Media and Politics: 
Re-Thinking the Indonesian Broadcasting System

Masduki

Abstract

The emergence of the policy of broadcasting liberalization in the established democracies of Europe and North America, which is indicated by the absence of state intervention to broadcasting governance has been influencing broadcasting policy in the new democracies, including Indonesia. Is it true that Indonesia adopts a liberal broadcasting policy? This paper outlines two issues. First, the academic debate surrounding broadcasting system in the world. Second, discussion as stated by scholars on a thesis of the enactment of the liberal media system in Indonesia that is primarily based on the broadcasting policies after Suharto’s reign of power, among others Law 32/2002 on Broadcasting. Based on the intensive literature review, it can be concluded that the broadcasting system prevailing in Indonesia is not purely liberal, but a mix of liberal and authoritarian model, a unique character that also occurs in the post-communist and post-authoritarian states in Asia, Africa and Eastern Europe. This mix is indicated within the last fifteen years through the adoption of public and community broadcasters and the establishment of Komisi Penyiaran Indonesia (KPI) as an independent regulator that were accompanied with the existing control of the ruling government to public broadcasters (RRI & TVRI); the weak mandate of KPI and the omission of commercial broadcasting domination.

Keywords:
broadcasting system; liberalization; hybrid.

Abstrak

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Introduction

After more than 15 years of political reform, studies on Indonesian media system including broadcasting system at the university level remain limited. Earlier studies tended to establish a general conclusion on the adoption of pro-market policy, especially in broadcasting, by encouraging commercial stations rather than public channels (Sudibyo, 2004; Kristiawan, 2012; Lim, 2012; Nugroho, 2012; Rianto, 2012). In developing their studies, researchers used the macro political-economic approach of Herman & Chomsky (1998); Mosco (2008) by taking a focus on the new policies of the post-Suharto regimes including Law 32/2002. The law was considered as the driving force of the country’s integration into the era of media liberalization, or market dictatorship (Hidayat, 2000) by minimizing state roles in the media industry. The ownership monopolized by only 13 players in the television industry is viewed as the main liberal character that is supported fully by the government (Lim, 2012). Kristiawan (2012) illustrated the phenomena as ‘the dark passenger of democracy’.

Meanwhile, in his book on Indonesian Television under Global Capitalism, Armando (2015) describes various policies of the Suharto regime and its subsequent governments that encouraged liberalization, in particular the massive entry of global capitalists to the ownership structure of Indonesian television. He also associates the massive development of global advertising as the driver for broadcasting marketization which marginalized public service interests of broadcasters. Nevertheless, within the last 15 years, there are more complex trends which are not truly in line with the logic of liberalization described. The phenomenon of broadcasting politicization by media owners (Masduki, 2014; Pambudi, et al, 2015), and the strengthened political intervention over Television of the Republic of Indonesia (TVRI) raise the need for revisiting Indonesian broadcasting policy.

This paper would like to bridge the need for such discussion through a review of previous debates on the global broadcasting system as well as the Indonesian broadcasting system in particular. It lies with the concept of media system, since its beginning when ‘the four theories of media’ was popularized by Siebert et al. (1956); a criticism over the theory up to the three models of media system embarked by Hallin & Mancini (2004 & 2012). Media here does not mean as print only, but they include radio and television. This paper does not only examine the two pillars of media regulation, namely Law 40/1999 on Press and Law 32/2002 on Broadcasting, but it will deeply look into the implementation of broadcasting laws and the discourses behind the initiatives to revise Law 32/2002 during the shift of the Indonesian political system.

The questions to be answered in this paper are: based on the conceptual categorization of the global broadcast system, what is the real broadcasting system in Indonesia? What are the policies that prove it? In other words, the author aims to revisit the general claim coming from media researchers that Indonesian broadcasting system is a part of the global liberalization process since the fall of Suharto’s regime in 1998.

