

Behind OPEC's Invitation for Indonesia to Rejoin: An Analysis of Membership Dynamics in an International Organization

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Abstract

The membership structure matters to ensure a durable negotiating forum in an international organization. However, in July 2017, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, on behalf of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), requested Indonesia to reactivate its membership, which the country had suspended—for the second time—in November 2016. The first suspension was in January 2009—annulled in January 2016. The Government of Indonesia (GoI) then welcomed the invitation. This study aims to analyze OPEC's membership scheme, which has given leeway to its members to send a request like the above. In-depth interviews were conducted with Indonesia's representatives in OPEC to capture the organization's internal condition. By analyzing the organization's membership dynamics, we can identify three reasons behind Indonesia's invitation to rejoin. The first is because OPEC's country members need Indonesia's presence in negotiations as they consider Indonesia neutral. Second, OPEC needs a country with a different attribute to strengthen the organization's image of diversity on the international stage. The third reason is the historical elements. OPEC strives to maintain historically good relations with the GoI as the country has contributed to the organization's development. For those reasons, an international organization might reinvite its former member to join the group.

Keywords:

international organizations; OPEC; Indonesia; membership status; rejoin

Introduction

Research on membership dynamics within an international organization has highlighted the involvement of new states (Droesse, 2020), suspended memberships (Sands & Klein, 2009), and intentions to rejoin (Droesse, 2020). For example, until the 2000s, two countries suspended their membership status in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), those are Ecuador and Gabon, and two other countries, Nigeria and Indonesia, followed to suspend. This condition threatened OPEC's oil production quota (Cuervo et al., 2008). The organization then invited the leaving members to rejoin, compelling them to consider the offer. The reasons for canceling or reapplying for

membership in an international organization are often analyzed from the point of view of the state's foreign policy (Droesse, 2020). This article offers a new perspective by analyzing the issue from the organization's point of view, i.e., the membership dynamics within the organization.

Scholars are inclined to explain Indonesia's behavior, hence reviewing Indonesia's decision and the possible return to full membership. Cabinet secretariat of the Republic of Indonesia (2016) argue that Indonesia's motivation to rejoin OPEC was that it could not independently solve the instability of global oil supply and demand. OPEC could protect Indonesia's oil export and import activities. Meanwhile, Brendt (2015) argued that the two reasons why

Indonesia reactivated its membership status are (1) the country needs technology experts from other OPEC country members to develop its domestic resources and (2) OPEC can ensure the energy supply and strengthen national energy security.

Indonesia withdrew from OPEC in November 2016 for the second time, sparking a debate regarding OPEC's membership regulations. Moreover, this second suspension was declared only ten months after the membership reactivation in January 2016. Chronologically, Indonesia's membership status is as follows. It first joined OPEC in 1962 and suspended its membership in January 2009. It rejoined the organization in January 2016 and suspended its membership yet again in November 2016. The rationale for the suspension in 2009 and 2016 was similar. The former Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ignasius Jonan, stated that the state of oil production in Indonesia was classified as a net oil importing country, so the membership status in OPEC would not bring any benefit (esdm.go.id, 2017).

Mid 2017, the Ministers of Energy of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), on behalf of OPEC, sent an official invitation to the GoI to rejoin the organization addressed to the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Indonesia (esdm.go.id, 2017). The GoI was honored with a direct invitation from OPEC's two largest oil producers to return to the intergovernmental organization. In response, Indonesia has requested special concessions to reactivate its membership status. The country also hopes that OPEC will not cut its oil production due to declining domestic production.

Indonesia is not the first member in OPEC's history to suspend membership. In 1992, Ecuador became the first country to suspend its membership due to its inability to fulfill an annual payment of USD 2 million and its reluctance to cut the oil production

quota (NewYorkTimes, 1992). Three years after Ecuador's suspension, in January 1995, Gabon followed suit for similar reasons. The government of Gabon stated that OPEC should be more considerate towards its members' domestic situations when stipulating the annual payment and oil production quota (Oil & Gas Journal, 1995). However, in 2007, Ecuador rejoined OPEC with the support of Venezuela, and Gabon returned in July 2016. Both countries maintain their active memberships today.

