money for the kampong improvement because they could not make any money from their land. It was the case after, especially, AMACAB (Allied Military Administration Civil Affairs Branch) did not allow the private land owners to ask the people living on houses built on their land to pay for the rent.8

What happened to the kampong of Plemahan was a case example. It was situated on the private land belonging to N.V. Bouw-en Handel Maatschappij, The GiokNio, Kembang Djepoen 74. The case first emerged when the people of Plemahansubmitted a proposal for their kampong improvement to the City Government through the City Public Work Agency. In response to this proposal, the mayor of the city of Surabaya in that time, Doel Arnowo, ordered the head of Pamong Pradja along with RT (Rukun Tetangga/Neighborhood Association) to make an investigation whether the land owners charged for the rent or not so that they were not able to make any improvement for their kampong.9

In response to the request of the mayor, the head of the City Development Agency, an agency in charge of private land in the city of Surabaya, proposed three points: (1) to keep the people living in the area healthy, it was necessary to do the area cleaning and the maintenance of the existing drainage; (2) based on the Regulations of Building Structures, article 3, N.V. Bouwen Handel Maatschappij, The GiokNio, the owners of the land, were ordered to do the area cleaning and the maintenance of the drainage located on the respective kampong; and (3) the Municipality would be responsible for the cost of the works. Nevertheless, they were charged for the compensation that had to be paid every month.10

Based on the suggestions of the City Development Agency, on December 6th, 1950, the City Mayor eventually sent a letter to N.V. Bouwen Handel Maatschappij, The GiokNio, the owners of the private land, stating that they had to do the area cleaning and the maintenance of the drainage located on the respective kampong. However, they had an objection to do the instruction of the mayor because all private land owners did not get any income from their land. They were prohibited by AMACAB to charge for the rent from the people living in houses on their land. Therefore, the land owners requested that the area cleaning and the maintenance of the drainage on the private land should be implemented and financed by the city government or the people living in houses in that kampong.11

The case of the kampong of Plemahan situated on private land also happened in other kampongs. Based on the letter of the head of the City Public Work Agency and it was sent to the chairman of DPD of Surabaya Metropolitan dated January 30th, 1952, there were 27 kampongs, an area of about 408.77 hectares, being situated on private land. The list of kampongs situated on private land is shown on Table 1 as follows.
Table 1
Kampongs Situated on Private Land and In Need of Improvement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Name of Kampong</th>
<th>Land Width (ha)</th>
<th>Estimated Cost of Improvement (Rp)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Muteran</td>
<td>1.601</td>
<td>64,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Gedong-Banger</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>68,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Kalibutah</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>156,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Plemahan DS</td>
<td>42.27</td>
<td>1,891,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Bagong</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>97,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Dinsujo</td>
<td>3.80</td>
<td>772,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Blauran (Gg. I-II)</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>34,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Srengganan (Gg. I, II, III, Kidul)</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>42,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Kepatihan (Gg. IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, X, Pasar Besar Wetan Gg. II and T. Bejan Gg. IV)</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Gembongsarswie</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Krembangan-Tengah</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>28,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Kalongan-Sajang</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Bibis Pasarean</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Kalisari Gg. III</td>
<td>*)</td>
<td>26,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Kalianjar Buntu I, II</td>
<td>*)</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Kalongan-Kidul</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>38,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Krembangan-Kidul</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>16,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Kp. Dukuh Gg. Buntu</td>
<td>*)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Djuwingan Manjar</td>
<td>35.56</td>
<td>1,426,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Kulon Menur, Kalibokor</td>
<td>4.80</td>
<td>192,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Djittis, Karango, Korowelang, Pulo</td>
<td>68.35</td>
<td>2,734,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Wonokromo DS, Kedungjar, Kedungkromo</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Patempon, Banjo-urip DS.</td>
<td>162.56</td>
<td>6,502,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Pandjuan DS.</td>
<td>17.70</td>
<td>708,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Blauran Kidul</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Kembangkuning</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>88,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Gunungmali, Pulosari, Karangan, Wonoktri, and Pakis</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1,320,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *) Road improvement only
Source: "Urgent Plan for Kampong Improvement" in the Archive of Surabaya Metropolitan (1950-1957), Volume 1, No. 322; Obor Surabaya, 5-8-1952

As it has been stated above, the number of kampongs, situated on both the government and private land, that needed to be improved was of imbalance with the financial support from the government. Therefore, the city government ordered the City Public Work Agency to make urgent plans on kampong improvement in 1952. They would submit the proposal to DPRDS for approval. After undergoing intensive talks between the City Government and DPRDS, through its decision dated August 27th, 1952, DPRDS made an agreement to improve eight kampongs in 1952. Those eight kampongs that were in need of improvement were included on Table 2.

