

Therefore, there are many assumptions that democracy has failed to develop in Arab countries after the Arab Spring flared up in late 2010 and early 2011. This seems to confirm the thesis of a pessimistic international political thinker related to the development of democracy in the Islamic world, such as Samuel P. Huntington, who believes that the prospects for democracy in Islamic states look bleak (Huntington, 1996). This pessimistic view sees that the Arab World (and the Islamic world in general) is undemocratic and unable to adapt to the global challenges of democratization (Hassouna, 2001). However, Tunisia emerged as one country that could answer this pessimistic view. On October 13, 2019, the Tunisian people had participated in the democratic party three times, with the elected leader being Kais Saied, aged 61 (Aljazeera, 2019). In 2011, not long after the political turmoil, Tunisia held presidential elections, and Moncef Marzouki was elected. In 2014, Tunisia held its second post-Spring presidential election, and Caid Beji Essebsi was elected. This is proof that Tunisia has succeeded in consolidating its democracy.

Tunisia's success in consolidating its democracy has resulted in the 2019 *Democracy Index* placing it in the position of *Flawed Democracy* with a score of 6.72 (out of 10.00). Tunisia's democracy index is above Indonesia (6.48), which started its democratic consolidation in 1998. This means that Tunisia has taken a tremendous leap in consolidating its democracy after *the Arab Spring*. Therefore, it is undeniable that only Tunisia has succeeded in consolidating its democracy in the last decade following the turmoil of the Arab Spring 2010. Some other countries have even been caught in civil war, such as Syria, Egypt has returned to a militaristic regime, and Libya has not yet completed its dualism of national leadership.

Literature review


Tunisia is the only country in the Middle East that has succeeded in consolidating its

democracy after the Arab Spring. Therefore, Tunisia's success has attracted scholars (scientists) from all over the world to conduct studies from various perspectives. Therefore, we find many publications, books, and journal articles, that discuss things related to Tunisia after the events of The Arab Spring 2011 ago. Several articles focus on looking at the democratic transition process, the consolidation process, and the role of foreign (foreign) countries, especially the European Union.

Farhad Khosrokhavar wrote an article entitled *Obstacles to Democracy after the New Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian and Egyptian Cases*. Here, Khosrokhavar compares democratization and the actors playing between Tunisia and Egypt, which began in late 2010 (Khosrokhavar, 2013). In Tunisia, for example, groups of entrepreneurs, unemployed youth, and netizens (youths active in social media) have become actors. Significant behind the demonstrations that toppled Ben Ali. Meanwhile, in Egypt, secular and pluralist groups initially became the main actors driving the demonstrations. However, over time, there was a change of actors in the two countries, namely the entry of Islamist groups to take over the leading role; Ennahda in Tunisia and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

Furthermore, Cristina Corduneanu-Huci, from the School of Public Policy, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary, wrote an article entitled *Autocratic checks and balances? Trust in courts and bureaucratic discretion, democratization*. In this article, Cristina compares the institutions that can carry out *checks and balances* in Tunisia and Morocco. Cristina said that the public trusts the judiciary in Tunisia to eradicate corruption more than the bureaucracy itself. This is a little different in Morocco, where the judiciary does not get the same trust as in Tunisia. However, the democracy in both countries lacks the trust of the public to eradicate corruption from authoritarian regimes (Corduneanu-Huci, 2019).

Figure 1.
Density visualization based on themes




Source: The Articles are processed using Vosviewer Application

Figure 2.
Words often used in articles
in Scopus indexed journals discussing
Tunisian democracy



Source: Processed using Word Cloud

Figure 3.
The relationship between democracy
in Tunisia



Source: Articles processed using the Nvivo 12 Plus application

by previous writers with the words *success* or *successfulness*. This space is filled with the presence of this article to read the keys to Tunisia's success in consolidating its democracy after a decade.

Method

This research is a research where the data analysis is mostly qualitative analysis. Therefore, in collecting data, the authors read 153 articles from reputable international journals (Scopus indexed) to see the themes discussed by the authors regarding democracy in Tunisia. We processed this article using Nvivo12 and VOSviewer. In addition, the author has followed the development of politics and democracy in Tunisia since the Arab Spring 2011 event through news published by reputable national and international media. The author also conducted a *Focused Group Discussion* (FGD) with experts in Middle East studies to sharpen the analysis of the study.