While Ecuador and Gabon exited and returned once, Indonesia seemed to go in and out of OPEC easily. This sparked debates regarding OPEC's regulatory powers in managing the relationship with its members. Also, OPEC is eager to ask for Indonesia's return, which is not the case for Ecuador and Gabon. International cooperation may show interest in inviting inactive members to rejoin, but it usually starts with a diplomatic approach from the closest partner. For instance, when the US showed no interest in participating further in the Paris Agreement, France's representative arranged a visit to the US president. The official visit was within France's agenda as the US' partner country. Different from this, OPEC as an organization, sent an official invitation directly to Indonesia, initiated by its two major players. This article investigates the rationale behind OPEC's insistence on keeping Indonesia as an active member.

Discussions about the relations between OPEC and its country members often center around why members withdraw from OPEC, not so much on how OPEC, as an international organization, acts upon the members' withdrawal. This study focuses on the organization instead of its members' projections. The findings fill the gap by providing a broader perspective of the organizational dynamics, both from the country members' and OPEC's points of view. This study approaches the issue from the perspective of an international

organization about its inactive member, which leads to an invitation to rejoin.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The second section presents a literature review that distinguishes the focus of this article from other discussions on OPEC and how the international organization theories might explain the phenomenon. The third section outlines the method. The fourth section discusses the empirical situation in light of the theories. The last section concludes the study.

Literature Review

The theoretical framework in this study consists of three main points. The first is how a member's resignation affects group coordination. The second is how significant players, e.g., group leaders, might take the initiative to invite a former member. The third is about the organization's point of view in inviting a former member to rejoin. This structure is expected to shed light on membership issues often debated in past studies (Droesse, 2020; Koremenos et al., 2003). Members shape an organization by, among others, influencing organizational decisions. Growth and reduction in the number of members affect organizational sustainability and effectiveness. In addition, sustainability lies in the compliance levels--the higher the compliance levels, the more effective and sustainable the organization will be.

Membership issues in international organizations may also be rooted in the exercised control. The number of members in an international organization stipulates how collective decisions will be made (Sommerer & Tallberg, 2017). The more members, the more negative impact on the decision-making process. Highly diverse members in an organization may also slow down negotiation processes, especially when each state member has a different capacity in the organization.

On the other hand, fewer participating members also affect negotiation and the

organization's ability to deal with crucial issues. Withdrawn membership, which often demonstrates organizational failures and ineffectiveness (Magliveras, 2011), decreases the number of participations. A sudden decrease in the organization's members may jeopardize internal coordination. In anticipation, international organizations set special clauses regarding membership withdrawal to maintain group stability and performance. Generally, the regulations assert how many years a country member needs to stay (Magliveras, 2011). For instance, the right to withdraw from European Space Agency and EUMETSAT is after six years of membership, which is legally binding (Magliveras, 2011).

When a member leaves, the remaining members must effectively address the imbalance within the organization, especially regarding finance, which comes from members' contributions (Magliveras, 2011). A short-term solution is to close the financial gap left by a resigning member by splitting the amount and distributing each portion to the remaining members. This method can be applied to obligations and services as well. However, the organization also needs new long-term strategies to fill the gap. Magliveras further argued that the solution is to find a replacement for the withdrawn member.

Replacing a withdrawn member in an organization needs active and inclusive participation from all remaining members. Important players in the organization often take the initiative to coordinate the process to decide the mechanism of filling in the vacancy in the organization. A country member considered an organization leader often delivers this function. This country usually has a high interest in international organizations, so it serves in a position of authority (Voeten, 2014). The de facto leader will oversee agenda setting, resolution drafting, and promoting specific principles. In other words, it has the most intense involvement in the design and delivery

(Barnett & Duval, 2019), so the most potent state usually takes the role.

