

The need to reform Indonesia's maritime strategy: A review

Buddy Suseto, Zarina Othman and Farizal Mohd Razalli

Received: 2017-09-11 / Accepted: 2018-11-12 / Published online: 2018-12-31
© 2018 Faculty of Geography UGM and The Indonesian Geographers Association

Abstract As one of maritime nations, Indonesia requires a sound maritime strategy. Maritime strategies are important not only to protect the state's maritime pathway and boundaries, but also to serve as part of the national security policy. This article is designed to provide an understanding why Indonesia urgently needs to redesign her maritime strategy. The article argues that a maritime strategy for Indonesia is needed because of the changing international politics such as the emerging non-traditional maritime security issues. These issues include illegal fishing, human trafficking, goods smuggling, piracy, sea robberies, and maritime terrorism. They affect the international trade through Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, and Lombok Strait which border with Indonesia. Data for the article have been collected from reliable secondary sources as well as from authors' field work and interviews. Finding of the study suggests that Indonesia needs to reshape her maritime strategy toward significantly reducing threats at sea. This, in turn, will guarantee the security of the archipelagic sea-lanes (ASL) as an international route. In conclusion, there exists an acute urgency for Indonesia to reform its maritime strategy lest the country risks its national security vulnerable to increasing non-traditional maritime threats.

Keywords: maritime strategy; non-traditional security issues; security; threats

Abstrak Sebagai salah satu negara maritim, Indonesia membutuhkan strategi maritim yang sehat. Strategi maritim penting tidak hanya untuk melindungi jalur dan batas laut negara, tetapi juga untuk melayani sebagai bagian dari kebijakan keamanan nasional. Artikel ini dirancang untuk memberikan pemahaman mengapa Indonesia perlu mendesain ulang strategi maritimnya. Artikel tersebut berpendapat bahwa strategi maritim untuk Indonesia diperlukan karena perubahan politik internasional seperti masalah keamanan maritim non-tradisional yang muncul. Masalah-masalah ini termasuk penangkapan ikan secara ilegal, perdagangan manusia, penyelundupan barang, pembajakan, perampokan laut, dan terorisme maritim. Mereka mempengaruhi perdagangan internasional melalui Selat Malaka, Selat Sunda, dan Selat Lombok yang berbatasan dengan Indonesia. Data untuk artikel telah dikumpulkan dari sumber-sumber sekunder yang dapat diandalkan serta dari kerja lapangan penulis dan wawancara. Temuan studi ini menunjukkan bahwa Indonesia perlu membentuk kembali strategi maritimnya untuk mengurangi ancaman di laut secara signifikan. Ini, pada gilirannya, akan menjamin keamanan jalur laut kepulauan (ASL) sebagai rute internasional. Sebagai kesimpulan, terdapat urgensi akut bagi Indonesia untuk mereformasi strategi maritimnya agar negara tersebut tidak membahayakan keamanannya yang rentan terhadap meningkatnya ancaman maritim non-tradisional.

Kata kunci: strategi maritim; masalah keamanan non-tradisional; keamanan; ancaman

1. Introduction

The use of sea-lanes as the connecting pathway between nations have started since several centuries and provided benefits for the progress of humankind. According to a prominent scholar, Geoffrey Till, there are four benefits of sea utilization. They are for resources it contains; for its utility as a means of transportation and trade; for its importance as a means of exchanging

information; and for a source of power and dominion (Till 2005). With the development of advanced technology, that affects the rapid use of the seas to connect between countries in the world.

It is important to note that according to the UNCTAD data, between 1980 to 2016, the world's demand for shipping services had improved. Shipping of oil and gas commodities in 2016 reached its high at 3.05 billion tons, followed by major bulk commodities (coal, iron ore, grain and bauxite / alumina / phosphate rock), dry cargo, and containers at 3.17 billion tons, 2.34 billion tons, 1.72 billion tons respectively (see figure 1) (UNCTAD 2017). The world- seaborne trade by region shows that the highest trade increase in 2016 was in the Asian region (UNTAAD 2016). These figures demonstrate the importance of sea lanes in the region.

In the recent decades, it has become clear that

@ 2018 by the authors. Licensee Indonesian Journal of Geography, Indonesia.
This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY NC) license <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/>.

Buddy Suseto

PhD candidate, at the Strategic and International Relations Program, Research Center for Policy and Global Governance, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Malaysia (UKM).