Methods

This paper is based on the intensive work during 2015-present. It consists of two activities: the intensive review over the past academic investigations on media system, particularly broadcasting system in the transitional democracies and the observation
of the dynamics of Indonesian broadcasting policies after the enactment of the Law 32/2002 on Broadcasting. The observation activity was in line with the author’s involvements in various public advocacies, mainly to reform public broadcasting system in Indonesia. Thanks to Thomas Hanitzsch of the University of Munich, for an inspiration to study media system.

On the literature review, as a writer, I examine two areas of issue: First, the previous academic debates of the theories of the press, including concepts on the broadcasting system from the classical model that was developed by Fred S. Siebert et al. (1956) up to Hallin & Mancini (2004; 2012). Subsequently, I criticize the past debates and try to correlate them with the current condition in the post-authoritarian countries, especially Indonesia. Second, I trace many of the Indonesian academic publications on the broadcasting policies over the last 15 years. Then, I criticize the use of a dominant academic assumption on the application of liberal system of Indonesian broadcasting policy, as well as offering an alternative insight of the existing Indonesian broadcasting system.

Debates of Broadcasting System

The term of system in this paper refers to a collection of units that is interconnected and it forms unity of a body or policy (McKenzie, 2006). In this context, broadcasting is a system consisting of several elements such analogue and digital technology; structure that organizes content production; and the content itself (Hardy, 2008). By combining two terms: system and broadcasting, broadcasting system can be defined as a unity of activity and or policy for the purpose of communicating to audiences with a number of patterns that have been observed in a coherent manner (McQuail, 2013). From an institutional point of view, broadcasting system is a network of platform consisting of television and radio operating in a region. Furthermore, broadcasting system is a complex relationship between radio and television institutions; state or government interest; and the public in certain areas.

The discourse of a broadcasting system is not separated from the general discourse of media system operating in a particular political regime. The relation between media system and political system was depicted by a number of thinkers such as Curran (2002), McQuail (2013) and McCargo (2012). They argue that any political system may influence certain characteristics of the media system, including broadcasting. In contrast, broadcasting may drive a shift of political regimes, from authoritarian to liberal or democracy.

According to Curran (2002), the intersection of broadcasting and political system is the long process of social-political change. It lies with five interpretive frameworks: liberal interpretation; populist; feminist; anthropological and radical. First, in a liberal interpretation, democracy takes place when broadcasting conditions are free from state control. Free television is considered capable of strengthening political accesses by conducting grassroots political education. Second, populist or cultural democracy. Broadcast media is an expression of the citizens’ consumption that leads to individuality of a liberal society. Consumers need television broadcasts that manage economic progress.

Third, in the feminist interpretation, Curran (2002) suggests double-fashioned media: they design interpretation of women’s stereotypes as a sub-system of social actors and acting as an agent of women’s political empowerment. Fourth, in the anthropological interpretation, broadcasting is considered as the guardian of national identity. In post-colonial and post-authoritarian countries, formulation of national identity involves television as an agent for strengthening social image. Fifth, radical interpretation is based on the macro assumption that politics and economy move in a circular manner: from authoritarian to liberal, to democracy or back to autocracy
that consequently determines a broadcasting system (Curran, 2002).

In an interplay of economic and political forces among actors and structures, broadcasting system is influenced by internal and external aspects. For example, the tendency of political intervention to the media hinders adoption of a democratic broadcasting policy (Voltmer, 2008). In this sense, Romano (2003) and McCargo (2012) noted, Indonesia has undergone a rapid reform of politics and broadcasting system over the past 15 years, however, it leads to an uncertainty of end result between consolidation to the democratic system, liberal or even moving back to the authoritarian model.

In the academic tradition of communication, assessment of the broadcasting system links to a broad study of media system. Initially, this study refers to a model developed by the trio of thinkers, namely Friedrich S. Siebert, Wilbur Schramm and Theodore Peterson (1956) through their book: *Four Theories of the Press*. The four theories consist of: Communist, Authoritarian, Liberal and Social Responsibility. The press in this context covers all platforms including broadcasting which in the 1950s had rapidly grown worldwide. The Communist and Authoritarian press theory has similarities in the state controlling over the performance of media via censorship and license. While the liberal system and social responsibility share similarities in self-regulation managed by media personnel.

