GLOBAL SOUTH
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Editor's Note

Mohtar Mas'oed

Suci Lestari Yuana

In this issue of the Global South Review Journal, we are delighted to present a collection of articles and a book review that collectively enrich the discourse on the Global South, offering diverse perspectives on the challenges and opportunities faced by nations in this dynamic region. As editors, we find these contributions instrumental in fostering a deeper understanding of the complex interplay of economic, political, and environmental factors that shape the Global South's trajectory.

The first article, authored by Kanyadibya Cendana Prasetyo, delves into the responses of Global South nations, with a particular focus on Indonesia, to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. The study sheds light on the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project, emphasizing Indonesia's active role in shaping the initiative to align with its New Developmentalism approach. This case study adds nuance to the prevailing discourse, highlighting the contrasting interests between the government and local communities, thereby emphasizing the importance of considering agency and responses of host nations in BRI initiatives.

Lacin Idil Oztig, in the second article, critically examines the inequalities within the discipline of International Relations (IR) that perpetuate a strong center-periphery dynamic. The author challenges the discipline's Eurocentric tendencies and calls for a truly global IR by addressing the intellectual and material barriers that hinder the representation of Global South IR theories. This aligns with the broader theme of empowerment and representation, urging a reevaluation of knowledge production in IR.

Tim Anderson and Dina Yulianti, in the third article, present a persuasive argument for the developmental case of Indo-Pacific and Global South nations joining BRICS Plus. The article positions this move as essential to escape the challenges posed by the dominance of the dollar and unilateral coercive measures, providing a potential alternative through BRICS Plus. This contribution resonates with the overarching theme of economic empowerment within the Global South.

Wenbo Wu's article, the fourth in this volume, explores the evolution of internationalism in the Global South, emphasizing three major components – pluralism, solidarism, and developmentalism. The study traces the historical development of these concepts and envisions an international order rooted in post-colonial solidarity, a pluralistic political outlook, and redistributive justice. This aligns with the ongoing discourse on the diverse trajectories of

internationalism in the Global South.

The fifth article, by Wulan Kencana Adjani, maps Indonesia's South-South Cooperation initiatives, particularly in the context of climate adaptation and sustainable development. The article underscores the strategic benefits of such cooperation and emphasizes the significance of technological exchange in fostering effective collaboration. This resonates with the broader theme of international cooperation and mutual support within the Global South.

Finally, the book review by Nino Viartasiwi and Geubrina Putri Ramadhani provides a critical examination of "Women, Peace, and Security: Feminist Perspectives on International Affairs." This review contributes to the broader discussion by emphasizing the importance of diverse voices and perspectives, particularly those representing women, within the international affairs narrative.

In conclusion, this issue of the Global South Review Journal offers a comprehensive exploration of the region's responses to global challenges, demonstrating the resilience, agency, and diversity of nations within the Global South. We hope these contributions stimulate further dialogue and understanding, fostering a more inclusive and nuanced approach to global discussions.

Sincerely,

Mohtar Mas'oed - Editor in Chief
Suci Lestari Yuana - Managing Editor

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Global South Responses to China's BRI Projects:

A Case Study of Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway Project

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China's rise as a global power in the 21st century, marked by its economic growth and political influence, has been exemplified through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The BRI has extended China's geoeconomic and geopolitical influence across Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. While existing literature predominantly focuses on China's actions, this study shifts the spotlight to Global South nations' responses and strategic policies, particularly Indonesia, in the context of China's BRI projects. Drawing upon in-depth interviews, literature review, and social media analysis, this research examines how Indonesia has actively shaped the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project within the BRI framework to pursue its objectives and interests. The study's findings highlight that the Indonesian government, in alignment with the principles of the BRI, is actively utilizing the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project to advance its New Developmentalism approach under President Jokowi's administration. This approach embodies a narrow perspective of development by focusing on infrastructure and economic growth while ignoring political and environmental considerations. Concurrently, the project has encountered resistance from local communities, underscoring the contrasting interests between the government and the public and adding a nuanced layer to the dynamics of the BRI. This case study sheds light on the complex interplay of interests and power dynamics within the context of China's BRI projects in the Global South. It underscores the importance of considering the responses and agency of host nations and local communities in shaping the outcomes of BRI initiatives.

Keywords: *Global South, China, Indonesia, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Railway*

Introduction

In the last two decades, new donors and actors have been participating in global development cooperation regimes with new ideas, narratives, and strategies (Kragelund, 2015; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). China has emerged as one of the largest and most prominent Southern donors among the new donors (Mawdsley, 2018). China has distinctive strategies and features, such as combining aid, trade, and investment (Yu, 2017) and emphasizing infrastructure development (Jiang, 2019). The Chinese style of development cooperation can be observed in establishing Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), which have included projects in 154 countries

across Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the South Pacific (Tiezzi, 2023). Under the BRI umbrella, China has established itself as a donor and provider of infrastructure projects and forged close cooperation with predominantly Global South countries (Damuri et al., 2019).

The majority of the studies on the BRI are China-centered, focusing on China's strategy, as well as the political and economic dimensions of the initiative and its global implications (Calabrese & Cao, 2021; Chan & Song, 2020; Yang & Van Gorp, 2023; Yu, 2017). A small but growing number of studies try to pay attention to the other side of the BRI, namely the host or recipient countries, by focusing on the benefits, impacts, and risks associated with the BRI projects (Calabrese & Cao, 2021; Yang & Van Gorp, 2023). Moving beyond China-centric analyses and spotlighting the recipient's agency, this case study highlights that understanding development cooperation requires examining both sides' perspectives. This study explores how the Indonesian government navigates BRI projects to align with its economic and political objectives.

This study contributes to Global South literature by focusing on the recipient's side of BRI's projects. Southeast Asia has received more attention regarding China's increasingly assertive foreign policy. This region is pivotal in the new Maritime Silk Road under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indonesia is now China's top export destination and a primary recipient of foreign investment through the BRI (Anwar, 2019). In 2019, the Indonesian government offered around 30 projects worth USD91 billion involving China's BRI (South China Morning Post, 2019). Notably, Indonesia leads as the biggest BRI investment recipient at USD 5.6 billion, almost double that of the second-largest recipient, Peru (USD 2.9 billion) (Nedopil, 2023), emphasizing the need for scrutiny and attention to Indonesia's experience and role under the BRI cooperation.

This study focuses on one of the most notable BRI projects, namely Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway (HSR) or 'Whoosh' to connect the capital city with Indonesia's third biggest city and the capital of West Java in just 45 minutes (Salim & Negara, 2016). The 'Whoosh' HSR was finally launched in October 2023 (BBC Indonesia, 2023).

In fostering the strategic relations between the two countries, China and Indonesia employ a "mutual benefits" discourse by highlighting shared visions and economic benefits. For Indonesia, the High-Speed Railway (HSR) project is envisioned to solve transport bottlenecks and stimulate economic development between Jakarta and Bandung, two of Indonesia's biggest cities. For China, the project is an example of high-speed rail diplomacy (Chan, 2016) and a flagship project for Southeast Asia to showcase China's capabilities in building quality HSR to compete with Japan's technology (Jiang, 2019).

However, the project has encountered many problems since its inception, namely, 1) land acquisition, 2) project construction, and 3) project funding (Tetama et al., 2022). The problems related to the local communities affected by the project have met with community protests against the project's

construction (Negara & Suryadinata, 2018). Moreover, the project has suffered from multiple delays and cost overruns, so the Indonesian government has to bear the additional cost through the state budget. In such situations, local communities and NGOs have used counter-hegemonic discourse against the dominant discourse produced by the government and its proxies that are often put forward to support the project (Plummer, 2019).

This study puts forth three arguments. The core argument is that the HSR project, as an example of the Sino-Indonesian development cooperation project, has been discursively represented to have material benefits for Indonesia. The Chinese and Indonesian governments have promoted the 'mutual benefits' discourse and linked the project to 'modernization' and 'connectivity' – a common discourse promoted by Global South under South-South solidarity. Indonesia has leveraged the project to advance its development agenda based on state-driven economic growth and infrastructure development, often referred to in scholarship on Indonesia as 'New Developmentalism' (Warburton, 2016, 2018).

Second, the support and opposition towards the project are influenced by the level of trust in the government and its proxies (the local governments and companies involved) and the perceived accountability of both, as well as the ground experiences of the communities living near the project that are affected by its implementation. Although the local communities generally support the project based on national development, they have also criticized some aspects of project implementation, which have lowered the levels of public trust and the accountability of the governments and their proxies.

Third, this study asserts that despite having fragmented voices, local communities can generate their own discourses. They can challenge and contest the hegemonic discourse of the state by assembling informal groups and promoting their causes through mass media campaigns and social media.

This study consists of four parts. The first part introduces the background, research gap, and main arguments. The second part elaborates on the case study methodology and the methods employed for data collection and analysis. The third part contains the results and discussion and is divided into two main steps. The first step discusses the landscape of development cooperation and BRI as part of China's development cooperation initiative. The second step brings forward the discussion on the discursive representations of the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway project. It concludes with the research's findings compared to other literature and provides suggestions for further research.

Methodology

The author conducted qualitative research with a case study approach. The research attempts to answer how the project is shaped by a specific case of development cooperation under the BRI umbrella, how the government uses the project to advance New Developmentalism in Indonesia, and how the local communities perceive the project. The case study strategy was adopted in this study because it is well-suited to investigate

a phenomenon within its real-world context holistically (Gerring, 2017), utilizing prior theoretical propositions and multiple sources of evidence for data triangulation to create a comprehensive picture of the dynamics in question (Gerring, 2017).

In addition, the data is collected from a literature review of secondary sources, semi-structured interviews with local communities and NGOs, and social media. The researcher collected three types of materials: secondary data from public documents, articles, books, news reports, and other written materials; in-depth interviews with local communities and NGO representatives; and community comments on social media platforms (Instagram). The data is then triangulated for the analysis.

The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail (HSR) Project spans eight cities, 29 subdistricts, and 95 villages in West Java (Kadarisman, 2017). Three specific neighborhoods were chosen for interviews with local communities – Tipar Complex in West Bandung District, Margawangi Complex in Bandung City, and Darangdan Subdistrict in Purwakarta District. Selection criteria included accessibility, project impacts, and the community's willingness to participate, as advised by the environmental NGO WALHI Jabar.

Interviews with the local communities were conducted online from February to March 2021. This study conducted additional interviews in October-November 2023 to capture the community's responses regarding the HSR's public trials after launching. WALHI Jabar provided community contacts

and a local assistant who helped connect with the neighborhood's chiefs. Snowball sampling was employed to identify initial interviewees and make further connections. The semi-structured approach allows flexibility to guide the interviewees and develop new themes that may arise during interviews.

The interviews, conducted via Zoom and lasting 30 to 70 minutes, involved 24 respondents (seven women and seventeen men). Seventeen respondents came from the three neighborhoods, while seven respondents were representatives of NGOs, CSOs, and the general public, including WALHI Jabar, Universitas Padjajaran, *Komunitas Pohon Indonesia* (Indonesian Tree Community/KPI), Transpod Podcast, and Jakarta City Transportation Council. Pseudonyms were assigned for anonymity, except for well-known figures.

In addition to interviews, social-media comments on the Instagram accounts of the West Java governor during 2018-2023, Ridwan Kamil (@ridwankamil), and the official account of PT. KCIC (@keretacepat_id) related to the Jakarta-Bandung HSR were analyzed. Using Export Comments services (https://exportcomments.com/), 290 pertinent comments were gathered and exported to a .CSV file. Among these, 59 comments originated from @ridwankamil, and 231 were contributed by @keretacepat_id, spanning from May 2019 to March 2021. The comments are then analyzed based on the sentiments (positive, neutral, and negative).

The collected data is analyzed using a subset of qualitative data analysis, namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), for

analyzing literature, policy documents, interviews, and social media comments. Interviews and social media comments are analyzed to find patterns and themes in how the local community perceives the project. The data will then be in the analytical framework that critically evaluates development cooperation and community engagement processes.

Results and Discussion

Development Cooperation

'Development cooperation,' as a concept and practice, has undergone significant transformation in recent decades. The transformation is characterized by two interrelated trends: the proliferation of emerging actors and a paradigm shift that brings new discourses and conceptual frameworks for development cooperation (Chaturvedi et al., 2021; Zimmermann & Smith, 2011). "Emerging donors" or "new donors" are commonly used to describe donors outside the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC) (Manning, 2006). The OECD-DAC members are commonly viewed as traditional donors due to their prominent contributions to shaping international development and foreign aid paradigms.

However, "emerging donors" is a contested term because some actors providing development aid have been giving foreign aid for decades. For example, China has been giving foreign aid to Africa since the 1950s, albeit on a much smaller scale and value than it does at present, which is why scholars argue that "Southern donors" might, therefore, be more appropriate to accurately capture their position in the Global South (Woods, 2008).

As mentioned above, the second trend is a shift in the paradigm employed in the development cooperation discourse. The emerging donors, predominantly from the Global South, bring new narratives and conceptual frameworks for development cooperation in which they emphasize fostering cooperation and mutual benefits. As they are coming from the Global South, it symbolizes the renewal of the South-South partnership that has existed since the 1955 Bandung Conference in Indonesia (Gray & Gills, 2016). Moreover, the emergence of new donors also provides the recipients with more alternatives to access funding and leverage to negotiate with traditional donors.

Indonesia's engagement in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) provides a unique perspective on development cooperation. It underscores the paradigm shift from traditional donor-recipient dynamics towards South-South-based partnerships emphasizing mutual benefits and solidarity. Seeing development cooperation through Indonesia's lens offers a more nuanced conceptualization. This case highlights that understanding development cooperation requires examining both sides' perspectives to reduce bias and balance information. Analyzing Indonesia's role in the BRI enriches our contemporary understanding, urging scholars to rethink and revise theoretical frameworks to capture the complex dynamics of development cooperation better.

China's Approach to Development Cooperation

Different points of view exist in the literature regarding the rise of China as an essential player in development cooperation, whether as a norm-maker, norm-taker, or norm-shifter, each of which is discussed further below (Kratz & Pavlićević, 2019). Several scholars, such as Woods (2008) and Manning (2006), argue that China has circumvented existing Western-led institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and developed alternative institutions and strategies, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the China-led development finance institution, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Woods, 2008; Manning, 2006). China's approach is likened to a 'silent revolution' to overthrow traditional donors' regimes and establish an alternative model to development (Woods, 2008). China has, therefore, created new arrangements and invited other countries to join Chinese-led initiatives in order to create the appearance of disrupting the development paradigm.

Although China has used the language of the partnership while dealing with other countries, its top-down actions, which accord more closely with "development association" than "development cooperation," contradict such language. With the establishment of the BRI and new financial institutions such as AIIB and the New Development Bank (NDB), China is rising to a more prominent position on the global stage, taking advantage of the United States' relative decline in economic power and influence and merely filling gaps within development cooperation field. Thus, China's new institutional arrangements serve its interests first and foremost, similar to the development practices of traditional donors like the U.S. or other DAC donors (Dreher et al., 2021).

Meanwhile, some studies have shown that China is shifting the existing norms in development aid and that the convergence process occurring between Northern and Southern donors produces a 'two-way socialization'' in which the actions of each donor influence the others (Kratz & Pavlićević, 2019). China and other Southern donors follow the existing rules while establishing different strategies from DAC donors, which in turn prompt the DAC donors to the norms embodied by the actions of Southern donors (Mawdsley, 2018).

One of the manifestations of China's development cooperation is the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI is a part of China's foreign policy and development cooperation strategies to extend and assert its influence within the global sphere. BRI does not deal with a single project but a network of projects that engage a myriad of actors across the world. A BRI project is any project under the BRI umbrella, although the projects may each demonstrate unique characteristics and may or may not have different configurations. It has been argued that China deliberately keeps BRI as vague as possible to ensure that any project they work on abroad could fall under the Belt and Road Initiative (Yu, 2019; Buckley, 2020).

Many scholars argue that BRI is used as China's geopolitical tool to gain influence and power in a world where China is challenging the US and Western hegemony (Yu, 2017; Yu, 2019). Others think that BRI is using economic means to reach political ends, as it is discursively represented and articulated in economic terms (e.g., trade connectivity, development, and financing) (Damuri et al., 2019; Lams, 2018; Zeng, 2019). BRI comprises six economic corridors, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China-Mongolia-Russia, China-Indochina, Central Asia, and Africa. BRI projects tend to have loose schemes and flexible arrangements, so the host countries could tailor the projects according to their needs and interests (Chan & Song, 2020).

