

THE INFLUENCE OF INDIVIDUAL AND SITUATIONAL FACTORS ON LOWER-LEVEL CIVIL SERVANTS' WHISTLE-BLOWING INTENTION IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to examine empirically the influence of individual and situational factors on the whistle-blowing intentions among lower-level civil servants in Indonesia. This research proposes a conceptual model where individual and situational factors influence the whistle-blowing intention among lower-level civil servants. More precisely this study used three variables as individual factors based on the theory of planned behaviour (the attitude toward whistle-blowing, the subjective norm, and the perceived behavioural control).

Two vignettes were used to manipulate three situational factors (the seriousness of wrongdoing, the status of the wrongdoer, and the personal cost of reporting). A survey questionnaire was distributed to 106 civil servants from government institutions in Indonesia by using convenience sampling. There are six hypotheses that were tested by using multiple regression analysis.

This research found that individual and situational factors successfully predicted a whistle-blowing intention. Specifically, research results indicate there are five antecedents of whistle-blowing intention among lower-level civil servants in Indonesia labelled: the attitude toward whistle-blowing, the subjective norm, the perceived behavioural control, the seriousness of wrongdoing, and the status of the wrongdoer. Further implications for practice and research are also discussed.

Keywords: *whistle-blowing intention, lower-level civil servants, theory of planned behaviour, individual factors, situational factors.*

INTRODUCTION

As financial crime, corruption in Indonesia is classed as an extraordinary crime. This is because corruption creates problems for economic growth. The effects of corruption are not only the loss of money but also social costs, including inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the economy as well as stagnation of economic growth (Mauro, 1995). Corruption is also extraordinary in terms of its characteristics, with corruption in Indonesia manifested mainly through the bureaucracy that pervades all levels of Indonesian society (see Olken, 2007; Newman, 2011).

An extraordinary crime needs an extraordinary effort to eradicate it. When almost all of the institutions, including the law enforcement institutions, are afflicted by corruption, the presence of a whistle-blowing system in an organi-

zation is crucial. A whistle-blowing system requires a collective effort inside an organization since it is effective in combating corruption only when all the organizational members participate. Participation in whistle-blowing system may be a response to provide information about the indications of corruption.

It should be remembered that the power of the whistle-blowing system will depend on the whistle-blower, as the participation of the whistle-blower is crucial to an effective whistle-blowing system. This is because the system will be useless if no one uses it to report any acts of fraud (Near et al., 1993). In the government, lower-level civil servants, as employees, are potential users of a whistle-blowing system because they are actively involved in the operational and technical activities of govern-

ment (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Due to their detailed knowledge about how their organization works, lower-level civil servants are those most likely to know about the existence of corruption in their workplace.

However, knowing about the existence of corruption does not mean that lower-level civil servants will report it. Consequently, researchers such as Park & Blenkinsopp (2009) have stated that the “gap” on whistle-blowing intentions among lower-level employees is worthy of research. First, there are a lot of factors that encourage employees to report, or not to report. If an organization can find out what factors influence the whistle-blowing intention, that organization can develop a system that will allow employees to become whistle-blowers. Second, lower-level employees are the closest resources to any act of corruption; hence, the investigation process can be started immediately when they supply the relevant and reliable information through a whistle-blowing system.

Previous studies of whistle-blowing intentions have addressed several implicated factors. Park & Blenkinsopp (2009) devised the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 2005), which consists of the attitude toward whistle-blowing, the subjective norm, and the perceived behavioural norm, all of which supported the hypotheses that these factors have a significantly positive effect on internal whistle-blowing intentions. Those factors are considered as individual factors.

However, these individual factors are not the only factors which affect the whistle-blowing intention. There is a possibility that the intention will change in a changing situation. In short, situational factors also influence intention. Research by Schultz *et al.* (1993) identified a negative relationship between the reporting of questionable acts and the personal cost of reporting, as well as a positive relationship between the seriousness of wrongdoing and the reporting of questionable acts. Meanwhile, research by Cortina & Magley (2003) used the status of wrongdoers to predict the whistle-blowing intention among employees. The research from Schultz *et al.* (1993) and Cortina & Magley

(2003) is considered to account for the situational factors.

This research is trying to examine empirically the influence of individual and situational factors on the whistle-blowing intentions among lower-level civil servants in Indonesia. The main question of this study is: What are the factors that influence the whistle-blowing intention among lower-level civil servants in Indonesia?

