Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) among Islamists in Jakarta

A'an Suryana[1], Ismail Alviano[2], Ghulam Ruchma Algiffary[3], Bobi Arisandi[4]

[1] Faculty of Social Sciences (FOSS), Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), Indonesia.
(Corresponding author: aan.suryana@uiii.ac.id)
[2] Faculty of Social Sciences (FOSS), Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), Indonesia.
[3] POLTRACKING, Indonesia.
[4] Universitas Pamulang, Indonesia.

Abstract

Political intolerance—the unwillingness to accept the political freedom of those with differing views—has become an increasingly significant issue in Indonesia in recent years. The country began holding free and fair elections at the national level in 2004, with regional elections following shortly thereafter. Despite this progress, at least two surveys show that the level of political intolerance in Indonesia increased over time, peaking between 2017 and 2019. Several scholars have examined this issue in Indonesia through various perspectives, including online political intolerance. Others used the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) method to measure the level of intolerance among particular groups. This research aims to expand the scholarship on political intolerance by examining the SDO levels among Islamists in Greater Jakarta, and whether the SDO levels positively correlate with their political intolerance. Using an explanatory approach with quantitative statistical analysis and qualitative in-depth interviews, this study examines the relationship between SDO levels and political intolerance. This study involves 265 Islamists in the Greater Jakarta region. The findings show that there is a positive correlation between the SDO levels and political intolerance, confirming the findings of previous studies that political intolerance usually parallels, and is built up by, higher levels of SDO among individuals. This is the first large study to investigate the level of SDO among Islamists in Jakarta.

Keywords:

social dominance orientation; political intolerance; Islamist; Jakarta gubernatorial election

Introduction

Political intolerance —the unwillingness to accept the political freedom of those with differing views (Gibson, 1998)—has been an increasingly important issue in Indonesia's social and political landscape in recent years. A series of surveys conducted between 2004 and 2019 by Mujani (2020) showed fluctuations in political intolerance among Indonesians. It was high from 2004 to 2007, declined between 2010 and 2013, and peaked again from 2017 to 2019. Mujani's research examined Indonesians' attitudes toward various social groups and found that the most disliked groups, in descending order: the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI); Darul Islam or the Islamic State of Indonesia (DI/NII); Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI); Islamic Defenders Front (FPI); the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); Chinese-heritage Indonesians; Christians; Catholics; Hindus; Buddhists; Judaists; heterodox Muslim sects such as Ahmadiyya and Shia; the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community; and others. The research indicates that while respondents' levels of dislike fluctuated over time, political intolerance trended upward between 2017 and 2019. In 2017, 69.1% of respondents expressed dislike for the mentioned groups, rising to 70.1% in 2018 and surging to 80.5% in 2019.

The survey confirmed the increase of political intolerance between 2017 and 2019.

A 2018 survey conducted by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) found high levels of political intolerance among Indonesians, reflected in preference for government leaders from their own religious groups and rejection of those from different faiths (Fauzi, 2018; Wardah, 2018). A significant percentage of respondents oppose government officials from different religious backgrounds is high: 57.9 per cent reject presidential candidates of different faiths, while 53.4 percent and 53.6 percent reject governors and mayors, respectively.

One of the most notable recent cases was the largest rallies in the country's history: held in late 2016 ahead of the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election. The protests called for the prosecution of then-governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (also known as Ahok) for blasphemy. Many protesters already believed that non-Muslims like Ahok, a Chinese-Indonesian Christian, were unfit to lead Jakarta. This belief reinforced their justification for joining the rallies and demanding his conviction (Irianto, 2018). Other instances of political intolerance have also targeted politically active women. At the end of 2017, the West Java Caring Community Alliance (AMPJB) met with officials from the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), a religiously conservative party, urging them to oppose women running for public office in Indonesian general elections (Ibrahim, 2017).

Public expressions of political intolerance have become more visible and intense in recent years (Habib, 2019; Lazuardi, 2018). Notable examples include the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election abovementioned and the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. In the latter two, supporters of Prabowo Subianto launched smear campaigns against his presidential rival, Joko 'Jokowi' Widodo, claiming that he was Chinese-Indonesian and unfit to run for the presidency (Editor.id, 2019). Meanwhile, Ahok's supporters often portrayed his 2017 gubernatorial rival, Anies Baswedan, as being of Arabic descent, arguing that he was unfit to serve as governor because he was not an indigenous Indonesian. In an East Jakarta *kampung,* residents even refused to join a public prayer for an Ahok supporter who had passed away ahead of the 2017 gubernatorial election, despite Islamic teachings encouraging prayers for the deceased. They refused to join the public prayer because the woman had supported Ahok, believing it was forbidden for them to pray for her since they consider Ahok is an 'infidel'. All these examples show how political intolerance has become more intense in recent years in Indonesia, which poses a threat to democracy, erodes the social fabric and fuels community tensions.

This research focuses on Islamists rather than Muslims in general, acknowledging that not all Muslims oppose the political opinions of other groups as Islamist groups do (Fealy, 2020). 'Islamists' here refers to people who support Islamic fundamentalism and militancy, who do not only advocate a literal interpretation of Islamic teachings, but also support the movement of Islamic radicalisation. This research measures the level of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) among Islamists in Jakarta due to their key role in spreading political intolerance and mobilising communities for events that support it. In short, SDO, as defined by Ho et al., 2012, refers to behaviours or attitudes aimed at maintaining a group's dominance over others.

Activists from HTI, FPI, and Salafist groups were the driving force behind the mobilisation of hundreds of thousands of Muslims from various Islamic factions during the 2016-2017 rallies, demanding the prosecution of then-Jakarta governor Ahok on blasphemy charges. One of the rallies, held on 2 December 2016, was the biggest rally in Indonesian history. Examining SDO levels among Islamists can help predict their degree of political intolerance.

Jakarta was selected as the research site because, as the capital and largest city, it serves as the country's political barometer. It also hosts major institutions, including the Indonesian Parliament and Presidential Palace, the headquarters of the National Police and Armed Forces, and the main offices of political parties. Jakarta is where key national policies are formulated, with their impacts extending to urban and rural areas across the archipelago. The policymaking process is closely covered by the media, making the city the focal point of national public attention. Finally, as Indonesia's capital, Jakarta has been the centre of many key historical events, including the 1965-66 protests that led to the rise of the New Order regime and the 1998 civil society movement that brought about its downfall. To sum up, Jakarta's central role in Indonesia's social and political landscape makes it a fitting choice for this study on social dominance orientation among Islamists.