In international politics, leadership matters in formal and informal institutional bargaining (Young, 1991). When a leader aligns with the organization's purposes, it steers the organization within the corridor of the existing rule (Barnett & Duval, 2019). The rules and principles governing the state members' behavior to cooperate with the organization are called institutional power. It mediates issues between members, as reflected in the organization's actions. A leading member often helps the organization identify the actors to deliver a solution (Barnett & Duval, 2019). In the case of membership withdrawal, a leading member is expected to use its diplomatic influence on the remaining members to monitor their compliance and attract new members. In addition, it can ask former members to rejoin. Therefore, leading members must prioritize good relations and active engagement with prospective members. Nevertheless, the relations with former members should be consistent with the existing organizational rules.

Approaching former members to rejoin the organization should align with its conditions as it influences membership composition. The consideration for inviting former members to rejoin is conformity to the current internal condition in the organization. Gray et al. (2017) argue membership involvement in an international organization needs to consider two factors because changes or shifts in membership configurations impact the dynamics significantly.

The first is how potential members would influence the decision-making process and outcomes. A desirable characteristic would be the ability to minimize potential internal restrictions or challenges (Gray et al., 2017). An international organization is an arena to negotiate national interests in various sectors. Different understandings and perceptions

become a challenge in a negotiation process. Members may also have bilateral disputes, which can lower their trust in each other. Disagreement between members in the long term may result in a negative outlook on the organization's effectiveness and sustainability.

The second consideration is the organization's need for diversity in its membership. Related to the first argument, different characters can change the organization's dynamics and decision-making. Different characteristics do not necessarily mean that countries will pursue their narrow interests only. Such diversity can also facilitate the emergence of common interests among all the member countries. Diverse multilateral configurations tend to evolve faster than homogenous groups (Gray et al., 2017). A member state with different characteristics than the majority within the organization can also reduce the potential of domination by certain members. Diversity also expands horizons and points of view, which may not happen when negotiations and deliberations occur within a homogenous group. Diversity factors may include a difference in material capabilities and geopolitics and the geostrategic position of the prospective member.

However, in reality, 'not so new' members may rejoin an established international organization. This may impact the organization's dynamic, especially when the former member is invited by a major player representing the group. The organization leader and other country members may readmit a former member with no hesitation because they have an excellent historical relationship, such as a meaningful contribution to the organization in the past, especially when the membership suspension by this former member was caused by other factors than disagreement with the organization's principles, norms, and rules. Recruiting this former member is considered safer because adaptation by the member and the organization will be more straightforward.

The member may give some conditions, but they may already be well understood by other members. In addition, the country's member's government has already understood the organizational dynamics and internal conditions.

Methods

This study uses qualitative methods to seek a deep understanding of the why question of a social phenomenon (Lamont, 2015). We conducted in-depth interviews to find information about OPEC's internal dynamics. The rationales of this data collection method are (1) to get a detailed description from the member regarding the organizational dynamics and (2) to focus the discussion on OPEC as the main research object. The interviews aim to obtain a general overview of OPEC-Indonesia relations, so the underlying conditions that had led to Indonesia's resignation and rejoin could be explained. We used structured interview questions to discover the common threads and answer the research objectives, covering (1) information about OPEC members' responses when Indonesia suspended its membership for the second time and (2) OPEC members' perspectives on the significance of Indonesia's participation in the group. The structured questions were coupled with follow-up questions whenever necessary.

The first interviewee was Purnomo Yusgiantoro, the former Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources of the Republic of Indonesia from 2000 to 2009. He was the Governor of OPEC from 1996 to 1998 and Secretary General cum President of OPEC in 2004. In our interview, Yusgiantoro stressed Indonesia's uniqueness compared to the other OPEC members as it is the only member from the far-east. Among the Gulf countries, Indonesia also introduces new culture that enriches the atmosphere.