The kampongs that were declared to have been completely improved are listed from numbers one to four on Table two. Nevertheless, several newspapers reported that the improvement of the kampongs Kketandan and Kebangar, located between Tunjungan Street/Tanjunganom and Embong Malang, was just started in the second week of June 1953. Meanwhile, the improvement of the kampongs listed from numbers two to four reached up to between 30% and 95% till June 1953 (Pewarta Soerabaia, 18-6-1953; Suara Masjarakat, 19-6-1953; Java Post, 19-6-1953). This fact shows that the coordination among institutions of the City Administration of Surabaya was weak, particularly the one involving the City Public Work Agency, DPDS (Dewan Pemerintah Daerah Sementara/Provincial Regional Administration Board), DPRDS (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Daerah Sementara/Provincial Regional House of Representatives) of the city of Surabaya.

Under certain circumstances, the kampong improvement could not solve the problem thoroughly, especially if the source of the problem dealt with drainage, like the one happening in Greges River. Such a condition was revealed in the letter forwarded to DPDS KBS from the head of the City Public Work Agency. It revealed that...
the condition of the kampong Kedondong Kidul was dependent on the uncompleted normalization project of Greges River. Therefore, the kampong improvement was considered ineffective despite the improvement of the kampong drainage but without the incomplete project of the normalization of Greges River. Considering that the project was not completed in a short time, the City Public Work Agency suggested that it was necessary to make an emergency improvement at the kampong Kedondong Kidul to prevent worse situations from happening. The motion was agreed by the city government of Surabaya by allocating the fund of Rp 36,000,00.¹³

Unlike the kampong Kedondong Kidul whose improvement received immediate attention, it took longer time, between one and two years, to improve several other kampongs. It was due to not only the limited budget but also the weak coordination among the city government institutions. The weak coordination was shown with the case of drainage improvement and road construction at the kampongs Wonorejo I and Wonorejo III. On the case of kampong improvement of Wonorejo III, for example, the city government had to send a letter of warning five times to the Head of City Public Work Agency. In another word, it took about eight months for the city government to get the kampong improvement plan confirmed (September 21, 1953 – May 25, 1954). It was interesting to note that the reply the Head of the City Public Work Agency sent eight months later did not show any regret. In his reply, the Head of the City Public Work Agency revealed that the kampong improvement of Wonorejo could not be implemented because of other projects that needed more attention, such as the market development project of Wonokromo Baru and kampong improvement projects in line with the urgency 1952 that was approved by DPRDS. In addition to the reason mentioned above, the City Public Work Agency was also puzzled because there was a pressure to improve kampong Patemon of which the condition was much worse than that of Wonorejo. However, Patemon belonged to private kampong.¹⁴

Meanwhile, the people of several kampongs did the community self-help to prevent their kampongs from being in poorer condition even though they had submitted proposals several times for the improvement of their kampongs but there was no response to their proposals. This is like what the people from the kampong of Kedunganjar did. Between 1950 and 1957, they were submitting their proposals several times to the municipality to receive some attention for their kampong improvement. However, no response was accepted till 1957. Therefore, with the help of several benefactors, they did the community self-help by undergoing the road improvement. They spent Rp 5,500,00 on it (Harian Umum, 25-6-1957).

On the other hand, according to Silas, the condition of kampongs by the change of the decades from 1950s to 1960s kept decreasing and was getting worse and worse. He saw that such a condition was aggravated by the political situation of the time that was signed with the friction of power balance. There was a tendency that the city government let people from villages come into the city without any obstruction. There was a strong assumption that they were purposefully invited to come for political interest. They were expected to vote for a certain political party (Silas, 1982:14). Silas also added that until mid.1960s the condition of the settlement of people with low income was getting worse. Indeed, it was made so intentionally. It was clearly seen, he said, from the emergence of illegal settlement along both large and small drainage, parks, fields, and uncontrolled buildings. Such a condition reached the peak when there was a riot breaking, popularly called G 30 S/PKI. The poor condition began to withdraw in early 1966 (Silas, 1982:14).