Theoretical Basis

This article was written to respond to Tunisia's success in consolidating its democracy after the 2011 Arab Spring. Therefore, in reading about the success of the consolidation of Tunisian democracy in that decade, the author uses the theory of democracy from Robert E. Dahl, Jack Snyder, and Georg Sorensen. These three theories are essential for us to use to justify the success of Tunisian democracy. Robert E. Dahl gave eight elements of a democratic state, and Jack Snyder introduced the terms *mature democracies*, *democratizing states*, and *nationalist conflict*. Meanwhile, Georg Sorensen introduced us to a model of the transition and consolidation of democracy.

Democracy According to Robert E. Dahl

Robert A. Dahl introduced the term "democratic foundation" to the world of politics. According to Dahl, three characteristics of democracy can be helpful operationally: popular sovereignty, political equality, and majority rule (Krouse, 1982). Then, these characteristics are further divided into eight more specific elements. At least eight elements reflect a democratic state system:

1. Freedom to form and join organizations (association and assembly)
2. Freedom of expression
3. The right to vote and be elected
4. Relatively open opportunities to occupy public office
5. The right for political leaders to compete for support or provide support
6. Alternative sources of information
7. Free and fair elections
8. Institutionalization of government policymaking refers to or depends on people's votes through voting or other similar methods (Dahl, 1971).

Dahl also tries to classify democracy in two forms: substantive democracy and procedural democracy or "polyarchy" (Dahl's term). Substantive democracy is a democracy that brings democratic principles and values into a practical order. Meanwhile, procedural democracy or "polyarchy" emphasizes the independence of the people in electing leaders. In essence, in a procedural democracy, the election of leaders and representatives of the people is carried out through elections.

Charles Tilly later developed this classification of democracy. According to Tilly, there are four public understandings of democracy that impact differences in interpretation and implementation of democracy. Here are the four public understandings of democracy:

1. Constitutional democracy
2. Substantive democracy
3. Procedural democracy
4. *Process-oriented* democracy (Tilly, 2007).

Until recently, democracy became universally popular because it was considered the best political system that mankind could adopt and rely on. Now, most nations and people can see it. Democratic transition, based on Dahl's theory, comes from internal/domestic

and external factors. Dahl said that the highly egalitarian political system, consensual, highly participatory, strongly protective, or personal and political liberties are highly “democratic” by usual criteria. This is the domestic factor of the democratic transition. However, people in one country may deliberately seek to use their resources to impose a particular kind of political regime on another country: outright foreign domination.

According to Robert A. Dahl, foreign influence will still exist in every system implemented by a country. Therefore, the movement of a country towards a democratic transition cannot be separated from external factors. Dahl states that the destiny of a country is never entirely in its own hands (Dahl, 1971). John C. Pevehouse has the same opinion. Pevehouse considers that international factors, especially regional organizations, have an essential role in the transition and sustainability of democracy (Pavehouse, 2005).

Therefore, democratic political institutions are formed because of the interactions built with outsiders or foreign factors. In many cases, domination that comes from outside (other countries) determines the wheels of government. Each country stands in an environment consisting of other countries. Under each regime, policymakers have to be aware of policymakers' possible actions and reactions in other countries. In this case, even the most emotional state can be limited by the influence or power of other countries.

Moreover, most countries participate more broadly in the global economy. Consequently, policymakers usually pay close attention to the actions and reactions of people from outside the country that are likely to affect the local economy. Countries must depend on international trade or foreign investment (Dahl, 1971).

After realizing the complexity of the influence of the international environment on the development of hegemony or polyarchy (“procedural democracy” in Dahl's term),

Dahl divides it into three forms. First, political actions from outside (foreign) parties impact domestic conditions, be it political, economic, social, or cultural conditions. Second, the actions of foreign parties can drastically change the options that exist in a regime without having to change the form of the regime. So, the international environment can change or reduce the options that exist in individual countries. Third, people in a country who deliberately use their resources to instill specific values can be called deliberate foreign domination (Dahl, 1971).

Democratization According to Jack Snyder

In his book, *Democratization and Nationalist Conflict*, Jack Snyder provides an exciting classification of a democratic state. Snyder distinguished that democratization consists of countries with *mature democracies* (MD) and *democratizing states* (DS).