The hallmark of the authoritarian media system is the placement of state as a dominant actor that limits the space of journalists and media institutions to maintain social order. In this sense, television as the dominant media is forced to be a regime’s propagandist. Interventions are made systematically by government ownership, censorship mechanism and operational permission. Private television can operate, but with the strict obligation to maintain the harmony of the ruling elite or to at least keep quiet in order to maintain calm in its operation. The application of authoritarian model in countries with economic development priorities such as Indonesia’s New Order era is considered as the practice of development journalism (Romano, 2003). News are packaged to include elite imagery.

The liberal press system is the opposite of authoritarianism. According to the history of the United States and Britain as ‘the birth mother’ of liberalism, the principle of individual rationality is totally allowed by giving freedom of television operation through individual ownership without government intervention. The basic concept of libertarian is a *free press-working in a laissez faire*; pluralism of information; providing views encouraging democratic societies that are in line with ideas of Milton, Locke, Jefferson and Mill. Theoretically, this system encourages presentation of empirical facts, however, in a free competition climate, there will be manipulation of facts for economic purposes (Siebert, et al 1956).

The communist media system is related to the theory of communism itself, which was originally created by Marx and Hegel (Siebert, et all, 1956). The media in this system are placed entirely as government instrument; ownership and personnel are integrated with government officials aiming to transmit the idea of a classless society, not a factual event or a routine activity. Broadcast media are run by the communist party such as in the Soviet Union, and criticism of its ideology is prohibited. This system rests on the assumption that the public is an apathetic entity, so that state intervention becomes necessary.

Meanwhile the social responsibility system is a mid-twentieth-century product in the United States, promoted by the Hustchins Commission in 1947 in response to a destructive libertarian media practice. Broadcasters in this system have a moral responsibility to maintain harmony and social norms through the code of conduct that is formulated and
agreed upon by the actors. Still, the scholars of this theory consider it as liberal, but in a responsible way. It places social interest through public broadcasting institution (Siebert, et al, 1956).

In its development, Firdaus (2012) noted, these four theories received criticism and innovation from subsequent media experts, such as Herbert J. Altschull (1995) and Hachten (1996). Hachten promotes a revolutionary media model, while McQuail introduces two other models: participatory development and democratic media, a modification of the two Siebert concepts: liberal and social responsibility. The main disadvantages of Siebert’s concepts are: the bias of post-war conditions when the US and the Soviet Union scrambled for political war. The theory also simplifies the complex portraits of each country. Moreover, the theory is mainly based on the political perspective of how media engages in relationships with the state, and its lack of a socio-cultural analysis (Hallin & Mancini, 2004) as well as the influence of economic system on the phenomena of broadcasting (Ostini & Fung, 2002).

Recent developments in the last two decades show a complexity that can no longer be measured on the basis of Siebert’s theory, especially after the collapse of Communism in the late 1980s. For example, Germany as one of the new democratic states has a unique character in broadcasting governance with a dual system modelling: equal treatment between public and commercial broadcasts. The German Constitution and Interstate Treaty since 1989 have equally regulated public broadcasters such as ARD and ZDF and commercial broadcasting as newcomers in the 1990s. This portrait differs considerably from such system in the UK which tends to apply the principle of media liberalism.

Based on intensive research in Europe and North America, Hallin & Mancini (2004) offers three models of media system representing the current situation that is better improved compared to the thesis of Siebert et al. The models consist of liberal, democratic corporatist and pluralized pluralist. First, the liberal model, as found in the UK, Canada & the US, features free media market competition, very weak state regulation as well as weak relation of media-political party with the application of objective journalism. Second, the democratic corporatist system (applied in the Central and Northern Europe especially Germany and Scandinavian states) characterizes the equality of commercial media position with media-based on social organization such as public broadcasters that are protected by law. Third, the Polarized Pluralist model (Southern Europe such as Italy and Spain), wherein the media are integrated into political parties and state officials play a key role in formulating broadcasting governance.