There are several rationales why the research question is important. First, there is the limitation from previous research, in that most of the previous studies on the intent to whistle-blow were undertaken in the private sector and thus there is little substantial analysis of case examples from the public sector. Second, this study attempts to partly address the lack of research within the context of developing countries by basing the research on the whistle-blowing intention in a developing country, where the actors and institutions operate differently compared to developed countries. Third, the reason for setting this study in the context of the governmental institutions is that corruption is still a big problem in the governmental institutions of Indonesia. Fourth, understanding what makes a whistle-blower blow the whistle is important for policy makers to create a whistle-blowing policy.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Whistleblowing Channels

Near & Miceli (1985: 4) gave the following definition of whistle-blowing:

The disclosure by members of an organization members (former or current) of illegal, immoral and illegitimate practices under the control of their employers to persons and organizations that may be able to effect action

The essence of whistle-blowing, based on the above definition, is the reporting of questionable acts to a certain entity (either an organization or individual) that is believed to be capable of stopping such actions (Near & Miceli, 1985). The whistle-blower engages in a decision making process to decide whether to give the information to parties that are internal or external to the organization. Kaplan *et al.* (2012)

described this option as selecting the whistle-blowing channel. Furthermore, the whistle-blowing options are not limited to internal or external channels. For example, Park *et al.* (2008) provided the typology of whistle-blowing. The typology consists of three dimensions: the formal versus informal, the anonymous versus identified, and the internal versus external, where each dimension represents a choice for employees.

Kaplan *et al.* (2012) found that whistle-blowers will behave differently in making the choice of the appropriate channel for them. Specifically, according to their research, a participant's reporting intention in terms of anonymous or non-anonymous channels is affected when there is a consideration of retaliation present. Moreover, each channel has unique advantages and disadvantages and the possibility to yield different reporting intentions (Ayers & Kaplan, 2005). As a consequence, the current research attempts to accommodate the different forms of whistle-blowing behaviour, by using different types of whistle-blowing channels. In summary, in relation to the whistle-blowing channel selection, this research focused on two types of formal reporting channels: the internal-anonymous and the internal-identified. In other words, the informal and external reporting channels will not be covered by this research.

Lower-Level Employees as Whistle-blowers

The whistle-blower is an important element in whistle-blowing since the whistle-blower must be present in order for the whistle-blowing to occur. Cambridge Dictionaries Online (2013) defines a whistle-blower as:

A person who works for a company or organization that tells an authority about something illegal happening within the company or organization.

In this research something illegal refers only to corruption since corruption is a frequent occurrence in Indonesia. In addition, the term "authority" in this research applies only to the internal whistle-blowing channel. This research also limits its scope to the internal whistle-blower. Internal whistle-blowers are members of an or-

ganization who report wrongdoing (Miceli & Near, 1988). In contrast, when information about wrongdoing is passed on by someone outside the organization, they are called external whistle-blowers.

There are two possible types of internal whistle-blower in an organization: upper-level employees and lower-level employees. These two internal whistle-blowers possess different powers in their reporting. Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) found that lower-level employees are uncomfortable about reporting fraud, especially when this fraud involves those in higher-level positions in the organization. They argued that lower-level employees lack the power to blow the whistle and effect changes in their organization. On the other hand, the position and power held by upper-level employees make it easier for them, rather than lower-level employees, to report fraud.

Despite the fact that lower-level employees are powerless compared to upper-level employees, they are considered as having the most potential as whistle-blowers in an organization. Research from the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2012) found that whilst most fraud in the private sector is conducted by upper management, other members of the organization, including lower-level employees, may have knowledge about the fraudulent activity. As an illustration, Moberly (2006: 1108), in relation to his analysis of the Enron case, stated:

Countless lower-level employees necessarily knew about, were exposed to, or were involved superficially in the wrongdoing and its concealment, but few disclosed it, either to company officials or to the public.


It is important to note that many studies in the field of whistle-blowing have been carried out without a clear separation between lower-level and upper-level employees, for example Park & Blenkinsopp (2009) and Schultz *et al.* (1993). Hence, the present study attempts to fill the research gap by focusing on lower-level employees as potential whistle-blowers.

Theoretical Basis

Many studies have investigated the factors that affect the whistle-blowing intention, and a considerable amount of literature has been published on that topic (e.g. Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Schultz *et al.*, 1993; Cortina & Magley, 2003; Near & Miceli, 1985; Miceli & Near, 1988; Keenan, 2000; Brennan & Kelly, 2007; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2006). Two common strands emerge from the previous literature, which are important in terms of the current study. Firstly, the previous research used the whistle-blowing intent instead of the actual whistle-blowing. The intention differs considerably from the actual whistle-blowing because the intent comes before the actual whistle-blowing. In short, the whistle-blowing intention must be present to make the actual whistle-blowing happen. In the study of behaviour, intention is a major factor in motivating people to take action. Intention is defined as the extent to which an individual willingly tries to perform a specific behaviour (Ajzen, 2005).

The second common strand is that all of the previous studies shared the view that the whistle-blowing intention is affected by certain factors.