The second interviewee, Maizar Rahman, was the Acting Secretary General of OPEC in 2004. He pointed out that OPEC is like an arena

of disputing countries. Indonesia's moves in the discussions were often charismatic as it maintained neutrality between conflicting nations like Iran and Iraq or Iran and Saudi Arabia. He argued that Indonesia's belief in its unique foreign policy—aiming to contribute to world peace and justice based on the National Constitution of 1945—has allowed the country to remain impartial in the OPEC conferences. Both interviewees also underlined the same points: historically, Indonesia has contributed to raising OPEC's prominence as an international oil organization.

The interviewees were chosen for their direct experiences within the organization. Since the interview results need to be validated for a more robust and objective understanding of the issue, we triangulated the data with information from document studies, such as reports, magazines, and past research articles. This process confirms the claims emerging in our theoretical framework. The finding shows that the research in this study confirms the reasons behind Indonesia's invitation to rejoin.

Results

Indonesia In-and-Out Actions: OPEC Internal Imbalance

Our research results show that Indonesia's leaving and rejoining OPEC twice have economic and political impacts on the organization's internal conditions. As stated in the literature review, when a member state leaves, the organization's revenue and negotiation dynamics in the decision-making process will be affected. OPEC had to deal with the impact of Indonesia's withdrawal in 2017. Indonesia left OPEC because the international society doubted the organization's ability to ensure oil price stability and control over the global oil market. The Indonesian government released an official statement that the national oil production had decreased, so it was no longer classified as a net exporter country. The international community believed this

decision was mainly triggered by OPEC's policy to reduce oil production (Sundaryani, 2016). OPEC expected that Indonesia would reduce its oil production by 5 percent, which was seven times higher than expected (Setkab.go.id, 2016; Sundaryani, 2016). The Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources, Ignasius Jonan, in an informal interview with the press, stated that Indonesia's revenue relies on the oil and gas sector, so cutting down the production (to increase the price of crude oil) will not benefit the country (Setkab.go.id, 2016).

The reason for Indonesia's withdrawal became a subject of speculation. The speculation is OPEC's incapability to manage its members' complaints regarding the oil production quota. OPEC applied an equal policy instead of a fair policy of high fees and restrictive quotas, which put some members in a disadvantaged position, including Indonesia (OPEC Statute, 2012). OPEC's internal management was scrutinized because, as an international organization, OPEC should be able to exercise fair practices for all members (Sundaryani, 2016). This exerted more pressure on OPEC, which had already been considered weak in regulating global oil prices.

Indonesia's withdrawal led to a financial imbalance. Each member had to pay the organization approximately EUR 2 million annually (Rahman, 2014). OPEC's Statute Chapter V (2012) about the financial provision stated that the organization operates on the principle of equal treatment. Therefore, all members had to pay a fixed annual subscription. This revenue is allocated to fund daily operations as OPEC consists of many departments to support the programs' management (Felor, 2017), including administration, research, and public relations. The administration department is responsible for providing administrative services such as OPEC's biannual conference mid- and end-year, emergency meetings, and biannual coordination among the board of governors. The research department focuses

on the energy, the oil market, and statistics. The public relations and information sector communicate progress from OPEC to the international community.

Once a country withdraws from OPEC, the Economic Commission Board (ECB) adjusts the budget to the decreasing revenue. In our interview, Yusgiantoro said, "Of course, Indonesia no longer had to pay the membership fee as this country withdrew from OPEC. The organization lost one of its important sources of revenue to fund the operations." This gap in the organization's income may or may not return to the state before the withdrawal. Indonesia paid the same membership fees as the rest of the country members, so its withdrawal left a gap in the budget. Magliveras (2011) suggested splitting the gap among the existing members. However, this is unfavorable because the annual membership fee would increase, burdening middle-income countries (Magliveras, 2011). The international community was aware that some of the OPEC members' national economies fluctuate (Nazari et al., 2019), such as the collapse of Iraq and Libya.