Literature Review

Scholars have examined the political intolerance issue in Indonesia from various perspectives. Amal and Saat (2022) discuss political intolerance among Muslim organisations. They argue that, in some cases, religious differences have led to illiberal actions, such as blocking Wahabi followers from establishing an educational institution in East Java or preventing Wahabi preachers from sharing their social, religious, and political views at public events. Mujani (2020) examines how Indonesians embrace democracy while exhibiting political intolerance toward others, describing this paradox as the 'Intolerant Democrat Syndrome'. Mahyuddin and Mahyuddin (2019) show that online political intolerance was widespread during political campaigns in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election.

Two other articles apply the SDO method to assess intolerance levels among specific groups of Indonesians, but their findings contradict each other. Ruswin et al. (2017) state that SDO can predict the emergence of political intolerance among undergraduate students at the University of Indonesia. Ruswin et al. compare SDO and social identity variables, and find that SDO has a greater influence on political intolerance than social identity. Meanwhile, research by Lusiana et al. (2004) finds no link between SDO and political intolerance among students from General Soedirman University. These contrasting results are notable and may result from differences in sampling locations, which influence cultural and group behaviours, even among university students.

Our research contributes to the existing literature by presenting a Jakarta case study on SDO levels among Islamists in Jakarta and examining their correlations with political intolerance. This focus is relevant given the high political intolerance, particularly among Islamist groups that reject leaders from different religious backgrounds. We hypothesise that SDO could explain this.

Since SDO has rarely been used to explain political intolerance in Indonesia, this research expands its application. It examines SDO levels among Islamist groups in Jakarta, building on scholarly arguments that suggest a correlation between SDO and political intolerance. Ho et al. (2012) argue that SDO is a robust instrument to predict social and political attitudes. Likewise, Osborne and Sibley (2022) state that SDO has a strong relationship with various political attitudes such as anti-democracy, prejudice, nationalism, political intolerance, and extremism. SDO can increase political intolerance by amplifying a sense of competitive threat in a society's social hierarchy. This, in turn, fosters the need to dominate other political groups, resulting in increased political intolerance.

SDO scholars argue that societies are structured by social hierarchies. A higher level of social hierarchy, where one group holds dominance and enjoys greater access to

social and political resources, often leads to the marginalisation of lower-status groups. SDO measures whether individuals support maintaining dominance by a particular group or prefer a more egalitarian social structure (Kleppestø et al., 2019). Individuals in the dominant group with high SDO tend to believe they have the power to influence and shape the system (Prati et al., 2022). Similarly, Olonisakin et al. (2022) argue that high levels of SDO create social barriers between groups, limiting interaction and increasing political intolerance by eliminating opportunities for social connections.

This research seeks to determine whether the level of SDO among Islamists positively correlates with their political intolerance and understand why Islamists with a higher level of SDO tend to be politically intolerant.

Hypothesis

H0 (null hypothesis) = There is no correlation between SDO and political intolerance.

H1 (alternative hypothesis) = Individuals with high levels of SDO tend to exhibit higher political intolerance, as their preference for group dominance reinforces exclusionary attitudes toward other groups.

Relationship between SDO and political intolerance is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows a positive association between SDO and political intolerance.

SDO follows the definition proposed by Ho et al. (2012), which describes social dominance orientation as an attitude or behaviour aimed at maintaining one group's dominance over others. SDO has two dimensions: domination and egalitarianism. Domination reflects individual or group preferences for maintaining their dominance over others, while egalitarianism pertains to the preference for sustaining systemic inequalities between groups. In such systems, the dominant group establishes rules or makes decisions that serve its own interests over those of other groups.

For political intolerance variables, researchers use the definition of political intolerance as formulated by Gibson (1988, 1998, 2007), who explains that political intolerance is the unwillingness to accept the political freedoms of others, including a reluctance to acknowledge or permit ideas and political activities from disliked groups. Gibson et al. (1982) explain that political intolerance has three aspects: freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of political association. Political intolerance has three key aspects: first, rejecting the expression of opinions in public by disliked groups; second, denying members of these groups access to political roles, such as public office; and third, preventing groups with different views and beliefs from participating in political processes. Gibson (1988) further developed a measuring tool

Figure 1. Relationship between SDO and political intolerance
Source: Ho et al. (2012); Gibson et al. (1982).

based on the operational and conceptual aspects. Several Indonesian scholars have previously used this measurement tool, finding it robust to measure behaviours and attitudes in Indonesian societies.

Islamists in this research are people who support Islam religious fundamentalism and militancy. Fealy (2020) offers a clear definition of Islamists in Indonesia, which this research adopts. He argues Islamists are people who "seek to make Islamic law and values a central part of public life and the structure of the state". They support the establishment of sharia (Islamic law); they insist that women or non-Muslims cannot assume strategic leadership positions in the country, arguing that it is against Islamic teachings. They differ from other groups of Muslims in Indonesia, such as moderate or secular Muslims, who hold different opinions.

Fealy (2020) further argues the term Islamists can refer to "a wide range of groups, from those who form parties and contest elections in a democratic system to militant jihadists who use violence to achieve their ends". Based on this argument, in Indonesia, Islamists are often members or sympathisers of certain community or political organisations, such as Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), and Jama'ah Anshorut Daulah (JAD), as well as Salafi groups such as Laskar Jihad, Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia, Khilafatul Muslimin, and Wahdah Islamiyah. The subject of our research is the members of these Islamist organisations.

Method

This research employs a sequential explanatory design, combining data collection and analysis through a mixed-method approach. The sample, measurement, and statistical analysis are explained below. The data is interpreted and then explained using qualitative literature grounded in existing theoretical discussions (Ivankova et al., 2006). The quantitative method in this research is used to examine sample characteristics and create categorisations that allow for broader analysis based on larger datasets (Cresswell et al., 2003; Creswell, 2009; Small, 2011; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003). This research uses a quantitative approach to identify correlations between SDO and political intolerance among Islamists in Greater Jakarta. In-depth interviews and qualitative analysis are then conducted to explore why Islamists with higher SDO levels tend to be more politically intolerant.

