**THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE URALIC LANGUAGE FAMILY IN THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION**

**Abstract:** The study examines the territorial organization of the Ural peoples and languages, reveals the features of the regional interaction and population dynamics, addresses the problems of the ancestral homeland and ethno genesis, the role of Finno-Ugrians in the history of Russia, highlights the acute issues of preserving languages and culture. The research focuses on some features in the development of the Uralic ethnic groups within the framework of the Russian civilization. It is alleged that the ethnic and political consolidation of most Finno-Ugric tribes was born in the bowels of the ancient Russian state and the first sprouts of the future unity of peoples were born, and their role in the powerful national-state construction that unfolded on the huge Eurasian territory of Russia in the period between 16th and 20th century is analyzed. The outcomes confirm that the Finno-Ugric peoples have always been an organic part of the Russian ethno-cultural mosaic. They actively participated in the strengthening of the state, mastered its vast natural wealth, and created the economic power of the country. Due to the fact that in Finno-Ugric, significant attention is paid to the problems of preserving languages ​and culture among Samoyed peoples, which cannot be called Finno-Ugric, we propose to use the term "Uralistics" more widely. This is a more accurate concept and can be used in the study of cultural processes among the peoples united in the Uralic language family.

**Key words:** *Finno-Ugric regions; Finno-Ugric groups; Finno-Ugric peoples; ethnic groups; languages.*

1. **Introduction**

The most important means of human communication is language. It serves as a means of storing and transmitting information, and is also a cultural medium. The total number of ethnic groups in the modern world, depending on which cultural groups are considered peoples, ranges from 2.5 to 7.5 thousand [1]. The most commonly reported number of languages ​is 6 910 [2], although other figures are given, which can be particularly associated with a rather conditional border between dialects and languages. It is important to note that many peoples (cultural communities with a common ethnonym, i.e. self-name) either speak the language of their neighbors (for example, Irish), or use not one, but several languages (for example, Sami, Khanty), and there are no permanent links between language and ethnicity. But in most cases, the names of the people and of the language coincide.

All the peoples of the world are divided into 15 linguistic families and more than 45 linguistic groups, which are further divided into linguistic branches. Learning the languages of the peoples of the world is important not only because a language is a dynamic communication system that needs to be rationed and improved, but also because it is languages that usually form the basis of the classification of peoples understanding as cultural communities. The linguistic classification system is based on the principle of the kinship of languages and the cultural proximity of their speakers. The highest taxonomic unit in this classification is the family of languages.

The Uralic language family is represented by three language groups: 1) Finno-Ugric (Hungarians (Magyars), Finns (Suomi), Estonians (Estlased), Karelians, Sami (Lopari) (descendants of the oldest population of Northern Europe), Komi and Komi-Permyaks, Udmurts (Votyaks), Mari (Cheri (Cheri), (Cheri), 2) Samodic (Nenets, Enets, Nganasans and Selkups), and 3) Yukagir (Yukagirs and Chuvans) [3], although there are legitimate doubts that the third group belongs to the Urals.

Figure 1 simplifies Korhonen’s [4] Uralic tree, reflecting classification fairly closely.



Figure 1. The classification of the Uralic languages, based on Korhonen [3]

The modern geographical space of the Ural peoples was formed under the influence of a whole set of conditions and factors. Traditionally, the Uralic languages ​and peoples are distributed in Northern (from northwestern Scandinavia and the Baltic Sea to the northern Urals), Central, and Eastern Europe (in the Middle Danube basin), the middle Volga region and the Volga-Kama basin, as well as in some regions of Western and Eastern Siberia and the Far East. Currently, large groups and diasporas of the Ural peoples are also noted in other countries of the world, for example, in the USA and Canada.

There are 25 large and small peoples in the Ural language family (fig. 2).

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Figure 2. Map of the Uralic languages showing the locations of the languages under investigation. Geographical areas are based on information from Abondolo [5]

There are few large peoples, numbering over 1 million people. In 1980 it was: Hungarians with 14,400 thousand people (living in Hungary ― 73.1%, Romania ― 11.9%, USA ― 4.2%, Czechoslovakia ― 4.2%); Finns with 5,190 thousand people (living in Finland ― 85.3%, USA ― 5.8%, Sweden ― 5.8%); Mordovian with 1,200 thousand people (living in the territories of the USSR ― 100%); Estonians with 1,100 thousand people (92.7% living in the USSR) [6].

In 2010, the number of large Ural peoples decreased. The number of the Hungarians was about 14.5 million people, the number of the Finns was 5.5 million people, and there were about 1.2 million Estonians [7] (Table 1).