In developing their analysis, Hallin & Mancini (2004) use four indicators: First, the structure of media market, including media circulation; audience access and their tendencies as a source of news. Second, political parallelism or media connection with political parties; broadcast media orientation to audiences; journalistic position on the dynamics of practical politics as well as the structure of media ownership. Third, journalist professionalism, which is related to the degree of autonomy journalists have at work, their orientation to public interest, the availability of codes of ethics and codes of conduct, etc. Fourth, state’s construction of the media through the making of policies. This is related to the presence or absence of a sensor mechanism on the content of the broadcast as well as state subsidy over public broadcasters as in the UK (BBC) and the US (NPR and PBS channels).

With a sample of 18 European and North American countries, the categorization of Hallin & Mancini was considered as the most systematic study of media system after Siebert, et al (El-Richani, 2012; Voltmer, 2008). The two author’s category of media system includes broadcasting and it can be described such as Table 1.
The classification above is the ideal concept that is constantly tested by empirical conditions that occurred both in established and transitional democratic regimes. McCargo and Voltmer, et al. (in Hallin & Mancini, 2012) who have examined media systems in several countries outside Europe concluded, there is no single system operating in a country. In other words, there is the complexity and mixing of various media systems. Particularly, the impact of privatization and technological innovation can result in two possibilities: a single model of broadcast system or a diverse one. In this sense, authors argue that the Hallin & Mancini model can only be used as a general framework of media system studies. However, McCargo and Voltmer did not specifically include Indonesian broadcasting in their study object. Hence, this paper intends to fill this gap by using Hallin & Mancini’s framework.

**Table 1. Three Models of Media System**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media System &amp; States</th>
<th>Polarized Pluralist (France, Greece, Italy, Portugal)</th>
<th>Democratic Corporatist (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands)</th>
<th>Liberal (Britain, United States of America, Canada, Ireland)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political parallelism</td>
<td>High, politics over broadcasting system</td>
<td>External pluralism especially in national press; historically strong party press; shift toward neutral commercial press; politics-in broadcasting system with substantial autonomy</td>
<td>Neutral commercial press; information oriented journalism; internal pluralism (but external pluralism in Britain); professional model of broadcast governance – formally autonomous system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professionalism of broadcasters</td>
<td>Weaker professionalization</td>
<td>Strong professionalization; institutionalized self-regulation</td>
<td>Strong professionalization; non institutionalized self-regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of the State in broadcasting</td>
<td>Strong state intervention; press subsidies in France and Italy; periods of censorship; “savage deregulation” (except France)</td>
<td>Strong state intervention but with protection for press freedom; press subsidies, particularly strong in Scandinavia; strong PSB</td>
<td>Market dominated (less state intervention, except strong public broadcasting in Britain &amp; Ireland)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political history</td>
<td>Late democratization, polarized pluralism</td>
<td>Early democratization, moderate pluralism</td>
<td>Early democratization, moderate pluralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political culture</td>
<td>Weak participation, strong clientelism</td>
<td>Strong and collective participation</td>
<td>Strong and rational participation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Hallin & Mancini (2004 & 2012)*

**Broadcasting in The Transitional State**

In Asian post-authoritarian countries, the formation of broadcasting system may widely differ with such formation in European democracies. For instance, a tradition of partisanship is rooted formally and informally in post-authoritarian countries in Asia and this must be understood as a political parallelism between broadcasters and politicians (McCargo, 2012). Moreover, McCargo concluded that mainstream media including television and radio in Southeast Asia after the collapse of authoritarian powers tend to serve individual political actors, not merely serving the dominant government or political institutions and or opposition groups. Under the hegemony of new politicians and pro-free market actors, television channels become supporters of political liberalism and capitalism.
Referring to the opinion of communication experts (such as Jakobuwicz, 2008 and Voltmer, 2008), applying the Hallin & Mancini conceptions in countries outside Europe and North America faced empirical weakness. By proposing a typology of democratic transition based on three characters: the communist oligarchy in Eastern Europe, the militarized dictator in South America and the single-party dictator in Asia and Africa, Voltmer (2013) made a conclusion that what happens in new democracies is the mixing of liberal media system with local values growing amidst the political transition.