Discursive Representations of The Jakarta-Bandung High Speed Railway Project

The Indonesian government has long been developing plans to revitalize railway tracks across Java, the most populous island in Indonesia with more than 150 million inhabitants. In 2014, the central government finally announced the construction of the Jakarta-Bandung HSR project, beginning in the western part of Java in Jakarta, with an option to continue to Surabaya, the capital of East Java (Negara & Suryadinata, 2018).

The Jakarta-Bandung HSR project was eventually awarded to China after bidding wars between Japan and China in 2015. The Jakarta-Bandung HSR is projected to be another transportation option between two of Indonesia's largest cities, offering high-speed journeys of 350km/hour at top speed and 40 minutes of travel time over 142.3 km (Negara & Suryadinata, 2018). A map of the HSR routes and its stations is shown below.

Figure 1: Map of High-Speed Railway routes and its stations

Source: KCJB

The HSR project is a chance to showcase China and its companies' capabilities and capacity to fill infrastructure gaps in BRI countries. The Jakarta-Bandung HSR project is also the first Chinese-backed HSR project in Southeast Asia under the BRI (Kratz & Pavlićević, 2019) that came to fruition. From the Chinese perspective, the project is an opportunity to achieve "win-win cooperation" and show its capabilities to construct a high-speed railway and its supporting infrastructures in Indonesia. Indonesia also utilizes the Jakarta-Bandung HSR as a New Developmentalism agenda under the Jokowi administration (Warburton, 2018), focusing on infrastructure and economic growth (Guild & Chen, 2021). Moreover, the HSR project is discursively represented by the government and its proxies – local governments, KCIC, and SOEs companies under KCIC – as a symbol of 'modern infrastructure,' signaling tightening cooperation with China and

bringing many benefits.

In addition, the infrastructure strategy also stems from what Warburton (2016; 2018) calls 'New Developmentalism' in Indonesia. In the period in the late 1990s, throughout the recovery from the financial crisis, even though there were factional splits among political classes on whether to pursue liberalism or protectionism, to a degree, Indonesia pursued a more liberal economic agenda by opening up the economy, particularly in trade and investment policies (World Bank, 2020). New Developmentalism is vital in state-led development and focuses on economic growth while retaining some aspects of neoliberalism (Bresser-Pereira & Carlos, 2016).

Related to the Jakarta-Bandung HSR project, the Government of Indonesia has hailed the project as one of the landmarks of Jokowi's administration. Through multiple communication channels, either via mass media or social media, state officials portray the HSR project as having positive benefits, while the negative impacts are rarely mentioned (The Jakarta Post, 2020). Similar discourses are also used by the KCIC consortium and the Indonesian companies within the consortium (WIKA, KAI, PTPN VIII, and Jasa Marga). Two significant benefits are portrayed in the text and other forms of representation used by the state and the associated joint venture: transportation and economic benefits. Regarding transportation benefits, the project is portrayed as a promise of 'connectivity' and 'modernization.' 'Connectivity' discourse is used throughout policy and project documents. In the policy

documents, 'connectivity' is the main frame to describe infrastructure provision (Ministry of National Development Planning, 2020, 2019; Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs, 2011).

Meanwhile, the 'modernization' discourse relates the project to Indonesia and Southeast Asia's first High-Speed Railway. KCIC's former president director framed the HSR project as a 'dream comes true'. The language used by the government and KCIC demonstrates that the high-speed railway is envisioned to show 'progress' and 'modernity.' The project is also connected to Jokowi-era 'New Developmentalism' (Warburton, 2016; 2018) – emulating China's success – by underpinning state nationalism, export-led economic growth, and infrastructure-led economic growth. Moreover, the government also has the means and capabilities to promote the discourse of 'benefits,' 'progress,' and 'modernity' through officials, mass media, and official social media accounts.

Regarding economic advantages, the government and affiliated entities openly discuss the possibility of generating employment, establishing new economic hubs through developing Transit-Oriented Developments (TODs) and High-Speed Rail (HSR) stations, and the potential for increased revenues. As discussed above, the Chinese-backed HSR project has been positively portrayed by the Chinese and Indonesian governments by showing its positive impacts and potential contributions to economic growth and infrastructure development.

Responses of the Local Communities

Across the qualitative sample, all respondents supported the overall HSR project in terms of its contribution to national development, except two from NGOs, namely WALHI and KPI (*Komunitas Pohon Indonesia*/Indonesian Tree Community). The support for the project is an extension of the support for national development as planned by the national government. Some of the respondents also listed the benefits promoted by the government through mass media.

> *"I support this project because the national development may have been planned. There is medium-term development and long-term development. It has been discussed from a scientific perspective by the government. Broadly speaking, I agree and will not obstruct it"* (Interview, Endah, 2021).

On the other hand, the in-depth interviews conducted for this research illustrate that communities have mixed feelings about the project implementation – particularly those that live near the construction sites. The respondents living near the construction sites, such as those in the Tipar Silih Asih Complex in Bandung City and Darangdan, Purwakarta District, have refused to receive the relatively small monetary compensation offered by KCIC in return for agreement to continue the project construction without complaint. Instead, people in these regions have asked the KCIC to buy their houses or rice fields at market price so they can move elsewhere.

> *"The point is we support any government project, still support it. But I ask for the safety of the citizens. The government's goal to develop this is for the welfare of the community. If we are disadvantageous, then it is not a development, but destruction. Harming society is not the goal of development. That is all for me. So, we do not even want to hamper, slow down or oppose national development. We do not mean it. But, we, the community, also deserve justice. The ultimate goal is the well-being"* (Interview, Herman, 2021).

Across the interviewees, the closer they were to the site, the more they opposed the project implementation given the disadvantages they experienced, while at the same time not necessarily rejecting the broader goal of infrastructure development per se. There are three perceived disadvantages, as discussed by the respondents, namely livelihoods, pollution, and disasters. First, the project has adversely impacted the local community's livelihoods. In Kompleks Tipar Silih Asih, eight consecutive tunnel blasts in September-October 2019 cracked their houses, roofs, and roads, affecting the groundwater as the soil shifted. The respondents in Kompleks Tipar who have experienced explosions explained the current situation.

> *"Because from the results of the LAPI ITB and the geological team stated that this land had cracked underneath and there is a [soil] movement beneath the mountain towards the village"* (Interview, Sony, 2021).

"Houses can collapse at any time"
(Interview, Akbar, 2021).

Figure 2: The effects of tunnel blast on residents' houses in *Kompleks Tipar Silih Asih*

Source: residents' documentation

In Margawangi, Bandung City, project activities have harmed residents' livelihoods through excessive noise pollution, vibrations causing structural damage, and groundwater contamination, rendering it unusable for household needs. Environmental risks are also a primary concern, as the project lacks a proper Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) or AMDAL in Indonesia. The AMDAL was only shared with local NGOs and communities upon request, with no public consultation, resulting in a lack of transparency and information.

Approximately 38% of respondents, including retirees and self-employed individuals, face income instability due to the project. They fear displacement because their homes or rice fields have been damaged. All respondents in the three neighborhoods are prepared to relocate but await proper compensation. Additionally, around half of the

Margawangi and Darangdan respondents worry about potential health issues and electronic device damage from electromagnetic radiation associated with the HSR.

Respondents generally exhibit low trust in the government and affiliated companies, leading to increased opposition to the project. Suspicion toward ethnic Chinese and China, rooted in historical anti-Chinese sentiment and Suharto-era conditioning, is still prevalent (Anwar, 2019). During interviews, many doubted China's motives and viewed Chinese companies as cunning and deceitful. Concerns about China's debt-trap diplomacy and the predominance of Chinese workers in the project, with locals mostly in low-level positions, also emerged. The local communities were growing wary and taking matters into their own hands by creating informal groups, speaking to mass media, or posting their opinions on social media (Plummer, 2019).

In addition, WALHI, an environmental NGO, has contended that the project violates environmental regulations meant to protect the local community. The project's hasty inclusion in government plans lacked proper public consultation, raising concerns about legal breaches and the marginalization of local rights. Additionally, WALHI and KPI emphasize the lack of urgency and importance in implementing an HSR line on Jakarta-Bandung and developing TODs near the stations.

A more comprehensive picture emerges from the social media. Analyzing 340 comments on the Instagram accounts of the then-West Java Governor, Ridwan Kamil (@

ridwankamil), and KCIC (@keretacepat_id) accounts shows a slightly different story. On KCIC's account, the comments were dominated by positive sentiment (45%), followed by neutral (32.5%) and negative sentiments (22.5%). Meanwhile, on the @ridwankamil account, the majority of the comments have positive sentiment (52.5%), followed by negative (33.9%) and neutral ones (13.6%).

Table 1: Sentiment Analysis of the Instagram Comments

Sentiment	@keretacepat_id	@ridwankamil
Positive	104	31
Neutral	75	8
Negative	52	20
Total comments	**231**	**59**
Positive %	45.0	52.5
Neutral %	32.5	13.6
Negative %	22.5	33.9
Total %	**100.0**	**100.0**

Positive comments are associated with the support for the project. At least three major themes emerged from the discourse analysis on social media (Table 1), namely support for the infrastructure development, support for the HSR, and support for the governor of West Java, Ridwan Kamil. On the Instagram account of Ridwan Kamil, the former West Java Governor, the project is represented as "the first high-speed railway in Southeast Asia," connected to "4 new urban areas" and "creating new jobs." Ridwan Kamil stated that the available jobs also employ local people, such as those from the Cipeundeuy Subdistrict.

Moreover, the then-governor alleviated concerns over China's debt trap by saying the project is under a B2B scheme without using state budgets. The governor reproduces a similar framing that Minister Luhut has said regarding the debt-trap concern (The Jakarta Post, 2020). The positive comments are primarily in line with the discourse produced by the Indonesian government.

On the other hand, the negative comments are primarily associated with the project's perceived disadvantages, risks, and impacts. Many commenters expressed concerns about being 'victims' of the project due to floods, traffic jams, and risks of disasters such as landslides and earthquakes. Concerns regarding the Chinese debt trap and the build quality of the HSR were also shown. They also countered Ridwan Kamil's narrative on local employment, saying that most workers there are Chinese.

The neutral comments encompassed diverse themes, namely the job opportunities or recruitment process at the KCIC, the general knowledge of the project, the design of the HSR, and other aspects of the HSR, with no apparent positive or negative sentiment.

Problematization of Jakarta-Bandung HSR Project

Indonesia's infrastructure priorities often prioritize company profits over quality and the environment, as seen in HSR and TOD projects (Walhi Jabar, 2019; Kadarisman, 2017). The local community and NGOs' voices are disregarded without proper public consultation, resulting in marginalization and rights violations (Walhi Jabar,

2019). The government employs increasing violence and power, breaching laws meant to protect against development's adverse impacts, exemplified by Law No. 2 of 2012 on Land Acquisition in the Public Interest during Jokowi's tenure (Aziz, 2016).

The Indonesian government prioritizes profit over comprehensive urban planning for Jakarta-Bandung. Their actions reflect a profit-focused approach, including omitting the HSR project from development plans and altering regulations to accommodate it. This willingness to bend the rules for financial gain is evident in the government's land use changes. (Walhi Jabar, 2019). Also, transparency and accountability are lacking in the national and local governments and KCIC. Local communities needed to be more informed about project benefits and risks, relying on media and community leaders for information. The absence of proper public consultation and site assessments before project initiation further compounds the issue.

Alternative Narratives and The Hegemonic Discourses

In this section, the author explores the hegemonic discourses, alternative narratives, and power dynamics among the actors relevant to the Jakarta-Bandung HSR project—the hegemonic discourses and opposition to such discourses related to the production of discourses and power struggles. Members of local communities and CSOs contest the discourses produced by the government and its proxies. Examining and analyzing interviews and social media reveal three strands of alternative discourses.

The Hegemonic and Alternative Discourses

The emergence of hegemonic and alternative discourses reveals the power struggles between two sets of actors. On the one hand, the first actors set the narratives of development cooperation by framing the project as beneficial and contributing to national development, especially in West Java province. On the other hand, the second actors produce their discourses based on the perceived risks and disadvantages that have been felt. Although the second set of actors does not reject the overall project, they challenge limited public participation spaces and the negative impacts of project construction near their sites.

Production of Hegemonic Discourses and Power Struggles

This project sheds light on the imbalanced power relations between the Indonesian government and its collaborators, on one hand, and the affected communities on the other. Drawing on Michel Foucault's analysis of truth and power, certain discourses shape "regimes of truth" that dominate how people understand and organize their world (Foucault, 1980, 2002). Through official messaging amplified by mass media, the government and its allies try to establish a dominant narrative that frames the project as a symbol of national progress. This hegemonic discourse, crafted by those in power, conveniently masks the negative impacts on local communities, obscuring the realities on the ground.

While the government wields control over knowledge production and the "regimes of truth" (Escobar, 1995), local communities are not simply passive recipients. Operating through informal groups and social media, they find alternative ways to voice their aspirations and counter the dominant narrative. Despite limited formal avenues for participation, these grassroots movements, driven by shared experiences and local knowledge, prove quite effective. They have not only pushed for public consultations but also challenged the project's trajectory through meetings and negotiations with various stakeholders, including the KCIC consortium, government officials, and NGOs.

This decentralized power and locally-grown knowledge empower communities to self-govern and generate "counter-conducts" that challenge the existing order, both in action and discourse. As Foucault points out (1991), these "counter-conducts" are intertwined with the history of governmentality itself, forming a continuous dialogue between control and resistance. In the case of the Jakarta-Bandung HSR project, two key forms of "counter-conduct" have emerged: the formation of informal groups and the use of social media to express dissenting views and concerns. These acts of dissent also reflect a desire for self-improvement and community-driven governance.

By creating space for alternative public interests and critiques of government and project practices, these "counter-conducts" have transformative potential. For local communities, they offer tools to mitigate project risks and advocate for fair compensation and

greater participation. For the government and project implementers, they necessitate strategizing in the face of dissent and addressing community demands. This dynamic interplay between the dominant discourse and counter-hegemonic narratives showcases the varied ways in which power is exercised and contested.

Alternative Discourses Produced by the Local Communities

The local communities are fragmented into two stances: supporting or opposing the project. Within the local communities this study interviewed, most respondents support the project for the more significant objective of national development but reject parts of the implementation and construction process near their neighborhoods. It is also interesting to note that while the local communities affected directly by the project voiced more negative views towards the project, the people who do not live near the construction project and have experienced 'Whoosh' HSR during trial sessions have predominantly positive views.

The support for the project derived from three factors: trust toward the government and China, national development, and perceived progress or advancement. Satrio, a Jakarta City Transportation Council respondent, actively supports the project and has experienced public trials. He firmly believes that Indonesia urgently needs the modernization of its transport infrastructure and a high-speed railway to connect various Indonesian cities. Similarly, Dini, a respondent who has experienced public trials, also

holds a positive outlook on the High-Speed Rail (HSR) project. Both respondents see the HSR as a significant step towards advancing Indonesia's railway infrastructure, emphasizing speed, comfort, and modernity as top priorities.

On the other hand, those who oppose the projects have produced alternative narratives to counter-hegemonic discourse based on similar concerns regarding infrastructure projects and South-South Cooperation worldwide. At least three strands of discourses regarding the Jakarta-Bandung HSR emerge from interviews and social media analysis: 'development for whom,' 'Chinese debt-trap,' and 'disrupted livelihoods.'

First, concerning the government's strategy in dealing with the local communities, a discourse arose from the local communities questioning who would benefit from the development project. Local communities are questioning the government's approach to engaging them in the development project, challenging the official narrative the government and KCIC presented.

While the government emphasizes 'modernization' and 'connectivity,' local communities and environmental NGOs argue that the benefits are skewed towards specific groups, including those near stations, frequent Jakarta-Bandung travelers, and the middle to high classes. Social media comments dismiss the High-Speed Rail (HSR) project as "*unfaedah*" (useless). The construction plan indicates that the project passes through only three neighborhoods, and the nearest stations are 30-45 minutes away. Residents prefer private vehicles, giving good

access to toll highways and national roads. Even upon completion, locals may stick to private transport, rendering the HSR ineffective in addressing traffic congestion and enhancing connectivity.

Moreover, locals challenge official claims of material benefits like job creation and economic growth. Critics argue that the project primarily serves state and business interests, neglecting broader public concerns and local geography and demography contexts. For example, local job opportunities are limited to 'low-level positions,' while 'high-level positions' are occupied by Chinese workers. Observations reveal that most Chinese workers are residing in closed enclaves, perpetuating racial stereotypes and anti-Chinese sentiments. The Jakarta Post (2023) observed that the Chinese staff operates the HSR as the local staff still needs necessary training during the first year of operation. Thus, the discourse produced by local communities challenges the official discourse on who will benefit and what benefit the local community gains from such development.