Table 1. Population dynamics and settlement ranges of the Ural peoples

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| People | The number of people, (according to population censuses, people) | | Settlement area in the territory  of the Russian Federation | Area of settlement abroad |
| 1926 | 2010 |
| Finno-Ugric peoples  Baltic-Finnish peoples | | | | |
| 1. Veps  (Veps, вепся, buttercups, "slightly") | 33 000 | 5 936 | Between oz. Ladoga, Onega and White, on the Republic of Karelia, Leningrad and Vologda regions | \_ |
| -27 064 | |
| 2. Vod  (vadyaline, vadyakko) | - | 64 | Leningrad region (villages of Krakolye and Luzhitsy), St. Petersburg, Moscow | Northeast Estonia |
| 3. Izhora  (Izhora, Izuri, Ingra) | 17 000 | 266 | Leningrad region, St. Petersburg, Republic of Karelia | Estonia |
| -16 734 | |
| 4. Karelians  (Karjalizet, Karjalani) | 248 000 | 60 815 | Republic of Karelia, Tver, Leningrad, Murmansk, Moscow, Arkhangelsk, Novgorod, Kemerovo, Vologda, Sverdlovsk regions, Moscow, St. Petersburg | Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Finland |
| -187 185 | |
| 5. To set | - | – | Pskov region, Krasnoyarsk territory | Estonia |
| 6. Liva (Livi) | \_ | \_ | Leningrad region. | Coast of Latvia |
| 7. Finns  (suomalaiset) | 134 000 | 20 267 | Republic of Karelia, Leningrad region, St. Petersburg | Republic of Finland, Canada, Norway, USA, Sweden |
| -113 733 | |
| 8. Finns-ingermanlandzy  (incerilinene) | - | 441 | Republic of Karelia, Leningrad region, St. Petersburg | Estonia |
| 9. Estonians  (Estas, Zestlasted) | 150 000 | 17 875 | Leningrad region, St. Petersburg, Krasnoyarsk, and Krasnodar territory, Pskov, Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Moscow | Republic of Estonia, Latvia, Ukraine, Australia, Canada, USA, Sweden |
| -132 125 | |
| 10. Sami  (Sami, Samm, Lopari) | 1 700 | 1 771 | Murmansk region | Republic of Finland, Norway, Sweden |
| +71 | |
| Volga Finno-Ugric peoples | | | | |
| 11. Maris  (маар, Mari, maria, "cheremisa") | 428 000 | 547 605 | Republic of Mari El, Republic of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Udmurt, Kirov, Sverdlovsk, Volgograd region | Kazakhstan, Ukraine |
| +119 605 | |
| 12. Mordva  (moksherzyat) | 1 335 000 | 744 237 | Republic of Mordovia, Republic of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Chuvash, Samara, Penza, Ulyanovsk, Moscow, Nizhny Novgorod, Orenburg, Saratov, Chelyabinsk regions, Moscow, regions of Siberia and Central Asia | Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, USA, Canada, Australia |
| -590 763 | |
| Perm Finno-Ugric peoples | | | | |
| 13. Besermyans  (beser, beserman, Beshermians) | - | 2 201 | Basin of the river. Cheptsy (a tributary of the Vyatka River), Yukamensky, Glazovsky, Balezinsky and Yarsky districts of the Udmurt Republic, Kirov, Sverdlovsk region | \_ |
| 14. Komi  (Komi Mort, Komi Voityr, "Zyryan") | 226 000 | 228 235 | Komi Republic, Arkhangelsk, Murmansk, Tyumen region, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area, St. Petersburg | Republic of Finland, Ukraine |
| +2 235 | |
| 15. Komi-Permyaks  (komi otir, komi yoz) | 149 000 | 94 456 | Perm and Krasnodar territories, Komi Republic, Tyumen, Sverdlovsk, Rostov regions, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area | Kazakhstan, Ukraine |
| -54 544 | |
| 16. Udmurts  (odmort, odmurt, udmort, "votyaki") | 514 000 | 552 299 | Udmurt Republic, the Republic of Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, Kirov and Sverdlovsk regions, Perm territory | \_ |
| +38 299 | |
| Ugric peoples | | | | |
| 17. Mansi  (manxi, mendsi, moan, "voguli") | 5 800 | 12 269 | Khanty-Mansi Joint-stock Company Ugra, Sverdlovsk, Tyumen region | \_ |
| +6 469 | |
| 18. Khanty  (khante, khanti, khande, "ostyaki") | 22 000 | 30 943 | Khanty-Mansi Joint-stock Company Ugra and Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Tomsk region | \_ |
| +8 943 | |
| 19. Hungarians  (Magyars) | 4 200 | 2 781 | Komi Republic,  Moscow, Krasnodar and Stavropol Territories, Tyumen region | Hungary, Austria, Canada, Germany, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, USA, Ukraine |
| -1 419 | |
| Samoyed peoples | | | | |
| 20. Nenets | 44 640 | | Arkhangelsk region, Nenets Autonomous Area, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area, Krasnoyarsk territory, Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Area - Ugra | \_ |
|  | |
| 21. Enets | 227 | | Krasnoyarsk territory | \_ |
|  | |
| 22. Nganasans | 862 | | Krasnoyarsk territory | \_ |
|  | |
| 23. Selkups | 3 649 | | Tyumen region, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Area, Tomsk region, Krasnoyarsk territory | \_ |
|  | |
| Yukagir peoples | | | | |
| 24. Yukaghirs | 1 603 | | The Republic of Sakha - Yakutia, Magadan region | – |
| 25. Чуванцы | 1 002 | | Chukotka Autonomous Area, Magadan region | – |