Zarina Othman and Farizal Mohd Razalli

Strategic and International Relations Program, Research Center for Policy and Global Governance, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, National University of Malaysia (UKM).

Correspondent e-mail: budiseto@ymail.com




Figure 1. International seaborne trade, selected years (Millions of tons loaded)

one of the main states' concerns, including Indonesia, is states' vulnerability to non-traditional maritime threats. This is also true for other maritime states such as Australia, Cuba, Japan, New Zealand, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, UK (Menon 1998). According to Bueger, maritime security ought to coordinate the majority of the following four different ideas namely marine safety, seapower, blue economy and resilience (Bueger 2015, 1). The key implication to Bueger's ideas is that developing one's maritime security policy requires the involvement of multiple stakeholders and good coordination among countries.

Several countries have published their official documents on maritime strategy. They are the United States of America with the headline A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (U.S. Navy 2015); France published her National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas (Ministre 2015); India came out with Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (Dhowan 2015); Canada established The Maritime Strategy by the Year 2030 (Philippe Couillard 2015); the Netherlands designed The Dutch Maritime Strategy 2015-2025 (Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport 2015); and Sweden produced A Swedish Maritime Strategy - for People, Jobs and the Environment (Sweden 2015). Most if not all of these maritime strategy documents emphasize the importance to defend their maritime boundaries against both traditional and non-traditional maritime threats.

This aspect of defense in states' maritime strategy underscores the importance of warfare as part of the overall maritime strategy. The warfare domain has changed dramatically as a result of the rapid advancement in defense technology. Some researchers argue that the

technology to be potentially used in future wars may well be in its fifth generation. This can be seen from the technological advances in aircrafts, submarines, surface ships and missile weapons. The development of fighter aircraft technology as of 2016 confirms that one is now entering the fifth-generation warfare. A "Fifth-Gen" fighter is a combination of stealth, high maneuverability, advanced avionics, fusion of data from networked sensors and avionics, and the ability to assume multiple roles (Briganti 2012). Technology then plays an important role. Similarly, the development of maritime warfare technologies like submarines have grown into the fifth generation. According to Keck, Russia has developed the fifth-generation submarines which focus on network-centric capabilities thus reduce the primary importance of dimension and speed (Keck 2015).

Till contends that technology may additionally alter the details of maritime strategy (Till 2005). Nonetheless, the vital conditions that influence the maritime prowess of countries remain to be geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, number of population, character of the people, and character of the government (Mahan 1889). Mahan believes that nations with the best possible advantages [natural and strategic endowments] ought to leverage upon their sea power advantages (especially naval power) as the way to succeed. This is supported by Till who broadly acknowledged the significance and military character of sea power (Till 2007). Sea powers in action: an overview

The development of the US maritime strategy has undergone several changes in accordance with the changing events and technological developments that have altered the situation on the global stage. This is

reflected in the documents US Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts 1974 to 2005 (Swartz 2005). In the 1980s, the American strategy was issued in reaction to the Russian strategy; therefore, it emphasized the draft strategy on anti-carrier warfare, anti-submarine strategic and Sea Lines of Communication (Watkins, 1986). Then in 1986, President Reagan of the United States issued a maritime strategy which was to build 600 warships to confront a conventional war with Russia (Mearsheimer 1986). Many efforts were made to train staff officers, and to develop a war plan. This had led to the formation of the modern theory of strategy (Hattendorf 2013).

An American Maritime historian Hattendorf, argues that the process of making strategic planning follow four levels: 1) high policy planning: it is established at the level of the President and modified or supported by Congress; 2) war planning: the general conceptual plans for war is made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 3) program planning: the system of coordinated weapons procurement by the Secretary of Defense which is accompanied by statements of strategy that define the rationale for the weapons involved and is made by each service and 4) operational planning the preparation of precise plans for wartime operations is done by the various unified and specified commanders in chief (Hattendorf, Phil, and J. 2004, 1).

In the context of maritime control, the US faces a number of threats. These include: *Terrorism; WMD proliferation; illegal seaborne immigration; blockades of important trading hubs and strategic chokepoints by hostile nations; illegal exploitation of resources; transnational crimes; piracy; PLA efforts to field robust anti-access/area-denial capabilities; maritime disasters such as Typhoons, Tsunami, Earthquakes; greenhouse gases and pollution (Fan 2011, v).*

Hoyt argues for the US maritime strategy to extend control to the nation's economic interest and safeguarding it against threats from other nations (Hoyt 2007).