For example, Park & Blenkinsopp (2009) support the hypotheses that attitudes toward whistle-blowing, the subjective norm, as well as perceived behavioural control as individual factors will affect the whistle-blowing intention. Other researchers, such as Schultz *et al.* (1993) and Cortina & Magley (2003), propose that situational factors like the seriousness of wrongdoing, the status of the corruptor, and the personal cost of reporting, have a role in affecting the whistle-blowing intention. Both individual and situational factors have been successful in predicting whistle-blowing intentions in different contexts, for example, among police officers in South Korea (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009), top management in multinational companies (Schultz *et al.*, 1993), and public-sector employees in the USA (Cortina & Magley, 2003). This study will consider both the individual and situational factors and apply them to the context of lower-level civil servants in Indonesia. The combination of these individual and situational factors is presented briefly in the figure1 below.



Notes:

Variable (a) is adopted from Ajzen (2005) and Park & Blenkinsopp (2009)

Variable (b) is adopted from Schultz *et al.* (1993)

Variable (c) is adopted from Cortina & Magley (2003)

Figure 1. Theoretical Framework

Individual Factors

Attitude Toward Whistle-blowing

Ajzen (2005) states that an individual's attitudes toward behaviour are the multiplication of the behavioural consequences and their assessment of those consequences by the individual. A civil servant is more likely to be a whistle-blower if he/she believes that such whistle-blowing will result in a positive outcome and the outcome is evaluated as important. For example the results of whistle-blowing may prevent serious harm to an organization and help eradicate corruption. It means that the more favourable the attitudes are toward the behaviour, the greater the possibility is that the person will form the intention to do the behaviour (Ajzen, 2005).

This variable consists of behavioural belief (b_i) and evaluation of behavioural outcome (e_i). After forming beliefs about such advantages or disadvantages, a person will make their own evaluation about the outcomes. A positive outcome supported by a positive evaluation of the outcome will lead to the intent to perform the behaviour. Therefore, the mathematical equation for attitudes toward behaviour is:

$$A_b \propto \sum (b_i e_i) \quad (1)$$

Attitudes toward whistle-blowing was found by Park & Blenkinsopp (2009) to affect the whistle-blowing intentions among police officers in South Korea. Empirically, there is a positive relationship between the variables of attitudes toward behaviour with a whistle-blowing intent. Therefore, in this research the first hypothesis is as follows:

H1: If lower-level civil servants in Indonesia have higher attitudes toward whistle-blowing, they will be more likely to report corruption.

Subjective Norm

Ajzen (2005) defines the subjective norm as a person's perception about the judgment of accessible referents (for example family, friends, co-worker, and society) on whether or not that person should perform a certain behaviour.

Subjective norms are a function of normative belief (n_i) and motivation to comply (m_i) with those referents (Ajzen, 2005). Normative belief has meaning as it is a person's belief that an individual or group around her/him will agree or disagree with the behaviour (Ajzen, 2005).

Motivation to agree or disagree with what Ajzen (2005) called accessible referents will create social pressure to perform or avoid the behaviour. More specifically, if someone believes that most of the referents think that the behaviour should be performed, it will create social pressure to perform the behaviour. Conversely, if someone believes that the behaviour should be avoided, it will create social pressure to not perform the behaviour. Therefore, the mathematical equation for subjective norm is:

$$SN \propto \sum (n_i m_i) \quad (2)$$

Prior studies have found that subjective norms have a significant positive effect on the whistle-blowing intention (see Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009 and Ponnu, Naidu & Zamri, 2008). The current researcher believes that lower-level civil servants are also subjected to social pressure regarding whether they should perform or avoid whistle-blowing behaviour. Assuming that civil servants work for society, this research added society as a civil servant referent. This research expected that a high subjective norm would lead to a strong whistle-blowing intention. Hence, the second hypothesis for this research is as follows:

H2: If lower-level civil servants in Indonesia have a higher subjective norm, they will be more likely to report corruption.

Perceived Behavioural Control

Alleyne, Hudaib & Pike (2013) define perceived behavioural control as the perception over the level of difficulty of performing a particular behaviour. Similarly to the previous two variables, this is a variable function of two elements: control belief (c_i) and perceived power (p_i) (Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009). Control belief is the belief about the presence or absence of factors that will encourage or inhibit the

behaviour (Ajzen, 2005). This factor will be weighted by evaluation of the power of the factor to facilitate or inhibit the behaviour (Ajzen, 2005) called perceived power. Perceived power is a second important factor in determining perceived behavioural control. In summary, greater perceived behavioural control means that the whistle-blower has the ability to overcome any difficulties in reporting fraud. Therefore, the mathematical equation for perceived behavioural control is:

$$PBC\alpha\sum(c_i p_i) \quad (3)$$

This research expected that perceived behavioural control would influence the whistle-blowing intentions among lower-level civil servants in Indonesia. This expectation is according to the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 2005) and previous studies by Ponnuru, Naidu & Zamri 2008 and Park & Blenkinsopp 2009 which indicate that perceived behavioural control influences behavioural intentions. Therefore, the third hypothesis is as indicated below:

H3: If lower-level civil servants in Indonesia have higher perceived behavioural control, they will be more likely to report corruption.