Other discourse that repeatedly emerged from interview respondents and social media commenters is how the project has "disrupted livelihoods," including noise and groundwater pollution, traffic jams, damaged houses and rice fields, and health risks. For example, the respondents from Kompleks Tipar narrated the project as "destroying their close-knit neighborhoods," they "no longer feel safe and comfortable." As told by the respondents, the damages from the construction have shaken up their homes and the

community that have lived in the neighborhoods for years and now have to move out due to irreparable damages.

Agung, a neighbourhood chief (Ketua RW) from Kompleks Tipar, and Gustav, a community leader from Kompleks Margawangi, expressed concerns that the residents are "anxious and restless" about the current situation and their future. On social media, some commenters complained that the project had disrupted traffic and caused floods in some areas near the project sites. Most respondents and commenters blamed KCIC and associated companies for damaging their livelihoods. They deemed the local governments "powerless" to demand compensation and put sanctions on KCIC and associated companies that have produced the damages. Thus, the local communities prefer to deal with their problems through informal groups as they have a low level of trust in government officials and agencies.

Concerns about China's debt trap due to cost overruns and increased interest rates are also mentioned, alongside concerns regarding Indonesia's debt sustainability and growing dependence on China (The Jakarta Post, 2020). As one user on social media commented, this project is none other than a "Chinese money trap" that only benefits China in the long run and traps Indonesia into ever-growing dependence on China. Critics also voiced concerns over the government's intervention to use the state budget to cover cost overruns. The Chinese proposal was initially projected to be cheaper than the Japanese one. However, the cost overruns and ballooning debt interest from 2% to 3.4%

eventually make it more expensive than the Japanese proposal (BBC Indonesia, 2023). The discourse of the debt trap in Indonesia echoes similar concerns for Chinese-backed projects in other countries, such as Kenya and Laos, that threaten the debt sustainability of both countries (Onjala, 2018; Westerman, 2019).

The ground experiences shared by the respondents reveal the diversity of views and alternative discourses produced by the local communities in West Java. It is not an isolated case but part of a broader trend. The expansion of South-South Cooperation and Southern donors, coupled with their increasing prominence on the global stage, has attracted public scrutiny. Social movements and NGOs have joined numerous countries to advocate for common causes. These include addressing the shared experiences of marginalized communities as disposable victims and advocating for fair compensation for the loss of their lands, ecosystems, and livelihoods (Mawdsley, 2019). However, the fragmented voices and perceptions within the local communities make it difficult to counter the dominant discourse produced by the government and its proxies.

The Hegemonic Discourses Reiterated

In response to the alternative narratives presented by local communities, the government and its affiliates reiterate the discourse emphasizing the "mutual benefits" while countering the "debt-trap" narratives. One respondent, Hilman, an employee at WIKA (a part of the KCIC Consortium), concurs that the project will bring numer-

ous advantages to Indonesia, including the advancement of train technology and job opportunities for residents. Their support is rooted in trust and the belief that the government and China will deliver a high-quality HSR. Additionally, their support for the project extends to a broader notion of national development. Thus, those favoring the project promote the hegemonic discourse set forth by the government and its proxies.

In pursuing Indonesia's New Developmentalism agenda (Warburton, 2018) through the Jakarta-Bandung HSR, the government and its proxies promote hegemonic discourses that subsumed those advanced by local communities. These discourses align with the government's and capitalists' interests in achieving the twin economic growth and infrastructure development goals under President Jokowi's administration. Indonesia's New Developmentalism coincides with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) objectives, enabling the Indonesian government to pursue its developmental agenda through Sino-Indonesian development cooperation. Hence, the principles of "mutual benefits" and "solidarity," which are fundamental to South-South Cooperation, primarily serve the interests of business and political elites who directly benefit from the project.

The findings also underscore the convergence and divergence of multiple voices within local communities and the state government. Various perspectives and discourses on Chinese-led development cooperation have developed and been perpetuated within recipient countries over the years. This research has demonstrated how multiple actors

within a recipient country express their concerns and have various interests that may or may not align with the hegemonic discourses. The hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses advanced by the actors in this project highlight how a Global South country actively shapes its objectives and destinies.

Conclusion

The Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway (HSR) project is hailed as a signature infrastructure project for Indonesia and China. At the center of this project are hegemonic discourses and alternative views presented by two sets of actors. The first set of actors comprised both Chinese and Indonesian governments, the KCIC consortium, and West Java local governments. The second set of actors comprised local communities affected by the project and local environmental NGOs, or those that oppose the project for various other reasons identified in the previous chapters. The former actors act upon the conviction of "mutual benefits" that will be reaped by both countries and justify the construction of the HSR project in the name of 'modernization' of transportation and increasing infrastructure and people-to-people 'connectivity.'

On the other hand, the local communities and NGOs have experienced damage to their lands and houses and environmental degradation. Furthermore, this article shows unequal power relations between the government, its proxies, and local communities. The government and its proxies could produce a hegemonic discourse through various channels, via speeches, officials' statements,

official texts and documents, and mass media and social media accounts of the company and elected government officials.

This study found that there are many perspectives and multiple realities to uncover in the future. First, in the development cooperation field, this study calls for a more in-depth analysis dealing with China or other countries, especially considering the nature of South-South cooperation. Second, the views expressed by the BRI project's local communities and recipient countries highlight the importance of public participation and people's voices for development projects. It warrants further discussion on the meanings and manifestation of South-South cooperation based on mutual benefits and solidarity among the Global South.

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IR and the Global South: Revisiting Obstacles to a Global Discipline

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The IR discipline is marked by a strong center-periphery inequality that is perpetuated through theories, methodologies, and concepts produced in the Global North that do not adequately capture the diverse experiences of Global South states and societies. In tandem with growing critiques of Western-centrism and calls for global IR, the discipline has now become more heterogeneous and inclusive, and IR scholars are more attentive to the global IR debate than ever before. Yet, the discipline has not become truly global, as many Global South scholars are absent from the major debates in the field and there are still sharp geographic differences with respect to IR knowledge production. Even though Global South countries have enormous potential to enrich and globalize IR with their history, political thinkers, and religious and philosophical traditions, this potential remains largely untapped. While Global South scholars develop alternative perspectives and engage in theorizing practices, these efforts have not yet been embodied in the form of an IR theory that provides alternative explanations of world politics. Equally important, these perspectives are not echoed in much of the mainstream accounts in IR. This study contributes to the global IR debate by problematizing the dynamics behind the insufficient development and representation of Global South IR theories and perspectives in the discipline. After delving into entrenched Western-centrism and the asymmetries of knowledge production in the discipline, the present study puts into spotlight the intellectual and material barriers that feed off each other and perpetuate the inequalities in IR knowledge production.

Keywords: *the Global North; the Global South; Western-centrism; homogenized knowledge; homegrown theories*

Introduction

International Relations (IR) is a discipline with strong center-periphery inequality, which has been described as "academic imperialism," "academic dependency," and "knowledge hegemony and exploitation."[1] Mainstream IR theories are primarily built on the idea of a Western experience and the concept

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[1] The Global North and the Global South have recently replaced the West and the non-West (Third World) as popular terms for describing structural inequalities in the IR discipline. See Kleinschmidt (2018). See Walter D. Mignolo, *On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics* (Praxia. Durham, 2008); Alatas, "Academic Dependency and the Global Division of Labour in the Social Sciences," Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *The End of the Cognitive Empire. The Coming of Age of Epistemologies of the South* (London: Duke University Press, 2018). Throughout the text, I use the terms the Global North/ the West/the core and the Global South/the non-West/ the periphery synonymously.

of modernity (Halperin, 2006, p. 43; Cossens, 2021, p. 56). They, as such, overlook the unique historical, cultural, and economic contexts that shape the behavior and interests of Global South actors (Halperin, 2006, p. 43; Cossens, 2021, p. 56). This is paradoxical for a discipline that aims to theorize about the world (Kleinn, 2016, p. 33; Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006). Overall, IR has evolved into a discipline characterized by historical, economic, political, and social biases produced by and for the Global North that have been imposed as an interpretive reference to relationships, problems, and experiences of the rest of the world (Cossens, 2023). This exclusionary approach prevents IR from becoming a more accurate reflection of the complex dynamics and power structures that shape our world today.

The dominance of Western-centric epistemologies and North-based publishing houses in the discipline has implications on the ways in which research communities around the world think about international affairs, teach IR, and conduct research. Global South scholars overwhelmingly experience dependency that operates through the imposition of Western-centric paradigms and ideas (Alatas, 2003), limiting their ability to shape and contribute to the field on their own terms. This goes parallel with the treatment of Global South scholars as "categorical others" and the othering of Global South contributions (Klein, 2016). Western-centric epistemologies often shape the criteria used by North-based publishing houses to decide which research to publish, leading to a bias towards research that aligns with Western-centric perspectives. These exclusionary practices have molded IR into a peculiarity that has serious implications for the development of the discipline (Pasha, 2011, p. 217-218).

Notwithstanding the entrenched parochialism in the discipline, there have been growing critiques targeting Western-centrism and systematic disregard for racial issues (Krishna, 2001; Zvobgo & Loken, 2020; Nisancioglu, 2020). Postcolonial perspectives have criticized the hierarchical organization of knowledge where knowledge produced in the Global North is considered superior to that of the Global South (Quijano, 2000; Rodriguez Medina, 2014). The Global IR debate has been at the center of disciplinary attention and scholars have devoted considerable attention to the possibilities of the development of non-Western international theory (Acharya, 2016; Layug & Hobson, 2023; Acharya & Buzan, 2017; Aydınlı & Biltekin, 2018; Makarychev & Morozov, 2013; Acharya, 2011).

Acharya succinctly describes the idea a global IR in the following words:

> The principal aim of global IR is to 'bring the Rest in'. It calls for greater participation from scholars from the Global South in the IR discipline and the broadening of the way IR is taught and written in the dominant centres of knowledge in the West. The purpose of global IR is to ensure the transformation of the discipline into something that actually captures and explains the relationships among states and societies in all parts of the world: East, West, North, South. A global IR perspective on IR theory does not seek to displace existing the-

ories, but challenges them to broaden their horizons and acknowledge the place and role of the non-Western world (Acharya, 2017).

The Global North-South disparities in IR limit our understanding of global issues and prevent the development of comprehensive and inclusive solutions to global problems. The equal representation of Global South scholars and their perspectives in the discipline can contribute to the decolonization of knowledge production in IR, and challenge the existing power dynamics. Global South countries have enormous potential to globalize IR with their history, political thinkers, and religious and philosophical traditions.

Indeed, recent studies offer valuable insight into how experiences and perspectives in the Global South could enrich and globalize IR. To name a few, Niang (2016) links African deliberations to perspectives of international morality, rights, and self-determination, Shimizu (2021) discusses how Mahāyāna Buddhist teachings can contribute to IR. Cossens (2019) attests to a pre-Hispanic international system configured in Mesoamerica through trade routes and dynamics (particularly obsidian trade). Pardesi (2021) illustrates that in the pre-colonial period, the Mughal Empire transformed South Asia into a region of the Eurasian international system, the other constitutive powers of this system being the Ottoman and Safevid Empires. Spruyt (2020) examines how the Ottoman, Safavid and Mughal empires; the Sinocentric tributary system; and the Southeast Asian galactic empires differed from the Westphalian state system. After criticizing Western-centric treatment of the Ottoman/Turk in the English School of International Relations, Ruacan (2018) moves to redefine the Ottoman Empire as a potential European superpower rather than as an abnormal polity in European life. Looking at power projection, interconnectedness, and the autonomy of frontier polities, Balcı and Kardas (2023) attest to the existence of an Ottoman international system between the early sixteenth century to the late eighteenth century.

Despite the fact that the discipline has become more heterogeneous and inclusive of Global South history and perspectives than ever before, it has not become truly global, as many Global South scholars are still not part of the major debates in the field. While Global South scholars engage in theorizing attempts, there is still no non-Western theory of IR (Maiken, 2019). There are large geographic asymmetries with respect to IR knowledge production. As it will be explored in detail throughout this study, mainstream IR theories and narratives dominate the Global South scholarship and the Global South perspectives and theorizing are not echoed in much of the mainstream accounts in IR. In light of these dynamics, it is fair to argue that the potential of the Global South to globalize the discipline remains largely untapped. This study starts from the analytical point of departure that the development and inclusion of Global South IR theories and perspectives is essential for inclusive and holistic approaches to IR.

The existing studies in the literature shed light on the question of why there is still no non-Western theory of IR and stress the importance of homegrown theorizing (theorizing in the periphery about the periphery) for a global IR discipline (Acharya & Buzan, 2007; Acharya & Buzan, 2017; Aydınlı & Biltekin, 2018; Kuru, 2018). Building on these studies, the present article brings under spotlight the discrepancy between mainstream IR and IR scholarship around the world. It contributes to the global IR debate by problematizing the underlying reasons behind the insufficient development and representation of Global South IR theories and perspectives in the discipline. As such, it provides new insights into the debate by critically examining the intellectual and material barriers that prevent scholars from contributing equally to the study of IR.

Western-centrism in the IR discipline

Geopolitical power, knowledge, and othering have gone hand in hand throughout most of history (Slater, 2004). Colonialism, which was based on the organization of the world for the benefit of Western powers, has left its epistemological imprint on scientific reasoning in the social sciences (Alejandro, 2019). In addition to brute force, colonialism utilized and manipulated normative ideals, such as civilization and progress (Pasha, 2011). As its spillover, Western-centrism, also a product of the modern world system, has influenced the intellectual sphere, resulting in the propensity to evaluate the world through "the ontological distinctiveness of the West" (Caserta, 2021, p. 323; Sabarat-

nam, 2013, p. 274).

Western-centrist thinking is built on the premise that there is a sharp analytical distinction between the West and the non-West (Gran, 1996). It is closely connected to Euro-centrism defined "as a set of practices – scientific, cultural, political – which overtly (mostly in the era of colonial imperialism) or tacitly (mostly in the postcolonial era) seek to establish and maintain the primacy of post- Enlightenment European political and epistemic culture at the expense of alternative political systems and epistemologies." (Vasilaki, 2012). The Western-centric discourse, which emerged in the 18th century concomitant with the construction of European identity, resulted in the creation and solidification of "an imaginary line of civilizational apartheid" that sharply divided the Global North and the Global South (Said, [1978] 2003). This division perpetuated notions of superiority and inferiority, contributing to the perpetuation of Western imperialism (Hobson, 2007, p. 94). It stripped the non-Western society of its independent identity and agency and made it a target of a myriad of negative attributes (Slater, 2004, p. 223). The Western-centrism in academic disciplines led to the colonization of intellectuals in the periphery and the normalization of global structures of inequality (Joseph et al., 1990).

The social sciences were born when Europe was at the apex of its power in the 19th century. In Wallerstein's words, "[i]t was virtually inevitable that its choice of subject matter, its theorizing, its methodology, and its epistemology should reflect the

constraints of the crucible within which it was born." (Wallerstein, 1997). Therefore, Western-centrism was embedded in a wide array of disciplines of social science, including philosophy, history, anthropology, law, and sociology (Kayaoglu, 2010). Rather than criticizing Western-centric thinking, social scientists endogenized it into their theories by explaining the developments in the world by looking at dynamics that existed only in the West (Hobson, 2007). The sharp distinctions between the West and the non-West were perpetuated by the modernization theory in the 1950s (Slater, 2004, p. 58). Modernization was described "as a universal process of change towards those types of social, economic and political systems that had developed in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries." (Slater, 2004, p. 59). The development of the non-West was only envisioned in the context of the diffusion of modern and secular norms from the West (Slater, 2004, p. 61).

Western-centric understanding gives agency to the Global North by emphasizing its ability to create norms, principles, and institutions of the modern international system and stripping away the agency of the Global South societies by treating them as passive actors who need to socialize into these norms, principles, and institutions (Kayaoglu, 2010, p. 194). In other words, Western values, norms, and political vision are treated as the ultimate stage that the Global South should strive to reach (Kayaoglu, 2010, p. 195). It is in this context that peripheral thinking "can attain presence only by conceding its alterity or by surrendering its distinctiveness." (Pasha, 2011, p. 218).

To fully account for the lack of diversity and equity in the discipline, it is essential to trace a biased and one-sided historical narrative that dominated the discipline (Fonseca, 2019). This narrative dates the creation of the modern international system and the birth of the idea of sovereignty to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Buzan & Little, 2000, p. 3).[2] The Westphalian narrative perpetuates a distorted understanding of the creation of the modern international system with its dualistic assumption that "with Westphalia European states had solved the anarchy problem either through cultural or contractual evolution. Non-European states, lacking this European culture and social contract, remained in anarchy until the European states allowed them to join the international society—upon their achievement of the 'standards of civilization." (Kayaoglu, 2020, p. 193). The Westphalian narrative obscures colonialism, imperialism, cultural erasure, and resistance of the non-West (Pasha, 2011, p. 221).