Snyder provides a classification of democratic growth in a country with two stages. The first stage is what he calls *Mature Democracy* (MD), a democracy that is already at a mature/mature stage. In a country with a *mature democracy*, government policies, including foreign policy and military policy, are formulated by officials elected through fair elections. Various constitutional provisions and obligations limit officials' actions to civil liberties. In general elections, candidates for the government often lose and therefore have to relinquish their posts. Freedom of speech, freedom to organize to compete in general elections, and fair representation of various views in the mass media are considered prerequisites for implementing an overly fair general election. Snyder defines the *Democratizing State/State Towards Democracy* (NSMD) as a country that has just fulfilled one or more of the democratic prerequisites mentioned above, even though the country still maintains important undemocratic characteristics (Snyder, 2003).

The *Democratizing State/ DS* category is comprehensive, including countries such as the Czech Republic in the early 1990s, which carried out the transition from full autocracy to full democracy. Also included in that category is the former Yugoslavia near the country's split in 1991 when the first general elections were held with a little more freedom of speech, but not yet *overflowing* and *fair* (Snyder, 2003).

The question that arises in the minds of many parties is, of course, when does a DS succeed in becoming an MD? When can it be said that democracy in DS has been consolidated? Snyder wrote that some scholars use the formula of "two turnover rules" to mark the consolidation of democracy: democracy is considered to have been consolidated when power has changed hands twice through a general election process. Some say that democracy is consolidated if it is the only game in town.


This means that there is no way for political parties or groups to come to power other than winning fair elections. Finally, other scholars measure the extent to which a country

has demonstrated MD's institutional and legal characteristics, using various indicators such as the presence of competitive politics, regular elections, broad participation, limitation of executive power, freedom of speech, and respect. Against civil liberties including minority rights. If a country has achieved a high enough score in almost all of the above criteria that country has succeeded in consolidating its democracy. According to all the criteria mentioned above, countries that have passed these transitional thresholds are MD, not DS anymore (Snyder, 2003).

Transition and Consolidation of Democracy According to Georg Sorensen

George Sorensen argues that slightly different from Jack Snyder, the transition from an undemocratic system or rule to a democratic system involves several phases. Sorensen also added that the new regime will always be faced with a democratic system that is still limited, more democratic than the previous regime, but not fully democratic (Sorensen, 2008). Here Sorensen's theory is almost the same as

Figure 4.
Democratization Process by Georg Sorensen



Source: George Sorensen, *Democracy and Democratization, processes and Prospects in A Changing World*. 2008.

Snyder's theory but in a different language. Jack Snyder uses the term *democratizing state*, which stages toward a *mature democracy*.

More details of this consolidation and transition of democracy can be seen in the chart made by Georg Sorensen at figure 4.

The phases outlined by Georg Sorensen in the transition and consolidation of democracy are constructive in reading democratization in Arab countries, especially in Tunisia, after the Arab Spring 2011. Starting from the chart above, we can look at the phase Tunisia has been consolidating and implementing the elements (from Dahl's theory) of democracy over the last ten years.

Result

Tunisia is located in the northern part of the African continent. The Mediterranean Sea borders the country to the north and east, Libya to the south and southeast, and Algeria to the West. Tunisia is only 163,610 square kilometers, but the country's scenery is breathtaking. To the West, the coastline stretches beautifully, and near the border with Algeria, the mountains also line up. Tunisia got its independence from France in 1956. As a former colony, French influence at all levels of life was inevitable in Tunisia, starting from culture, politics, etc. It is no wonder that Tunis, the capital of Tunisia, is often known as a structure of three in one (city with three faces), namely Modern Tunis, Islamic Arab Tunis, and Roman Tunis. Since its independence from France until the political turmoil in 2011, Tunisia has only had two presidents, namely Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali. Bourguiba ruled for about thirty years. Ben Ali overthrew him in a peaceful coup on November 7, 1987 (Sahide, 2019).

Ben Ali became President of Tunisia from 1987 to early 2011. The end of Ben Ali's leadership began with the self-immolation of a young man named Muhammed Bouazizi, which then sparked a mass movement to overthrow Ben Ali's authoritarian regime.