The quantitative analysis used in this research involves descriptive analysis, correlation, and regression to determine whether there is a significant relationship between SDO and political intolerance among Islamists in Greater Jakarta. Two control variables are added into the method: respondents' ages and frequencies in attending religious events. The findings are in line with the research hypothesis, so this research confirms that there is a relationship between SDO and political intolerance. To further examine the relationship between SDO and political intolerance, interviews were conducted with the 13 respondents who exhibited the highest levels of political intolerance. These interviews provided deeper insights into the connection between the two variables. Additionally, interviews were conducted with 'elite' respondents, including a convicted terrorist who had experience recruiting individuals into Islamist organisations in Greater Jakarta.

Operational Definitions

1. SDO is a behaviour or attitude to maintain the position or dominance of a group over other groups (Ho et al., 2012).
   1.1 Domination (SDO-D): Preference for group-based domination systems, where a higher-status group exerts social or political control over a lower-status group. This domination can

take various forms, including violent behaviour, rejection, and controlling the rights of low status groups.

    1.2 Egalitarian (SDO-E): Preference for a group-based system of inequality, sustained through interconnected ideologies and social policies that reinforce hierarchical structures.

2. Political intolerance is an individual attitude that does not accept political freedom for other individuals or groups who are considered politically different (Gibson, 1988, 1998, 2007).

    2.1. Freedom of speech: Rejecting the ideas or denying other groups the freedom to express their opinions.

    2.2. Freedom of assembly: Denying people from other groups the right to access political positions, such as becoming public servants.

    2.3. Freedom of political association: Denying people from other groups the right to participate in politics, such as running for public office.

Research Instrument

A Likert scale is used to measure survey respondents' behaviour and perception across two dimensions—political intolerance and SDO—using a four-point scale: 1 (strongly disagree), 2 (disagree), 3 (agree), and 4 (strongly agree). The unfavourable technique method is used to formulate some survey statements, with certain statements phrased in opposition to what the survey aims to measure. This approach helps encourage respondents to complete the questionnaire in a way that reflects their true behaviour and perceptions. In other words, this technique aims to prevent the respondents from performing false good or bad behaviour that would result in inaccurate survey results.

The measurement of political intolerance uses a measurement tool based on the definitions and aspects put forward by Gibson (1988):

freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association. This measuring instrument consists of five items and is selected for its ability to capture political intolerance across three key aspects. It aligns with various instances of political intolerance observed in Indonesia. This research uses the SDO measurement instrument developed by Ho et al. (2012) to measure intolerance on two dimensions: domination and egalitarian, consisting of 16 items (each item of political intolerance and SDO is displayed in the Appendix).

We test the items by using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) (see Figures 2 and 3 and Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix). CFA does not aim to answer or address the main hypothesis being tested. It is used to decide which questions (items) need to be explored further within in-depth interviews (with chosen interviewees). These interviews aim to validate the results of the quantitative questionnaire distributed earlier to respondents. The CFA analysis uses a model developed by Umar and Nisa (2020). The model is considered to fit if the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) value is below 0.05 and P-value is above 0.05. Each question item is considered valid to be used if the significance value (t) is above 1.96. All the five items of the political intolerance can be used for further measurement. Meanwhile, for the SDO measurement instrument, only two out of the total 16 SDO items are considered invalid, so they cannot be used in the SDO measurement process, quantitatively or qualitatively.

Participants

This research employs primary research through a survey involving 265 respondents (see **Table 1**). The respondents were selected by using a snowball distribution technique. We started by visiting the headquarters of the organizations whose members were the focus of our research. We approached each person

we met and asked for recommendations for additional respondents, using a snowball sampling technique. This method was chosen due to the challenge of accurately estimating the number of Islamists in Jakarta, with the number of respondents determined according to statistical principles ensuring sufficient degrees of freedom. This allows us to conduct the validity test of the instruments. All respondents are Islamists, defined as those who "seek to make Islamic law and values a central part of public life and the structure of the state" (Fealy, 2020). Some respondents are members of religious organisations, while others do not belong to any religious organisations but have actively participated in Islamic study circles such as *majelis taklim* (Islamic prayer and study groups) (Figure 1). Repeated sampling is carried out by using a nesting technique to obtain respondents with the highest values of intolerance. The highest score is sorted out based on the t score, which is used to compare two related samples.

In this light, the total number of 265 respondents that we have obtained (approximately 300 in total before the data cleaning) theoretically meets the requirements for model validation and measurement (Bentler & Chou, 1987; Kline, 2015; Hair et al., 2010). The recommended sample size for this research is at least five to ten times the number of indicators for the most numerous factors, in which, in this case, is SDO, with 16 items. Therefore, the recommended sample size for the data testing for this research is supposed to be between 80 and 160 respondents (Bentler & Chou, 1987; Hair et al., 2010). Hence, the total number of respondents collected in our research (265 respondents) exceeds the requirement stipulated by the scholars in previous studies (Bentler and Chou, 1987; Kline, 2015), and Hair et al (2010). To sum up, the sample of 265 respondents has passed and met the requirements in quantitative-based testing and analysis.

Since the exact number of segmental subjects, i.e., Islamists, cannot be determined demographically, the justification for the quantitative analysis has been demonstrated through a nesting technique in which the individuals with the highest intolerance indicator scores are interviewed (Thompson, 2012). The researchers then interviewed 13 individuals with the highest value of intolerance. These in-depth interviews aim to enrich information obtained through questionnaires. We conducted 40-minute interviews with each respondent to clarify the answers they previously provided in the questionnaires. This aimed to boost the accuracy of the research in order to analyse more thoroughly the connection between SDO and level of intolerance among Islamists in Greater Jakarta.

Based on the demographic analysis of the respondents (Table 1), those affiliated with FPI had the highest average score for political intolerance (57.30), 212 Alumni Brotherhood (54.41), and other organisations (54.61). The highest average SDO was scored by respondents from Indonesia Without Dating (63.90), Salafiyah sympathisers (55.96) and FPI (55.73). The proportion of respondents in the high and low categories of political intolerance and SDO is shown in Table 1. Respondents are classified as having high or low political intolerance and SDO if their scores are above or below the average, respectively (50.00; Table 2, see it in Appendix section).