At the beginning of the 21st century, the number of the Uralians did not exceed 25 million people. The number of large Ural peoples with a population of 1 million or more decreased. Mordovians (744 thousand people) dropped out of this group. The number of the Hungarians amounted to about 15 million people, of the Finns to 6.0 million people, and of the Estonians to about 1.1 million people [8].

The number of the Ural peoples in the territory of modern Russia in 1926 was 2.9 million people, in 1970 it was 3.1 million, in 1989 ― 3.2 million people, and then began to decline so that in 2002 it decreased to 2.6 million people, and in 2010 to 2.3 million people (or 1.6% of the country's population).

**2. The Methods**

In the process of research, methods of spatial analysis, information technologies, as well as a systematic approach in the study of historical and geographical observations of social phenomena and processes were used. The applied geoinformational analysis made it possible to assess the structure of the resettlement spaces of peoples, to identify their territorial interactions and formulate certain problems. The use of information technologies and software products in the analysis allowed to:

1) evaluate the national policy strategy based on civic patriotism. A citizen living in the country should not forget faith and ethnicity, but they could not place ethnic and religious interests above the laws of the State;

2) make the key idea of strengthening civil unity;

3) understand that the choice of language, ethnicity, religion, lifestyle is a purely a personal matter of an individual. The interference with this choice is an attempt to violate the cultural rights of citizens;

4) use the possibilities of information technologies and software products in studying the complex picture of the change in the number, composition and resettlement of the peoples of the Uralic language family. This is necessary for the development of the targeted policies in the cultural and demographic development of ethnic groups.

This study used quantitative analysis methods based on the official data from the state censuses and current statistics, as well as the qualitative analysis methods that made it possible to describe the settlement and cultural ties of the peoples in a comprehensive and multidimensional manner.

1. **Result and Discussion**

The historical destinies of the Ural peoples are closely related to the history of Russia [8]. Moreover, initially, the Russian state was created as a kind of alliance of Slavic and Ural, or rather East Finnish tribes. As it is known from the annals, the Old Russian state was created in 862. The Russian statehood arose with the direct participation of the Varangians, when Prince Rurik "came to the words" founded the political center of the new state "the city of Ladoga" [9]. Even if Rurik himself was not a Varangian, as some researchers are trying to prove, Varangian squads, Varangian trade (the way from Varangian to the Greeks) played an important role in the integration of the associations 0f tribes that lived on the Eastern European plain at that time. At the same time, it is important to note that a very indicative phenomenon is hiding behind the scarce information of the annals because not only the East Slavic population turned to the Varangian prince Rurik. Among the five tribes that called a foreign ruler to Russia, only two were Slavic (Krivichi and Slovenes), and the other three (miracle all) and Merya) were Finnish or Finno-Ugric, as they say now. Obviously, the tribes that called for the reign of the Varangian leader did not accidentally turn to a foreign prince, but did so, realizing the need to improve the management of the lands on which they lived side by side, that is, they realized both territorial unity and the commonality of interests, and the result of this awareness was a common search for an authoritative ruler for an emerging early state association. Thus, Russia as a state is the fruit of the joint efforts of the Eastern Slavs and Uralians. Vod, Izhora, Karelians, Veps (who were often called a miracle) until the beginning of the twentieth century, although the term "miracle" was also used for the generalized name of all the Finnish peoples), were originally part of the Old Russian state, and other Ural peoples became part of it later. Moreover, the Ural peoples (primarily Finno-Ugric) played a very significant role in the formation of the Russian people, whose representatives began to be called Great Russians since the 18th century.