KAMPONG IMPROVEMENT OF THE POST 1965: FROM THE DEMOLITION OF ILLEGAL BUILDINGS AND SETTLEMENT, W.R. SUPRATMAN PROJECT TO KIP-URBAN

After all efforts to improve kampongs were experiencing stagnation by the decade change from 1950s to 1960s till the affair of G 30 S/PKI, the city life was gradually recovered. For three years since then, all recovery activities were focused on the demolition and condemnation of illegal buildings and shelters. Those living in the shelter located on open spaces that were supposed to be for public
facilities, paths for fire emergency (brandgang), river banks, and drainage were forced to demolish their own buildings. Otherwise, they would be demolished by civil service.

After the instruction of the Mayor, Lieutenant Colonel Sukotjo, was released, all houses, buildings, and shops built on both sides of Peneleh River were demolished by civil service that were guarded by the state apparatus (Suluh Indonesia, 5-2-1966). The demolition had to be implemented because those buildings were illegally erected or had no permit from the city administration. In addition to having no permit, many buildings were found to have their foundation planted into the land of river bank and that it blocked the water flow in the river (Suluh Indonesia, 4-5-1966).

Nevertheless, according to Silas, because of so many illegal shelters and buildings that were found in every corner of the city and they had been in existence since 1950s, many of them were not demolished. They were even made legal by improving them and implementing the process of obtaining the legal document for the land (Silas, 1982:14).

Kampong improvement was the one that was felt by most people. For the kampongs whose majority people had enough income, the kampong improvement project was implemented by applying self-supporting basis. In other words, all cost was the responsibility of local people. Meanwhile, for the kampongs whose majority people earned a little, a program called W.R. Supratman Project was launched in 1969 (Liberty, 1978:21, 1984:26).

To improve the program quality, the Kampung Improvement Project (KIP) Urban II was established in 1976/1977. Unlike the W.R. Supratman Project that relied on the participation of people and the city government for its fund, KIP Urban II used the fund from APBN (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara/National Budget), APBD I (Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Daerah I/ Provincial Budget), APBD II(Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja DaerahII/ City Budget), and soft loan with low interest from the World Bank. With the presence of the KIP Urban II, it did not mean that the W.R. Supratman Project was terminated. It remained to be going on, particularly in the kampongs whose people could afford to finance up to 50 percent. Meanwhile, KIP Urban II took the priority over the people with low income and the ones who could not afford to provide fund up to half of the fund required (Kompas, 26-5-1992).

In the first year (1976-1977) of the KIP Urban II Program, the improvement was implemented in four kampongs, namely TembokDukuh, Kalibutuh, GubengKlingsingan-Gubeng Masjid, and Karangrejo with the total fund of Rp 500,000,000. KIP Urban II ended in 1979 and continued with KIP Urban III between 1979 and 1983. No KIP Urban IV was implemented, but then continued with KIP Urban V between 1987 and 1990. When KIP Urban V was completed, any activities related to kampong improvement also ended. However, according to SP Sardjono, the Head of Bappem (Badan Pelaksana Pembangunan / Development Implementing Board), the program of kampong improvement would be continued with the program of Surabaya Urban Development Project (SUDP) (Herlianto, 1988:4).

In 1996, the City Government of Surabaya again received some aid from the World Bank amounting to seven billion rupiah for the improvement of 17 kampongs. This aid was distributed through the sampling project of Kampung Improvement Project (KIP) Comprehensive. With this project, it was expected that by 2002 the environmental improvement for about 70 kampongs in Surabaya would have been completely implemented (Kompas, 24-7-1996).
KAMPONG IMPROVEMENT AND FLOOD

Considering that the people indeed felt the benefits of the kampong improvement program, many kampongs were waiting in line for it. Therefore, to decide which kampongs were in need of it was carried out tightly. In short, the selection process included: (1) the review of the existing land use and “outline plan Surabaya 1969”; (2) the observation of formation of housing arrangement and development program; (3) the classification of housing areas to “kampongs” and “non-kampongs”. (Kampong here is defined as a city settlement area with low physical standard and low social-economic condition of the people as well); (4) in each kampong, a survey on physical condition, people’s attitude toward improvement, age of kampong, and procurement of legal land; (5) and the extension of score especially the evaluation of physical condition. The rank of kampong was then chosen and based on three levels, i.e.: pioneer I with the scores of 40-60; pioneer II with the scores of 20-40; pioneer III with the score of lower than 20.

The score determination on a kampong was based on 14 criteria with the evaluation scale for each criterion, this is 1-3. Of those 14 criteria, flood is one of the four criteria with the highest weighing score, this is 3. In addition, according to ChusenChasbullah, Head of BAPPEM KIP (BadanPelaksana Pembangunan Program PerbaikanKampong/Board for the Development Organizer of Kampong Improvement Program) of the time, the kampongs that were prioritized to be improved were old kampongs situated on the region of 11 old sub-districts. Of all those kampongs situated on 11 sub-districts, the highest priority was given to the ones flooded every year, having less supply for drinking water, having high population density, having people with low income, and having inadequate buildings and public facilities (Chasbullah, 1982:163).