It is important to highlight a growing body of literature that describes the alleged link between the Treaty of Westphalia and the creation of a sovereignty-based international system as a "myth." (Osiander, 2001).[3]

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[2] For the study that problematizes this assumption, see Benjamin de Carvalho, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson, "The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths that your teacher still tell you about 1648 and 1919," *Millennium: Journal of International Studies* 39 no. 3 (2011), 735-758.

Furthermore, the concept of Indigenous sovereignty (which acknowledges interdependencies between political actors and relationships with the land and sees sovereignty as a contextualized rather than universal phenomenon) continues to evolve (Bauder & Mueller, 2023). Despite these developments, the Westphalian narrative still guides many IR scholars (Zarakol, 2022). Rather than studying non-Western states and actors in their own right, most IR studies tend to attribute them a supporting role in the story of the West (Zarakol, 2022).

The Western-centric bias is poignantly visible in major IR theories such as Realism and Liberalism that were built upon and binary distinctions such as "developed" vs. "undeveloped"; "modern" vs. "primitive"; "civilized" vs. "uncivilized" (Zvobgo & Loken, 2020, p. 11-13). Constructivism provides another example of how this bias is ingrained in IR theory. While Constructivism initially offered a prospect for the decolonial project with its focus on non-Western norms, Constructivist scholars have systematically disregarded racial issues as well as pre-Westphalian civilizations in the Global South (Acharya & Buzan, 2017, p. 314-370). Importantly, in their analysis of IR journals, Bertucci, Hayes, and James (2018) reveal that the majority of Constructivist studies concentrate on security processes and outcomes in the Global North. It is equally important to note that postcolonial IR theory underlines the legacies of colonialism on which

IR is built, but it does not strive to include Global South perspectives (Anderl & Witt, 2020, p. 41). Even though critical IR theory has encouraged the emergence of alternative discourses that counter western-centric discourses within the discipline, it still speaks for and to the West (Shani, 2008).

In recent years, calls for IR to become a global discipline have become louder. Calls for a global IR have gone hand in hand with calls for decolonialism and mounting criticisms of the legacies of imperialism and racism (Fonseca, 2019, p. 45). Against this backdrop, the discipline has indeed become more inclusive of new voices and critiques. Scholars have moved to analyze the intellectual and structural gatekeepers of the discipline, the developments of IR in different regions of the world, the possibilities of homegrown theorizing and post-western critical IR that encompasses critical discourses from the Global South (Tickner, 2009; Aydınlı & Biltekin, 2020, 45-68; Makarychev & Morozov, 2013, 328-350; Acharya, 2011, 619-637; Shani, 2008, 722).

Despite these recent developments and growing revisionist voices, international relations (IR) is still far from being a diverse and pluralist discipline that brings equal opportunities to Global South scholars and their perspectives (Wemheuer-Vogelaar & Peters, 2016, p. 2). The traces of a tendency "to parochially celebrate or defend or promote the West as the proactive subject of, and as the highest or ideal normative referent in, world

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[3] For the critique of Westphalia-based narrative, see also Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Kinji Akashi, *Acta Pacis Westphalicae: Mythos et Veritas* (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 2009).

politics" are still visible (Hobson, 2021). Apart from exceptions, the Global North still maintains an agenda-setting role (Aydinli & Mathews, 2008). Many Global North scholars maintain their tendency of not being curious about the Global South and of imposing theories, categories and concepts produced in the Global North to Global South dynamics (Bilgin, 2008). Even though Global South countries have enormous potential to enrich and globalize IR with their history, political thinkers, and religious and philosophical traditions, this potential remains mostly untapped. To engage with the question of why this potentiality has not become manifested in the context of an equal and global discipline, this study first proceeds by giving an overview of the general dynamics of global knowledge production in the social sciences in general and IR in particular.

Geographic Asymmetries of Knowledge Production in Social Sciences and IR

Inequalities in IR knowledge production between the Global North and the Global South is a microcosm of global knowledge production in the social sciences. The Global North has monopolistic control over social science knowledge production with its generation of large outputs of research and the global reach of its ideas and theories (Alatas, 2003). For example, almost half of the social science articles published in Q1 Scopus journals are written by authors from North America and Western Europe whereas the Global South is represented by less than 1% (Demeter, 2020). In a very interesting study,

it is found that the monopoly of the Global North in social sciences is also produced and reproduced through the phrasing of article titles (Torres & Alburez-Gutierrez, 2022).

It should be emphasized that while the Global North and the Global South are useful categories in understanding the distinction between the center and the periphery, they are not homogeneous, as center-periphery relations exist both within the Global North and in the Global South. There are countries in the former, such as the Netherlands, Japan, Australia or Spain that are considered "semi-peripheral social science powers" (Alatas, 2003). For example, while Japan is a world economic power, it is not a social science power in the context of its dependency on Western-centric ideas. It has some influence on social science research in the Global South through funds, but it is still far from diffusing its ideas (Alatas, 2003). Israel fits perfectly into the "center within the periphery" phenomenon, as its scientific community has a greater affinity for the USA than for those of the Middle Eastern countries. It stands at the core of global knowledge production with respect to publication output, international collaboration, and the quality of its universities (Alatas, 2003).

Different countries regions in the Global South are characterized by asymmetries in terms of research output. For example, Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt produce more social science research than other countries in the African continent (Egbetokun et al., 2022) whereas, in Latin America, Brazil and Mexico take the lead in social science publications (Keim, 2008). On

the other hand, Asian countries such as China rank only behind the US and the UK in terms of the number of published papers in social science, but the citation per document index of China is much lower compared to that of the Global North countries (Demeter, 2020). Notwithstanding their differences, all Global South regions are characterized by overreliance on theories and ideas and the media of ideas (such as books and scientific journals) of the Global North (Alatas, 2003).

Moving down the ladder of generalization, a closer scrutiny of IR publications reveals that the inequalities of the general dynamics of global knowledge production in the social sciences are reflected in the IR discipline. The Global North and the Global South scholars are not equally represented in high-ranking IR journals. For example, in analysing US political science journals between 1970 and 2005, Waever and Tickner find that North America is represented by 80% (Waever & Tickner, 2009). Importantly, Aydinli and Matthews show that in leading IR journals (including International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, and World Politics), less than 3% of the authors come from the periphery. Zooming in on International Studies Quarterly, the authors reveal a striking finding by noting that less than 1% of the authors come from the periphery (Aydinli & Mathews, 2000). In their analysis of 17 IR journals from Africa, East Asia, Europe, Latin America, North America, and the United Kingdom and more than 2000 arti-

cles published between 2011 and 2015, Lohaus and Wemheuer-Vogelaar find that these journals are overwhelmingly represented by authors from their regions. Interestingly, the authors reveal that most Global South scholars represented in IR journals, which appear to have more diverse backgrounds, received their education in North America, the United Kingdom, and Europe (Lohaus & Wemheuer-Vogelaar, 2021). These findings attest to a skewed representation of diverse perspectives and voices in the field of International Relations.

Inequalities in IR: The Challenges of the Global South

Broadly speaking, parochialism and inequalities in IR are closely related to the historical developments that resulted in the dominance of Western-centric epistemologies, asymmetries of global knowledge production in the social sciences, and the current power dynamics in the world. While experiences of and voices in the Global South carry enormous potential to enrich and globalize the IR disciplines, this potential remains mostly latent. Global South perspectives and theorizing have not yet evolved into a major IR theory that provides alternative explanations of world politics.[4] Global South scholars' theorizing practices are not echoed in much of the mainstream accounts in IR. This study contributes to the global IR debate by problematizing the dynamics behind the insufficient development and representation of Global South IR theories and perspectives. It

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[4] While it is necessary to make the southern voice heard, the author cautions against turning the global IR project into a "global south parochialism."

sheds light on the intellectual and material barriers that prevent Global South scholars from globalizing the discipline by focusing on homogenized knowledge in IR; linguistic and education-related barriers; financial and bureaucratic problems.

Homogenized Knowledge in IR

Decades after Stanley Hoffmann's (1997) definition of IR as "American social science," the USA maintains its hegemonic role in the discipline. A study conducted by Maliniak et al. in twelve major IR journals between 1980 and 2014 corroborates this argument (Maliniak et al., 2018). In Smith's words, "IR remains an American social science both in terms of the policy agenda that US IR exports to the world in the name of relevant theory and in terms of the dominant (and often implicit) epistemological and methodological assumptions contained in that theory" (Smith, 2000). Tickner & Blaney (2012) eloquently expresses the dominance of the USA in IR in the following words: "the predominance of the American Academy in International Relations is manifested in many ways, from the number of lecturers, the number of doctoral programs offered, the number of doctoral students and thesis, the number of university presses and scholarly journals, to the predominance of epistemological, theoretical and methodological approaches made in the USA among different academic communities around the world" (Tickner & Blaney, 2012). It goes without saying that American IR is parochial in spatial, linguistic, and methodological terms (Biersteker, 1999). The IR discipline is

as such characterized by a "(neo)imperialist" division of labor between the Global North (mainly the USA) and the Global South (Tickner, 2013).

In general, many Global South scholars tend to adopt theories, methodologies, and concepts produced in the center. Adherence to defined standards of the discipline results in less resistance from editors and reviewers and an increased chance of publication (Friedrichs, 2004), which leads to the homogenization of knowledge. Abu-Bakare's (2022) share of a rejection letter from a journal of international politics reveals with poignant clarity the gatekeeping role of journals and the difficulty of overcoming the general dynamics of knowledge production in IR:

> Whilst white supremacy, Islamophobia and anti-blackness are indeed global features structuring contemporary politics, and the literatures with which the manuscript engages speak to the ways in which colonialism formed the racial, political, and economic orders shaping modernity, this is not explicitly developed or elaborated within the piece. Instead, it currently focuses quite specifically upon the UK context - tailored to a particular audience - without explication of this context, extrapolation of it more broadly or consideration of its ramifications for the international or International Relations. Given our mandate around theory development in international studies, however broad-

ly and interdisciplinarity conceived, the piece might be better suited to another journal focused more on race and class, or terrorism studies.

In addition to the general dynamics of knowledge production in IR, career promotion systems in many Global South universities push academics to adhere to the norms dictated by the Global North. Although peripheral perspectives are unequally represented in the Global North, there is a silent acceptance among Global South scholars that perspectives offered by the Global North are more valuable than peripheral perspectives. In addition to global, regional, and local dynamics of knowledge production, the dominance of English in the IR discipline exacerbates the homogenization of knowledge. Treating languages as systems of meanings that influence how people see and think about the world, Pellerin suggests that knowledge production in IR is closely related to the perspective offered by the English language, which is itself the result of the language's historical conditions and its words (Pellerin, 2012).

Considering that creating homegrown theories means taking a "rogue" attitude, an attempt to take a stand and go against that what is already established, it is important to taken on board the dynamic that Global South scholars who engage in home grown theorizing risk being judged against mainstream theories and methodologies, and expected styles of academic writing (González, 2021). Regardless of the Global North/South division, IR scholarship in the world has still a long way to go to develop alternative schools of IR.

For instance, in his analysis of the state of IR in Iran, Sariolghalam notes that despite Iranian officials' counter-American attitude and attachment to "revolutionary idealism," the US-originated theories (especially realism and liberalism) have an unprecedented impact on the Iranian IR community (Sariolghalam, 2009). The state of the Arab countries with respect to homegrown theorizing is no different. Against the backdrop of the politicization of social science research agendas and insufficient resources and investment in IR, there is little prospect of homegrown theorizing in the Arab world (Makdisi, 2009). In their analysis of 116 scholars in 57 Turkish universities, Okur and Aytekin (2023) attest to the dominance of Global North perspectives in Turkish IR community.

Although Russian IR scholars moved away from Marxist ideology in the post-Cold War period, they have not made a big leap toward homegrown theorizing. Realism remains the most dominant theory in Russian IR while some scholars use idealist, globalist, and post-positivist approaches. Most Russian IR scholars produce policy-relevant work (Sergounin, 2009). The survey conducted by Tsygankov and Tsygankov with forty IR scholars in various Russian universities in 2013 is telling. When asked about their evaluation of the development of Russian IR theory, 50% of the respondents selected the categorization of "insufficient development" and 37% of them opted for the categorization of "growing dependence on foreign/Western approaches" (Tsygankov & Tsygan-

kov, 2014).

In his analysis of Yan Xuetong's moral realism, Zhao Tingyang's Tianxia system, and Qin Yaqing's relational theory of world politics, Hwang notes that the nascent Chinese school of IR mimics the mainstream IR by using the altered meanings of the same concepts, ideas, and principles employed in the Global North (Hwang, 2021). Examining Japanese scholars' attempts of home-grown theorizing, Chen comes to the conclusion that the epistemological underpinnings of these attempts remain Western-centric (Chen, 2012). By the same token, Cho argues that South Korean IR academia's attempt to establish an independent school of IR met with little success as it still reinforces the colonial mentality (Cho, 2015).

As seen above, despite efforts to create alternative schools of IR around the world, IR scholars are still guided by deep-seated assumptions that impact their theory development practices. Even though diverse concepts and ideas have been developed in the Global South, these concepts and ideas have not yet evolved into major IR theories. Equally important, while there are structural barriers for Global South scholars to be included in the major discussion of IR, the agency of Global South scholars should also be highlighted. Based on his contextualized autoethnographic reflection of learn-

ing and researching IR in Indonesia, Umar (2023) reveals the complicity of Indonesian IR scholars in maintaining and naturalizing Western-centrism through their everyday exclusionary practices. Exclusionary practices also dominate the Turkish IR community. By adopting a bibliometric analysis of Turkish foreign policy studies between 1939 and 2022, Parlar Dal points to the scarcity of interactions and collaborative efforts within the IR community in Turkiye and the reluctance of scholars in reading and citing each other's papers (Mehmetcik, Dal, & Hakses, 2024). Taken all together, homogenization of knowledge in IR creates a path dependency that is carried over to subsequent generations of IR scholars.

Linguistic and Education-related Barriers

Linguistic and education-related barriers present major obstacles for Global South scholars in their attempts to globalize the discipline. One of the key characteristics of the Global North hegemony in the IR discipline is linguistic (Aydinli & Aydinli, 2024). The fact that English is the lingua franca of IR scholarship perpetuates the Global North/South inequalities.[5] In their recent study, Aydinli & Aydinli (2024) find that English-medium journals have higher international rankings than non-English or

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[5] That being said, associating one dichotomy (English vs non-English) with another (Global South vs Global North) is rather problematic due to its complex, language-related hierarchies. Despite of the English primacy in IR scholarship, the Global North is not only Anglophone. There are several linguistic spheres in that Global North which has its own sphere of influence due to historical imperialism/colonialism (e.g., Francophone, Hispanophone, Lusophone, Dutch-speaking countries). For example, France, has historically played a major role in international diplomacy and has its own academic traditions and influence within IR scholarship. I would like to thank Reviewer 2 for his/her remarks on these points.

multi-language journals. Furthermore, they also find evidence to suggest that even in multi-language journals, priority is given to articles in English rather than those in other languages.

This linguistic unilateralism prevents Global South scholars prevents "the periphery's original contribution potential in an imperialistic manner" Aydinli & Aydinli (2024). To be able to compete and have the possibility of having their academic work published, Global South scholars must gain proficiency in English; otherwise, their careers bear the fate of disappearing in the limbo of poor dissemination (González, 2021). Being proficient in another language requires time, effort, and money which is an extra load to the life of a Global South scholar that is not shared by his/her counterparts in the Global North, giving the latter an extra advantage (González, 2021). Those who decide to publish in their native languages are considered "outside of the club" (González, 2021). Aydinli & Aydinli (2024) eloquently articulate this linguistic discrimination in the following words:

> The spread of linguistic unilateralism is thus not only a clear sign of dependency but reflects an underlying linguistic racism, ensuring that inclusion in the global discipline is possible only through the dominant language. Some may consider the 'linguistic racism' label harsh, but it seems warranted when we consider that on the other side of the picture is an apparent deep-seated inferiority complex

leading many hard-working periphery scholars to feel that the only way to succeed is to act, think, and write in the Anglo-American core's language. The inherent 'racism' ensues in the sense that the Anglo-American core sees no anomaly in expecting periphery scholars to be proficient in English if they want their academic quality to be recognised. The practice is exacerbated by a parallel phenomenon within the periphery itself. While the linguistic core dominates and dismisses periphery disciplines at the global level, locally, the English-utilising 'core of the periphery' dominates and dismisses the non-English-proficient 'periphery of the periphery'.