The question of the role of the Finnish component in the formation of the Russian ethnic community has long been the focus of research. This issue is debatable, and prominent Russian historians and ethnographers took part in its discussion. Many historians, including famous scientists such as N. M. Karamzin, M. S. Soloviev, S. V. Yeshevsky, were of the opinion that the Finnish tribes voluntarily became part of the lands of the first Old Russian state, and then Veliky Novgorod and Moscow Russia and gradually dissolved among the Slavic population. D. I. Illovaysky, and later V. O. Klyuchevsky and S. F. Platonov also wrote about the assimilation of the Finnish-speaking inhabitants of the North Russian regions. At the same time, S. F. Platonov noted that not only the Russians who migrated to the north assimilated the local miracle population, but also the Slavs of the Rostov-Suzdal land mixed with the miracle tribes, which had a significant impact on their cultural appearance. V. O. Klyuchevsky, summarizing historical materials regarding the problem of the interaction of "Russia and miracles," came to the conclusion that the results of this interaction affected the religious consciousness and mythological representations of the Great Russians in terms of their anthropological type.

But, along with the prevailing opinion in pre-revolutionary historiography about the active participation of the Finno-Ugrians in the formation of the Russian ethnic community, there were other opinions. So, in 1893, academician A. I. Sobolevsky expressed the idea that the theory of peaceful colonization of the Finnish lands by the Russians was incorrect. He pointed to the annals of evidence talking about the campaigns of the Novgorodians to the Western miracle, cited legends about the "miracles of the white eye" and their struggle with the Slavs, and pointed out that the share of Finnish borrowings is small in the Russian vocabulary, which means the scale of peaceful and consistent cultural interaction between the Slavs and Finnish tribes is not so significant. Similar positions were held by some other scientists. However, with the beginning of mass archaeological research, new evidence of Slavic-Finnish ties appeared. In particular, A. S. Uvarov's study of the mounds of Vladimir land showed the presence of significant archaeological material, which spoke of the presence of the Finnish component in the very center of the future Russian state. The atlas "Antiquities of the Finno-Ugric North", compiled on the basis of archaeological materials, prepared by the famous Finnish scientist I.R. Aspelin, actually confirmed the idea that the Finnish tribes were not displaced by the Slavs from their habitats, but continued to live in their former places, until the complete assimilation.

One of the greatest specialists in the field of East Slavic ethnography, D. K. Zelenin, in the 1920s, also addressed the question of the role of the Finnish influence "on the Great Russian tribe." He considered this issue both in the introduction to his most famous work, "Russian (East Slavic) ethnography", and in a special article published in the LOIKFUN collection in 1929, where he recognized that the Russians were of mixed origin, but nevertheless claimed that the Finnish-speaking population of Eastern Europe did not take part in this mixture. The position of D. K. Zelenin, however, caused sharp criticism on the pages of the magazine "Ethnography" in 1930, with which M. T. Markelov and the future academician S. P. Tolstov spoke. Tolstov rightly noted that in different periods of history, relations between the Slavs and Finns were different and the degree of the Finnish influence on the process of the formation of the Russian people cannot be assessed without the connection with a specific era. In contrast to D. K. Zelenin, one of the founders of the Soviet historical school, Professor M. N. Pokrovsky, stated that the non-Slavic admixture is approximately 80 % among the Russians [10].

Discussion of the 1920-1930s did not finally solve the problem of Slavic-Finnish interaction and in subsequent years, researchers returned to it again. Today, however, the idea that the influence of the Finnish-speaking peoples on the ethnogenesis of the Russians was significant has become dominant.

Researchers draw attention to the fact that many toponyms and hydronyms in the European north of Russia and in the central regions are of Finnish or Samoyed origin [11, 12], including the name of the capital of Russia. A common version of the origin of this name is its translation from the Finnish name "Cow Creek" ("mosk" ("wash") ― calf, cow, "va" ― water) [13], although, of course, this is only one of the assumptions.

The analysis of historical information characterizing the interaction of the Finno-Ugric and the Old Russian state and the Moscow kingdom gives us a very complex picture of this interaction, because in different eras and with different peoples, the relations developed in different ways. Moreover, it is very significant that different groups of the same people had their own history of relations with the Russian state. So the mountain Mari voluntarily became part of the Moscow kingdom and adopted Orthodoxy, which was deeply rooted in their cultural environment. At the same time, the meadow Mari, after the capture of Kazan by Tsar Ivan the Terrible and the conquest of the Kazan Khanate, waged a long struggle with the new government. This struggle was called the "Cheremis Wars" and lasted from 1552 to 1592 [16], when the Mari, together with the Kazan Tatars, and then the Nogais and Voguls (Mansi) opposed Moscow.