Situational Factors

Seriousness of Wrongdoing

Schultz *et al.* (1993) state that the seriousness of wrongdoing relates to the concept of materiality in an accounting context. It can be inferred that Schultz *et al.* (1993) measure seriousness from a quantitative perspective. Curtis (2006) provides a qualitative perspective on the seriousness of wrongdoing. For example, seriousness can be assessed from the probability of harm to others, the certainty of negative effects, and the occurrence of wrongdoing (Curtis, 2006).

Several studies have found the seriousness of wrongdoing to be positively related to the whistle-blowing intention (e.g. Schultz *et al.*, 1993; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Curtis, 2006; Curtis *et al.*, 2010). To illustrate this, more serious wrongdoing means that the wrongdoing

might involve substantial sums of money (Schultz *et al.*, 1993) and has the significance of causing potential harm to the organization (Curtis, 2006). Employees will have the perception that the more serious wrongdoing will be more likely to lead to corrective action by the organization than the less serious wrongdoing (Near & Miceli, 1985). This line of thinking makes sense since the organization will incur bigger losses from more serious wrongdoing than from less serious wrongdoing. Employees, as part of an organization, will feel they have a responsibility to protect their workplace from loss and harm.

Based on the above discussion, this research predicts that civil servants in Indonesia will have similar perceptions about the seriousness of wrongdoing. Hence, this study proposes the fourth hypothesis as follows:

H4: If lower-level civil servants in Indonesia find very serious corruption, they will be more likely to report that corruption.

Status of Wrongdoer

Cortina & Magley (2003) suggest that wrongdoing committed by a member of the organization who holds a high position is a thing that is not easily reported. This is because employees in higher positions have more power than employees with lower positions and wrongdoers in high positions can use their position to create retaliatory actions. In other words, the greater the power distance between the wrongdoer and the whistle-blower, the more the whistle-blower may suffer from retaliation. Fear of retaliation itself can prevent a potential whistle-blower from reporting wrongdoing. Then, it can be hypothesized that reporting intention is associated with the status of the wrongdoer in the organization.

According to Cortina & Magley (2003), employees in lower positions more often experience retaliation. Specifically, if the wrongdoer had a higher position and had more power in the organization, the whistle-blower would be more likely to experience retaliation when reporting the alleged offenders. Meanwhile, research by Ahmad, Smith & Ismail (2010) showed an in-

significant relationship between the status of the wrongdoer and the whistle-blowing intention.

Despite the mixed findings about the status of the wrongdoer, this research expects that lower-level civil servants in Indonesia may be reluctant to report wrongdoing which is committed by a highly placed member of the organization. Conversely, if they discover wrongdoing committed by a co-worker or a subordinate, they will be more likely to report the wrongdoing. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is:

H5: If lower-level civil servants in Indonesia find that the corruption is committed by a higher-level civil servant, they will be less likely to report the corruption.

Personal Cost of Reporting

The personal cost of reporting may be defined as the employees' views of the risk of retaliation from members of the organization, which could reduce their intention to report wrongdoing (Schultz *et al.*, 1993). Curtis (2006) adds that some retaliation could occur in intangible forms, for example, an unbalanced performance assessment, the refusal of pay increases, the termination of ones job contract, or transfer to an undesirable position. Related with the assessment of personal cost, the personal cost of reporting may be based on a subjective assessment (Curtis, 2006). Hence, the personal cost may be assessed differently across employees and it may also increase and decrease depending on other factors.

Previous research has identified the negative relationship between personal cost of reporting and the whistle-blowing intention (see Schultz *et al.*, 1993 and Kaplan & Whitecotton, 2001). Schultz *et al.* (1993), using multinational companies as the context, succeeded in predicting the intentions of managers in reporting wrongdoing. By using auditors as respondents, Kaplan & Whitecotton (2001) tested and extended Schultz *et al.*'s research on the whistle-blowing intention and found that auditors were less likely to report when their perceptions of the personal cost of reporting increased.

This research predicts that among lower-level civil servants in Indonesia, the personal cost of reporting will also be a factor which affects their intention to report. When lower-level civil servants feel that the cost to them of reporting wrongdoing is increased then their intention to report will decrease. Hence, the sixth hypothesis in this research is as follows:

H6: If lower-level civil servants in Indonesia feel there is a higher personal cost for reporting the corruption, they will be less likely to report the corruption.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Sampling Method, Sample, and Population

This research positions its method with that of previous research by using a quantitative paradigm and adopting the survey method as the method for collecting data (see Ponnu, Naidu & Zamri, 2008; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009; Zhang, Chiu & Wei 2009). This study obtained data from primary sources. Data were taken from civil servants who worked in central or local government in Indonesia. Primary data were obtained directly from the respondents by means of questionnaires. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available list of civil servants in Indonesia. Hence, this research used convenience sampling to select the sample. This study uses two approaches in collecting responses from civil servants: a paper based questionnaire and an internet based questionnaire.