In addition to linguistic difficulties, Global South scholars may be less familiar with the specific formatting and style requirements of high-ranking journals, making it challenging for them to meet the publication standards expected by these journals. Peripheral works are much less likely to appear in journals that prioritize theoretical contributions (Aydinli & Aydinli, 2024). In Weaver's words "journals are mainly defined, structured, and to a certain extent controlled by theorists. You only become a star by doing theory. The highest citation index scores all belong to theorists. Thus, the battle among theories/theorists defines the structure of the field…" (Waever, 1998).

Education makes a huge difference with respect to compliance to the theoretical and methodological standards expected by IR journals. Global North and Global South

scholars, who receive their education at Global North universities, have a better chance of having their work published in high-ranking journals than their counterparts who graduated from peripheral universities. In addition to the level of education, the first group is more likely to publish coauthored papers with Global North scholars due to the networking opportunities they are exposed to during their education periods at Global North universities; yet, it is not always the case for the latter group. While conferences offer good opportunities for academic networking, financial and bureaucratic problems abound for Global South academics, which will later be discussed. Variations between the Global South countries with respect to their contribution to global knowledge were previously mentioned. Crucially, there are important asymmetries within Global South countries with respect to their integration into the IR communities in the Global North. Broadly speaking, national IR communities in the Global South are marked by divisions between the center and the periphery, which have serious implications for the way these groups are represented in the discipline. IR scholars from the Global South who receive IR education in the Global North are indeed more likely to be represented in the center. However, in many cases, if not all, they perpetuate the perspectives into which they are socialized in the Global North.

Mainstream IR education socializes students into particular ways of seeing and evaluating the world. As Niang puts it, most IR scholars "operate in an intellectual system characterized by structures of reason-ing that remain conservative given that the themes and concerns, in fact the paradigmatic logics that have framed the boundaries of the discipline, endure even in critiques of orthodox scholarship" (Niang, 2016). All in all, the representation of Global South scholars in the disciplinary core does not always translate into the representation of Global South perspectives, which renders the Global South's potential to globalize IR even more problematic.

Financial and Bureaucratic Problems

Financial resources in the Global North are usually generous compared to the Global South and crucially these resources are allocated to studies where the Global North has interests. Many universities in the Global South have poor funding mechanisms. Many Global South scholars have a lot of teaching responsibilities and little time for research. There are universities that do not have sufficient money to pay for subscriptions to major journals, as a result of which scholars working in these universities cannot keep track of the latest research in their fields.

Against the backdrop of financial limitations, many Global South scholars have difficulties attending international conferences. While some international conferences provide travel grants, they cover less than 25% of travel expenditures, not to mention the increased travel costs in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic (Chatterjee, 2022). In Brazil, some scholars sell their assets to afford ISA conferences (Kristensen, 2019). Many Mexican scholars are insufficiently

funded given the current presidential policy of austerity (Wade, 2019). Some Ph.D. students and junior scholars in Turkey take bank credits to go to ISA conferences (Ersoy, 2022). Visa application is another difficulty that illustrates the sharp distinction between North-based and South-based academics.

Difficulties related to participation in international conferences perpetuate the problem of inequality in the discipline and push many Global South scholars to the fringes of academia (Chatterjee, 2022). Even if Global South scholars attend international conferences and engage in networking, finding opportunities for academic collaboration with Global North scholars presents a significant challenge. That many North-based universities require fees for visiting scholar positions also impedes the mobility of peripheral scholars and the North-South dialogue (Ersoy, 2022). South-South dialogue and research collaborations are equally important in the path towards global IR with respect to the sharing and diffusion of knowledge, skills, and alternative perspectives. Yet, the current lack of cohesion within and between national IR communities in the Global South is another important factor that prevents the Global South from tapping into its full potential in the discipline.

Conclusion: How do we build a global discipline?

This study offered fresh perspectives on the ongoing global IR debate by critically examining deep-seated obstacles that hinder Global South scholars from making an equitable contribution to the field of Inter-

national Relations. Generally speaking, the dynamics both in the Global North and in the Global South perpetuate inequalities in the discipline that are carried over to subsequent generations of scholars. The absence of many Global South scholars from the core's discussions, debates, and themes in IR is a major problem for the discipline and world politics in general as it limits the understanding of global issues and hinders the development of comprehensive and inclusive solutions to global problems.

While there are apparently no easy solutions to this conundrum, this final section contemplates the ways in which the Global North/South inequalities in IR might be practically remedied. As many scholars have underlined, global IR requires first and foremost a thorough deconstruction of the unwritten norms of the discipline that privilege theories, methodologies, and concepts produced in the Global North. Although self-reflexivity is a crucial starting point in the path towards a global IR, there are limits to it as it risks remaining a sole intellectual endeavor (Anderl & Witt, 2020). For a truly global discipline, IR scholars need to "work towards changing the material conditions of possibility to effect transformations in practice" (Anderl & Witt, 2020).

Insights from the Global South are essential for Global IR (Acharya, 2016). In this respect, homegrown theorizing has a focal role (Aydinli & Biltekin, 2018). In creating homegrown theories, it is important to put a spotlight on how different regions of the Global South evolved throughout history and whether and how the basic IR concepts like

war, peace, alliances, diplomacy, and treaties have their roots in ancient societies around the world. Studies that illustrate connections between the cultures, concepts, and understandings of ancient societies and the current international system would broaden the geo-temporal perspective in IR (González, 2021). In other words, re-historicising pivotal events and concepts would contribute to the deconstruction of "the colonial thinking that suffuses cultural and racial assessments of non-Western political forms and to destabilise the epistemological centrality that characterises strategic concepts in IR" (Niang, 2016).

Interdisciplinary studies carry enormous potential to bring the experiences, voices, and concepts of the Global South to the core of the discipline. In this context, IR scholars around the world should be more involved in debates in history, anthropology, religion, philosophy, and archaeology. Different disciplines have different ways of knowing and doing things. By engaging with these disciplines, IR scholars can gain a deeper understanding of the historical, social, and cultural contexts that shape non-Western political forms and societies and develop more comprehensive and inclusive theories and frameworks that better reflect the complexity of global politics. This interdisciplinary approach can contribute to a more balanced and equitable representation of diverse voices in international relations scholarship. Furthermore, empirical research on comparative analysis of IR research and education around the world needs to be increased. A systematic analysis of different ways of thinking in the Global South could bring new perspectives to the study of global politics.

In general, intellectual inequalities (that refer to disparities in access to knowledge, education, and opportunities) and material inequalities (that encompass disparities in resources, funding, and infrastructure) within the discipline create conditions that mutually affect each other. These inequalities perpetuate a cycle of disadvantage for Global South scholars which is further exacerbated by the dominance of Western-centric theories and perspectives. In this context, redressing material inequalities between the Global North and the Global South scholars would have intellectual implications in the long run and provide a further stimulus to the development of global IR. While fixing material inequalities between different world regions necessitates comprehensive initiatives at global, regional, and local levels, at this juncture, initiatives and efforts of each IR scholar would provide valuable steps, carrying the potential of leading to a tipping point in the direction of global IR. Future research could focus on the comparative analysis of the efforts of the Global South regions/countries in globalizing IR. Bibliometric analyses measuring the level of engagement and cooperation among IR scholars in different Global South regions/countries can also provide valuable insights into the dynamics of globalization of IR.

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The Developmental Case for BRICS

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This paper argues the developmental case for Indo-Pacific and Global South nations joining BRICS Plus, which presents the best possibilities to escape the dictatorship of the dollar, whether through bilateral swaps, new baskets of currencies or some new shared digital forms of exchange. This move is necessary for two main reasons. First, the dollar dictatorship has damaged and continues to damage developing countries through depreciation of non-dollar currencies, adverse income effects and associated damaging impact on credit ratings and investment. Second, the expanded use of unilateral US and EU "sanctions" (unilateral coercive measures) imposes crippling siege warfare on more than 20 nations while seriously damaging the free trade options of third party nations. That siege warfare and its effects is only possible because of the tight nexus between the dollar, the US-dominated SWIFT system and the US capture of protocol agreements such as those against money laundering and the financing of terrorism. Establishing alternative financial mechanisms to the dollar dictatorship has become essential to the developmental possibilities of Global South economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the weight and determination of the BRICS Plus group presents the best chance to build such alternatives.

Keywords: *Global South; Indo-Pacific; BRICS; dollar dictatorship*

Introduction

The U.S. dollar has dominated world finance since 1944 when the Anglo-American-dominated Bretton Woods agreement established a fixed exchange rate regime with the U.S. dollar at its centre (Ghizoni, 2013). That system gave artificial strength to the U.S. dollar but stabilised trade prices until 1971 when the U.S. abandoned the fixed rates system.

Since then, exchange rates have fluctuated according to trade and foreign investment (the so-called 'demand for dollar-de-nominated assets'), plus the 1970s onwards, vagaries of secondary and financialised markets. The U.S. also gained control of the European SWIFT system, which registers and verifies most interbank communications and transactions (CFI, 2022). The U.S. does not own SWIFT but controls it (Walsh, 2018), especially after the Obama administration threatened SWIFT with unilateral sanctions unless it ejected Iran from global banking in 2012 (Gladstone & Castle, 2012).

The result has been that this centralised financial system, bolstered by con-

ventions such as those against money laundering and financing terrorism, has allowed Washington to 'weaponise the dollar', blocking entire countries from financial transactions and turning the system to benefit U.S. coercive practice in its many trade wars. There are also severe developmental implications of dollar dominance, discussed in section 1.2 below. A strong reaction to this dollar dictatorship eventually led to attempts by many countries to 'diversify' the currencies used for trade, finance and foreign reserves.

In the 21st century, there has been a clear downward trend in the use of dollars for trade and as a proportion of foreign reserves (Table 1). Global trade in USD has declined to about 50%, while forex reserves in 2022 were less than 60%. However, the dollar remains dominant in financial trading and debt. In 2022, the USD was involved in nearly 90% of global F.X. [foreign exchange], at least 85% of secondary markets (at some stage) and 88% of debt and loans (Maronoti/BIS 2022).

Table 1

Table 1: US dollar share of foreign exchange reserves	
Year	percentage
2002	70
2004	65
2006	66
2008	64
2010	62
2012	62
2014	61.5
2016	65.5
2018	62.5
2020	61
2022	58.5

Source: Maronoti/BIS 2022

In 2023, various initiatives were taken by Global South countries to divest from or at least reduce dependence on the U.S. dollar. On September 5, 2023, Indonesia launched the National Task Force for Local Currency Transactions, which is mandated to reduce the country's dependence on the U.S. dollar in international transactions and encourage the use of local currency, especially in transactions between ASEAN countries. Promotion of this task force was carried out on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in Jakarta, and previously, at the ASEAN Summit in East Nusa Tenggara, ASEAN countries also agreed to jointly increase economic integration by using local currencies among fellow block members (Kristianus, 2023). Previously, in July 2023, Bolivia – following Brazil and Argentina – had paid for imports and exports using the Chinese Yuan / Renminbi. The United Arab Emirates has also been willing to exchange its L.N.G. for Chinese Yuan in a sale and purchase process with China's national oil company, CNOOC, and France's TotalEnergies.

The de-dollarisation trend co-occurred with the rise of BRICS – with its promise of a financial haven from the dollar dictatorship. This promise is, of course, appealing to the many small countries targeted for blockade and siege, such as Cuba, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua and Syria. However, it also has promise for global south countries seeking better terms of trade and more symmetrical cooperation, not mediated at every step by the dollar. BRICS offers the strength of a union, with some 'big brothers' (China and Russia, which are nowhere near as coercive

or arrogant as the U.S. and E.U.) and substantial capacity in critical areas of resources, technology, production and trade. The opportunities and risks of joining BRICS might be considered under these themes: more symmetrical and less coercive cooperation, favourable access to BRICS markets, escaping the dollar dictatorship, and considering the possible risks involved.

This situation leads to several questions: Why should Global South countries consider joining BRICS? Does the expanding group led by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa demand a new, risky political alignment? Or might there be real developmental benefits? It is perhaps clear that countries under attack by the US-led bloc might, for some strategic reason, look for refuge from U.S. financial domination, but what about other countries which wish to keep their options open?

We consider the problems of the dollar dictatorship alongside the developmental benefits and potential risks of joining BRICS, the group most strongly identified with creating an alternative to the dollar and to the U.S. and Western-denominated world economic and financial system. Even U.S. think tanks have observed that BRICS momentum is driven by broad dissatisfaction with "the West's proclivity to deploy unilateral financial sanctions, abuse international payments mechanisms, renege on climate finance commitments, and accord scant respect to food security and health imperatives of the Global South" (Suri & Tripathi, 2023).

Even Western financial groups like Morgan Stanley acknowledge emerging multipolarity, saying that "the U.S. and China … are disassociating in key economic areas." Multilateralism (per US-led globalism) is "in retreat"; alternate models were on offer, and various strategic concerns will encourage moves away from US-centrism (Morgan Stanley, 2020). So, what are the relevant considerations? The first section of this paper considers the dollar problem, the second is Washington's abuse of its domination of the global financial system, and the third is the benefits and risks of joining BRICS.

This paper is an interpretive argument that draws on the twin theories of hegemonic decline (Kennedy, 1987) and the emergence of multipolarity (Kratochvil, 2002), using some global data and particular experiences to illustrate new strategic possibilities. It explains particular opportunities and risks of what has been termed "an extension of inter-regionalism to the Global South" (Naik, 2019).

The Dollar Dictatorship and De-dollarisation

The dollar dictatorship is tight control of the global financial system by the U.S. government through enforcement of the U.S. dollar as the key means of exchange and reserve holding, with additional controls through U.S. domination of the ubiquitous SWIFT system of inter-bank communications. This tight control enables the U.S. a dangerous "weaponisation" of the dollar (Tayeb, 2023), which includes imposing unilateral coercive 'sanctions' on many countries to cut them off from global banking. Efforts have been underway for many years to

'dethrone' this financial dictatorship (Crosston & Deahn, 2015).

Internationally, the countries under unilateral sanctions by the US-EU bloc scramble for dollars, avoiding U.S. unilateral 'sanctions' in a way that is often said to be 'money laundering', while many other countries look for alternatives to the dollar, at the least through a "diversification" away from the dollar which has gained pace in recent years (see Table 1 above).

The shift in Global South countries' preference to divest from the USD started just recently. In the case of Indonesia, efforts to free itself from its dependence on the greenback go back, at least, to 2017. Iran, as one of the primary victims of the unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the U.S.A., has also been trying for a long time to be able to trade without the U.S. dollar. Iran has become a more economically and politically independent power to establish non-dollar agreements with various countries. For example, in 2016, Iran agreed with India – the third largest economy in the world – to use national currencies to buy and sell oil and other commodities (Simha, 2016).

Previously, in 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a statement encouraging his country and the Caspian Sea countries to abandon the dollar. According to him, the United States has implemented a "dollar dictatorship" about oil prices on the global market, to the detriment of countries which do not want to submit to the will of the U.S. In implementing this plan, Russia has worked closely with China to integrate the Ruble and Yuan into global markets (Crosston & Deahn, 2015).

Economic sanctions used by the U.S. to suppress countries that refuse to submit have also created a backlash for U.S. allies, including the European Union. That is why, in 2019, several European leaders also spoke of the importance of de-dollarisation. Efforts to find alternatives to dollar dominance are significant because Europe was hurt by the Trump administration's decision to withdraw from the 2015 Iran nuclear agreement and re-impose unilateral economic sanctions on Iran. This move made targets of U.S.' sanctions' the third-party European companies which had invested in Iran (Johnson, 2019).

Further, geopolitical developments such as the Russia versus NATO War in Ukraine have strengthened enthusiasm for de-dollarising amongst countries of the Global South. Washington's unilateral 'sanctions' on Russia, even arbitrarily freezing Russian assets denominated in dollars, have increasingly opened the eyes of Global South countries to the fact that over-reliance on the greenback threatens their national security. Due to rising interest rates, the USD has become more expensive for Global South countries, encouraging the intensive use of non-dollar currencies in inter-south trade (Morgan, 2023).

The impact of de-dollarisation will undoubtedly shift the balance of power between countries, reshaping the world order. In particular, de-dollarisation will eventually weaken the financial and economic power of the U.S., leading to dollar depreciation and worsening the relative performance of U.S.

financial assets (Morgan, 2023). This dynamic will impact geopolitics, with an expected outcome of slowing the violence carried out by the U.S. on various other countries.