Both the Novgorod Republic and the Grand Duchy of Moscow, as well as the Moscow kingdom, fought for quite a long time against the raids of the Ostyaks (Khants) and Voguls (Mansi), and therefore, as the Moscow kingdom was strengthened and its expansion to the east intensified, the question arose about the need to conquer the Siberian Khanate and other Siberian lands. The campaigns of the army of Yermak and other Cossack detachments in Siberia are often characterized in history textbooks and historical literature using a simple phrase ― "the conquest of Siberia by the Russians". But since the Russian state was initially multicultural and the Ural tribes took a direct part in its formation, so long as the further expansion of the state could not take place without the participation of the Uralians. There were quite a lot of Komi-Zyryans in the "Russian" detachments, and therefore a large number of Siberian villages and villages are still called Zyryanovka, Zyryanka, etc. [15]. The Cossacks also had Kod Khanty allies, and later many other Siberian peoples who no longer belonged to the Ural language family (for example, Yakuts) [16].

Over time, the Uralians, like the groups of other peoples that became part of the Russian state, became more and more firmly integrated into the country's general cultural and political space, and their elites became part of the Russian elite. At the same time, from the second half of the 19th century, on the outskirts of the Russian Empire, along with the integration processes, there was an increase in the nationalist sentiment, and the formation of national movements took place. This was most obviously manifested in Finland (the Grand Duchy of Finland), which was annexed to Russia at the beginning of the century after the Russian-Swedish war of 1808-809. At the same time, the Russian government itself contributed to the growth of the nationalist sentiment in Finland, which encouraged the Fennomanian movement in order to weaken the Swedish influence in Finland, helped to establish the national Finnish intelligentsia, ousting Swedish from office work and the education system. But by the beginning of the twentieth century, the Fennomanian movement was increasingly politicized, its representatives demanded not only the expansion of the Finnish autonomy, but also increasingly supported anti-Russian and anti-Russian slogans and ideas and tried to extend the influence to Karelia [17]. Thanks to the efforts of the nationals and social democrats, the so-called "national issue" began to be actively discussed in the Russian Empire.

It is useful to mention here the conclusion reached at the time by the founder of the Faculty of Sociology of Harvard University (USA), the famous native of Komi, Pitirim Sorokin. As polemicizing with those who adopted the "national question," he noted that few can give a reasonable answer to the questions "What is nationality? What are its elements? What are its hallmarks?". But, trying to answer the questions himself, Sorokin concluded his reasoning with the following conclusion: "While the national principle coincides and does not contradict the slogan of social equality, we heartily welcome national movements...". But, as soon as the national principle becomes a means of oppression of one group toward other groups, we turn our backs on it, bearing in mind that the highest value is "an equal human person". The fullness of rights must be granted to every individual, without the distinction between "Hellenes and Jews, slaves and free ones". "The individual on one hand, and "all-humanities", on the other, are things that cannot be overlooked anywhere and at any time, like the inextricable sides of one great ideal" [18].

The Bolsheviks did not adopt either the idea of "humanity" or the revolutionary ideals of the French Revolution, which proclaimed the idea of citizenship and civil equality. They laid the foundation for the domestic policy on the concept of a divided society. In contrast to the ideas of the French Revolution, instead of freedom and equality, they put forward the idea of dominating the political life of the country by only one social group ― industrial workers who were supposed to exercise the "hegemony of the proletariat".

Ethnic minorities were to become an ally of the proletariat, since many groups of "foreigners" did not have a developed class structure and, therefore, they were more prepared for the formation of a new classless structure of society, which the Bolsheviks sought in theory.

In order to attract the minorities, the Bolsheviks rejected the idea of the nation, as well as the idea of the state people, and therefore excluded the Great Russian ethnonym from their cultural vocabulary. Instead, they counted on the domestic politics on the doctrine of ethnic nationalism. This doctrine was based on two key provisions: (1) each ethnic group must have its own national-state education; 2) within the framework of their own state education, this group received the status of "indigenous", and the rest of the population belonged to the "non-indigenous" peoples. An indigenous ethnic group could claim political dominance and other preferences in national-state education [19].