The population for the purpose of this study is the lower-level civil servants of government institutions in Indonesia. As the civil service in Indonesia consists of central government and local government employees, this research will consider both of these government institutions. The sample in this study comprises civil servants with work experience of more than one year who are also lower-level employees and hold no strategic posts. The sample is differentiated by the type of institution in which the respondents work: whether central government or local government.

QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN

Research Instrument

The research instrument used in this study was not built from scratch but developed from previous studies in the field of whistle-blowing. One dependent variable and six independent variables were used in this study. Variable whistle-blowing intention was measured using a questionnaire from Park & Blenkinsopp (2009), whilst the independent variables of attitude toward whistle-blowing, perceived behavioural control, and the subjective norm were derived from the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 2005). The other antecedents were the seriousness of the wrongdoing and the personal cost of reporting, taken from Schultz *et al.* (1993), and the status of the wrongdoers, taken from Cortina & Magley (2003). As summary table 1 provides detail of the questions.

Vignettes Development

To manipulate situational factors and the whistle-blowing intention this research used vignettes as a tool. Vignettes were presented in a hypothetical situation from a first person point of view. The respondents were expected to be more familiar with real cases. However, it was not practical to present all of the information on the real cases. Hence, the cases were simplified by only presenting important information in the form of vignettes: the materiality of the wrongdoing, the position of the wrongdoer, and the type of retaliation faced by the respondent.

The first vignette relates to a mark-up in a procurement project. This type of fraud is common in the government sector. In Indonesia, based on research by the Committee for Eradication of Corruption (see ACCH, 2013) a mark-up on procurement projects is the most common type of fraud. Hence, the respondents would understand about this fraud. Vignette one has a high materiality in terms of the sum of money

involved in the fraud and is considered a serious fraud. The fraudster holds a high position as the head of department. The last piece of information is that the respondents are at risk of deferment of promotion if they report the mark-up.

The second vignette relates to fictitious expense claim. This type of fraud is also common in the government sector since it is really easy for a fraudster to carry out. Mostly the fraudster uses fake documents of transaction to manipulate expense claims. Unlike in vignette one, the second vignette involves fraud committed by a co-worker, which means the fraudster wields little power in the organization. The fraud involves a small amount of money compared with case one. The type of retaliation in this vignette is a worsening professional relationship with the fraudster. Therefore, the two vignettes are opposite in terms of the seriousness of the wrongdoing, the status of the wrongdoers, and the personal cost of reporting

Pilot Testing of the Questionnaire

This study used three stages of pilot testing, as suggested by De Vaus (2002). The first was the question development phase, the second phase was the questionnaire development, and the last stage consisted of polishing the pilot testing. Pilot testing was conducted on 12 respondents. Of these 12 respondents, 2 were specifically asked to evaluate the vignettes.

Reliability and Validity of the Questionnaire

Reliability

Reliability testing for all the variables in table 2 below showed that all items had a Cronbach's alpha of more than 0.7. Sekaran & Bougie (2010) state that a general reliability value of less than 0.6 is to be considered as poor, and a reliability value 0.7 is considered acceptable, whilst a value of 0.8 is considered as good. The closer the score is to 1.0 the better.

Table 1. Details of the Questions

No	Construct	Variable	Elements	Question	Origin
1	Dependent	Internal Whistle-blowing Intention	Report Anonymously Report with Identity	Rate the likelihood that you would report the act of corruption performed by the wrongdoer to internal parties in your organization anonymously Rate the likelihood that you would report the act of corruption performed by the wrongdoer to internal parties in your organization with identity	Park & Blenkinsopp (2009)
2	Independent: Individual	Attitude Toward Whistle-blowing	Behavioural Belief Evaluation of Importance	If you reported any acts of corruption in your workplace, do you agree with the following benefits of reporting corruption? If you reported any act of corruption in your workplace, how important do you think the following result would be to you?	Park & Blenkinsopp (2009)
		Subjective Norms	Normative Belief Motivation to Comply	Based on your belief, what do the following persons really want in relation to your intention to report any act of corruption in your organization? How much do you desire to follow what the following persons want you to do over not reporting or reporting any acts of corruption in your organization?	Park & Blenkinsopp (2009)
		Perceived Behavioural Control	Control Belief Perceived Power	If you reported any acts of corruption in your organization, how much do you agree with the following statements? Based on your belief, how influential do you think the following issues are to discourage your intention to report any acts of corruption in your organization?	Park & Blenkinsopp (2009)
3	Independent: Situational	Seriousness of Wrongdoing		Case 1: How serious do you think the act of corruption (mark-up) performed by the head of department? Case 2: How serious do you think the act of corruption (fictitious expense disbursement) performed by the co-worker?	Schultz <i>et al.</i> (1993)
		Status of Wrongdoers		Case 1: How powerful do you think the head of department in the organization? Case 2: How powerful do you think the co-worker in the organization?	Cortina & Magley (2003)
		Personal Cost of Reporting		Case 1: If you reported the act of corruption, how high would your personal cost (deferment of promotion) be? Case 2: If you reported the act of corruption, how high would your personal cost (worst professional relationship) be?	Schultz <i>et al.</i> (1993)