Hoyt's concern was heard by the US government as it issued a new maritime strategy document entitled A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (U.S. Navy 2015). The strategy chosen clearly acknowledges that "the economic importance, security interests, and geography of this vast maritime region dictates a growing reliance on naval forces to protect U.S. interests and to maintain an enduring commitment to the stability of the region" (U.S. Navy 2015, 3).

On the other side of the continent, Russian scholars such as S.G. Gorshkov argues that sea power and military power are the two important factors for the Soviet economy (Gorshkov 1979). The threats to the Russian government derive from the expansionary NATO and the U.S activities in the Arctic region. Therefore, this explains Russia's military build-up in the region through the modernization

of its strategic nuclear submarines and its Northern Fleet as well as the reconstruction of critical infrastructures needed to operate such capabilities. (Klimenko 2016, v). It can be argued that the concept of Russian maritime strategy emphasizes the power of nuclear submarines as the core strength of Russia.

The threat factor becomes one of the considerations in determining maritime strategy. In the document of The UK's 2014 maritime security strategy, (maritime) threats are being explicitly highlighted:

Terrorism affecting the UK and its maritime interests, including attacks against cargo or passenger ships; Disruption to vital maritime trader routes because of war, criminality, piracy or changes in international norms; Attack on UK maritime infrastructure or shipping, including cyber-attack, the transportation of illegal items by sea, including weapons of mass destruction, controlled drugs and arms, People smuggling and human trafficking (Government 2014, 19).

According to a historian of the English navy, Corbett, sea command and control of the sea cannot be applied in absolute terms. Sea command and control only refer to temporary sea control and direction of sea lines of communication (Corbett 1911). It then only forms part of the maritime strategy. An effective maritime strategy constitutes an understanding of the principles of governing a war in which the sea plays a substantial part and encompasses all aspects of a state's power: the army, navy, commercial and political power. This is where Corbett effectively introduced the concept of joint operations between the army and the navy.

Till echoed Corbett's concept when he wrote:

The importance of securing command of the sea; The effectiveness of sea-based economic pressure; The need to avoid continental commitments while securing the aid of allied land powers; Generous expenditure on the navy; Focusing on maritime areas of operation; Developing synergy between the army and the navy; The value of expeditionary operations; Limited and modest objectives; The need to project power ashore (Till 2005, 48).

W.S.G. Bateman and R.J. Sherwood, there are four important things than researchers previously thought:

That maritime strategy and the theory of sea power can be applied in military operations either in times of peace or in times of conflict; That in the conflict situation, it involves more complex principles than simply war fighting; It is truly a joint approach in that it recognizes the roles and importance of land and air forces; and that it integrates civil components of maritime power (the marine industries and maritime infrastructure) into its principles (Bateman and Sherwood 1992, 2).

Although Till reckoned that initially states often utilize the sea for economic interests rather than for security purposes. However, with time and along with the power and capabilities of more advanced fleets, the sea acquires more security significance (Till 1982). Till further explained that while the conceptions of maritime strategy are universal, the extent to which individual countries can (or even want to) realize such conceptions may be highly particular” (Till 2005, 25). Till explained that the British’s success lies in the combination of land and sea power, or as Corbett and Mahan referred to as maritime and naval power respectively (ibid., 42).

Yet another maritime strategy study by Richard Hill argues that the conceptual tools employed in maritime strategy of medium powers are ‘levels of conflict’ (Hill 2000, 7). This involves an understanding of the levels of the command and tasking as well as the management of the military forces rather than the nature of conflict (Hill 2000). This idea also discusses the hierarchy of doctrine spanning at all warfare levels [tactical, operational and strategic] (Defence 2011).

Maritime strategy consists of bringing collectively and coordinating all the factors of national power, including, diplomatic, military, economy elements, in pursuit of protection national interests (Mccaffrie 2007). This argument also supported by Morrison, who argues that a maritime strategy is a joint strategy, among inter-agency, army and not only naval strategy (Morrison 2011).

Having introduced the maritime strategies of some of the world’s most important maritime states, this research seeks to investigate why Indonesia must design her own maritime strategy. Being one of the largest maritime states in Asia, with 16,056 Islands (Kompas 2018), it is important for Indonesia to have her own maritime strategy. Indonesia’s coastline which measures some 54,716 km (GlobalFirepower 2018b) is among the longest in Asia. With increasing maritime issues such as illegal smuggling, illicit trafficking, and maritime terrorism, it is timely for Indonesia to have her own maritime strategy.