Most respondents were university students and university graduates because the questionnaires were distributed to student activists (who were executives of university student organisations) at several universities in Greater Jakarta, alongside the executives of Islamist community organisations in the area. Only a small number of respondents, including many FPI members, were senior high school graduates who never attended university. All respondents came from middle- to lower-

Table 1.
Survey Participant Demographics

Category	Sub-categories	Proportion	Total	SDO level (average)	Intolerance level (average)
Sex	Male	57%	265	50.47	51.29
	Female	43%		49.37	48.29
Age	17-20	33.7%		47.15	48.13
	21-25	52.7%		50.43	49.19
	26-30	6.8%		56.65	57.62
	31-35	3.4%		55.78	59.57
	36-40	2.3%		55.75	60.92
	>40	1.1%		47.91	48.64
Organizations	Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI)	19.8%		55.73	57.30
	Campus Islamic Propagation Institute (LDK)	32.3%		45.46	45.24
	Indonesia Muslim Students' Action Front (KAMMI)	9.1%		51.00	49.72
	212 Alumni Brotherhood (PA212)	5.3%		51.17	54.44
	National Islamic Propagation Institute "Student's Islamic Nuance" at the University of Indonesia (LDKN SALAM)	7.6%		41.46	41.45
	Salafiyah sympathisers	1.5%		55.96	49.81
	Youth Hijrah Movement (Pemuda Hijrah)	3.4%		52.08	49.19
	Prosperous Justice Party (PKS)	2.7%		53.08	48.31
	Do not follow any Islamic organisations	12.5%		52.76	54.21
	Indonesia Without Dating (Indonesia Tanpa Pacaran)	0.4%		63.90	47.83
	Markaz Syariah Islamic Boarding School (Pondok Pesantren Markaz Syariah)	0.8%		50.60	47.83
	Majelis Rasulullah (prayer and Islam study group)	0.4%		53.25	49.04
	Majelis Pengajian Masjid (prayer and Islam study group)	1.1%		53.34	48.27
	Other organisations	2.7%		49.00	54.61
Position in the Organization	Alumni	17.6%		46.62	47.88
	Cultural members of organisation	27%		50.31	48.77
	Structural members of organisation	36.9%		50.35	50.89
	Organisational executives, including treasurer and secretary general	8.1%		51.55	50.59
	Coordinator or chairperson	10.4%		52.78	50.96
Frequency Attending Islamic Study Circles	Started attending (several times)	15.7%		45.62	45.75
	Does not attend monthly	11.7%		42.40	42.06
	At least once a month	29.4%		49.74	49.59
	At least once a week	25%		52.85	52.22
	Several times per week since first participation	18.1%		54.80	55.90
Intolerance	Low	57.6%			
	High	42.4%			
SDO-D	Low	52.3%			
	High	47.7%			
SDO-E	Low	52.5%			
	High	47.5%			
SDO	Low	49.2%			
	High	50.8%			

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

socioeconomic backgrounds, as reflected in their earnings—many received salaries around the Greater Jakarta regional minimum wage, while some recent university graduates had not yet entered the workforce. The interviews also revealed that some respondents were small-scale business owners but earned below the regional minimum wage due to their lack of a fixed income.

Procedure

To ensure respondents could easily complete the questionnaires, they were adapted to the Indonesian context. We used snowball sampling by visiting the headquarters of various Islamist organisations, contacting their leaders, or speaking with individuals who could participate, and then distributing the questionnaires to them. We also asked respondents for the contact details of other potential respondents, whom we then contacted to distribute the questionnaire. Each respondent filled out the questionnaire, taking 10 to 15 minutes on average. We analysed the results, then conducted in-depth interviews with the respondents with the highest SDO scores. The interviews lasted 40 minutes on average.

Ethical Considerations

We conducted the survey and in-depth interviews with informed consent. Before any activities began, respondents' consent was obtained for their participation in the research. All respondents were informed that their participation was voluntary. In disseminating the questionnaires, we showed the respondents a formal letter from Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), stating that we were researching on behalf of the university. To sum up, the 265 survey respondents, including 13 interviewees, were aware that they voluntarily participated in the research and understood their rights and obligations.

Descriptive Statistics/Data Analysis

In the analysis, each indicator or item in the two instruments reflects respondents' attitudes and behaviours. The items measure SDO and political intolerance, complementing each other to form a broader assessment. Therefore, a respondent cannot be classified as tolerant or intolerant, or as having high or low SDO, based on just one or two items. Instead, all items are aggregated to determine the overall score before analysis. We first present the statistical data from the research sample, then conduct a normality test and analyse the maximum and minimum values of the results.

Based on statistical analysis toward every variable, we have found that the minimum and the maximum score of each variable is similar (Table 4). For the political intolerance (INT) variable, from all 265 respondents, the minimum score is 34.26 and the maximum is 74.96. Aligning with this, the SDO variable, SDO-D variable, and SDO-E variable have similar scores. Hence, this serves as evidence that SDO can predict intolerance. For SDO, the minimum score is 31.87 and the maximum is 73.50. The minimum score for SDO-D is 35.28 and the highest is 74.55, while for SDO-E, the minimum score is 33.40 and the maximum is 73.50.

Table 4.
Statistic Description: SDO and Political Intolerance Variables

	Minimum	Maximum	Std. Deviation	Mean	Variance	Skewness	Kurtosis
INT	34.26	74.96	9.64	50.00	93.09	0.469	-0.386
SDO-D	35.28	74.55	8.24	50.00	67.93	0.353	-0.541
SDO-E	33.40	74.28	9.22	50.00	85.13	0.346	-0.358
SDO	31.87	73.50	9.33	50.00	87.18	0.116	-0.727

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

JSP
JURNAL ILMU SOSIAL
DAN ILMU POLITIK

In **Figures 5 and 6 (in the appendix)**, we can see the distribution of values of political intolerance and SDO, respectively. The standard deviation for political intolerance is 9.64, while for SDO, it is 9.33, indicating a high variation in both variables. However, respondent scores for political intolerance tend to cluster around 50, whereas SDO scores show a tendency to fall between 50 and 60. The average score for both variables is 50.