One of the kampongs with frequent flood problem was Kedungdoro. Before being improved through the program of UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program), Kedungdoro had also been improved through another version program, this is W.R. Supratman Project. Even though it had been improved, Kedungdoro was still flooded. A survey before the UNEP program was launched shows that 69 kampongs, 34% of the area, were still often flooded (Salam, 1982:128; Kompas, 6-8-1976). Because of that condition and its position in the central part of Surabaya, Kedungdoro unsurprisingly received the improvement program again.

As it has been stated before, one of the important criteria for a kampong to receive the improvement program was flood. However, the fund allocated for solving the flood was small. It ranked the fourth after roads for cars, paths, and drinking water. Big fund allocated mainly for the city flood solution was available on the KIP Urban III. Meanwhile, the fund allocated for the kampong flood solution was still small (Silas, 1982:294). However, even though the fund was small, the kampong improvement project was able to minimize the people’s suffering from flood that always happened in the kampong.
According to the evaluation made by Johan Silas, after the launching of the program KIP, 58.5% of the kampongs were declared to have been relatively freed from flood. The survey was even made during the rainy season with high rainfall (March). 48.8% of kampongs that was badly flooded decreased to 12.2% after the program KIP was implemented. The number of RWs free from flood increased from 12.2% to 46.3% after the program KIP was implemented (Silas, 1982:295). Johan Silas even added that before the program KIP was implemented, most kampongs in Surabaya were filled up with semi-permanent houses and soil roads without fixed and unclear design. During the rainy season, those roads were merged with gutter (Silas, 1982:295).

For the achievement made by the city of Surabaya in the kampong improvement program, several international appreciations were awarded. They were, among others, Aga Khan Award for Architecture (AKAA), given in 1986 for the kampong of Kebalen, International Council for Local Environment Initiative (ICLEI), given in 1991 as one of the world’s 11 cities considered having been successful in developing local initiatives (Budihardjo, 1987:55; Kompas, 12-10-1982). In addition to receiving several appreciations, Surabaya, through the KIP Model, was also taken as an example that was applied by Thailand and a number of African countries (Jawa Pos, 3-1-1986). 24

**CONCLUSION**

Flood is a problem that a lot of Indonesian kampongs face. Flood along with kampong dirtiness becomes the cause of epidemic for various diseases such as malaria and plague. In the early times of colonial administration in Surabaya, no serious handling was taken into consideration to the condition that frequently happened. This was due to the limited fund, so many kampongs that needed to be improved, and other various problems. Serious attention began to be paid in the second decade of XX century. In that time, the colonial administration began to provide fund through some program.

During the occupation of Japanese troops, all activities for improving kampong were on a real stop. On the contrary, any effort to face the coming war was intensively undertaken. When the city of Surabaya was really under the control of Japanese troops till the era of independence revolution, any attention paid to improving kampongs was on a real stop. On the contrary, quite a few kampongs were suffered from destruction because of the war. An effort to improve kampong began to be seriously done again in 1950s. But then, it stopped again by the time of decade change from 1950s to 1960s. After the political riot was over, especially the post-G 30 S/PKI, the city life was gradually recovered. For three years after the riot, all activities were focused on the demolition and condemnation of illegal buildings. Anyone occupying field for public facilities, paths for fire facility (brandgang), river banks, and drainage was forced to demolish his own building. Otherwise, it was the municipality officers who would demolish the building.

To intensify the kampong improvement program, in 1969 a program called W.R. Supratman was launched and followed by another one called Kampong Improvement Project (KIP). This project was aimed at helping the people improve and maintain their kampong by improving the physical environment and developing proper basic facilities. One of the criteria for a kampong to be improved in the project was whether it was flooded or not. In other words, kampongs that were flooded every year were given high priority. Under certain circumstances, kampong improvement could not solve the problem thoroughly. However, the evaluation made showed that the kampong improvement project contributed significantly to minimizing the flood in the city of Surabaya.

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Notes:

1. The same condition also happened to many kampongs in Semarang. According to Arief Akhyat, during the rainy season many kampongs were flooded and that the flood could lead to various diseases (see Akhyat, 2006:19).