Table 2. Reliability Analysis

	Items	Cronbach Alpha	N
1	Attitudes toward whistleblowing		
	a. Behavioral Beliefs	0.78	5
	b. Evaluation of Importance	0.81	5
2	Subjective Norm		
	a. Normative Beliefs	0.72	5
	b. Motivation to Comply	0.84	5
3	Perceived Behavioral Control		
	a. Control Beliefs	0.84	5
	b. Perceived Power	0.87	5

Source: Output from SPSS

Validity

Factor analysis was used as a method to confirm that the instrument in this research had construct validity. Factor analysis indicates which items are most suitable for each dimension (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). This research used principal component analysis and varimax criterion for orthogonal rotation.

The 15 scales of individual factors were asked about twice by using 2 different questions, the first is about belief factors and the second is about evaluation factors. Each of the three constructs was divided into two components (belief and evaluation). The categorisation in factor analysis is based on the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 2005), which splits each variable of individual factors into a belief factor and an evaluation factor element. The belief factor group comprises behavioural belief, subjective belief, and control belief, whilst the evaluation factors are importance, motivation to comply, and perceived power. Factor analysis was only performed for individual factors since there was more than one item to measure the personal variables. In contrast, the situational factors were measured by means of a single item and therefore did not require factor analysis.

Belief Factors

A principal component analysis was conducted on the 15 items with oblique rotation (direct oblimin), whilst the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified the sampling adequacy

for the analysis as $KMO = .758$, which means that the sample was adequate (Field, 2013). An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each factor in the data. Three factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser's criterion of 1 and in combination explained 58% of the variance. This research retained three factors since they confirmed the theory about belief factors. Table 3 shows the factor loading after rotation.

The items that group on the same factors indicate that factor one represents behavioural belief, factor two represents normative belief, and factor three represents control belief. The table also shows that factor number 10 has a factor loading of only 0.352, which is below 0.50. However, the factor was not deleted since it was to be multiplied by its evaluation factor.

Evaluation Factors

A principal component analysis was conducted on the 15 items with oblique rotation (direct oblimin), whilst the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure verified the sampling adequacy for the analysis as $KMO = .772$, which indicated that the sampling was adequate (Field, 2013). An initial analysis was run to obtain eigenvalues for each factor in the data. Three factors had eigenvalues over Kaiser's criterion of 1 and in combination explained 62% of the variance. This research retained three factors since they confirmed the theory about belief factors. Table 4 displays the factor loading of evaluation factors after rotation. The items that group on the same

factors indicate that factor one represents evaluation of importance, factor two represents motivation to comply, and factor three represents perceived power.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics

A total of 80 questionnaires in paper-and-pencil format and 59 online questionnaires were distributed. In the paper-and-pencil format 70 questionnaires were returned (88% response rate) and in the online format 53 completed questionnaires were returned (89% response rate). From the total of 129 questionnaires, only 106 were usable. The 23 remaining questionnaires were unusable mostly because the respondent failed to complete the questionnaire.

The descriptive statistics show that the respondents were almost equally split on gender (49% male and 51% female). The largest age group was the age 26 - 30 group (32.08%). The majority of respondents worked in local government (76.42 %). The majority of respondents had worked for 1-3 years (44.34%) as civil servants. Most of the respondents were at rank 3 in their institution.

Hypotheses Testing

The results of the test and the subsequent analyses are discussed below. Table 5 shows the unstandardized regression coefficient (B), standardized regression coefficient or beta (β), the intercepts, multiple correlation coefficients (R), and the coefficient of determinations (R^2), for the model of the whistle-blowing intention