Skewness and kurtosis scores in this research are below 1.96, hence it can be concluded that the data in this research is normally distributed. This is based on the normality test assumption idea proposed in previous studies (e.g., Bera et al., 1984; Das & Rahmatullah Imon, 2016), arguing that if skewness and kurtosis scores are below 1.96, the data is normally distributed. After this stage, the research proceeds to causal analysis, which includes correlation and multiple linear regression. The normality test was also carried out using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with the value of 0.186 (a significant value > 0.05) so that the data was declared normal (see Table 5). In the linearity test, the data was found to be linear, with a significance value of 0.000 (<0.05). The data was also well distributed and free from multicollinearity, as indicated by its dispersion in the scatterplot and alignment with the normality line in the normality plot (see Figures 7, 8 and 9 in the Appendix).

Furthermore, the assumption of multicollinearity or collinearity is circumvented because the regression essentially uses only one independent variable, Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) (to confirm, this test is still performed in Table 8 in the Appendix using VIF values). Although in practice, SDO is ultimately analysed based on its dimensions, namely D (Dominance) and E (Egalitarianism), these are still two dimensions of the same variable, i.e., social dominance. Therefore, a test related to multicollinearity is not necessary, because, theoretically, these are dimensions of the same

latent variable (Ho et al., 2012). Regarding the other two variables (age and frequency of attending Islamic study circles), these are demographic variables that are not latent and are theoretically distinct from the SDO construct (Bollen, 2014; Schreiber et al., 2006).

Results

We began with performing correlation analysis to see relations between political intolerance and SDO by using Spearman's two-tailed correlational method using a significance level of 0.05 (the correlation value in the table with an * sign means that it has a P-value below 0.05 or significant). The result can be seen in **Table 6.**

Table 6.
Correlation Analysis: SDO and Political Intolerance

Correlation	Intolerance	Sig.
SDO-D	0.336**	0.000
SDO-E	0.629**	0.000
SDO	0.660**	0.000
Age	0.267**	0.000
Frequency in attending Islamic study circles	0.391**	0.000

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

The correlational analysis in Table 6 supports the hypothesis that SDO and political intolerance are correlated. The above result shows that political intolerance is correlated strongly with SDO-D (0.336), SDO-E (0.629), and SDO (0.660), as well as respondents' frequency in attending Islamic study circles (0.391) and age (0.267). This means that all variables influence the level of respondents' political intolerance. We then performed regression analysis to see the influence of each variable on political intolerance.

The regression analysis separated the two dimensions of SDO and then sought to see their influence on political intolerance, resulting in an

Table 7.
Regression Analysis: SDO & Political Intolerance

Variable	R Square	Adj. R Square	R (Coef. Corr)	Std. Error of Estiamte	F	Sig F. Change	Independent Variable	R Square Change	Coef. (Beta)	T	Std. Error	Sig.	Partial Corr
SDO-D and SDO-E to INT	0.405	0.401	0.637	7.49566	87.647	0.000	SDO_D	0.113	0.112	1.821	0.062	0.070	0.113
							SDO_E	0.293	0.618	11.252	0.055	0.000	0.574
SDO to INT	0.435	0.433	0.660	7.29120	198.878	0.000	SDO	0.435	0.682	14.102	0.048	0.000	0.660
SDO-D, SDO-E, AGE, FR STUDY CIRCLE to INT	0.480	0.471	0.693	7.19935	54.901	0.000	SDO_D	0.132	0.130	2.113	0.062	0.036	0.136
							SDO_E	0.309	0.562	9.884	0.057	0.000	0.539
							AGE	0.009	1.105	3.140	0.389	0.040	0.133
							FR_STUDY_CIRCLE	0.029	1.221	2.064	0.535	0.002	0.199

N= 265 respondents

Source: Author

R Square score of 0.405 with 0.000 significance (< 0.05). This means that 40.5 percent of the total 100 percent political intolerance variation can be explained through SDO-D and SDO-E variables with significant results. The coefficient test results showed a positive relationship between the two variables, with SDO-D at 0.112 and SDO-E at 0.618. This indicates that higher SDO-D and SDO-E scores are associated with higher levels of political intolerance. However, the result showed that only SDO-E significantly influenced political intolerance (with score 0.618), while SDO-D did not significantly influence political intolerance (significance score of 0.070 [> 0.050]) (see **Table 7**).

Further analysis treats SDO as a unidimensional variable rather than separating its two dimensions. The results show an R Square of 0.660 with a significance score of 0.000 (<0.05), indicating that SDO explains 66% of the variation in political intolerance. The organisation of coefficient test results in coefficient score 0.682 with a significance value of 0.000 (< 0.050). This indicates that higher SDO levels are associated with a greater tendency toward political intolerance, and vice versa. This relationship is supported by the significance score being below 0.050.

The final analysis was conducted through putting age and frequency of attending Islamic study circles into a regression analysis test. The test resulted in SDO-D, SDO-E, age, and frequency in attending Islamic study circles obtaining an R Square score of 0.480, with a significance score of 0.000 (< 0.050). It means that all the four variables being regressed can explain 48 percent variation in political intolerance. The SDO-D coefficient test resulted in a 0.130 score with significance of 0.036 (< 0.50). The similar test for SDO-E resulted in a 0.562 score with significance of 0.000 (< 0.050). Coefficient test for age resulted in a positive score (1.105) with significance of 0.040 (<0.050), which means that the older the person, the higher their political intolerance, and vice versa.

The score for frequency in attending Islamic study circles is 1.221 with a significance of 0.002 (< 0.050). This means that the more active an individual is in participating in Islamic study circles that promote political intolerance, the more intolerant the person becomes. This frequency of attendance variable could become a strong intervening variable toward SDO. SDO-D, which is not a significant variable during the preliminary test, turned out to be a significant variable when frequency of attendance was included in the test. This aligns with the nesting analysis, which showed that some individuals who were not members of Islamist organisations still exhibited high political intolerance scores due to their regular participation in Islamic study circles that

JSP
JURNAL ILMU SOSIAL DAN ILMU POLITIK

promoted such views.