This 26-year-old youth chose to trade fruit by the roadside because he did not get a decent job. In addition, there are still many rural and urban poor, including small businesses that are unable to compete in facing the world market. It was the police officers' harsh and arbitrary treatment that made Bouazizi take the shortcut and extreme. In addition, towards the end of 2010, the Tunisian economy deteriorated further. Tunisian inflation reaches 10 percent, and the ratio of foreign debt to GDP reaches 46 percent. Therefore, the demonstrators, who were triggered by Bouazizi, who demanded that Ben Ali step down, emphasized issues and complaints against the economy, namely unemployment, inflation, and the high cost of living (Angrist, 2011). Bouazizi's choice of life is undoubtedly a picture of Tunisia's desperate social life, not seeing a better future because of his authoritarian regime, and not being concerned with the people's lives at large.

Therefore, the resurrection of people's power, which originated from the self-immolation of Bouazizi, demanded a better life with a democratic system. Democracy is considered one of the solutions for the life system of the nation and state. Democracy is believed to bring the common good because democracy opens space for people to participate and seize their sovereignty so that their dignity can be protected and guaranteed by the state. Thus, the leaders of a democratic country will pay attention to the fate and lives of the people they lead. Thus, the social gap between the elite (leader) and the people can be avoided. This is the reason why Bouazizi's voice of democracy triggered the movement of people's power.

The resignation of Ben Ali from the presidency in January 2011 was due to the rise of people's power, which was the beginning of the democratization process in Tunisia. These are the first and second phases if we read Georg Sorensen's theory of democratization. The first phase was when the Tunisian people rose against Ben Ali's authoritarian regime in sympathy for

Bouazizi. The second phase was when Ben Ali chose to resign and fled to Saudi Arabia. After that, Tunisia entered a different phase, namely the phase to build a democratic political order.

Discussion

Building a Democratic Order


In 2011, not long after the political turmoil, Tunisia held a presidential election, and Moncef Marzouki was elected. In 2014, Tunisia held its second post-Spring presidential election, and Caid Beji Essebsi was elected. This is proof that Tunisia has succeeded in consolidating its democracy. On October 13, 2019, Tunisia held another general election for the third time after The Arab Spring, with its elected leader being Kais Saied, aged 61 (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Therefore, if we read the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia using Jack Snyder's theory, then Tunisia has entered the stage of *Mature Democracy*. This is because general elections have become the only way to change leadership and have also held general elections three times. Likewise, if we read it with Georg Sorensen's theory, Tunisia has entered a consolidation phase, namely the further development of a democratic order.

Therefore, Tunisia was the only country affected by The Arab Spring in late 2010 and early 2011, which succeeded in consolidating its democracy. Egypt failed halfway when its democratically elected leader, Mohammad Morsi, was coup d'etat by the military in 2013. Libya is trapped in leadership dualism. Likewise with Syria which fell into the pit of civil war. The result of this consolidation of democracy is that it is based on a report from the *2019 Democracy Index*, which places Tunisia in *Flawed Democracy* with a score of 6.72 (out of 10.00) (The Economist, 2019). Tunisia's democracy index is above Indonesia (6.48), which started its democratic consolidation in 1998 (Azhar et al., 2020). Data from the *Global Freedom Status* released by Freedom House in 2020 places Tunisia as a free country, the same as Western countries in general. The Western media then labeled Tunisia a "success story" (Haythem, 2020). Tarek Masoud also saw the democratic victory in Tunisia (Masoud, 2018).

Factors of Successful Consolidation of Tunisian Democracy

Kais Saied is Tunisia's third president who was elected by a democratic mechanism

Figure 5.
Tunisian Democracy Index



Source: (Freedom House, 2020)

in 2019. The emergence of Saied as the new leader of Tunisia is proof of Tunisia's success in consolidating its democracy after the 2011 Arab Spring. Reading the development of democracy in Tunisia by referring to Jack Snyder's theory, Tunisia has entered the stage of 'mature democracy' or has entered a phase with Georg Sorensen's theory of democratic consolidation in which a democratic culture is embedded in its political culture. The results of our study indicate that several factors determine the success of Tunisia in consolidating its democracy, namely internal and external factors. The internal factor is the firm foundation of civil society in Tunisia and the elites' political will, and the main political actors in Tunisia after Ben Ali's departure. The external factor is that the presence of international actors does not play double standard politics, which is an obstacle. Robert Dahl said that the foreigners may affect the chances of polyarchy or hegemony in a particular country in three ways, those are the actions, reactions, and expected action . The actions of the foreigners may and almost will have some impact on the democratization in a particular country and the actions of the foreigners may drastically alter the options available to the regime without necessarily altering the form of the regime. Last, people in one country may deliberately seek to use their resources to impose a particular kind of political regime on another country (Dahl, 1971)