2. The Methods

Main data for this article come from publicly available secondary data. These data were obtained from several sources such as official documents from several countries including Indonesia, United Kingdom and Australia. Journals and books on maritime strategy, diplomacy, maritime issues, national security were retrieved from online archives of the National University of Malaysia. Credible Internet archives were also referred to. Bulk of the data had also been gathered from authors’ field work conducted in England between September and October 2017. Authors’ participation in the Langkawi International Maritime & Aerospace Exhibition (LIMA) Malaysia 2017, Plymouth Naval Base and International Maritime Organization (IMO) United Kingdom, and the International Maritime Security Symposium (IMSS) 2017 in Bali Indonesia

has also provided sufficient understanding about the importance of maritime strategy, in this case for Indonesia. The in-depth expert interviews conducted during the field work and various trips to Jakarta between May and September 2017 have tremendously helped authors to add value to the research. These interviewees include prominent Indonesian diplomats, leading academics in Indonesia and the U.K., and policymakers and experts in Indonesia and the Philippines.

3. Results and Discussion

The rapid economic development in the Asian region especially in the sea has also effectively increased threats in the sea, making Asia the most vulnerable place in the world (Arashi et al. 2016). This is of concern because many states are affected as these threats threaten their national security as well as relations between and among nations. Furthermore, there is a potential conflict in the South Chinese Sea that involves many countries, either directly or indirectly. Even though Indonesia is not party to the South China Sea overlapping territorial claims, she has indeed encountered problems such as the incidence of Chinese fishing vessels in the Natuna Sea between 2010 and 2016 (Connelly 2016).

Additionally, Indonesia’s water territory has four of the world’s nine choke points; the four choke points are strategic routes used for both national and international activities shipping activities. Indonesia’s obligation with respect to international shipping is to provide international shipping security and to supervise foreign ship traffics.

According to United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982 Indonesia as a coastal nation, is obliged to maintain security in the international shipping lanes of the Archipelagic sea lanes (ASL) which has been divided into three ASL I, II, and III (IMO 2003). This speaks of the need for a suitable maritime strategy to smoothly manage maritime issues.

To face the diverse threats that occur in the sea, Indonesia requires a strong seapower. Sea power is defined as input and output. Seapower as inputs are “...navies, coastguards, the marine or civil-maritime industries broadly defined and, where relevant, the contribution of land and air forces” (Till 2005, 4) and as outputs, it mean the ability to impact the conduct of other individuals or things by what one does at or from the ocean (ibid.). In addition to maintaining Indonesia’s national interests in the sea, a maritime strategy is required, which is part of the national security strategy. Maritime strategy is the path of all factors of national strength that relate to a nation’s interests at ocean (Hattendorf 2013; Interview Budiman, 24 May 2017; Interview Mangindaan, 23 May 2017).

Seapower cannot stand alone but must cooperate with other forces such as political, diplomatic and official power (Mangindaan 2002). This demonstrates the importance of inclusive maritime strategy for a maritime nation like Indonesia. Maritime security

issues in Indonesia have been discussed at two levels: the conceptual level of the maritime security and the practical level of its [maritime security] implications for Indonesia (Keliat 2009). It defines the jurisdiction of the relevant authorities at sea in order to combine maritime safety policy. The other is a blue ocean strategy in dealing with maritime security by using the Revolution in Military Affairs in the development of Sea Power Indonesia (Interview Oegroseno, 13 July 2017; Interview Sukma, 5 September 2017; Poerwowidagdo 2013). In a deeper study, Marsetio said that another country's national maritime strategy is similar to the naval strategy and the establishment of the Indonesian national maritime strategy will support the role of naval diplomacy in the future (Marsetio 2014).

This is not to argue that Indonesia has no plan for a maritime strategy. The notion of maritime strategy can at least be traced in 2005 with the formation of the Archipelago Sea Defense Strategy by the Navy (Interview Marsetio, 8 August 2017; Interview Salim, 27 July 2017). This strategy was a navy strategy and not explicitly termed as a national maritime strategy involving other elements of maritime power. Nevertheless, the Archipelago Sea Defense Strategy is the seed of the eventual development of maritime strategy. In the Archipelago Sea Defense Strategy, the concept of strategy is known as layer defense strategy. The Layer Defense strategy consists three layers: a the deterrence strategy, the in-depth defense strategy, and the national resilience (Puspen Mabelsal 2006). Further developments to improve the Archipelago Sea Defense Strategy concept then proposed the concept of Indonesia Maritime Defense System. However, until 2015 this concept has not been officially declared as a national maritime strategy and as a reference in implementing the defense of the maritime state (Salim 2015).