Table 3. Factor Loading of Belief Factors

No	ITEM	Rotated Factor Loadings		
		F1 Behavioral Belief	F2 Normative Belief	F3 Control Belief
1	Preventing serious harm to an organization	.669	.285	-.399
2	Eradicating corruption	.730	.279	-.365
3	Enhancing the public interest	.742	-.224	-.143
4	Performing one's duty as a public employee	.758	-.005	-.088
5	Moral satisfaction on one's part	.580	.224	.059
6	Members of one's family	.370	.638	-.022
7	Co-workers	.035	.809	-.276
8	Immediate supervisor	-.079	.722	-.299
9	Friends outside workplace	.036	.734	.064
10	Society	.281	.352	.178
11	The organization will ignore my reporting every step of the way	-.234	-.079	.792
12	The difficulties to be faced in the process of my reporting will be too great for me to endure	-.183	-.016	.802
13	My reporting won't make any difference	-.176	.072	.673
14	I will be subjected to retaliation from the organization	-.048	-.135	.790
15	I will get pressure from co-worker	.111	-.161	.759
Eigenvalue		2.151	1.972	4.688
Percent of variance		14.343	13.146	31.254

Source: Output from SPSS

Table 4. Factor Loading of Evaluation Factors

No	ITEM	Rotated Factor Loadings		
		F1	F2	F3
		Evaluation of Importance	Motivation to Comply	Perceived Power
1	Preventing serious harm to an organization	.848	.246	-.028
2	Eradicating corruption	.821	.216	-.057
3	Enhancing the public interest	.711	.062	-.070
4	Performing one's duty as a public employee	.790	.053	-.061
5	Moral satisfaction on one's part	.494	.387	-.020
6	Members of one's family	.121	.776	.175
7	Co-workers	.225	.807	-.033
8	Immediate supervisor	.189	.736	-.009
9	Friends outside workplace	.044	.853	.047
10	Society	.111	.637	.035
11	The organization will ignore my reporting every step of the way	-.042	-.004	.856
12	The difficulties to be faced in the process of my reporting will be too great for me to endure	-.163	.018	.866
13	My reporting won't make any difference	-.218	.035	.721
14	I will be subjected to retaliation from the organization	.016	.076	.785
15	I will get pressure from co-worker	.136	.068	.838
Eigenvalue		1.765	3.500	4.282
Percent of variance		11.765	23.336	28.550

Source: Output from SPSS

Table 5. Regression Result for Internal Whistle-blowing Intention Model

	B	S.E.	β	t	Sig.
Constant	1.514	0.506		2.992	**0.004
Seriousness of Wrongdoing	0.246	0.081	0.282	3.029	**0.003
Status of Wrongdoer	-0.270	0.108	-0.242	-2.498	**0.014
Personal Cost of Reporting	-0.051	0.093	-0.052	-0.553	0.581
Attitudes toward whistle-blowing	0.064	0.018	0.361	3.655	*0.000
Subjective Norm	0.035	0.017	0.191	2.018	**0.046
Perceived Behavioural Control	0.039	0.023	0.150	1.729	***0.087
R ²	0.332				
R	0.576				
F-value	8.183				

Note: *p<0.001, **p<.005, ***p<0.10

Source: Output from SPSS

From the table, a completed regression equation can be produced. By using standardized regression coefficients (β), the following is the regression equation for the whistle-blowing intention:

$$\text{IWB} = .361\text{ATB} + .191.\text{SN} + .150.\text{PBC} + .282.\text{SR} - .242.\text{SW} - .052.\text{PCR} + \text{error.}$$

Based on the model, a civil servant will be more likely to report corruption if that civil servant is in favour of reporting it (ATB), feels social pressure to report it (SN), and feels in control of reporting any act of corruption (PBC). In addition to individual factors, situational factors could make the intention to report either stronger or weaker. When a civil servant faces serious corruption (SR), the corruption is performed by a lower level official (SW), or the civil servant feels they have a low personal cost of reporting (PCR).

The next step was to examine the model R^2 . The R^2 of the regression model was 0.332 and the model was statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Field (2013, p235) stated that R^2 is “a measure of how much of the variability in the outcome is accounted for by the predictors”. Hence, R^2 for this model is 0.332, which means that all of the independent variables account for 33.2% of the variation in the internal whistle-blowing intention. There is 66.8% of variation which still remains to be explained by unobserved independent variables. Table 5 indicates that the model achieved an F-value of 8.183. The F-test is significant as $p < .05$. It can be concluded that the regression equation as a whole is statistically significant in explaining the internal whistle-blowing intention.

To assess whether each independent variable is significant or not Field (2013) explained that if the value in the column labelled *Sig.* is less than the level of confidence of 0.01, 0.05, or 0.10 (the p-value) then the predictor is making a significant contribution. Results from hypotheses testing shows that among the situational factors only the personal cost of reporting is not significant, while all of the individual factors are statistically significant.

Discussion

This research hypothesized that attitudes toward whistle-blowing have a positive effect on civil servants' whistle-blowing intentions (Hypothesis 1). The multiple regression results showed that attitudes toward whistle-blowing have a significant effect on the whistle-blowing intention. This result is consistent with the The-

ory of Planned Behaviour. Based on this theory, if civil servants have a belief that whistle-blowing will result in positive consequences, the intention to perform the action will be greater.