Does the BRICS group have the capacity to make such a challenge? Some Western-aligned sources suggest it does not have sufficient weight and, in particular, that "the New Development Bank does not grant the BRICS the structural power needed to change the rules and norms that underpin the game." (Duggan et al., 2022). However, other analysis says that BRICS has substantial (USD45 trillion) investment weight (Henley & Partners, 2024) and that "the use of new financial technologies (e.g., blockchain, digital currencies, and cloud-based financial infrastructure) can propel the formation of a revisionist de-dollarisation coalition … [which] could lead to the creation of new market instruments and infrastructure that exclude the incumbent power, serve as global public goods with a broader buy-in, and divert global financial traffic away from the incumbent system. (Zongyuan and Papa 2022). In other words, innovations in financial technology could help realise the de-dollarisation aims of the BRICS project.

Developmental Damage of a Strong and Dominant Dollar

The critical economic damage done to developing countries by U.S. dollar dominance, other than that through U.C.M.s, seems to be:

- Artificial depreciation of local currencies
- Disadvantageous distortion of trade prices
- Depressing transmission of U.S. interest rates
- Disincentives for foreign investment

Explanations of these effects come from many sources, including the I.M.F., as we will describe below.

When the U.S. dollar appreciates, "other currencies essentially depreciate … rising commodity process can be a boon for emerging economies", particularly those that export oil but also some exporting metals and food (Baldwin 2023: 3). Yet a strong dollar "often starts to depress global trade growth, as it is the invoicing currency of the world" and those with weaker currencies lose their capacity to engage in trade. "It also makes countries that have dollar-denominated debt less creditworthy, as it makes it harder for them to purchase the U.S. currency to manage their debts" (Baldwin, 2023, p. 2). Others confirm that USD "appreciation shocks predict downturns in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs) … a strong dollar, higher interest rates, and slower economic growth will be challenging for EMDEs" (Obstfeld & Zhou, 2023).

I.M.F. papers (2015 and 2023) confirmed that "negative spillovers from U.S. dollar appreciations fall disproportionately on emerging market economies when compared with smaller advanced economies" (Bems and Moussa 2023: 1). U.S. dollar appreciation has an income effect: "As the dollar appreciates, commodity process falls; weaker commodity process depress domestic

demand via lower real income, real G.D.P. in emerging markets decelerates; and vice versa". U.S. interest rates also have a negative impact (Druck et al., 2015). Further, "periods of stronger U.S. growth result in subdued growth in emerging markets .. the tension between the income effect of a stronger dollar, which reduces the purchasing power of exports, particularly for commodity exporters, offsets any expansionary effect owing to a weaker domestic currency" (Druck et al., 2015, p. 38).

Strong U.S. growth may benefit emerging markets as external demand for the latter increases. However, beyond that effect, a stronger U.S. dollar "mitigates the expansionary effect of faster growth in the U.S., by an income effect … higher U.S. interest rates further add to the mitigation/amplification effect through the tighter/easier financial conditions that usually come" with a stronger dollar (Druck et al. 2015: 38). As the U.S. dollar appreciates, "capital flows to emerging markets are likely to moderate at best ... on the back of weaker commodity process" (Druck et al., 2015, p. 38).

The effects of the strong dollar "spread via trade and financial channels ... real trade volumes [of emerging markets] decline more sharply, with imports dropping twice as fast as exports .. [plus] worsening credit availability, diminished capital flows, tighter monetary policy .. and bigger stock market declines" (Bems and Moussa 2023: 2). U.S. dollar appreciation is also "associated with current account [deficit] increases in both emerging markets and advanced economies through different channels … in emerg-

ing market economies, fear of letting the exchange rate fluctuate and lack of monetary policy accommodation magnify the increase in the current account [deficit] .. the external sector adjustment in emerging market economies is further hindered by their heightened exposure to the Z.U.S. dollar through trade invoicing and liability denomination" (Bems & Moussa, 2023, pp. 3-5). Global South countries would experience some relief from these adverse conditions if there were alternative financial options.

The Impact of US-EU Unilateral Coercive Measures ('Sanctions')

Economic warfare (often termed 'sanctions') has become integral to contemporary hybrid warfare. Its use has grown enormously in recent decades (Coates, 2019; G.A.O., 2020). These 'sanctions' regimes, policed by the dollar dictatorship, have quadrupled since 1980, with 92 listed in 1980 and 407 in 2016 (Felbermayr et al., 2020, p. 54). Of 1,102 sanctions listed since 1950, only 77 (or 7%) were imposed by the United Nations; the other 93% were mostly by the U.S.A., the E.U. and allies (Felbermayr et al. 2020: appendix). Such unilateral 'sanctions' are discussed in Western circles mainly as to how 'effective' they are as tools of coercive foreign policy.

However, most unilateral 'sanctions' have no basis in international law, as they typically attempt to coerce political objectives. International law prohibits such coercion by the principle of non-intervention and an implied ban in the UN Charter. This illegality is reinforced by customary and treaty law in

trade, shipping and telecommunications (Anderson 2019: Chapter 3). The illegality is obvious when there is an 'unlawful intent', such as damaging the economy of another nation or an economic attack to enforce political change (Shneyer and Barta 1981: 468, 471-475). For these reasons, the widespread use of 'unilateral coercive measures' (U.C.M.s) has become a concern of the United Nations (OHCHR 2020). One U.N. Rapporteur on the Human Rights Impact of U.C.M.s has confirmed that illegality was widespread and that the major offenders were the NATO states. Most U.C.M.s "indiscriminately" harmed entire populations, while secondary sanctions imposed on third parties also damaged human rights (OHCHR 2021).

Impacts of Sanctions

Direct Impacts

Of course, the populations subject to economic siege suffer the most. The brutal US-EU siege on Syria has led to 90% of the Syrian population living in poverty (OCHA 2022) while the people of Yemen, under a UNSC-sanctioned blockade, suffer what has been called "the world's worst humanitarian crisis" (W.F.P. 2022).

The aim of coercive economic war has been typically 'to starve and cause desperation' amongst entire populations. So much was said about Washington's blockades on Cuba and Iran (O.T.H. 1960; Cole, 2018). The explicit aim is imposing 'deliberate harm' in the hope of coercing political change. That is why coercive measures should never be called 'sanctions', which

suggests just punishment for wrongdoing imposed by some judicious authority (Anderson 2019: Ch.3). These unilateral siege measures are often carried out erroneously in the name of 'democracy', 'human rights' and even 'anti-terrorism'.

Nevertheless, evidence of human rights abuse by these 'sanctions' regimes is mounting. In 2015, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the impact of 'sanctions' on human rights, Idriss Jazairy, urged the states that had imposed U.C.M.s on Sudan to review their policies. "Sudan has been under unilateral coercive measures for two decades without any adaptation ... The signal given by compulsory measures is in contradiction with their proclaimed objectives," he said, referring to financial restrictions imposed on all business transactions with Sudan (OHCHR 2015).

The W.H.O. reported that unilateral US-EU' sanctions' had damaged children's cancer treatment in Syria (Nehme, 2017). Medical studies have also condemned Europe's coercive 'sanctions' for their damage to COVID-19 prevention and treatment in Syria (Hussain & Sen, 2020). In 2022, a major UNICEF report drew attention to the impact of sanctions regimes on children's health and well-being. In Syria, "lower life expectancy, reduced routine immunisation coverage, higher food inflation and lower G.D.P. were, at least partly, due to sanctions ... severe bread and fuel crises ... [were] in part caused by sanctions .. [which also] negatively impact UNICEF operations .. [and] hinder the import of critical imports (Pelter et al., 2022, p. 12).

In Iran, renewed US-EU "sanctions" contributed to a major economic slowdown, significantly impacting the health sector, including medical supplies for children, raising transport costs and impeding the finance of transactions. "Reduced fiscal space has disrupted health benefits packages [and] is expected to hurt mortality and morbidity, particularly amongst the most vulnerable and those with chronic conditions" (Pelter et al. 2022: 13). That health impact worsened under the COVID-19 pandemic. "Had sanctions on Iran been eased, early on in 2020, the effects of a second wave of infections in late May 2020 could have been reduced, and 13,000 lives [could have been] saved" (Pelter et al., 2022, p. 13). Venezuela was also the target of U.S. "targeted and broader" U.C.M.s, which, from 2017, compounded many economic problems and helped worsen child malnutrition (Pelter et al., 2022, pp. 18-19).

Third-Party Damage

Washington has imposed huge fines on European banks for multiple violations of U.S.' sanctions', mainly on Iran and Cuba, but also on Sudan, Libya, Sudan, Burma and Liberia. For example, the $963 million fine on BNP Paribas (in 2014) was for breaches of US UCMs against Sudan, Iran, Cuba and Burma; it seems that the year after this settlement, a U.S. court imposed an additional $8.9 billion fine on the bank (Raymond, 2015). A $619 million fine on the ING Bank (in 2012) was for breaches of Washington's U.C.M.s against Cuba, Burma, Sudan, Libya and Iran. The $329 million fine on Credit Agricole (in 2015) was for breaches of U.C.M.s

against Sudan, Burma, Cuba and Iran (U.S. Department of Treasury 2019b). Under President Obama, the U.S. moved to aggressively enforce its unilateral blockades by punishing third parties that otherwise had no obligation to abide by U.S. extra-territorial law.

Similarly, South Korea became a third-party victim of US UCMs against Iran, being forced to 'freeze' billions in Iranian funds after it had purchased oil from Iran (K.J.D. 2023). This did not suit South Korea at all, which had "previously [been] one of Iran's leading Asian oil customers … South Korean oil buyers chiefly imported condensate, or an ultra-light form of crude oil, from Iran" (Reuters, 2022). The NE Asian country's refineries were "hit hard" by Washington's U.C.M.s imposed on Iran (Paik, 2019), and its petrochemical industry had been the "key" to the South Korean economy (Al Jazeera, 2018). Iran's $7 billion in funds were eventually 'unfrozen' by South Korea after the U.S. and Iran arranged a prisoner swap; but, in the meantime, South Korea was held hostage to this coercive game.

The Illegality of Unilateral Coercive Measures ('Sanctions')

Unilateral Coercive Measures imposed by the U.S.A., using its dollar power, typically violate international law on several heads. They are rarely genuine attempts to resolve a bilateral dispute after negotiation (Shneyer & Barta, 1981, p. 465); rather, they aim to coerce political change, impose harm on entire populations and deliberately or recklessly harm third parties. The tightening of the six-decade-long U.S. blockade

of Cuba in the 1990s, for example, was described as a policy of imposing "deliberate harm" (White, 2018, p. 14).

Illegality is obvious when there is an 'unlawful intent', such as damaging the economy of another nation or economic measures aimed at political coercion (Shneyer and Barta 1981: 468, 471-475). Also illegal are measures which damage the rights of third parties. Such unlawful aims, aggressive intent and damage to third parties can be seen throughout most of Washington's sanctions regimes.

Politically, Washington's U.C.M.s typically do not attempt to secure an affected population's 'consent' to coercive measures. However, this principle was observed when building legitimate sanctions against the apartheid system in South Africa. That demand for boycotts and sanctions on the apartheid regime was charted very carefully, building a consensus for national and then international boycotts. Finally, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 1761 (XVII), which called for member states to impose sanctions on South Africa (Reddy, 1965, p. 10). Only in the final years did the U.S.A. and U.K. join in these legitimate sanctions.

Unilateral sanctions by the U.S.A. avoid such a course. To the contrary, we see much evidence of unlawful and malign intent against entire populations. Concerning Cuba, in the early 1960s, U.S. official Lester Mallory argued for damaging economic attacks on the population as a means of undermining support for what was acknowledged as a popular government:

"The majority of Cubans support Castro (the lowest estimate I have seen is 50 per cent) … The only foreseeable means of alienating internal support is through disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship … every possible means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba …to bring about hunger, desperation and overthrow of the government" (O.T.H. 1960).

Similarly, when taking measures against the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende in Chile in the early 1970s, U.S. President Nixon expressed the hope of forcing political change by measures "to make the economy scream" (Kornbluh, 2017). Nixon intended direct damage to public health, food security, and general well-being.

A similarly illegal aim was heard more recently from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in relation to a new round of coercive measures imposed on Iran. Pompeo threatened the Iranian people with hunger if their government persisted with military support for the independent peoples of the region (Palestine et al.): "The leadership has to make a decision that they want their people to eat" (Cole, 2018), he said, trying to shift the blame for U.S. aggression onto its target. Successive U.S. administrations have 'normalised' sanctions regimes as part of their hybrid war and 'regime change' strategies, and these measures can be enforced because of U.S. control of the dollar and its domination of the SWIFT system.

UN Surveillance of UCM Regimes

U.N. experts have widely condemned unilateral sanctions regimes, but that criticism has had little effect, given the unipolar order. U.N. rapporteur on the impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures (U.C.M.), Ms Alena Douhan, called for an end to Washington's U.C.M.s, which inhibit the rebuilding of Syria's civilian infrastructure, destroyed by the conflict (OHCHR 2020). "The sanctions violate the human rights of the Syrian people, whose country has been destroyed by almost ten years of ongoing conflict," said Ms Douhan. Washington's anti-Syrian 'Caesar Law' was also condemned as it attempts to block third-party support for the Syrian population. "I am concerned that sanctions imposed under the Caesar Act may exacerbate the already dire humanitarian situation in Syria, especially in the course of the COVID-19 pandemic, and put the Syrian people at even greater risk of human rights violations," she said.

U.N. rapporteur Alfred de Zayas pointed out that U.S. sanctions on Venezuela were 'killing ordinary people'. The 'economic warfare' practised by the U.S., E.U. and Canada were 'significant factors' that had hurt Venezuela's economy, he said (Selby-Green, 2019), adding that U.S. sanctions could amount to 'crimes against humanity', as they were contributing to 'needless deaths' (Webb, 2019).

Mr Idriss Jazairy, UN Rapporteur on the use of 'unilateral coercive measures', made similarly scathing remarks about this economic warfare, saying, "sanctions which can lead to starvation and medical shortages are not the answer to the crisis in Venezuela … I am especially concerned to hear that these sanctions are aimed at changing the government of Venezuela" (U.N. News, 2019). "Coercion, whether military or economic, must never be used to seek a change in government in a sovereign state," he added (OHCHR 2019). It was widely recognised that sanctions were part of Washington's efforts to overthrow the Venezuelan government 'and install a more business-friendly regime' (Selby-Green, 2019). 'Business-friendly' here was a euphemism for wide-scale privatisations, from which U.S. companies would benefit by seizing control of the resources and productive assets of yet another oil-rich country (Parraga, 2019).

BRICS: Opportunities and Risks

The explanation we have given above shows that the dollar's dominance over the world economy and politics has given the U.S. excessive power to impose its will on countries in the world. This condition gives rise to enthusiasm to look for other alternatives. BRICS plays the most important role in providing options for Global South countries. The opportunities and risks of joining BRICS might be considered under these themes: more symmetrical and less coercive cooperation, favorable access to BRICS markets, escaping the dollar dictatorship and consideration of the possible risks involved.

More Symmetrical and Less Coercive Cooperation

The BRICS group, committed to multipolarity, also offers the prospect of

more symmetrical and less coercive cooperation relations, in contrast to the 'Washington Consensus' conditions imposed through development banks and G7 aid programs. Pressures to remove social or environmental controls on foreign investors, privatise state assets and drop all subsidies on basic goods have long been resented (Grugel et al., 2008).

By contrast, the BRICS group has a developed body of principles and experience in developing world concerns such as public health and poverty reduction (McBride et al. 2019; Ghosh & Sarkar, 2023). This approach differs from the G7 model of 'development cooperation' as a source of commercial opportunities for G7 corporations.

Incoming BRICS members Iran and Egypt are already improving ties, before their formal accession to the new bloc (in January 2024), planning banking, medical, tourism and transport cooperation. Iran has also expressed a willingness to cooperate with Egypt in establishing joint banks and shipping companies (Tehran Times, 2023). The Iran-Egypt rapprochement illustrates a mutual interest to explore the possibilities of cooperation across a strategic political divide, as does the China-brokered better relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia (Fantappie & Nasr, 2023), once again, even before either country formally joins BRICS.

Favourable Access to BRICS Markets

Even before a change in currencies, it can be expected that BRICS members will see favourable terms of trade within the bloc, in part because of the greater likelihood of bilateral swaps or use of a basket of currencies.

Paying for goods and services in domestic currencies can lead to appreciation, stabilisation, and increased purchasing power. None of that negates the possibility of ongoing commercial relations outside the bloc. Most new trade opportunities since the demise of the W.T.O. have been through regional agreements (OECD, 2023), but intra-BRICS trade seems likely to resurrect a system of multilateral preferences.