Based on this doctrine, the new authorities began to scrap the old administrative division of the country and began the process of so-called national-state separation, which supplemented the process of political and social differentiation. Union republics were created for large peoples, autonomous republics for smaller ones, followed by national regions, districts and national regions. And as a result, a unique ethnic federation was created [20], the analogues of which cannot be found anywhere in the world, even in those countries in which many ethnic groups live (India, China, Burma, etc.). At the same time, it is worth noting that not a single union, autonomous republic, or national district was created as a result of a referendum, that is, popular will, or rather, an act of self-determination (this act of self-determination was not carried out during the 1991 "parade of sovereignty”). Republics and districts were created from above, by the decision of the central authorities and local conferences of the communists, the number of which was extremely small on the lands where Komi, Udmurts, Mari, Mordovians, Nenets, Khanty and Mansi lived.

If we do not take into account the Finnish national movement, then some movements in support of the idea of ethnic autonomy were formed before the revolution of 1917 only among the Estonians, as well as among Karelians (however, in the "Society of White Sea Karelians" created in Finland in 1905, most of the members were Finns). After the revolution of 1917, the national movement under the influence of Tatar nationalists arose among the Mari (the first congress of the Mari people was held in Birsk, Ufa province in 1917, and the second in Kazan in 1918). However, the Bolshevik policy itself stimulated local communist leaders to engage in the process of national-state construction and adopt the ideas of ethnic nationalism. So the leader of the Karelian labor commune "red Finn" Edward Gulling, at the 4th congress of the CPF, held in 1921 in Petrograd, in response to the reproaches for supporting nationalism, stated the following: "The thesis about nationalism is correct. But the question now is that the revolution benefits from the awakening of nationalism"[21].

Meanwhile, the leader of the Russian Bolsheviks, V.I. Lenin, in the famous work "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" cited the referendum of 1905 in Norway as an ideal example of solving the "national question" [22], during which the Norwegians voted to secede from the Kingdom of Sweden. But the experience of creating the Norwegian state was not extended to the practice of the Soviet state construction. All the national-state entities in Russia arose in a clear way, and the essence of their creation was to appoint one people as the "collective owner" of a certain territory and it is this understanding of the essence of national republics that is quite common today both in the minds of the resident and in the minds of the activists of ethnic organizations.

The Ural/Finno-Ugric peoples of Russia received statehood at different times. As early as on December 6, 1917, the Bolshevik government recognized the independence of Finland. In 1920, the Soviet government recognized the independence of Estonia. In the same year, 1920, the recognized the Karelian Labor Commune, the Mari Autonomous Region, the Autonomous Region of Votyaks (i.e. Udmurts), and, in 1921, Komi Autonomous Region. Later, the Mordovian Autonomous Region was conscious of others in 1930 [23]. In 1925, the first national district in Soviet Russia was created ― Komi-Permyatsky, and other districts were formed in 1929-930.

The creation of national state entities was accompanied by the introduction of a "policy of rooting", the essence of which was to replace non-ethnic specialists with the representatives of "indigenous peoples" in the system of government, in education, cultural institutions, etc. Very often, this policy took the form of direct and active forcing of the representatives of non-indigenous peoples to leave their jobs and the frank division of local communities into ethnic segments. In Karelia, for example, "in the northern regions of the republic, among the Karelians, under the influence of Finnization, a fashion appeared to change their old Russian surnames to Finnish ones (Petrov, Rodionov, etc.). Finnization led to the division of the population along the ethnic lines in literally all the spheres of everyday life and socio-political activity. "Finnish-speaking" Karelians held separate Komsomol meetings from the Russians, and in schools Karelian children did not want to sit at the same desk with their Russian peers. Of the 22 newspapers, 10 were in Finnish, out of 8 magazines 5 were for Finnish-speaking people. Until 1935, there were no Russian-language books in Rebolah and Rugozero, and not one of the leading workers spoke Russian. In the schools of Rebol, Kestengi and Ukhta, the Russian language was not taught at all" [24]. But the long cultural interaction between the Russians and the Uralians could not but affect the process of national-state demarcation and "roots". The cultural traditions rooted in the previous centuries were stronger than the dictates of the Bolsheviks. An example of this was the cultural situation surrounding Izhora. For all the groups an izhor the ethnic self-name - "Russians" ("venäläiset", venalaizet") originally represented the most general politony (belonging to the Russian state), and subsequently turned in konfessiony ("Russians" as the carriers of Orthodox religion) that was important for cultural positioning at accommodation in one territory with Lutheran Finns (‘ingermanlandets’) [25]. It is no coincidence that in the 1930s the Izhora intelligentsia unanimously rejected the local version of rooting ― the idea of "Izhorization".