Internal factors

Jan-Erik Refle, in his article entitled *Tunisian civil society and international links*, has outlined the critical role of civil society in Tunisia in guiding the consolidation of democracy so that democratization does not fail like in Egypt (Refle, 2016). Shelley Deane (2019), *Middle East Adviser for International Alert*, has also seen the important role of civil society in Tunisia after the Arab Spring in mobilizing the movement for change for democracy. We

can also see the firm foundation of democracy in Tunisia from the *literacy rate*, which is already in the medium category (with a score of 79), in contrast to Egypt, whose consolidation failed with a *literacy rate low*(71.2) (United Nations Development Programme, 2021).

Figure 6.
Literacy rate, adult (ages 15 and older)

| HDI Rank | Country | 2008-2018 | Note |
|----------|--------------------|-----------|---------------------------------|
| 95 | Tunisia | 79 | Medium human development (73.8) |
| 116 | Egypt | 71.2 | Low human development (59.0) |
| | Sub-Saharan Africa | 65 | Low human development (59.0) |
| | Arab State | 79.4 | |
| | World | 84.9 | |

Source: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/indicators/101406> (United Nations Development Programme, 2021)

Note: Human Development: Very high human development (98.1), High Human development (94.8), Medium human development (73.8), Low human development (59.0)

The movement *Civil Society / Civil Society Organizations* (CSO) that laid the foundation from below is like The Tunisian Association of Democratic Women (*Association Tunisienne des Femmes Démocrates*, ATFD), which was formed in 1989. Then there is *The Ligue Tunisienne pour la Defense des droits de L 'Homme* (LTDH), one of the first independent political organizations in Tunisia. Furthermore, there is an extraordinary traditional civic group in Tunisia, namely the General Union of Tunisian Workers (UGTT), founded in 1946 (Deane, 2013). These CSOs had played a significant role in laying the foundation and discourse of democracy in Tunisia; when the emerging people in power succeeded in overthrowing the Ben Ali regime in 2011, the consolidation of democracy was successful.

This strong Civil Society movement also certainly influenced the national mindset of elites who became the main political actors in

Tunisia after the downfall of Ben Ali's regime. Therefore, one of the main factors behind the successful consolidation of Tunisian democracy is the development of *twin tolerance*, which means mutual respect between religion and democracy (Lavie, 2019). According to Limor Lavie, this *twin tolerance* did not occur in Egypt, so its democratization only went backward. Indonesia succeeded in consolidating its democracy after the fall of Soeharto in 1998 because the phenomenon of *twin tolerance* was successfully put in place by the two largest socio-religious organizations in Indonesia, namely Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama.

The decisive role of CSOs is one of the factors in the development of *twin tolerance* so that the main actors of the Tunisian political elite have succeeded in laying the foundation of democracy constitutionally. They then succeeded in reaching a consensus with the concept of *civil state*, not *Islamic state* or *secular state*. The 2014 Constitution was successfully signed by political actors who came from different backgrounds (Lavie, 2019). Mustafa Ben Jaafar, Head of the Assembly, said, "This constitution is the dream of Tunisia. This constitution is evidence of the revival of the revolution. This constitution creates a democratic civil state" (Sahide, 2019). The constitution that was signed in 2014 contains elements of a democratic state, such as the existence of equality between men and women, and embrace all religious identities. However, they have the same perception to build rational civil, legal, and political policies. En Nahda, as the winning party in the 2011 election, realizes that democratic reconstruction is not the time to seek a monopoly of power or be driven by a familiar political majority, but rather consensus (Sadiki, 2014). This openness of political views from En Nahda is essential in paving the way for the success of Tunisian democracy