In his study of media system in Eastern Europe in late 1980s, Jakobuwicz (2008) found the absence of a single character in the broadcast system. This may have happened due to incomplete consolidation of pro-democracy actors, while new regimes wanting to maintain authoritarianism remains on guard. In this sense, adoption of both concepts of Siebert et al. and Hallin & Mancini without deep examination upon local situations will result in a false conclusion. In this regard, El-Richani (2012) assesses the need for new conceptual frameworks based on particular media conditions, for example at the Southeast Asian level or even at the provincial level within a country, the indicator may be the same as Hallin & Mancini’s model, but the sub-indicators may be different.

In Southeast Asian countries, broadcasting systems may vary. Thomson (2013) states there is a trend toward a mix of polarized pluralist and liberal models. As an illustration, since the late 1990s there has been strong policies in Indonesia and the Philippines to privatize television ownership, reducing direct control of the state to broadcast media thus opening up room for local and transnational capitalist entrepreneurs. Thailand approaches the model of a pluralist polarized system because of strong military intervention to radio and television in every transition of power, although liberalization policies are also adopted. In the Philippines and Indonesia, according to Thomson (2013), the political systems are more stable and they open up favorable conditions for liberal media system as a single model.

Unlike Thomson, McCargo (2012) & Romano (2010) consider broadcasting system in Southeast Asia as a collaborative model of liberalism and authoritarianism that continues to move following every change of political power. In Indonesia of late 1980s, the establishment of commercial television began with the ownership model that remained controlled by the family of former president Suharto. However, in the post-Suharto era, the implementation of broadcast media policy experienced high dynamics. By using the Hallin & Mancini media system indicators, these dynamics will be presented in another section.

Based on the above description, it can be concluded that there are three broadcasting systems experienced in post-authoritarian states including Indonesia: (1) homogenizing to a particular model e.g. liberal model, an imitative model referring to established democracies in Western Europe (Jakubowicz, 2008); (2) embracing several models without leniency toward a certain model; (3) assuming the hybrid model as its popularized by Chadwick (2013).

The idea of hybrid media system was promoted by Chadwick (2013) who based his study on the dynamics of technology; structure and behavior of media, including radio and television in the US and the UK. Chadwick uses four concepts: genres, norms, behaviors and organization, and defines hybridity as interdependent, complex and transitional systems. He considers power relations in broadcast media may be overlap. Moreover, changes of media governance are a continuity of events in the past.

In a macro-political perspective, hybridity is a mixed concept of democracy
and authoritarianism in transitional society. Diamond (2002) describes it as ‘pseudo democracy’ or ‘competitive authoritarianism’. Formal democratic rules are made, including freedom of expression and media, but political interventions by the government over the society remain to exist. The concept of hybridity is commonly used in social and political sciences. It is considered as a combination of elite control and individual autonomy, bureaucracy and so on. In this context, in the transitional political regimes, being a republic does not necessarily mean embracing a liberal democratic system. Conversely, being a republic does not necessarily mean state domination (Huang, 2009). In media organization, hybridity lies with a mix of public, government and commercial broadcasters (Chadwick, 2013).

However, Chadwick focused solely on broadcasting system in the United States and Britain, the two old democracies, and left broadcasting system in new democratic regimes as the next study of other researchers. This paper takes Chadwick’s perspective on hybridity of the media system, with a focus on the study of broadcasting system operating in Indonesia as one of the transition countries. The term transition here refers to O’Donnell’s (1986) concept as the fall of the old-dictatorial regime and the acceptance of the principles of democracy. In this situation, broadcasting policies remain unclear.

**Study of Indonesian Broadcasting**

As discussed, criticisms over Hallin & Mancini’s three classifications reinforce the argument of the need for in-depth study of broadcasting system in post-authoritarian countries in the sense that there has been no such systematic effort by academics for the new democracies. In Islamic countries for instance, as noted by Firdaus (2012), the effort to formulate a model of Islamic media system was firstly initiated by Maulana and Edward W. Said by criticizing the dominance of Western perspectives in viewing the relationship between Islam and the media. However, they did not represent the complex dimensions of broadcasting system in a country, particularly Muslim Arab countries.