The policy of indigenization was rejected in the second half of the 1930s, and from 1950s the dominating cultural concept in the Soviet Union was the idea of the Soviet people according to which all the population of the country in the course of socialist construction was allegedly transformed to a new historical community which was primarily focused on the ideals of communism and brotherhood of the people, and the cultures of the separate people of the country became national in a form, but socialist according to their contents. This new community was treated as some kind of family of the people in which the Russian people acted as the older brother. At the same time, in the idea of new historical community we see "a melting pot", similar to the American idea, which appeared at the beginning of the 20th century and positioned Americans as a certain "alloy" made of the representatives of different peoples.

Certainly, the concept of new historical community had a significant effect on the development of ethnic groups and strengthened the processes of unification and integration in the Russian society. Besides, seriously I affected cultural orientations of the representatives of ethnic minorities, school reform of 1958 which allowed students parents to choose training language at high school and a considerable part of schools in the republics and districts was transferred to Russian of training at the requests of the parents. In the next decades, the processes of a deetnization and loss of the native language as a result assumed very considerable scale. In this sense, it is useful to refer to a conclusion to which I came to at the time while studying Finno-Ugric, the famous Finnish sociologist Seppo Lallukka: "The history confirms that both assimilatory and pluralistic values and aspirations are inherent in the east Finnish people. So, on one hand, a large number of their representatives more or less consciously apprehended russification as the purpose, i.e. they wanted to be absorbed in a big society, want them to them to treat just as individuals. Directed thus on assimilation, the group of people wants to be completely apprehended dominating group with the subsequent merge in big society. On the other hand, took and continue to take place and aspirations to ethnic revival" [26].

It was these phenomena that became the basis for the formation of ethno-national movements in the Urals in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the process of democratization began in the Soviet society and the voice of the public began to sound louder and more persistent.

The first ethnic organizations, some of which declared themselves heirs to the organizations created at the beginning of the twentieth century, or immediately after the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1917, and declared their goal to preserve the languages and cultures of the Ural peoples. But quite quickly they began to politicize and demand the ideas that did not always correspond to the norms of democracy, Russian cultural traditions, or civic ideals. One of the main shortcomings of the ideological positions of the ethnic movements of the Uralians was the obvious opposition of ethnicity to citizenship [27].

It is obvious that the preservation of ethno-cultural distinctiveness is the main goal of the activities of ethno-national organizations, but the absolutization of this goal leads to the fact that "people are not considered as equal human beings, but as ethnic beings different from each other" [28]. But it is in this context that many ethnic activists consider the reduction in the number of the Ural peoples, which was noted by the censuses of 2002 and 2010 [29] and the situation in the linguistic sphere, which is characterized by a significant decrease in the level of language competencies of the Urals [30].

Based on the analysis of the census data, it becomes clear that the Ural peoples have lost their population due to the low level of demographic reproduction. But the sharp decrease in their number is not explained only by the low birth rate and the high mortality rate. The losses we used to call assimilation losses are also significant. However, in our opinion, today these losses will be more correct to be called the losses from a change in the nature of identification. One of the rights of the individual is the right to cultural freedom, so if a person decided to change ethnic identity, they only exercised their right to the freedom of cultural choice. And in this regard, talking about assimilation, which is associated with cultural pressure, is hardly correct.

In the current situation, this is doubly wrong, since in recent years a huge number of events have been carried out that are aimed at supporting the cultures and languages of the Finno-Ugric and Samoyed peoples, and at conducting various cultural events designed to promote the cultures of Finno-Ugric and Samoyed people. The Federal Finno-Ugric Centre in Syktyvkar and the Volga Finno-Ugric Center in Saransk were established, new magazines were published, folklore and theater Finno-Ugric festivals have been held, television programs and specialized Finno-Ugric sites were created, etc. Nevertheless, in the conditions of cultural pluralism, a significant part of the Urals is inclined to change their ethnic identity, and an even greater number of the representatives of the Ural peoples, without refusing to identify with the ethnic communities to which their ancestors belonged, change their linguistic identity and choose the Russian language as their native language. But there is no strong connection between the language and the ethnicity [31] and the main thing is that by changing their native language, people do not change the nature of their ethnic identification. So, according to the census of 2010 in the Komi Republic (similar data for a number of other "Finno-Ugric regions"), the Russian language was chosen as the native by 37 % of the Komi [32] living here, but they do not refuse to identify with the titular ethnic community. Of every 1,000 people in the Russian Federation, 35.2 % (352 people) chose Russian as their native language. In other words, the cultural orientations of the Uralians are becoming more complex and therefore the changes in the cultural appearance of the peoples and cultural orientations of the Uralians are incorrectly explained using primitive schemes of "extinction" of peoples or deethnization.