External Factors

Apart from internal factors, external factors also have a significant role in maintaining the

road map for the democratization of Tunisia. As we all know, the experience of several Arab countries failed in the democratization process due to the intervention of foreign parties, in this case, the United States (US). US foreign policy is indeed aimed at expanding and defending its national interests. To defend these interests, the US will do whatever it takes, including overthrowing the legitimate government. This was done by the US when it thwarted the democratic election results in the Palestinian National Authority in 2006. At that time, Hamas was the official winner of the election. However, George W. Bush, the US President at the time, refused to acknowledge Hamas' victory because he considered that he could not be part of the peace process because he still had an armed wing (*Hamas Menang Besar Dalam Pemilu Palestina*, 2006).

America's role in thwarting democratization can also be seen in the coup case against Mohammad Morsi in Egypt in 2013. Morsi was the president of Egypt, of the Muslim Brotherhood, who was democratically elected in 2012. However, the military did a coup against Morsi in July 2013. Obama denied any intervention that the US was behind Morsi's overthrow, but documents proved US involvement in funding support for the groups that overthrew Morsi (Selim, 2013). These facts show that the United States, on the one hand, is actively taking the initiative for democratization. However, on the other, it has contributed to thwarting democratic processes taking place in several Arab countries. This is a form of double-standard politics adopted by America in the Middle East, showing that democracy is a "project" of US foreign policy. The US will actively encourage democratization if it does not threaten its national interests. On the other hand, the US will cooperate with authoritarian leaders to safeguard its national interests and influence in the Middle East region (Sahide, 2019).

In Tunisia, it can be argued that America did not play much of a role after The Arab

Spring flared up. America's political stance in Tunisia is because Tunisia is a peripheral country and does not have abundant natural resources. America is also not worried about the rise of the political power of Islam in Tunisia, as was the concern about the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (Angrist, 2011). Therefore, the democratization process in Tunisia runs without obstacles coming from international actors. Such as said by Dahl that the actions of foreigners may and almost certainly will have some impact on the democratic transition in one state (Dahl, 1971). The European Union does exist for democratization but it does not apply double standards like the United States. Tunisia's success in consolidating its democracy in the last decade cannot be separated from the absence of foreign interference, other than internal factors, which thwarted the process, in contrast to Egypt (2013) and Palestine (2006).

Conclusion

The Arab Spring is a term that has been gaining popularity in the world of international politics, especially in Arab countries, since the beginning of January 2011. This term denotes the fall of several authoritarian regimes in the Arab world, starting in Tunisia with the end of the Zine El Abidine Ben Ali regime, followed by Egypt with the setback of Hosni Mubarak, and Libya, which succeeded in ending the dictatorial regime of Muammar Gaddafi. Political turmoil has also occurred in several other countries in the Middle East, such as Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria, whose political conflicts are still ongoing today.

The Arab people call this historical political event the *Al Tsaurat al-Arabiyyah*, namely a revolution that will change the order of society and the Arab nation after being led by an authoritarian system for a long time. In this system, government power is not limited, curbs press freedom, and creates a gap between the elite (ruler) who lives in luxury and the people who live in poverty. However, a more

popular term is "The Arab Spring," which is the season that is expected to be the starting point for the growth of democracy in Arab countries (Burdah, 2014).

However, after a decade has passed, only Tunisia has succeeded in consolidating its democracy in which the journey of Tunisian democracy over the course of a decade has been categorized as *mature democracy* (Snyder) or has entered a different democratic phase where a democratic culture has begun to be well-embedded in Tunisian political culture. (Sorensen). Freedom House later put Tunisia as a country free by 71 out of 100, in 2020. Tunisia's success in consolidating its democracy cannot be separated from the support that comes from internal and external factors. The internal factor is building the foundations of civil society and the openness and political maturity of actors after the resignation of Ben Ali. The internal factor is the "absence" of America in the consolidation of Tunisian democracy. Finally, this achievement of democracy in Tunisia also refutes political thinkers who are pessimistic about seeing democracy develop in the Islamic world. Tunisia has proven that Islam and democracy can go hand in hand following what Indonesia has shown the world. Indeed, most Arab countries failed to consolidate their democracy after the Arab Spring. However, the Islamic world must be optimistic in seeing the democratic future of Islam.

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