This analysis highlights key findings: while SDO influences individual intolerance levels, those with an egalitarian tendency (SDO-E) are more likely to exhibit high political intolerance than those with a dominance tendency (SDO-D). However, individuals with SDO-D become significantly more intolerant when factors such as age and frequency of attending religious studies are considered.

Hence, external factors such as the frequency of attending religious studies become important factors in determining the level of people's political intolerance. To further explore these results, the analysis is complemented by interview findings, which are presented in the next section.

Discussion

Our research shows that there is a positive correlation between the level of SDO among Islamists in Jakarta (which is the whole combination of SDO, SDO-E, and SDO-D, with age and frequency of attending religious studies) and their political intolerance. This confirms previous findings. In their study on populism and political intolerance, van Prooijen and Krouwel (2016) found that a higher level of SDO contributes to an increase in political extremism (both right-wing and left-wing political extremism). In the Netherlands, a survey of 5,000 households (comprising 7,500 individuals) shows that populist voters with a high level of SDO tend to show higher levels of political intolerance (Bos et al., 2021). In South Africa, SDO is positively correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes (Gordon, 2021). This result from South Africa was based on an analysis of the political attitudes of 2,885 respondents across approximately 500 small areas in the country. Through the Islamist study case in Jakarta, our research adds more evidence to the body of literature on SDO and political intolerance that there is a positive correlation between SDO level and political intolerance in

a group in society.

Future research could explore why higher levels of SDO lead to greater political intolerance. This study suggests that organisational membership is less relevant than participation in Islamic study circles that promote intolerance. Our findings show that the more frequently individuals engage in such study circles, the more politically intolerant they become. However, questions remain: Is SDO a stable trait, or does it fluctuate based on circumstances, such as rising in response to perceived social challenges from minority groups? Do socially dominant groups exhibit political intolerance primarily when they fear losing their dominant status? How does religion influence SDO levels within specific societal groups?

These are pressing questions in the study of SDO because a substantial number of SDO studies measure the level of SDO and how it affects social or political orientation of certain groups in the context of certain social or political attitudes, such as anti-immigrant orientation (Gordon, 2021), populist political intolerance (Bos et al., 2021), and dogmatic intolerance (van Prooijen & Krouwel, 2016). However, research has yet to explore in depth the underlying factors that drive SDO.

This research aimed to uncover the reasons behind SDO among Islamists in Jakarta. We interviewed 13 individuals with the highest SDO levels about their political (in)tolerance, but the findings remain inconclusive. The interviews did not provide clear explanations for why respondents adopt politically intolerant views. One interviewee ('TAS', an FPI member) gave different reasons when asked whether he supported non-Muslims in public office and whether he accepted women as leaders.[1] In answering the first question, TAS argued that non-Muslim

---

1 In-depth interview with TAS, a member of FPI on 30 September 2023.

officials, once elected, would prioritize policies favouring non-Muslim citizens at the expense of Muslims. This response suggests a fear that Muslims will lose both power and political dominance if non-Muslims hold public office. TAS's reasoning is not rooted in religious beliefs but in fear. However, when asked about women's leadership, he based his response on religious beliefs, arguing that only men can be *imam* (leaders). He referred to the Quran and Hadith stipulations that women cannot serve as leaders, especially in performing prayers.

Another member of FPI ('F') agreed that women are unfit to be leaders, but gave a different reason. While TAS cited religious reasons for opposing women in leadership, F argued that women cannot be leaders because they lack the firmness and toughness of men. In contrast to TAS, F accepted that non-Muslims may assume leadership positions in public offices. F argued that leadership positions in public office are subject to public scrutiny, so if non-Muslim leaders implement policies that do not align with Muslim interests, they can be ousted. Therefore, he argued that non-Muslims holding leadership positions in public office is not a problem.[2]

These two interviews illustrate that the factors driving high SDO levels and political intolerance remain inconclusive, highlighting the need for further research.

Conclusion

The research finds that there is a positive correlation between SDO and political intolerance among Islamists in Jakarta. These findings suggest that a strong sense of dominance, which can lead to intolerance, is influenced by frequent participation in religious study groups. This supports the conclusion that the frequency of attending such groups significantly impacts SDO and political

intolerance.

This paper contributes to the literature by broadening the scope of SDO theory and its connection to political intolerance, particularly by examining external influences such as age and the frequency of attending religious study groups—factors that have been largely overlooked in previous studies. The research findings strongly suggest that intolerance in Greater Jakarta stems from the high social dominance orientation of Islamist groups. Interview analysis further reveals a strong tendency among members of these groups to oppose leadership roles for women and non-Muslims. However, these findings do not fully apply to all individuals in Islamist groups, even though most respondents align with the hypothesis. Future research should explore why some individuals exhibit low SDO despite being in high-SDO environments. This could provide deeper insight into the factors shaping intolerant attitudes within Islamist groups. This study confirms previous findings that political intolerance typically aligns with and is reinforced by increasing levels of an individual's SDO.

Another implication of this research is that since the SDO-D is heavily influenced by external factors, government and religious leaders should encourage young people to avoid joining intolerant organisations to limit their exposure to intolerant ideologies. Additionally, efforts should be made to disengage those who have already become involved in such groups.

---

2 In-depth interview with F (an FPI member) on 29 September 2023.

References

Amal, M. K., & Saat, N. (2022). Tolerance without Liberalism. *Epistemé: Jurnal Pengembangan Ilmu Keislaman*, *16*(02), 189–211. https://doi.org/10.21274/epis.2021.16.02.189-211

Bentler, P. M., & Chou, C. P. (1987). Practical Issues in Structural Modeling. *Sociological Methods & Research*, *16*(1), 78–117. https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124187016001004

Bera, A. K., Jarque, C. M., & Lee, L.-F. (1984). Testing the Normality Assumption in Limited Dependent Variable Models. *International Economic Review*, *25*(3), 563. https://doi.org/10.2307/2526219

Bollen, K. A. (2014). Structural equations with latent variables. *Structural Equations with Latent Variables*, 1–514. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118619179

Bos, L., Wichgers, L., & van Spanje, J. (2021). Are Populists Politically Intolerant? Citizens' Populist Attitudes and Tolerance of Various Political Antagonists. *Political Studies*, *71*(3), 851–868. https://doi.org/10.1177/00323217211049299

Cresswell, J. W., Plano-Clark, V. L., Gutmann, M. L., & Hanson, W. E. (2003). Advanced mixed methods research designs. *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioral Research*.