This is similar to Indonesia wherein several studies of broadcasting system by Indonesian academics tended to be fixed with the classic model developed by Sibert et al., as an example is Anom’s study (2015). There is no systematic effort, among other criticisms to the existing concept of media system based in Europe and North America by combining it with the empirical conditions in Indonesia as a post-authoritarian state.

Over the past two decades, studies related to broadcasting policy in Indonesia tended to use macro political economic approach (Sudibyo, 2004; Sekundatmo, 2006; Kristiawan, 2012, Armando, 2015). Broadcasting is seen as a long history of the battles of actors within the backdrop of the political economy situations, and this fight is marked by a high conflict of interest between pro-reform forces and the remaining groups of authoritarian regimes. In this sense, Sekundatmo (2006) identifies three approaches of analysis.

First, the conservative and neo-conservative approach. This refers, among others, to the thoughts of Nisbet and Huntington (Sekundatmo, 2006) placing broadcasting as a popular cultural agent that destroys traditional values; injures formal democracy; and undermines social authority in society. Commercial channel is dominated by content exploiting citizens as consumers, undermining the culture and national identity. Within this framework, studies on television literacy had grown in various NGOs and universities.

Second, liberal approach with reference to experts such as Bagdikian, J. Gans, Carey and Newcomb (Sekundatmo, 2006). The approach believes in free market competition in broadcasting, however concentration of
ownership threatens freedom of expression as well as content diversity. Studies of Sudibyo (2004) and Sudibyo & Patria (2013) are included in this group. They investigated the dominance of commercial broadcasting that marginalized RRI and TVRI as public service broadcasters. Third, the radical approach which refers to Marxist thoughts such as Schiller and Chomsky (Sekundatmo, 2006). This approach views television as a hegemonic medium of the state, a regime’s propaganda machinery. Television is placed as an instrument of autocratic power and a tool of the elite’s domination over the general public. Moreover, the control of television by both capitalists and politicians in the new regimes forms a ‘false consciousness’ among the public for the sake of status quo. 

Using the theory of Siebert et al. (1956), previous researchers categorize the Indonesian broadcasting system as social responsibility which is characterized by the release of government control over radio and television content by establishing an independent regulatory body, namely the Indonesian Broadcasting Commission. But this category is too simplistic, in the sense that during the post-2000s period, there were political initiatives of the new government that undermined the autonomy of broadcasting practitioners, especially journalists, among others the idea of making state secrecy law and the existence of the Criminal Code.

Historically, pre-condition of the changes in the Indonesian broadcasting system was the momentum of political reform in 1998 marked by the end of Suharto’s authoritarian regime. This event was followed by the advent of various regulations issued by the Parliament, President and Ministry of Communication and Information. Concurrently, the global financial crisis affected Asian countries including Indonesia. According to Kristiawan (2012), the economic crisis and student actions voiced by commercial televisions owned by Suharto’s children and cronies encouraged the collapse of the patronimal power.

Media regulation is the main instrument used in observing how the country has redefined its role on broadcasting. The main regulation of broadcasting is Law 32/2002 on Broadcasting, which replaced Law 24/1997 which was published in Suharto’s era. Law 32/2002 was passed on 28 November 2002 and it has several stipulations encouraging liberalization (Masduki, 2007; Armando, 2015). Among them is that it paves way for foreign capital investment of broadcasting.
institution in Indonesia at a maximum of 20 percent. Moreover, the law allows cross ownership models and presence of commercial channels in the framework of free market competition, with advertising as the main source of income. The law also marks the transfer of some state authorities to the independent regulator.