It is hypothesized that the whistle-blowing intention among civil servants would increase when their subjective norms are greater (Hypothesis 2). The results from multiple regression are consistent with results from previous studies. Subjective norms have a positive effect on the whistle-blowing intention among civil servants. This result is also consistent with the Theory of Planned Behaviour. Ajzen (2005) stated that the subjective norm reveals an individual's perception about whether other people think the specific behaviour should be performed. It can be concluded that civil servants in Indonesia have positive perceptions that other people will agree if they report any act of corruption.

Related with perceived behavioural control in Hypothesis 3, this study proposed that civil servants who have a higher perceived behavioural control are more likely to act as whistle-blowers. Results from multiple regression showed that perceived behavioural control is a significant variable. This result is consistent with previous results (Ponnu, Naidu & Zamri 2008; Park & Blenkinsopp, 2009). Hence, it can be concluded that perceived behavioural control is successful in explaining variation on the whistle-blowing intention. Supporting the theory, difficulties in performing whistle-blowing may be seen as a problem by civil servants.

This study hypothesized in Hypothesis 4 that civil servants are more likely to be whistle-blowers when the wrongdoing is serious. Previous research showed that the seriousness of wrongdoing is positively significant in affecting the whistle-blowing intention (Schultz *et al.*, 1993; Ayers & Kaplan, 2005; Curtis, 2006; Curtis & Taylor, 2010; Ahmad, Smith & Ismail, 2010; Robinson, Robertson & Curtis, 2012). Results from multiple regression showed a consistent relationship with previous research. The seriousness of the corruption has a significantly positive relationship with the whistle-blowing intention.

Hypothesis 5 proposed that civil servants will be less likely to report a higher level wrongdoer compared to a wrongdoer who has a lower position in the organization. Regression results showed that the status of the wrongdoer has a significant relationship with the whistle-blowing intention. This is also consistent with findings from previous studies (e.g. Miceli, Near & Schwenk, 1991; Cortina & Magley, 2003). What can be inferred from this finding is that a civil servant considers the status of the wrongdoer as a factor before deciding whether he or she will report the act of corruption.

An interesting finding emerged on variable personal cost reporting. Hypothesis 6 proposed that civil servants will be less likely to report corruption if they feel they have a higher personal cost reporting. Research result do not conform to initial expectations. Results from multiple regression failed to show support for hypothesis 6. This indicates the inability of the personal cost of reporting to explain the whistle-blowing intention. This result differs from that gained by Schultz *et al.* (1993), who reported that variable personal cost reporting was significant in the expected direction. A possible explanation for the result is that civil servants probably do not count personal cost as a factor in whether they should report or not report any act of corruption.

Generalizability of the Regression Model

Field (2013) states that the regression model that has been tested to produce complete regression equation is true for samples that have been observed. That means there are limitations for generalization of the model, preventing its use outside of the sample. Furthermore, in order to conclude that the regression equation can be used outside of the sample then there are several assumptions that must be met. These assumptions include the assumption of linearity, independent errors, homoscedasticity, normally distributed errors, variable types, and multicollinearity (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). Field (2013) stated that the violation of the assumption is a potential source of bias. Any biases create a problem to making the conclusion that the re-

gression model can be generalized. This research conducted four test to make sure the assumptions are met. In summary, since all the assumptions are fulfilled, the regression model can be used for generalization.

Conclusion

Results from multiple regression revealed that five of the six independent variables have a significant relationship with the whistle-blowing intention. It can be concluded that the factors that affect the whistle-blowing intention among lower-level civil servants in Indonesia are the attitude toward whistle-blowing, the subjective norm, perceived behavioural control, the seriousness of the wrongdoing, and the status of the wrongdoers.

The results from this study make a contribution to the literature by applying the theory in the context of developing countries, more specifically in the context of civil servants. The current study can be used as a basis to create effective whistle-blowing systems in Indonesia's government institutions. For example, this study demonstrates that civil servants are more likely to blow the whistle through anonymous reporting channels. Hence, the government should pay more attention to this type of reporting channel. Another implication of this study is that findings from both individual factors and situational factors can be used to enhance ethics training. Such training is useful in increasing attitudes toward whistle-blowing, the subjective norm, and perceived behavioural control. In addition, the training will help lower-level civil servants to deal with serious corruption as well as high profile fraudsters.

This study has many limitations, especially with generalization of the model such as an unrepresentative sample, a problem with convenience sampling, and a problem with the internet survey method. These limitations open a lot of possibilities for future research, for example by encouraging future researchers to explore other possible research methods to find the determinants of whistle-blowing intention. This research also encourages exploration of other factors which may affect the whistle-blowing intention

among civil servants. Using a more representative sample and more vignettes will also improve this research.

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