Another effect of Indonesia's withdrawal is the dynamics of negotiation within OPEC. Sommerer and Tallberg (2016) argue that the number of member states involved in the organization affects the group's negotiation. According to the OPEC Statute (2012) Chapter III, article 11, an OPEC conference can be held if the member states reach the three-quarters quorum. When conducting a conference, the group shall achieve unanimous agreement from all members. Indonesia's multiple exits and re-entries complicated the decision-making regarding changes in oil production's target (Lawler, 2015). The membership dynamics raised a debate on the individual production quotas' reenactment. This debate remains politically sensitive as it relates to market shares and member states' national prestige (Lawler, 2015).

Both the political and economic impacts above cannot be easily solved or prevented

because OPEC does not explicitly state the policy of membership withdrawal, especially regarding the length of stay before a member can suspend the membership. OPEC Statute (2012) in article 8 only mentions that if a member country plans to leave OPEC, it must notify the organization in advance and finish all financial obligations before the effective date. Secondly, a former member may reapply for full membership and be admitted if three-fourths of OPEC's full members agree. This has allowed Indonesia to cancel its membership status, although it had only been a member for a year in 2015. This short membership period shocked the rest of the members, especially because they had to pay a higher subscription fee to fill the gap in the budget.

Discussion: Approaching Indonesia

This section discusses how dominant players in an international organization may take the initiative to rebalance the organization after a member leaves and why these actors can represent the organization to reinvoke a former member. Dominant members are involved in designing the organization and are in a position of power (Voeten, 2014). Therefore, they can initiate and invite a former member to rejoin. These *de facto* leaders exercise their institutional power (Barnett & Duval, 2019) to approach a former member to come back and achieve the organization's purposes based on their close relationship.

Therefore, on behalf of OPEC, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE approached Indonesia. Saudi Arabia is particularly considered the *de facto* leader of OPEC. Saudi Arabia was one of OPEC's founding fathers and is the largest oil producer in the group. With its prominence, Saudi Arabia leads the decision-making of the production quota (Van De Graaf, 2017). Saudi Arabia tends to prioritize OPEC's stability and sustainability. Its pricing behavior is reflected in OPEC, which has its own vested political interests (Quandt, 1982).

Saudi Arabia's attempt to approach Indonesia was partly based on the close relationship between the two countries. Saudi Arabia was among the first countries to recognize Indonesia's independence and then built diplomatic relations in 1955, marked by the establishment of an embassy in Jakarta (Negara, 2017). Saudi Arabia acknowledges Indonesia as its Muslim sister country from Southeast Asia. Indonesians go on a pilgrimage journey to Mecca every year. In the oil sector, Saudi Arabia has several investments in Indonesia, such as the joint venture between Saudi Aramco and Indonesia's national oil company, Pertamina, in Cilacap Refinery (TheJakartaPost, 2017). With this political, economic, and social-cultural proximity and its prominent position in OPEC, Saudi Arabia is in a position to actively engage with Indonesia. In our interview, Maizar Rahman stressed that an invitation from Saudi Arabia is powerful and can signify the seriousness of OPEC's request for Indonesia to rejoin (Rahman, 2020). In fact, for many, Saudi Arabia's action on behalf of OPEC is considered the action of OPEC altogether.

The UAE is one of the largest oil producers after Saudi Arabia. Its active engagement with Indonesia demonstrates its strong support as an organization's leader. The UAE's decisions often align with Saudi Arabia's decisions, prioritizing maximum profit for the group. In the 48th OPEC Conference in 1976, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only members to increase the oil prices by 5 percent, while the others asked for a 10 percent increase (Al-Yousef, 1998). Recently, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been dealing with non-OPEC countries, such as Russia, in terms of oil production quotas to balance global oil prices. In the oil sector, the UAE investment in Indonesia grew continuously from 2010 to 2016. In fact, the UAE has become one of the key investors from the Gulf countries (Negara, 2017). Indonesia is considered an important partner and a

source of Asia’s future growth (Jensen, 2017). This economic relationship makes Indonesia a valuable strategic partner in Asia. The fact that the ‘dynamic duo’ of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are approaching Indonesia signals a strong motivation to stabilize OPEC’s group dynamics (Yusgiantoro, 2020).