According to Kristiawan (2012), changes of broadcasting policy in Indonesia after the New Order regime supported the growth of private television involving non-media capitalists with the main agenda of profit maximization, not merely disseminating information to the public. The market expansion encourages concentration of ownership by investors having close relationship to the political power (Armando, 2015). For example, since 2010 there has been a concentration of TV ownership in 13 groups of conglomerates, among others are the MNC Group, Jawa Pos, Kompas Gramedia and VIVA (Lim, 2012).

Leading up to 2016, the pro-market policy is accompanied by the government’s effort to return to authoritarian conditions of the past, particularly through the recent idea of revising the prevailing broadcasting law. My previous research in 2007 found complexities in Law 32/2002, that is a mix of encouraging broadcasting liberalization and managing authoritarian power. There is a contradiction between the text of the Law and its practice. The Law recognizes alternative broadcasting institutions for public and the community as well as an independent Indonesian Broadcasting Commission (KPI). However, in the implementation stage from 2002 up till 2016, there were many political interventions on TVRI and RRI operations; the emasculation of KPI power, among others, through the decision of the Constitutional Court 05/2003 which canceled the authority of KPI to draft lower broadcasting regulations.

The Law also introduces two contradictory broadcasting regulators, namely KPI in the field of broadcast content and the government (Ministry of Communications and Informatics or MCIT) in infrastructure and licensing sectors. This condition is totally different with such laws in the UK and the US that adopt a single regulatory regime. Indeed, Indonesian government through the MCIT does not want to remove its authority pertaining to frequency allocation and its licensing management. In terms of institutional power, the content of the Law contradicts itself. For instance, article 7 point 2 of the Law mentions KPI as an independent state institution regulating matters concerning broadcasting. This article implies that the KPI’s authority applies to the whole aspect of broadcasting interest. In contrast, article 33, point D limits the KPI’s authority to only assume a role as a recommending body in the process of frequency allocation.

In mid 2016, a draft of the Government’s version of the new Broadcasting Law proposed a limitation of KPI power to a mere supervisor of broadcast content, or no longer as a general regulator for all issues pertaining to broadcasting. This proposal, in addition to narrowing down the KPI mandate, is also a signal of the strong desire of government intervention over broadcasting that is identical with the old-authoritarian policy.

Based on the above illustration, it seems that the post Suharto governments since the Habibie era until Jokowi have no clear and consistent policy on how to take a stance on broadcasting development. Normatively, there is an effort to keep a distance from controlling content production, but by maintaining political intervention to the institution, the government automatically has access to control broadcasting in Indonesia.

Rahayu et al. (2016), in their current research on communication policy, identify an overlap in communications policy that reflect the directional crisis of communication and media system in Indonesia. Press Law no 40/1999 encourages freedom of publication,
however, it contradicts the Film law that still maintains censorship policy. Rahayu et al., also mentioned that broadcast digitalization policies during the last five years has resulted in a stronger state authority with a tendency to prioritize industry, not the public.

In the context of political parallelism, government relations with broadcasting can be observed through the position of RRI and TVRI in two issues. First, the authority to elect the supreme leader: Supervisory Board which according to Law 32/2002 is in the Parliament through a team formed by the government. Second, the provision of operational budget namely the annual state budget of revenue and expenditure or APBN. These two powers open a room for political intervention over the operation of public broadcasting. On the other hand, since 2002, government officials and broadcasters of RRI-TVRI are enjoying comfortable and interdependent positions, as well as disagreeing on the idea that RRI and TVRI become an independent corporation outside the government (Masduki, 2007).

In the commercial sector, the trend of media politicization has been emerging in the past 10 years, involving political actors outside government officials. The term politicization refers to a repeated history of media use for practical political interests in the Sukarno regime of the 1950s and 1960s (Kitley, 2000). In this period, broadcasting was owned by the government and its role was as a tool for public order. The recent politicization took place throughout the 2014 election wherein national televisions centered in Jakarta such as Metro TV and TVOne became a political imagery agent for their owners (Surya Paloh and Aburizal Bakrie).