Creswell, J. W. (2009). *Research designs. Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approach*. Sage Publications, Inc. https://spada.uns.ac.id/pluginfile.php/510378/mod_resource/content/1/creswell.pdf

Das, K. R., & Rahmatullah Imon, A. H. M. (2016). A Brief Review of Tests for Normality. *American Journal of Theoretical and Applied Statistics*, *5*(1), 5–12. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ajtas.20160501.12

Editor.id. (2019). Kelompok Intoleran dan Radikal Manfaatkan Prabowo untuk Tumbangkan Jokowi. *Editor.Id*. Kelompok Intoleran dan Radikal Manfaatkan Prabowo untuk Tumbangkan Jokowi – Editor.id

Fauzi, A. (2018, December 4). *Sikap Intoleransi Politik di Indonesia Tinggi*. Media Indonesia. https://mediaindonesia.com/politik-dan-hukum/202020/sikap-intoleransi-politik-di-indonesia-tinggi

Fealy, G. (2020, September 27). *Jokowi's repressive pluralism*. EASTASIAFORUM. https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/09/27/jokowis-repressive-pluralism/

Gibson, J. L. (1988). Political Intolerance and Political Repression During the McCarthy Red Scare. *American Political Science Review*, *82*(2), 511–529. https://doi.org/10.2307/1957398

Gibson, J. L. (1998). Putting Up With Fellow Russians: An Analysis of Political Tolerance in the Fledgling Russian Democracy. *Political Research Quarterly*, *51*(1), 37–68. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299805100102

Gibson, J. L. (2007). Political Intolerance in the Context of Democratic Theory. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, 323–323–341. https://doi.org/10.1093/OXFORDHB/9780199270125.003.0017

Gibson, J. L., Bingham, R. D., Gibson, J. L., & Bingham, R. D. (1982). On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance. *American Political Science Review*, *76*(3), 603–620. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:76:y:1982:i:03:p:603-620_18

Gordon, S. L. (2021). Can social dominance orientation predict intergroup hostility and aggression in South Africa? Testing the applicability of the SDO7(s) Scale. *South African Journal of Psychology*, *52*(1), 23–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/00812463211022492

Habib, Z. (2019). Jakarta Masuk Kategori Provinsi Paling Intoleran. *Media Indonesia*.

Jakarta Masuk Kategori Provinsi Paling Intoleran (mediaindonesia.com)

Hair, J. F. , Black, W. C. , Babin, B. J. , Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2010). *Multivariate data analysis* (7th Edition). Pearson, New York. https://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Hair%2C+J.+F.%2C+Black%2C+W.+C.%2C+Babin%2C+B.+J.%2C+%26+Anderson%2C+R.+E.+%282010%29.+Multivariate+data+analysis+%287th+ed.%29.+Upper+Saddle+River%2C+NJ%3A+Pearson.&btnG=

Ho, A. K., Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Levin, S., Thomsen, L., Kteily, N., & Sheehy-Skeffington, J. (2012). Social Dominance Orientation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *38*(5), 583–606. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167211432765

Ibrahim, G. M. (2017, August 4). *Temui PKS, Aliansi Masyarakat Peduli Jabar Tolak Pemimpin Perempuan*. Detiknews. https://news.detik.com/berita/d-3586477/temui-pks-aliansi-masyarakat-peduli-jabar-tolak-pemimpin-perempuan

Irianto, D. (2018). Ini Alasan Tolak Ahok Pimpin Jakarta karena Tionghoa dan Kristiani. *LesaIndonesia*. Ini alasan tolak Ahok pimpin Jakarta karena Tionghoa dan Kristiani - LensaIndonesia.com

Ivankova, N. V., Creswell, J. W., & Stick, S. L. (2006). Using Mixed-Methods Sequential Explanatory Design: From Theory to Practice. *Field Methods*, *18*(1), 3–20. https://doi.org/10.1177/1525822X05282260

Kleppestø, T. H., Czajkowski, N. O., Vassend, O., Røysamb, E., Eftedal, N. H., Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Kunst, J. R., & Thomsen, L. (2019). Correlations between social dominance orientation and political attitudes reflect common genetic underpinnings. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, *116*(36), 17741–17746. https://doi.org/10.1073/PNAS.1818711116/-/DCSUPPLEMENTAL

Kline Rex. B. (2015). *Principles and Practice of Structural Equation Modeling (4th ed.). New York Guilford Press. - References - Scientific Research Publishing*. The Guilford Press. https://www.scirp.org/reference/referencespapers?referenceid=2989266

Lazuardi, G. (2018). Intoleransi Politik di Indonesia Meningkat Jelang Pemilu. *Tribunnews*. Intoleransi Politik di Indonesia Meningkat Jelang Pemilu 2019 - TribunNews.com

Lusiana, Y., Markum, M. E., & Muluk, H. (2004). *Model Integrasi Intoleransi Politik : Pengaruh Faktor Kepribadian dan Persepsi Ancaman* [Universitas Indonesia]. https://lib.ui.ac.id

Mahyuddin, & Mahyuddin. (2019). The Crisis of Intolerance and Primordialism in the Name of Religion in Indonesia: a Case Study Of Pilkada DKI Jakarta at 2017. *KURIOSITAS: Media Komunikasi Sosial Dan Keagamaan*, *12*(1). https://doi.org/10.35905/KUR.V12I1

Mujani, S. (2020). Intolerant Democrat Syndrome: The Problem of Indonesian Democratic Consolidation. *Jurnal Politik*, *6*(1), 1. https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v6i1.1006

Olonisakin, T. T., Idemudia, E. S., Olonisakin, T. T., & Idemudia, E. S. (2022). Social Dominance Orientation and Outgroup Intolerance: The Role of Transcendence in Outgroup Attitude. *Social Development Issues*, *43*(3). https://doi.org/10.3998/SDI.2810

Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2022). The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology. In *The Cambridge Handbook of Political Psychology*. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108779104

Prati, F., Pratto, F., Zeineddine, F., Sweetman, J., Aiello, A., Petrović, N., & Rubini, M. (2022). From Social Dominance Orientation to Political Engagement: The Role of Group Status and Shared Beliefs in Politics Across Multiple Contexts. *Political Psychology*, *43*(1), 153–175. https://doi.org/10.1111/POPS.12745

Ruswin, H. R., Milla, M. N., & Narhetali, E.