With regard to maritime policy, the Indonesian government has declared the country as the world's 'maritime fulcrum'; a state that straddles across the two oceans: the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean (Indonesia Government 2015). The new maritime policy is based on five pillars: a. Redevelopment of Indonesia's maritime culture; b. Build maritime industry, priority on fisheries; c. Increase Maritime's connectivity of infrastructure, shipping, and ports; d. Maritime diplomacy; e. Improve maritime defense forces (Indonesia Government 2015).

The types of threats that occur at sea are very diverse and different in every country. Threats at sea are categorized into several categories namely: cross sea borders; piracy; human trafficking; smuggling; Asylum seeking; illegal fishing; the spread of infectious diseases; disruption of pipes and cables on the seabed" (Kusumaatmadja 1979, 163–64). Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General, in his 2008 Report on Oceans and the Law of the Sea, has identified seven specific threats to maritime security: Piracy and armed robbery against ships; Terrorist acts against

shipping, offshore installations and other maritime interests; Illicit trafficking in arms and weapons of mass destruction; Illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; Smuggling and trafficking of persons at sea; IUU fishing; and intentional and unlawful damage to the marine environment (UN General Assembly 2008, 18–31).

The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) data indicate that illegal activities at sea are still common e.g., arm piracy and robbery at sea for five years (2012-2016). Indonesia hosted the highest incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea, followed by Nigeria and India (Table 1) (ICC 2017). There is the problem of illegal fishing around the waters of Indonesia, which has occurred since the 1990s. If one counts the loss of rupiah due to illegal fishing, it is estimated to reach trillions of rupiah. Therefore, the government seriously needs to combat illegal fishing by forming a task force 115 consisting of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, Navy, Police, Bakamla (Coast Guard), and the Attorney General. This effort has proven to be quite effective in reducing illegal fishing.

The issue of the development of defense budget increase in Asia compared to other regions shows a higher increase due to the growth factor of the economy and the problems of the South China Sea. Some countries such as China, Japan, India, South Korea, and Australia have improved their maritime capability. According to modernizing military capabilities, data, in Asia (2017) China ranks first with a budget of US \$ 145.83 billion, then Japan and India for US \$ 47.96 billion, South Korea for US \$ 40 billion and Australia for US \$ 20 billion (The Military Balance 2016). In addition, Asian countries are beginning to show improvement of Maritime capabilities, including Tanker and transport aircraft is the highest, followed by, frigates, and patrol boats, since 2011 (ibid.).

The mushrooming of illegal activities at sea is also due to inefficient bureaucracy practiced in Indonesia. There is simply too many departments involved in handling illegal activities at sea: the National Coordinating Body for Ocean Safety; the National Coordinating Body for Ocean Safety; the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries; the Ministry of Forestry; the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources; the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Transportation and Communications; the State Ministry for Environment; the Indonesian Navy; the Indonesian Air Force; the Marine Police; the Directorate General of Immigration; and the Directorate General of Customs (Dirhamsyah 2005). This leads to ineffective handling of illegal activities at sea. Several interrelated factors are responsible for this as Dirhamsyah wrote.

Of more crucial factor to Indonesia's inability to curtail illegal activities at sea is the required manpower to guard the massive coastline (Table 2) (D-Mitch 2018; GlobalFirepower 2018a). The table below shows the length of Indonesia's coastline as