The two leading countries have exerted their institutional power by extending the invitation letter to Indonesia. There are three reasons underlying this action. The first motive for inviting Indonesia to rejoin is its influence on the membership composition, as Indonesia has a role in the negotiation process. Yusgiantoro (2020) and Rahman (2020) argued that OPEC members regard Indonesia’s crude oil production and export as an important consideration. Discussions on crude oil export are heated as Indonesia is deemed to be shifting into a net oil importer. Meanwhile, OPEC prioritizes crude oil exports instead of oil product exports. According to OPEC Statute 2012 Article 7, an OPEC member is a country with substantial net crude petroleum exports and has fundamentally similar interests to other members. Based on the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) report, Indonesia’s petroleum production is declining, yet it exports crude oil, especially to the neighboring regions (US EIA, 2015). The Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Indonesia reported that growth in the export of petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals increased by USD 200 million from 2016 to 2017 (Kemendagri, 2018). Therefore, Saudi Arabia and the UAE decided to put this rule aside and invite Indonesia to rejoin OPEC. They consider the situation not a fundamental infringement of membership criteria. The return of Indonesia could add to the oil output of 900,000 barrels per day (BPD), pushing OPEC production to almost 32.50 million BPD (Lawler, 2015).

The second reason is that Indonesia’s presence affects the group’s diversity, which can boost the organization’s advancement

(Gray et al., 2017). Indonesia is expected to mediate the segregated political preferences among OPEC members (Yusgiantoro, 2020). Despite their great power relations on a wider political landscape, the bilateral and multilateral relations among OPEC members predispose a logic of its own within the organization. According to OPEC’s historical dynamics, matters unrelated to petroleum originate from the existing relations between members. Issues concerning Middle East politics have bled into the organization’s internal dynamics. Indonesia has an extensive history in OPEC and the international systems, so it can leverage its influence to ease the political tensions between members. The leading countries’ invitation to Indonesia reflects how OPEC needs its unique characteristics in the organization. Indonesia is the only Southeast Asian country in OPEC with a different political and social culture from the other Middle East country members.

Indonesia suits this role for a number two reasons. First, the principles of ‘freedom and active’ foreign policy mark a strong character unparalleled by other OPEC members. As regards internal coordination, Indonesia engages well with all OPEC members, despite the bilateral conflicts between the Gulf countries. During the clash between Iraq and Iran in the 1980s that Indonesia’s representative, Subroto, who also acted as Secretary General of OPEC, rearranged the seating configuration during the OPEC Conference in Bali (Nitisastro, 2011). Indonesia’s representative was seated before Iran and Iraq but then moved to the seat between Iran and Iraq to reduce possible tension. On another occasion, Indonesia did not show any partisanship when Iran confronted Saudi Arabia, nor when dealing with interests between moderate Gulf countries *vis-à-vis* hardline states, such as Libya (Nitisastro, 2011). Indonesia’s disposition emphasizes international peace, especially within OPEC, leading Indonesia to be known as ‘the wise man’ (Yusgiantoro, 2020).