2. Administratively, till the end of 1930 the area of Surabaya city was still under two authorities, i.e. *gemeente*, supervising *wijk*, and regency, supervising *inlandschgemeenten* or native people residing in kampongs and villages. In that time, there were 26 *wijken* and 29 villages, each of which was headed by a *wijkmeester* or *wijkhoofder* and a village chief. A *Wijkmeester* was responsible to the *burgemeester*. A Village chief was responsible to the regent (see Basundoro, 2013:256; Koesman and Pangestu, 1975:114).

3. Law of abolishing *InlandschGemeenten* Surabaya, also published in *Staatsblad van NederlandschIndie*, No. 373 Year 1931.

4. Anything related about Japanese Occupation in Indonesia can also be obtained in Aziz (1955).

5. For the 1952 budget, for example, the estimated expenditure is Rp 47,427,535.00. Meanwhile, the estimated income is only Rp 21,126,950. Thus, there is a lack of fund for Rp 26,300,585.00 (see *OborSurabaja*, 5-8-1952).

6. Keputran, Pacarkembang, and GubengKlingsingan are three kampongs in which the improvement was prepared in 1952, but realized in 1951. It spent Rp 97,300,00 to improve the kampong of GubengKlingsingan. At the same time, the improvement became an experiment project (see *Java Post*, 27-8-1951; *SuaraRakjat*, 25-8-1951; *SuaraRakjat*, 25-11-1951).


14. “Bundle of Kampong and Drainage Improvement in Wonorejo and Patemon” in the Archive of KBS (1950-1957), Volume I, No. 356. The weakness of the coordination between the city administration and its lower agencies is also identified in the case of the plan to improve the roads and gutter in the kampong of Tambakredjo. Since it was proposed long before, it was on August 31, 1953 that the plan was realized, found in the Archive of KBS (1950-1957), Volume I, No. 332.

15. The author, did not find strong data about the assumption of Johan Silas. Yet, in July 1957 in the city of Surabaya there was an election for the representatives of DPRD of the municipality. It was PKI that won the election with the total votes of 150,000, showing an increase of 24,000 votes compared to the ones at the constituent election. See *TrompetMasjarakat*, 7-8-1957.

16. The name is chosen as to remember the hero merit of arek Suroboyo (Surabaya’s guys). He is also well-known as the composer of the Indonesian anthem. In Surabaya, W.R. Supratman is used to name the project, XX in Jakarta it is called Muhammad Husni Thamrin Project. Muhammad Husni Thamrin used to be a hero from Jakarta (see *Kompas*, 28-9-1977; 27-11-1987).

17. From 1976/1977 to 1985/1986, Rp 9,857,418.00 was spent for the KIP Surabaya. 60% of the fund came from the World Bank, and the rest came from APBD I & II and APBN. The fund was used to finance the improvement of 69 kampongs in Surabaya, covering the area of 1,530,5 hectares.
There were 670,412 people receiving the benefits of the improvement project. The improvement included the construction of drainage of 375,065 meter in length, the construction of urung-urung of 154,172 meter in length, the construction of 81 roads, the construction of 33 bridges, the construction of 225 MCK (public toilets), the construction of drinking water canal with the length of 183,088 meter, the construction of 13 elementary schools and 10 public health centers (see Jawa Pos, 3-1-1986).

18 This program stopped for one year. In 2001 the program was continued by improving 15 kampongs by using the budget of 1998/1999 (see Kompas, 1-11-2000).

19 By the end of KIP-Urban III, there were still a lot of kampongs listed for improvement. According to the Head of Bappem KIP of Surabaya, Chusen Chasbullah, about 662,400 people occupying the kampongs with the area of 1,985 hectares were in need of the KIP. Meanwhile, a few people whom the daily Kompas met for an interview were fond of the KIP project. However, one of the local figures from Tambaksari, Su’ud, felt sorry that the implementation of KIP program was not evenly distributed to the whole kampongs. For example, the citizens of Gang Kapas Madya III, the city village of Gading, Sub-district of Tambaksari, kept waiting for the implementation of KIP project in their neighborhood (see Surabaya Post, 24-2-1982; Kompas, 26-6-1996).

20 Behind the success story of kampong improvement project in Surabaya lies the negative story as well. There was still illegal charge leading to the decreasing quality of construction. According to the Daily Kompas investigation, the decreasing quality of construction was caused by illegal charge done by persons from the city government. The charge reached up to 15-20% of the total cost of the project. To the Daily Kompas, several contractors that became the city government partnership said that such amount of illegal charge was common to make the project bid smooth to get and also to cash the fund for the project that had been completed. As a result, the contractors were reducing the quality of construction (see Kompas, 21-12-1988).