In these circumstances, new BRICS members can expect to have favourable access to the specialities of BRICS members, including energy, I.T.C. products, machinery and motor vehicles, electrical goods, infrastructure projects and initiatives in poverty reduction, food security and environmental protection. The Western / G7 group no longer leads in technology and production but maintains superiority in finance, pharmaceuticals and media.

Nevertheless, when Venezuela joins (likely to be in 2024), the BRICS group will control between 54% and 55% of the world's oil and gas reserves (Worldometer 2023a and 2023b). This energy network is already generating cross-links through infrastructure, science, technology and training (Geiger, 2023). Chinese strength in I.C.T. (I.T., comms and 5G), electrical goods and machinery/rail industries is not just asserted by China (Yang, 2019) but is recognised by European and U.S. sources (Yang, 2019; E.U. et al., 2019; Bateman, 2022).

China alone has rich lessons in mass poverty reduction and food security strategies, as evidenced by the fact that, by 2015, it met its Millennium Development Goal

of halving hunger, reducing the number of hungry people globally by two-thirds (S.S.G. 2023). No amount of Western 'aid' has done this (Niyonkuru, 2016). BRICS is also seen as a decent option for dealing with environmental problems. For example, a Perspective article proposes that facilitated networks of biologists in the core BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) could quickly build the capacity "to advance policy relating to invasive species" (Measey et al., 2019).

BRICS will not help with special access to European and U.S.' Big Pharma' products. However, India has an excellent capacity for generic medicines, and there are pharmaceutical innovations from some BRICS members. In any case, these Western products are typically sold on a commercial basis, and a facility is only compromised if a country is targeted by a unilateral 'sanctions' regime.

South Africa is said to have already gained a very large increase in trade (a 70% increase between 2017 and 2022) through BRICS membership (Musallimova, 2023), while Agarwal (2023) observes the potential benefits of freer movement of labour within the BRICS bloc, plus greater technology transfer.

Escaping the Dollar Dictatorship

The initial financial benefit of BRICS will be in the use of bilateral swaps, and also access to a likely basket of BRICS currencies, which should improve terms of trade and help appreciate local currencies.

Completely escaping the dollar dicta-

torship, however, will require a new banking information exchange outside the SWIFT system and a new BRICS currency. BRICS is now well identified with the project of de-dollarisation (Sullivan, 2023; Roach, 2023), an extension of the broader 'diversification' trend away from the dollar (Horii, 1986), which began many years ago and gained strength after the 2008 U.S. financial crisis (Amadeo, 2022).

The candidates for a BRICS currency, which might be advanced in 2024, though some feel it will take longer (Devonshire-Ellis, 2023), seem to be either a shared, gold-backed BRICS money (Lewis, 2023) or a Central Bank controlled Digital Currency (CBDC), similar to or based on China's Digital Yuan (Elston, 2023). Zharikov (2023) argues that "only a digital unit of account for a group of countries … unlike a cryptocurrency, may help create a sustainable financial stability environment and solid money infrastructure". He says such a CBDC would have to perform the traditional functions of a stable unit of exchange and a store of value, creating an asset which could "provide stable returns and benefit from the growth prospects of the BRICS economies"; digital cryptocurrencies cannot do this, he concludes (Zharikov, 2023). In any case, this "counterbalance" move is underway (Track-insight, 2023), and the BRICS bank is set to issue substantial bonds in local currencies (Rangongo, 2023)

Possible Risks of Joining BRICS

It seems likely that some global south countries are hesitant to join BRICS be-

cause, as the African proverb says, "When elephants fight, the grass gets trampled." Why would anyone want to get into a fight between the U.S.A. and China or the U.S.A. and Russia? Therefore, we should consider the possible risks involved in joining BRICS. These include the risk of becoming the target of unilateral 'sanctions' (U.C.M.s), losing access to technology and losing Western aid and investment.

There seems little risk that mere membership of BRICS would lead to a state becoming the target of U.S. or E.U. unilateral 'sanctions'. Several U.S. allies (Egypt et al.) are in the first rank of new BRICS members due for accession in January 2024 (Ismail, 2023). While Iran – considered an enemy or rival by the U.S.A. - is also in that group, it takes more than mere BRICS alignment to attract aggressive economic measures. So what was in the minds of the Saudis and Emiratis (both with a significant trade surplus) and Egypt (an indebted nation) when they decided to 'play both sides' of the strategic divide? They certainly saw future benefits in BRICS, believed they could manage any tensions with Washington, and probably wanted some counter-leverage to offset the often humiliating subservience of U.S. demands. Furthermore, we already see what might be called 'cross-bloc cooperation' within BRICS, with the new agreements between Iran and Saudi Arabia and Iran and Egypt before those three join BRICS (Fantappie & Nasr, 2023; Tehran Times, 2023).

What of access to technology? It is undoubtedly true that there is some technology war between the U.S.A. and China. How-ever, despite the talk of 'decoupling' and U.S. bans on Huawei, there are no absolute barriers, as many cross-links remain, and there are calls on the U.S. side for caution in blocking Chinese technology (Bateman, 2022). In any case, cross-bloc cooperation will likely reduce the risk of barriers to most non-military technology, as access to the technology of both sides will likely be possible. A similar argument applies to pharmaceuticals, where the US-EU group currently has the leading edge. However, the U.S. view of 'technology transfer' means that at standard commercial rates, U.S. medicines will remain accessible but expensive (USPTO, 2021).

Regarding Western aid and investment, there is a risk that seeing a country's new relations with China and Russia, the U.S. government may decide to reduce foreign aid projects. This risk, which could be managed, would be less with corporate investment so long as it seems profitable and there are no legal (unilateral sanctions) barriers. Overall, the risks of joining BRICS seem quite small when compared with the array of potential benefits.

Conclusion

This paper argued the developmental case for Indo-Pacific and Global South nations joining BRICS as presenting the best possibility to escape the dictatorship of the dollar. The aim would be to escape the damaging developmental damage done by a dominant dollar and enjoy better trade terms with the new and expanding group of BRICS economies.

Establishing alternative financial mechanisms to the dollar dictatorship has become essential to the developmental possibilities of Global South economies in Asia, Africa and Latin America, and the weight and determination of the BRICS group present the best chance to build such alternatives.

De-dollarisation is already underway, mainly through bilateral swaps and diversification of reserves, but a new BRICS currency is also on the horizon. The U.S. has abused its position through the dollar dictatorship, effectively declaring economic war on countries which remain strategically separate or disconnected from the U.S. global strategy. Those subject to Unilateral Coercive Measures (unilateral 'sanctions') from the U.S. or the E.U. certainly have the greatest incentive to escape the dollar-SWIFT system monopoly.

However, benefits can be seen for other Global South nations who are cautious about any political confrontation. The benefits can be seen in more symmetrical and less coercive forms of development cooperation, favourable access to BRICS markets and avoiding the damaging economic impact of dollar domination. On the risk side, there is little risk of unilateral sanctions simply by association with BRICS, and few disadvantages concerning access to technology. The broad character of BRICS members, so far, shows that 'cross bloc' cooperation amongst BRICS members is possible and is already underway. However, there may be some risk of reduction in U.S. investment and U.S. development cooperation projects.

Overall, engaging with alternative financial mechanisms to the dollar dictatorship is likely to become essential to the developmental possibilities of Global South economies, and the weight and determination of the BRICS Plus group offers the best chance to build such alternatives.

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Three Concepts of Internationalism in the Global South:

Solidarism, Pluralism, and Developmentalism

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Throughout modern history, internationalism has been one of the most powerful forces that drives global political changes. While existing research focuses exceptionally on liberal internationalism, studies devoted to internationalism beyond its liberal and Western forms remain relatively scant. Building on a conception that perceives internationalism as a form of human practices, this article explores the evolution of the concept of internationalism in the Global South through a series of political practices from the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung to the proposal of the New International Economic Order in 1974 and the BRICS's contestation over NATO's Libyan intervention in 2011. It is argued that the normative core of internationalism in the Global South is constituted of three major components – pluralism, solidarism, and developmentalism, each in its particular form. Taken together, it envisions an international order rooted in the solidarity of the post-colonial peoples based on their shared colonial past, underpinned by a pluralistic outlook of political life, and places emphasis on redistributive justice in structuring the international economic order. Though some argue that with the rise of the BRICS countries, there will be a revival of Global South internationalism, this article concludes that this is not likely to happen at present.

Keywords: *internationalism; Global South; solidarism; pluralism; developmentalism*

Introduction

Throughout modern history, internationalism has been one of the most potent forces driving global political changes. From the establishment of the League of Nations to the global anti-colonial movements and the program known as the 'liberal internationalism 2.0' (Ikenberry, 2009) instituted by the United States to provide order to the post-1945 international system, different forms of internationalism have emanated many prominent political practices which have significantly shaped the international order. However, international relations (IR) scholars have not studied the varieties of internationalism equally. Among all its variants, liberal internationalism has been most extensively studied over the past few decades, focusing generally on two themes. The first theme concerns the liberal internationalist project in the interwar period, with scholars discussing the political thoughts of leading internationalist figures such as Alfred Zimmern (Morefield, 2005), Gilbert Murray (Wilson, 2011; Morefield, 2005), and Leonard Woolf (Wilson, 2015). Others have also

argued that it was the liberal internationalist ideal of building lasting peace and preventing warfare through the establishment of a 'world government' and the promotion of cross-national understanding that had driven scholars to search for international theory and give birth to IR as an academic discipline (Long & Schmidt, 2005; Stöckmann, 2022).

The second theme revolves around the liberal hegemony of the US and its project of 'liberal internationalism 2.0'. After the Cold War, there were extensive debates about the predicament facing liberal internationalism resulting from its discontent with political reality and other political forces such as nationalism (Hoffmann, 1995), the nature and future of American liberal internationalism (Ikenberry, 2009, 2020), how liberal internationalism has informed political practices including peacebuilding (Paris, 1997) and sanctions (Hurd, 2005) especially in and through the working of international organizations, and whether the liberal internationalist compact had come to an end as the domestic political consensus on US foreign policy demised (Kupchan & Trubowitz, 2007).

While the research on these two themes has produced many insights into internationalism in its liberal forms, it has had little to say about the strands of internationalism that emerged from the non-liberal political environment and practiced beyond the Western world. The exceptional focus on liberal internationalism has created a myth that supposes internationalism is a value exclusive to Western foreign policy and liberal statecraft (Moore, 2018).

In recent years, nevertheless, internationalism beyond its liberal and Western forms has attracted increasing scholarly attention. For instance, Weber and Winanti (2016) examined the emergence of the 'solidarist internationalism' project at the Bandung Conference and how this project informed the particular understandings of 'modernization' and 'development' in the Global South. Moore (2018) traced the evolution of the concept of internationalism and the changing foreign policy practices in the Global South. In a solicited article, Dirik et al. (2023) discussed multiple forms of internationalism in the non-Western world, ranging from Pan-African and Early Soviet to Islamic Socialist and Kurdish. They noted that each form has its own revolutionary view of international order, instigating grassroots social movements and making non-Western internationalism remarkably different from its Western counterpart. Still, despite the growing scholarly attention, literature devoted to studying internationalism beyond its liberal and Western forms remains relatively scant.

This article seeks to contribute to the scholarly debate on internationalism in the Global South by exploring its concept and history. Through conceptualizing internationalism as a form of human practice, this article traces the evolution of the concept of internationalism in the Global South through a series of political practices starting from the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 and the Asian-African Conference in Bandung (The Bandung Conference) in 1955 to the proposal of the New International Economic Order

(NIEO) in 1974 and the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) contestation over NATO's intervention in Libya in 2011. This article argues that the normative core of internationalism in the Global South is constituted of three main components: pluralism, solidarism, and developmentalism, each in its particular form. Taken together, the internationalism that emerged in the Global South articulated a post-colonial vision of international order underpinned by the solidarity and shared identity of the peoples in the Global South based on their shared experiences of colonialism and anti-colonial struggles, centered around the affirmation that every nation is entitled to build its domestic political, economic, and social institutions by its conception of 'good life' without external interference, and emphasizes redistributive justice and the need for eliminating the colonial legacies embedded in the modern international (economic) order as a prerequisite for the post-colonial nations to pursue development and modernization.

The contribution of this article is three-fold. Firstly, as Halliday (1988) pointed out, internationalism always involves specific normative assertions about international life – that particular ways of organizing the international connections and interactions between people, governments, and other actors are considered excellent and desirable. Such normative assertions create an international interest beyond that of individual nations and thereby rationalize and legitimize internationalist politics. Unraveling the normative complexities of internationalism is vital in understanding why actors engage in internationalist politics, what they are after, and on what grounds they try to justify their cause. This could advance our understanding of the norms and values underlying the foreign policies and statecraft of the rising powers in the Global South and answer the critical question about what kind of international order they are trying to build at present. Secondly, as Acharya and Buzan (2019) argued, the IR discipline's conceptual, theoretical, and methodological paradigms derive predominantly from Western intellectual traditions and experiences. In a world increasingly characterized by deep pluralism, knowledge production within the discipline must be more reflective of the Global South's history, ideas, and practices. Examining the ideas and practices associated with non-Western internationalism represents an entry point for pushing the discipline toward Global IR. Finally, by taking a practice-oriented methodological approach, this article reveals a new method for studying internationalism. As the next section will show, such an approach would complement the shortcomings of studying internationalism as intellectual history or as political value embedded in the foreign policies of certain states, thereby expanding the toolkit for IR scholars in studying complex and conceptually confusing phenomena like internationalism.

This article is organized into five parts. The first part provides a conceptual analysis of internationalism and explains how conceptualizing internationalism as human practice would aid the analysis of internationalism in the Global South. The

second, third, and fourth parts each discuss a particular normative component of the Global South internationalism and examine how it was articulated from the political practices in the Global South. The final part sketches the BRICS's contestation over NATO's Libyan intervention in 2011 and suggests that although this event displayed some of its normative characteristics, they did not mark the revival of internationalism in the Global South.

This article interchangeably uses the terms the 'Global South' and the 'Third World.' While well aware that these terms were coined in different contexts to denote different meanings, for this article's purpose, it would be futile to engage in the lengthy debate about the differences between them. The term 'Third World' was first coined by Alfred Sauvy in 1952 to denote the group of countries that remained outside of the confrontation between the Western and the Soviet blocs, which was later given political significance concerning these countries' shared experience of colonialism and their developing economies. 'Global South' gained popularity after the Cold War and is more encompassing in its meaning. As Haug et al. (2021) noted, in academic and political discourses, 'Global South' generally has three understandings: the poor or socio-economically marginalized parts of the world, the formerly colonized countries, and the resistant forces against neoliberal capitalism or other global hegemonic powers. Following Moore (2018), this article also discusses a group of countries whose foreign policies derive considerably from post-colonial lega-cies and the quest for developmental justice, which both terms can create. Nevertheless, it is worth clarifying that Russia is not included in the 'Third World' because of its past as an imperial power in the Tsarist period and as a hegemonic power in the Soviet period. As the final section will show, though today the BRICS as a whole embody some of the political legacies of the Third World project in their foreign policies, it would not be evident to assume the BRICS countries all derive their foreign policies from post-colonial lega-cies and the quest for justice in international economic relations.

Understanding Internationalism

As pervasive and remarkable as internationalism has been in political practices and discourses, the concept of internationalism has only sometimes remained clear and consistent throughout history. As Halliday (1988) pointed out, internationalism has too often been associated with several ideas, but none of them constitutes the core meaning. Halliday (1988) identified three broad themes that disparate forms of internationalism share: firstly, there is an objective process of 'the internationalization of the world' that has been taking place in reality, bringing distant human communities into ever-closer connections; Secondly, there is a corresponding political process in which international and transnational collaborations between governments, NGOs, and individuals increase; Thirdly, there is a normative assertion that these processes are good because they promote the interests of human community at large.

Halliday's conception provides a viable entry point for mapping the conceptual structure of internationalism. Firstly, internationalism emerges through a materialist process in which the interconnectedness of human beings worldwide is tremendously increased. This process arguably started in the Age of Exploration in the fifteenth century. However, it was greatly accelerated during the nineteenth century when industrialization and the global expansion of the capitalist market not only created strong incentives for people from different backgrounds to engage in extensive political, commercial, and cultural exchanges but also enabled them to do so through modern means of transportation and communication such as railways, steamships, telegraphs, telephones, and mail services. Sluga (2013) argued that this objective process 'provided the infrastructure and motivation for the international institutions and associations devoted to all internationalized political, economic, religious, and humanitarian issues proliferating across the world.' Therefore, the materialist process of the 'internationalization of the world' laid the foundation for the emergence of internationalism. Without inter-human interactions across different cultural backgrounds, people would not develop any idea about life beyond their primordial communities or sense of the 'international.'