Table 1. Piracy and Arm Robbery at Sea Period 2012-2016

Location	Year				
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
SOUTH ASIA					
Indonesia	81	106	100	108	49
Malacca Straits	2	1	1	5	-
Malaysia	12	9	24	13	7
Philippines	3	3	6	11	10
Singapore Straits	6	9	8	9	2
Thailand	-	-	2	1	-
EAST ASIA					
China	1	-	-	4	7
South China Sea	2	4	1	-	-
Vietnam	4	9	7	27	9
INDIAN SUB					
Location	Year				
	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Bangladesh	11	12	21	11	3
CONTINENT					
India	8	14	13	13	14
SOUTH AMERICA					
Brazil	1	1	1	-	-
Colombia	5	7	2	5	4
Costa Rica	1	-	-	-	-
Dominican Republic	1	1	-	-	-
Ecuador	4	3	-	-	-
Guyana	-	2	1	-	2
Haiti	2	-	-	2	4
Mexico	-	-	-	-	1
Peru	3	4	-	-	11
Venezuela	-	-	1	1	5
AFRICA					
Algeria	1	-	-	-	-
Angola	-	-	1	-	2
Benin	2	-	-	-	1
Cameroon	1	-	1	1	-
Dem. Republic of Congo	2	-	1	3	2
Dem. Rep. of Sao Tome & Principe	-	-	1	-	-
Egypt	7	7	-	1	-
Gabon	-	2	1	-	-
Gana	2	1	4	2	3
Guinea	3	1	-	3	3
Gulf of Aden*	13	6	4	-	1
Ivory Coast	5	4	3	1	1

Cotinue Table 1. Piracy and Arm

Kenya	1	1	-	2	2
Liberia	-	-	1	2	-
Mauritania	-	1	-	-	-
Morocco	-	1	1	-	1
Mozambique	2	2	1	1	1
Nigeria	27	31	18	14	36
Red Sea*	13	2	4	-	-
Sierra Leone	1	2	1	-	-
Somalia*	49	7	3	-	1
South Africa	-	-	-	-	1
Tanzania	2	1	1	-	-
The Congo	4	3	7	5	6
Togo	15	7	2	-	1
REST OF WOLRD					
Oman	-	-	2	-	-
Papua New Guinea	-	-	-	1	-
Yemen	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL AT YEAR END	297	264	245	246	191

Table 2. Comparative Maritime Strength with Coastline Coverage in Maritime and Continental Countries (Selected only)

Category	Indonesia	Malaysia	Singapore	Japan	Australia	UK	US	Canada	India
Total Naval Assets*	221	61	40	131	47	76	415	63	294
Aircraft Carriers	0	0	0	4	2	2	20	0	1
Submarines	5	2	4	20	6	10	66	4	16
Frigates	8	3	6	0	10	13	10	12	14
Destroyers	0	0	0	36	1	6	65	0	11
Corvettes	24	6	6	6	0	0	0	0	22
Patrol Craft	74	41	11	6	13	21	13	20	139
Mine Warfare Craft	12	4	2	25	6	13	11	0	4
Merchant Marine Strength	8,782	1,690	3,558	5,289	549	1,551	3,611	500	1,674
Coastline Coverage (km)	54,716	4,675	193	29,751	25,760	2,429	19,924	202,080	7,000

being the second longest in the world after Canada.

From the table above, the ratio of total Naval Assets to Coastline Coverage 1 to 248. What this means is that each naval asset will have to cover 248 km of Indonesia's coastline. This is quantitatively better than the case of Australia (1:548) and that of Canada (1:3,208). Qualitatively, however, Indonesian coastline lends itself to one of the world's most strategic SLOCs and most vulnerable to maritime threats discussed earlier. It is this qualitative context that makes Indonesia worse off when compared to Australia and Canada. Besides, the quality of these naval assets that are highly questionable makes it difficult for Indonesia to secure its territorial waters from various types of maritime threats as exemplified in Table 3 below (Maritim 2017; Pertahanan 2015; UN General Assembly 2008).

4. Conclusion

The change has indeed made it vital for maritime states like Indonesia to issue a renewed maritime policy- the world maritime fulcrum. However, with increasing maritime threats that have been continuously confronting Indonesia, the world maritime fulcrum policy needs to espouse a broader maritime strategy framework that includes all maritime elements. The article specifically argues for the Indonesian navy to be one of the key components in this renewed maritime strategy. The foregoing discussion has demonstrated how and why the navy can become the driving force in reformulating the concept of maritime strategy for Indonesia. An inclusive maritime strategy does not only help protect Indonesian maritime boundaries but it will also create harmony and long-term solidity in the