In the early years of the 1998-2007 period, the growth of television industry was still in the consolidation stage with a very strong business style. However, during the 2000s, there was an engagement between owners of commercial TVs with the candidates for President/Vice President and even the political party leaders. This behavior changed TV performance from market player to a partisan actor. The owners who are a group of oligarchs (Winters, 2014) did not merely seek economic profit, but aimed at practical political positions. By the end of 2016, an updated draft of the Broadcasting Law from the Government proposed a controversial issue, namely the special broadcasting institution. Kristiawan (2017) considers this proposal as a step backwards which aims to restore broadcasting institution as an authoritarian political agent. It also reduces the existence of public broadcasting as a democratic model of broadcasting system.

Furthermore, in terms of public and community broadcasting, protection over both models in Law 32/2002 and its subsequent policies is very weak. Several policies issued from 2003 to the present day show the marginalization process of the two institutions. For example, Government Regulations 12 and 13 of 2005 only allocate 20 percent of the frequency quota for RRI and TVRI, in contrast to such institution in the UK (BBC) and Japan (NHK) that receive more than 40 percent. The same is experienced by community radio which only receives three frequencies, the rest is offered for private channels. In the content production, ministries and politicians kept intervening in the operation of RRI-TVRI through their positions as state budget provider (Masduki & Darmanto, 2014).

Journalist professionalism as the third indicator (refer to Hallin & Mancini, 2004) in the past ten years of Indonesian democracy shows a bleak portrait. On the one hand, there is freedom for television and radio journalists in producing news, freedom in setting up broadcast channels and association, and also the introduction of independent regulators such as KPI which becomes the guardian of broadcaster’s autonomy from direct state intervention through the issuance of codes of
ethics and the settlement of content standards on the other hand. These conditions enhance the need of professionalism in broadcasters that refers to the liberal system or social responsibility in the perspective of Siebert et al. (1956) and Hallin & Mancini (2004).

Nevertheless, radio and television journalists, especially in the network media, are still threatened to become practical political agents of their owners. In their study on the media independence during the last 2014-General Election, Pambudi, et.al. (2015) have confirmed this situation and they propose to revise Broadcasting Law 32/2002 in order to protect journalistic freedom in the television newsroom.

Moreover, physical violence against broadcast journalists that marks public resistance to both television and journalist partisanship continues to increase every year. In 2016, the Alliance of Independent Journalists noted about 130 cases of violence with police officers and local government officials as the main perpetrators of the violence (AJI, 2016). In summary, political pressures coming from media owners limit journalist professionalism and public trust over both media and journalists.

**Conclusion**

It can be observed that the broadcast system operating in Indonesia is a complex matter, and it does not simply refer to a single model, whether liberal, social responsibility or authoritarian (Siebert et al., 1956). Based on the three main indicators developed by Hallin & Mancini (2004 & 2012), namely political parallelism, that is the role government has over broadcasting and journalistic professionalism, the character of the Indonesian broadcasting system is seen to be approaching two models: (1) polarized pluralist and (2) liberal or free market system. This rectifies the previous argument of media observers on the application of liberal as the single model.

As commonly examined to occur in post-authoritarian nations of Asia and Africa, broadcasting system in Indonesia can be considered as a hybrid pattern, a concept that refers to Chadwick's (2013). The hybrid broadcasting system in Indonesia is a continuous progress and it marks the unfinished and contested ideas of broadcasting policy among stakeholders. The dualism of the broadcasting regulators between KPI and MCIT is a good example.

This study is intended as a preliminary effort to define Indonesian broadcasting system and it is limited to merely review past academic literature and take some empirical phenomena which transpired in the last 15 years of Indonesian democratic media system. In the future, more systematic studies are required, involving media, sociology and law experts in a collective research.

Particularly, it is necessary to assess the two sectors: First, what is the characteristic of broadcasting content over a decade in accordance with the hybrid system described by applying discourse analysis. Second, how public and private broadcasters respond in defending their interests amidst the mix of internal and external interventions from media owners, government, politicians and general public as well.

**References**


Government Decrees of 12 & 13/2005 on RRI and TVRI


Law 32/2002 on Broadcasting

Law 400/1999 on Press