Not only the processes of globalization and unification, which have increased significantly in recent years, but as the data of sociological studies show, the orientation on the civil all-Russian identity, which not so much displaces the ethnic identity, but coexists with it as another way of cultural positioning of the person within the framework of the Russian society, is becoming increasingly influential [33].

The representatives of the Ural peoples feel a close personal connection between themselves and the Russian state, for their integration into the all-Russian political space has a centuries-old history, and today, the "policy of fellow citizenship" has become the cornerstone of the "Strategy of the State National Policy of the Russian Federation for the Period until 2025", approved by the decree of the President of the Russian Federation in 2012 and this policy has not only official doctrinal formalization, but is also reflected in the personal cultural strategies of the Russians.

1. **Conclusion**

Every nation on Earth has customs and beliefs, language, history and culture, and they do not fall out of the common history of mankind. The culture of any of the nations on the planet is unique and unique. Currently, culture is one of the basic components of human capital. Firstly, it accumulates centuries of experience of the people. The overwhelming majority of the values a country lives by have been created in the past, sometimes far away, and they largely determine its future development. Secondly, it is culture that shapes the individual himself, creates the intrinsic motivation for his actions and thereby guides current and future changes in the country, contributes to an open and rule-of-law society and civic harmony.

Culture includes: 1) the creative potential of the creators of culture, accumulated over centuries and developed from generation to generation; 2) cultural heritage, which is the result of centuries of work by creators; 3) cultural traditions embodied in the population's interest in the values of culture.

Thus, culture is one of the most important components of the national human capital accumulated by a nation [34,35].

History, language and culture were preserved by the Ural peoples living both in Russia and in Western Europe. They have occupied a certain niche in the history of mankind.

It is obvious that the preservation of ethno-cultural distinctiveness is the main goal of the activities of ethno-national unions. But the absolutization of this goal often leads to the fact that the representatives of ethnic groups are not considered as equal people among themselves, but as distinct ethnic individuals. It is in this context that ethnic leaders are considering a reduction in the number and level of linguistic competencies of the Ural peoples.

Based on the analysis of the census data, it is obvious that the Ural peoples have a loss of population. It is primarily associated with low levels of demographic reproduction. However, the sharp decline in their numbers cannot be explained only by the low birth rate and the high mortality rate. Significant contributions are borne by losses that we used to call assimilation. In our opinion, these losses are more correct to be called the losses from a change in the nature of identification. One of the rights of the individual is the right to cultural freedom. If a person decided to change ethnic identity, they only exercised their right to the freedom of cultural choice. And in this regard, talking about assimilation, which is often associated with cultural pressure, is hardly correct.

In recent years, a huge number of events have been carried out to support the cultures and languages of the Finno-Ugric and Samoyed peoples. Among small Finno-Ugric peoples, a large field of activity remains in the field of national culture. This activity of the national core will save many Finno-Ugric peoples from assimilation, and therefore from the extinction. Nevertheless, in the conditions of cultural pluralism, a significant part of the Uralians is inclined to change their ethnic identity, and an even greater number of representatives of the Ural peoples, change their linguistic identity and choose the Russian language as their native language.

However, we note that there is no strong connection between the language and the ethnicity and, most importantly, that by changing their native language, people do not change the character of their ethnic identity. For example, in the Komi Republic, 37 % of the Komi living here chose Russian as their native language and at the same time identified themselves with the titular ethnic community. In the Republic of Mordovia, 35% of the people of Mordovian nationality living here chose their native language. This figure increases due to an increase in the number of ethnically mixed marriages. Intermarriage is one of the very important factors determining the change in national consciousness, that is, the transition, for example, of the Mordovians to the Russian ethnic state. In interethnic families, children choose Russian nationality. In other words, the cultural orientations of the Uralians become more complex and therefore changes in the cultural appearance of peoples and cultural orientations of the Uralians are incorrectly explained using primitive schemes of extinction of peoples or deethnization.

Apparently, the danger of the complete assimilation for such large ethnic groups as Mordovians, Udmurts, Komi, Mari, is exaggerated. Many Uralians, despite their small number, have a thousand-year-long history and have survived, despite all the problems of their historical development. The communist experiment did not take place, primarily due to the attempts to erase national differences, destroy cultural values and, above all, the languages of the peoples, including Finno-Ugric. Ethnic leveling has never contributed to solving the current problems of ethnic groups. We hope that the Uralians, in unity with other peoples of Russia, will be able to find answers to the severe challenges of the modern era.

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