5. References

- Arashi, Reiko et al. 2016. Asia-Pacific Defense Outlook 2016 Defense in Four Domains. <https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/public-sector/articles/gx-asia-pacific-defense-outlook.html>.
- Bateman, WSG, and RJ Sherwood. 1992. Principles of Australian Maritime Operations. Canberra. http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Principle_of_Aust_Maritime_Operations_265_opt.pdf (November 14, 2016).
- Briganti, Giovanni de. 2012. "'Fifth-Generation' and Other Myths." *defense-aerospace.com*: 1-12. http://www.defense-aerospace.com/article-view/feature/135080/f_35-reality-check-10-years-on-%28part-1%29.html (April 16, 2017).
- Budiman, Djoko Said. 2017. "Personal Interview 24 May."
- Bueger, Christian. 2015. "What Is Maritime Security?" *ScienceDirect* 53: 159-64. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X14003327> (March 26, 2016).
- Connelly, Aaron L. 2016. "Indonesia in the South China Sea: Going It Alone." Lowy Institute for International Policy Report (December).
- Corbett, Julian Stafford. 1911. *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*. ed. Keith Ekins Suzanne Shell. London: Project Gutenberg.
- D-Mitch. 2018. "The Attack Submarines of Asia and Australia in 2018 ." : 2. <http://www.navalanalyses.com/2018/05/infographics-34-attack-submarines-of.html>.
- Defence, Ministry of. 2011. Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 British Maritime Doctrine. Swindon: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre Ministry of Defence. www.mod.uk/dcdd.
- Dhowan, RK. 2015. *Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy*. ed. Jasneet S Sachdeva Sanjay J Singh, NM, Sarabjeet S Parmar. New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy). http://indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_Document_25Jan16.pdf.
- Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment Directorate for Maritime affair. 2015. *The Dutch Maritime Strategy 2015 - 2025*. Den Haag: Directorate for Maritime affair, Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. <https://www.government.nl/documents/reports/2015/07/07/the-dutch-maritime-strategy-2015-2025>.
- Dirhamsyah, Dirham. 2005. "Maritime Law Enforcement and Compliance in Indonesia: Problems and Recommendations." 144(October): 1-16.
- Erwin, Alde Darma. "Wawancara 22 Mei 2017."
- Fan, Gaoyue. 2011. "Maritime Interests: China-US Cooperation and Conflicts." *Pacific Forum CSIS* 11(August): 17. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/issuesinsights_vol11no10_English.pdf.
- GlobalFirepower. 2018a. "Comparisons of World Military Strengths." *GlobalFirepower*. <https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison.asp> (October 23, 2018).
- . 2018b. "Indonesia Military Strength." *GlobalFirepower*. https://www.globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=indonesia (October 23, 2018).
- Gorshkov, S. G. 1979. *Pergamon Press Ltd Sea Power of the State*. First. London: Cox & Wyman Ltd.
- Government, HM. 2014. *The UK National Strategy for Maritime Security*. London: Williams Lea Group. www.gov.uk/government/publications.
- Hattendorf, John B. 2013. "What Is a Maritime Strategy?" (1).
- Hattendorf, John B., D. Phil, and Ernest J. 2004. *The Evolution of the U.S. Navy's Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986*. New York: Galt & Hoy.
- Hill, Richard. 2000. *Sea Power Centre-Australia Working Paper Medium Power Strategy Revisited*.
- Hoyt, Timothy D. 2007. "The United States and Maritime Strategy: A Parochial View from the U.S. Naval War College." *Elsevier* 51(4): 577-84.