(2017). *Orientasi dominansi sosial dan identitas sosial sebagai prediktor kemunculan intoleransi politik = Social dominance orientation and social identity as predictors of political intolerance* [Universitas Indonesia]. https://lib.ui.ac.id

Schreiber, J. B., Stage, F. K., King, J., Nora, A., & Barlow, E. A. (2006). Reporting Structural Equation Modeling and Confirmatory Factor Analysis Results: A Review. *The Journal of Educational Research*, *99*(6), 323–338. https://doi.org/10.3200/JOER.99.6.323-338

Small, M. L. (2011). How to conduct a mixed methods study: Recent trends in a rapidly growing literature. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *37*(Volume 37, 2011), 57–86. https://doi.org/10.1146/ANNUREV.SOC.012809.102657/CITE/REFWORKS

Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2003). *Major issues and controversies in the use of mixed methods in the social and behavioral sciences*

(C. D. Laughton, Ed.; 1st ed., Vol. 1). Sage Publication. https://books.google.co.id/books?id=F8BFOM8DCKoC&printsec=frontcover&hl=id#v=onepage&q&f=false

Thompson, S. K. (2012). *Sampling* (Third Edition). A John Wiley & Sons, INC., Publication. http://students.aiu.edu/submissions/profiles/resources/onlineBook/Q2T8G7_Sampling-_3rd.pdf

Umar, J., & Nisa, Y. F. (2020). Uji Validitas Konstruk dengan CFA dan Pelaporannya. *Jurnal Pengukuran Psikologi Dan Pendidikan Indonesia*, *9*(2), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.15408/JP3I.V9I2.16964

van Prooijen, J. W., & Krouwel, A. P. M. (2016). Extreme Political Beliefs Predict Dogmatic Intolerance. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *8*(3), 292–300. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616671403

Wardah, F. (2018). *Intoleransi Politik di Indonesia Meningkat*. LIPI: Intoleransi Politik di Indonesia Meningkat (voaindonesia.com)

11. Appendix
Validity Test

Chi-Square=4.19, df=7, P-value=0.75723, RMSEA=0.000

Figure 2. Validation Test: Political Intolerance

*Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political
In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023*

Table 2.
Political Intolerance Measurement

No	Statements	Coefficient	Std. Error	T Value	Significance	Alpha Cronbach Ave (0.923)
1	Groups that I dislike should not speak in public.	0.71	0.05	13.89	Valid	.919
2	People who come from groups I do not like are not fit to be president, governor, major, and other type leaders.	0.88	0.05	19.17	Valid	.905
3	People who come from groups I do not like should be prohibited from becoming teachers (university, school).	0.82	0.05	17.27	Valid	.909
4	I do not like it when they (other groups) exist as a political group.	0.90	0.05	19.68	Valid	.907
5	Groups that I dislike should not be in government.	0.91	0.05	19.97	Valid	.909
6	I do not pay attention to the ideas of groups that I consider unsavoury.	0.81	0.05	16.54	Valid	.919
7	I get annoyed when members of groups I do not like work in government.	0.89	0.05	19.40	Valid	.909

*Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance)
Survey) conducted in 2023*

Chi-Square=64.11, df=49, P-value=0.07236, RMSEA=0.032

Figure 3. Validation Test: Social Dominance Orientation

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

Table 3.
Social Dominance Orientation Measurement

No.	Statements	Coefficient	Std. Error	T Score	Significance	Alpha Cronbach Ave (.815)
1	Some groups should remain in their respective social position.	0.00	0.04	-0.07	Not valid	-
2	It is normal for one group to be stronger than other groups.	0.16	0.04	3.58	Valid	.807
3	In social life, the existence of a majority group is important.	-0.01	0.04	-02.29	Not valid	-
4	Some groups are lower than other groups.	0.40	0.04	11.33	Valid	.798
5	Groups with low social status have equal rights with groups with high social status.	0.94	0.04	21.41	Valid	.807
6	There should not be one dominant group in society.	0.53	0.03	16.61	Valid	.813
7	Groups with low social status should try to improve the quality of their group.	0.34	0.04	9.50	Valid	.814
8	The majority group should have the same rights as the minority group.	0.67	0..04	18.13	Valid	.802
9	We should not encourage group equality.	0.55	0.03	18.04	Valid	.797
10	We should not strive for all groups to have the same quality of life.	0.83	0.03	30.72	Valid	.800
11	Equality between groups is a form of injustice.	0.75	0.02	32.29	Valid	.798
12	Equality of status between groups should not be our main goal.	0.63	0.03	22.62	Valid	.798
13	We should try to provide equal opportunities to all groups of people in achieving success.	0.66	0.03	25.85	Valid	.807
14	Group equality is something that must be strived for.	1.00	0.03	33.68	Valid	.799
15	All groups have the same opportunity to live life.	0.35	0.03	11.22	Valid	.810
16	Equality between groups should be our joint focus.	0.92	0.03	34.99	Valid	.799

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance)

Survey) conducted in 2023

Figure 5. Distribution of Values: Political Intolerance

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023


Figure 6. Distribution of Values: Social Dominance Orientation

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

Table 5.
**Normality and Linearity Test**

Test	Sig.
Normality	0.186 (Monte Carlo Sig. 2-tailed)
Linearity	0.000

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

Figure 7. Normality plot (P-P)

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

Figure 8. Normality plot (Q-Q)

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

Figure 9. Scatterplot for heteroscedasticity

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023

Table 8.
Multicolinearity test

Variable	VIF
SDO_D	1.194
SDO_E	1.321
FR_Study_Circle	1.120
Age	1.196

Source: The result of our fieldwork survey (Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and Political In(tolerance) Survey) conducted in 2023