Secondly, Indonesia's international image as a cooperative country is also attached to OPEC's image on the global stage, especially when engaging with non-OPEC countries and net oil importers. The principle upheld was 'from confrontation to cooperation'. When OPEC Secretariat was under Indonesia's leadership, the cooperation between OPEC and IEA was established in 1991 in Paris. After the meeting, the dialogue between the two institutions deepened, resulting in the creation of the International Energy Forum (IEF) (OPEC, 2010). OPEC became more open to the international community. In IEF, OPEC not only engaged with stakeholders to discuss the oil industry but also promoted relations with local and international media. OPEC's image had not been the most desirable, so the organization was often met with animosity from oil consumers in Western countries. They considered OPEC a questionable organization that could not be trusted to control the global oil price (OPEC, 2010). Indonesia tried to improve this situation. Subroto encouraged OPEC to keep open communication with the media. The international society responded positively to these efforts. In the US, the media labeled Indonesia's representative, Subroto, as 'the smiling secretary general,' who sought to show the world a more satisfying, kinder, and gentler face of OPEC.

The third reason OPEC invites Indonesia to rejoin is its historical role in expanding group engagement through active participation. Needless to say, Indonesia also has the capacities in decision-making processes and unique characteristics that make it a not-so-new prospective member. OPEC was in its infancy when Indonesia joined the organization in 1962. Seven years later, Indonesia was mandated to lead OPEC with the election of Elrich Sanger as Secretary General in 1969 for the first time (OPEC, 2010). In the following years, OPEC recognized the role of Indonesia in developing the organization.

By 2009, before leaving the organization for the first time, Indonesia had never shown any non-cooperation with OPEC. No significant publication was found about problems caused by Indonesia during its membership period. Compared to other members, Indonesia was classified as 'obedient' and properly participated in all discussions within OPEC. For example, Indonesia took prudent steps in response to the 1986 oil price collapse. It sought to stabilize prices by collaborating with other OPEC members and bringing other oil-producing countries into the fold. Indonesia was part of 'the three wise men' along with Nigeria and Venezuela, who initiated official visits to non-OPEC members (OPEC, 2010). They approached oil-producing countries such as Oman, Russia, and Angola, resulting in productive visits as the Sultanate of Oman signed a 'Declaration of Cooperation' with OPEC and offered the highest level of commitment to help adjust the oil production quota. Meanwhile, Angola later signed to become a full member of OPEC in 2007. While these efforts helped OPEC's stability, it was speculated that some members engaged in fraud by failing to comply with the oil production reduction scheme, resulting in rising global prices (Yusgiantoro, 2020). They pursued their narrow national interest by keeping the oil export quota to boost their national incomes.

Conclusion

According to the theory of international organization, losing a member may lead to internal instability. Therefore, approaching a former member could solve this problem by considering their historical records. In this case, an approach from a de facto country member could be influential.

From this picture, we can argue that OPEC needs Indonesia both for internal, among member countries, and external coordination with the wider international

community. Historically speaking, Indonesia has a good track record, causing no internal problems. Instead, it significantly helped the organization to develop. In short, both OPEC, as an organization, and OPEC's member states have good relations with Indonesia in a historical context. Therefore, reactivating Indonesia's membership is urgent because OPEC could benefit from having Indonesia as a member, which matches the criteria of the organization's needs.

To reiterate the explanation above, the urgency of reactivating membership status in an international organization can be understood by analyzing why OPEC, through its de facto leaders, insisted on inviting Indonesia to rejoin. OPEC experienced an internal imbalance after Indonesia's membership cancellation left burdens on the existing members. Therefore, leaders need to take action to fill the gap. In this case, Saudi Arabia used its institutional power to approach Indonesia with an argument that the country could still meet the organization's membership criteria in the OPEC statute.

At least three factors underlie OPEC's decision-making concerning the reactivation of Indonesia's membership status. First, Indonesia is a valuable member state that strengthens the organization's composition and remains influential in its oil production quota. Second, Indonesia's unique image has positively contributed to OPEC's international appearance, especially in bridging OPEC and non-OPEC countries and oil producers and consumers. The country has a significant role in reducing friction and challenges in organizational decision-making. Third, OPEC recognizes its good historical relations with Indonesia because its track record is good, causing no internal problems but helping the organization instead. According to those particular reasons, an international organization might ask its former member to rejoin and reactivate its membership status.

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