- ICC, International Maritime Bureau. 2017. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. London. <http://www.nepia.com/media/558888/2016-Annual-IMB-Piracy-Report.pdf>.
- Indonesia Government. 2015. "Indonesia Sebagai Poros Maritim Dunia." Sekretaris Kabinet: 15. <http://presidenri.go.id/maritim/indonesia-sebagai-poros-maritim-dunia.html> (April 15, 2017).
- Keck, Zachary. 2015. "Russia Is Already Developing New Fifth-Generation Submarines." *The National Interest*: 1–9. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/russia-already-developing-new-fifth-generation-submarines-13167> (October 23, 2018).
- Keliat, Makmur. 2009. "Keamanan Maritim Dan Implikasi Kebijakannya Bagi Indonesia." *Jurnal Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik* 13(Juli): 19.
- Klimenko, Ekaterina. 2016. *Russia's Arctic Security Policy Still Quiet in the High North?* Stockholm: SIPRI. <http://books.sipri.org/files/PP/SIPRI45.pdf>.
- Kompas. 2018. "Kompas Cyber Media." Kompas. <https://nasional.kompas.com/read/2018/05/04/20442371/indonesia-daftarkan-16056-pulau-bernama-ke-pbb> (October 23, 2018).
- Kusumaatmadja, Mochtar. 1979. *Pengaturan Hukum Penjagaan Keamanan Di Laut Dan Pantai*. Bandung: Binacipta.
- Mahan, Alfred Thayer. 1889. *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.
- Mangindaan, Robert. 2002. "Maritime Strategy of Indonesia in 2000-2010." In *Maritime Strategies in Asia*, eds. Jiirgen Schwarz, Wilfried A Herrmann, and Banns-frank Seller. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 325–37.
- . 2017. "Personal Interview 23 May."
- Maritim, Kemenko. 2017. *Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia*. Jakarta: Kemenko Maritim.
- Marsetio. 2014. *Sea Power Indonesia Pertama*. Jakarta: Universitas Pertahanan.
- . "Wawancara 8 Agustus 2017."
- Mccaffrie, Jack. 2007. *The Sea Power Centre-Australia and Halstead Press Positioning Navies for the Future: Challenge and Response*. Sydney: Halstead Press. http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Sea_Power_Conference_2004.pdf.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 1986. "A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe." *International Security* 11(2): 3–57. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538957>.
- Melda, Kamil Ariadno. "Wawancara 25 Juli 2017."
- Menon, Raja. 1998. *Maritime Strategy and Continental Wars*. London: Frank Cass.
- Ministre, Premier. 2015. *National Strategy for the Security of Maritime Areas*. http://www.gouvernement.fr/sites/default/files/contenu/piece-jointe/2016/01/strategie_nationale_de_surete_des_espaces_maritimes_en_national_strategy_for_the_security_of_maritime_areas.pdf.
- Morrison, Ltgen David. 2011. "Ltgen David Morrison, AO." (January): 5. http://103.11.78.168/~media/Files/Speeches/Speech_to_Maritime_Conference.pdf.
- Oegroseno, Arif Havaf. "Wawancara 13 Juli 2017."
- Pertahanan, Kementerian. 2015. *Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia 2015*. III. Jakarta: Kementerian Pertahanan Republik Indonesia.
- Philippe Couillard. 2015. *The Maritime Strategy by the Year 2030*. Quebec: Gouvernement du Québec. <https://strategiemaritime.gouv.qc.ca/app/uploads/2015/06/maritime-strategy-unabridged2.pdf>.
- Poerwowidagdo, Sapto J. 2013. "Maritim Blue Ocean Strategy in Managing Maritime Security." *Jurnal Pertahanan* 3(Desember): 41–52.
- Puspen Mabesal. 2006. "Membangun Kekuatan Angkatan Laut." *Mabes TNI*: 7. <http://www.tni.mil.id/view-3163-membangun-kekuatan-angkatan-laut.html> (April 18, 2017).
- Salim. "Wawancara 27 Juli 2017."
- Salim, Commander. 2015. "A Pathway to Indonesia's Maritime Future: The Role of Maritime Policy, Doctrine and Strategy." In , 30.
- Sukma, Rizal. "Wawancara 5 September 2017."
- Swartz, Peter M. 2005. "US Navy Capstone Strategies & Concepts (1974-2005)." : 1–31. http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/NHC/Capstone/USN_Strategies_and_Concepts_-_1974-2005/USN_Strategies_and_Concepts_-_1974-2005.html.
- Sweden, Government Offices of. 2015. "A Swedish Maritime Strategy – for People, Jobs and the Environment." (December): 7. <http://www.government.se/information-material/2015/12/a-swedish-maritime-strategy/>.
- The Military Balance. 2016. *Modernising Military Capabilities; Familiar Security Challenges*. Routledge Taylor & Francis Group.
- Till, Geoffrey. 1982. *1 Maritime Strategy and The Nuclear Age*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.
- . 2005. *Sea Power A Guide for the Twenty-First Century*. London: Frank Cass.
- . 2007. "Maritime Strategy in a Globalizing World." *Orbis* 51(4): 569–75. <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438707000749> (March 26, 2016).
- U.S. Navy. 2015. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*. https://www.uscg.mil/seniorleadership/DOCS/CS21R_Final.pdf.
- UN General Assembly. 2008. "Oceans and the Law of the Sea." A/63/63(10 March). <http://www.refworld.org/docid/48da24e72.html> (April 9, 2017).
- UNCTAD. 2017. *Review of Maritime Transport 2017*. New York: UN. https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/rmt2017_en.pdf.
- UNTAD. 2016. *Review of Maritime Transport 2016*. New York: UN. <https://doi.org/10.18356/8a715c05-en>.
- Watkins, Admiral James D. 1986. *The Maritime Strategy*. Annapolis Maryland. United States Naval Institute Press.