Secondly, internationalism manifests through a series of political projects that appeal to the interests beyond individual nation-states and seek to organize or govern the increasingly internationalized world in specific ways. Liberal internationalist projects, such as the working of international organizations, the rule of international law, and the promotion of free trade, have been extensively studied by scholars interested in regime theory and have been widely considered an effective means to achieve peace and prosperity. However, the political significance of internationalism goes deeper. As Halliday (2009) later elaborated, the political process of internationalism involves the transformation of political identities and responsibilities in the sense that internationalism envisions a shared community of humankind and informs political practices based on the common interest of humankind. Goldmann (1994) pointed out that internationalism derives from an outward-looking, universalist form of political opinion. We can observe the existence and influence of internationalist politics through the practices emanated by such political opinion.

Finally, internationalism is centered around specific normative visions about international life. The normative spectrum of internationalism concerns the 'right,' 'good,' or 'desirable' way of organizing the increasingly internationalized world, with cosmopolitanism lying on the one side of the spectrum and communitarianism on the other (Lawler, 2005; Dunne & MacDonald, 2013). The central question is about the place of nation-states in an internationalized world. As internationalism brings about shifts in the sense of belonging and political identity, it opens up the possibility of transcending the national community to define actors' identities in a broader social milieu. Cosmopolitans, therefore, argue that since we are all

human beings, we are bound by some shared moral values rooted in humanity. States, for cosmopolitans, are only an intermediary form of political community and will be replaced by new forms of political community that function better in upholding the cosmopolitan principles (see Linklater & Suganami, 2006; Dunne & MacDonald, 2013). Communitarians, on the other hand, are skeptical about the cosmopolitan visions. As political realists, communitarians consider the territorial state as the primary community in defining human beings' political identities, which is unreplaceable by any other forms of communities, at least shortly. As Miller (1999) argued, '[Republican citizenship] represents the best way in which people of diverse beliefs and styles of life can live together under laws and institutions which they can endorse as legitimate.' In his critique of cosmopolitan citizenship, he noted multiple political, legal, and ethical constraints that would make the transformation from national to cosmopolitan citizenship not only unrealizable but also undesirable. As its name suggests, communitarians emphasize the role of the politically bounded communities, i.e., territorial states, in supplying and embodying moral values in international life.

Within this normative spectrum, internationalism is expected to occupy the middle ground. As Goldmann (1994) pointed out, the value of internationalism lies in its potential to ameliorate the stability of the international system without necessarily replacing the system of states with a world authority. The coercive and accommodative powers of internationalism through the law,

organization, exchange, and communication, according to Goldmann (1994), would not only prevent incompatibility of interest between states but also bring people closer. This form of 'classical' internationalism is found in the foreign policies of the Scandinavian countries, which are more prone to cosmopolitan values, multilateralism, the rule of law, and the primacy of the United Nations in world politics (Pratt, 1989; Lawler, 2005). Central to classical internationalism is the conception of the 'Good State' – states who are committed to other-regarding moral purposes and robust internationalist foreign policies (Lawler, 2005). Internationalism in such a conception is uncontestably statist – it does not seek to transcend the state. Instead, it prescribes a particular role to the state and envisions a particular kind of state in its project, i.e., liberal democracies.

Taken together, internationalism can be understood as a particular form of political practice appealing to the interests beyond nation-states, emerging from specific objective backgrounds, and embedded with certain normative orientations about international life. How, then, can we operationalize such a conception to explore the role of internationalism in world politics? How can we articulate the normative content of internationalism amidst the pervasive internationalist political projects? Existing research in the IR discipline generally studies internationalism from two methodological approaches. The first is tracing the intellectual history of internationalist thoughts, from earlier figures like Emanuel Kant (e.g., Bartelson, 1995) to more recent thinkers like Gil-

bert Murray (e.g., Wilson, 2011). The second examines the internationalist foreign policies of states sharing liberal political values (e.g., Ikenberry, 2009, 2020; Pratt, 1989).

Both, however, exhibit some shortcomings. Internationalist thoughts undoubtedly reflect the objective processes in a given historical period and usually carry certain moral or ethical judgments about international life that play essential roles in informing internationalist projects. However, they have only been applied in political reality with interpretation and, on many occasions, distortion, which may lead to disarray between political thought and practice (see Desch, 2007). The second approach often overlooks the complexity and multiplicity of internationalist movements. Historically, non-state actors have played prominent roles in different internationalist projects, from the multiple national League of Nations societies during the interwar period (see McCarthy, 2011) to the various nongovernmental organizations that carry forward liberal ideas globally in the contemporary period (see Iriye, 2002). This is more telling when examining internationalism in the Global South since most Third World actors began to engage in internationalist projects as anti-colonial, nongovernmental, national liberation parties, organizations, and associations. As Colás (2002) demonstrated, most social movements embody certain kinds of universal political agency. They are inevitably internationalized, whereas a focus on states' foreign policies would overlook this critical dimension. Therefore, neither tracing the intellectual history nor evaluating the for-

eign policies of leading internationalist states would give a complete picture of internationalism.

This article takes a methodological standpoint which views internationalism as an inter-subjective process of human practice. According to Adler and Pouliot (2011), practices are socially meaningful patterns of competent performances in which the background knowledge and discourse about the material world are embodied, acted out, and reified. Practices differ from 'behaviors' or 'actions' in that through practice, actors not only engage in the material world in a patterned manner but also try to make sense of the material world, generating intersubjective social meanings about the material world. Through practices, actors exercise material agencies informed by an organic combination of instrumental rationality and normative judgments to shape the material and social structures in the social field, through which new knowledge is reproduced and internalized by the actors to inform subsequent practices (Pouliot & Mérand, 2013). A practice-oriented approach weaves together the material and ideational, and agential and structural dimensions of the social phenomenon to focus on how social meanings are produced and reproduced as actors meet each other, speak to each other, and do things that would affect each other (Adler & Pouliot, 2011).

As Clavin (2011) put it succinctly, 'Internationalism represents the value of the practice it defines.' By taking a practice-oriented approach, this article shifts its focus away from analyzing the purely ideational,

intellectual history of internationalism or the state-centered internationalist foreign policy to generate knowledge about internationalism by concentrating on the occasions and events that bring actors into the interaction to formulate internationalist agendas and trying to articulate the ideational principles and normative visions that inform their interaction and are produced and reproduced through their interaction. This article investigates what the actors think by examining what they do in practice. Empirically, this article examines a series of international conferences and gatherings that are prominent in the unfolding of the Third World and later the Global South projects, from the drafting of the UDHR and the Bandung Conference to the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the UN Security Council meetings in 2011. As Heffernan et al. (2022) noted, 'It was through periodic conferences that internationalism was formalized as both an arena of governance and a scale of investigation.' This article draws on relevant materials including official documents, speeches, statements, conventions, conference proceedings, and secondary historical works to discern the normative visions expressed in these materials.

Solidarist Internationalism, Decolonisation, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

For the West, internationalism emerged as a natural outcome of the liberal idea of an international community, which was not only ideologically predominant but also objectively coming into being at the turn of the twentieth century. As previously noted, the vastly increased political, economic, cultural, and social connections between the Western people and the rest of the world have enabled them to forge closer transnational relationships than ever. They had fuelled their imaginations of the realization of an international community in which human beings are unprecedentedly interconnected (Sluga, 2013). As the US Secretary of State Robert Lansing commented in 1919, the nineteenth century belonged to nationality, while the twentieth century would be driven by internationality (cited in Sluga, 2013).

We should not, of course, lose sight of the essence of such interconnection and what it meant to the people in the rest of the world – that such interconnection was based on colonial expansion and imperial hierarchies. While the internationalization of the world meant a good thing for the West as it brought power, prestige, material benefits, and commercial opportunities, it meant sustained alien exploitation and subjugation for the colonial peoples. The League of Nations Mandate System provides a vivid example. Envisioned by liberal internationalists as an institutional means to guide the 'backward' civilizations towards self-rule, the system sustained imperial exploitation in the colonies. The underlying logic of the system, though being argued by many as firstly articulating the idea that colonial empires are no longer a legitimate political form (Mayall, 1990; Pedersen, 2015), was still based on the 'Standard of Civilisation,' according to which the colo-

nial peoples are regarded as 'backward' and need to be 'civilized' by the West.[1] Liberal internationalism, as Mazower (2012) noted, was not the 'antithesis to the empire but its civilizer.'

Internationalism emerged in the Global South as a reactionary force against this colonial setting. This was made explicit at the beginning of the anti-colonial movement by the League against Imperialism Conference in 1927, a name deliberately chosen to denounce the League of Nations for maintaining the colonial empires through the Mandate System (Prashad, 2007). The conference gathered roughly 200 delegates representing 134 anti-colonial organizations across three continents, many of whom became enormously influential later in anti-colonial struggles, such as Jawaharlal Nehru and Sukarno (Prashad, 2007). For these anti-colonialists, the conference became a venue for them to share experiences of colonial domination, forge personal relationships, and seek common ground in their visions of a post-colonial international order. Though briefly disrupted by the Second World War, the global anti-colonial movement flourished as a transnational phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century through more of such conferences, mass demonstrations, and labor movements (Prashad, 2007).

In the aftermath of the Second World War, one of the major tasks facing the international community was to define the normative basis upon which the new inter-national order could be constructed. The core objective of the anti-colonial forces, of course, was to fight for sovereign equality and non-interference. To achieve this objective, internationalists in the Global South tactically utilized liberal internationalist norms. This occurred in the drafting process of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, in which some newly independent Third World nations were invited to participate, particularly India, which played a leading role in this endeavor as one of the most potent post-colonial states at the moment (Basu-Mellish, 2023). The goal was to integrate the right to self-determination for the colonial peoples into the whole liberal package of 'basic human rights,' including the freedoms of opinion, expression, religion, and peaceful assembly. The post-colonial states argued that the right to self-determination constitutes a prerequisite for the satisfaction of civil and political rights. As the idea of universal human rights is widely accepted, especially in the Western world, the gross, inhuman colonial conducts that violently exploited colonial peoples and denied them of their inherent political, economic, social, and cultural rights, therefore, became a weapon for the post-colonialists to expose the hypocrisy of colonial administration and the illegitimacy of imperial rule.

Reus-Smit (2013) observed that the post-colonial states' claims in negotiating the UDHR were more liberal than those of Western states. Not only had the Indian del-

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[1] For the 'Standard of Civilisation,' see the famous articulation by Scottish jurist James Lorimer (1883). He argued that humanity could be classified into three kinds of civility: civilized (the West), barbarous (old historical states like Turkey, Persia, China, Siam, and Japan), and savage (Africa). This conception, to a great extent, legitimized European colonialism.

egation proposed to establish robust enforcement mechanisms to ensure the implementation of human rights laws (Bhagavan, 2010), but the post-colonial states had also managed to block the Soviet Union's attempt to replace civil and political rights with social and economic rights as the focus of the UDHR (Reus-Smit, 2013). On the one hand, the radically liberal position adopted by the post-colonial states was a strategic choice. Since many colonial nations had not achieved independence in the immediate postwar years, the post-colonial states needed such a strategy to cultivate prestige and attract support, which they certainly achieved in the 1950s (Basu-Mellish, 2023). On the other hand, this position had to do with the leadership of India, especially the normative vision of Nehru, who envisioned India's independence as an internationalist project that would inspire and facilitate the solidarity of the global anti-colonial forces (Bhagavan, 2010). This was most explicitly manifested in Nehru's 'Towards a World Community' speech at the UN in 1956. He spoke of how the UN came to mark the emergence of a world community, or 'One World,' in which international order is underpinned by a 'conscience of the world'. He also reminded the diplomats to adhere to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and think about world opinion when making decisions (cited in Bhagavan, 2010). On its appearance, Nehru seemed to appeal to a form of cosmopolitan, utopianist thought commonly associated with liberalist ideology. Nevertheless, if we bring his words into the context, it would be easy to tell that Nehru spoke in favor of the post-colonial

nations, who had been systemically excluded from participating in international affairs equally. Using the predominant liberal discourse, Nehru offered a powerful argument championing the logic that if we accept the conception of universal human rights and the UN Charter, then the rights of the colonial peoples should be equally protected, and they should also be included in the 'world community.'

Therefore, at the very beginning, internationalism in the Global South was envisioned as a cosmopolitan project, appealing to a form of international solidarity for the independence of the colonial nations. Though the post-colonial states' struggle for institutionalizing the right to self-determination through the UDHR proved to be unsuccessful, the way this struggle unfolded – drawing on the liberal normative language as enshrined in the UN Charter and later the UDHR to argue for post-colonial struggles, was carried forward in subsequent efforts from Bandung to the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514. However, these events following the UDHR also articulated another core feature of Third World internationalism: its pluralism. As Basu-Mellish (2023) noted, as an increasing number of colonial nations achieved independence, the problem of cultural and ideological diversity soon became a significant issue. A strong normative consensus must be reached to retain the solidarity of the post-colonial nations while allowing them to pursue their diversified cultural and ideological courses. This normative consensus is based on sovereign equality and non-interference principles, most systemical-

ly articulated in the Bandung Conference.

Pluralist Internationalism and the Bandung Conference

As an assembly of post-colonial nations, the participants of the Bandung Conference were well aware of the importance of maintaining the solidarity of the post-colonial world. They were, however, alarmed by the presence of the Communist regimes at the conference, most notably, the People's Republic of China (PRC). As previously noted, universal human rights provided the normative basis for the post-colonial independence struggles. Many post-colonial states, therefore, viewed the protection of human rights and individual freedom as inseparably linked to their sovereign independence. They denounced the Communist regimes for their totalitarianism and suppression of individual freedom (Burke, 2010).

Furthermore, the founding of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe was perceived by many as a new form of imperialism instituted by the Soviet Union, which, according to the Libyan representative Mohammed Bey Muntassar, not only exhibited 'all the disadvantages of classical colonialism,' but also sought to impose 'intellectual slavery' upon the newly independent nations (quoted in Burke, 2010). The Communists' atheistic attitude also raised concerns from those nations in which religion played an important role, like Iran and Thailand (Burke, 2010). The Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was compelled to act in this grim situation. In his speech, Zhou (1955) reiterated the 'Five Principles (Panchsheel)' initially adopted to resolve the Sino-India territorial disputes, including mutual respect for a state's territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference, equality and mutual respect, and peaceful coexistence, and proclaimed that China was ready to engage in diplomatic relations with the Afro-Asian nations on these principles.

Zhou's endeavor was supported by two leading figures of the post-colonial world – Nehru and Sukarno. Risking fracturing the conference, it was Nehru and Sukarno who decided to invite the PRC instead of Taiwan because of the former's long-standing anti-colonial position, which Nehru and Sukarno considered to be the binding force that united the whole Conference (Prashad, 2007). Zhou's charismatic diplomacy during the conference and his promise of peaceful coexistence and not exporting Communism reassured those delegates who remained suspicious of China and made it possible for the conference to proceed. As The Times (1955) reported: 'It was he [Zhou Enlai], rather than Mr. Nehru, who became the focal point of the conference […] His assurances to Thailand were his guarantee of non-interference in Laos. His liberal agreement with Indonesia over the future position of Chinese settlers, his friendliness to Japan, and his insistence that the "peaceful coexistence" that he promised was, like the now widely publicized principles for its achievement, which he originally inserted in the Sino-Indian Treaty over Tibet […] all these made a profound impression even upon the representatives of countries which have the most cause to fear the advance of Communism.'

Nehru maintained a solid personal relationship with Zhou and introduced him to the conference delegates. He had already signed off the 'Five Principles' in his dealing with China and promoted the idea of peaceful coexistence in practices, such as handling India's bilateral relationship with Yugoslavia. In his joint statement with President Tito, it was claimed that 'All hope for the advance of the peoples of the world, and even for the survival of the civilization, rendered their acceptance [of the Five Principles] not merely as an alternative but imperative' (The Manchester Guardian, 1954). In Sukarno's opening remarks, he also emphasized that the conference must be guided by the logic of 'live and let live' to achieve 'unity in diversity' (quoted in Devetak et al., 2016).

The endorsement and commitment of Nehru and Sukarno facilitated the inclusion of the 'Five Principles' into the Final Communiqué of the Conference, adding a pluralist connotation to the post-colonial internationalist project. This pluralist position recognizes that the cultural, ideological, and ethical diversities among the post-colonial nations are not a problem that must be addressed but a fact to be recognized and respected. It envisioned a post-colonial international order in which nations who had achieved independence were entitled to establish their domestic institutions and develop their own cultural, religious, and ethical principles or their conception of 'how to live the good life' (Devetak et al., 2016; Basu-Mellish, 2023). Sovereignty, in this conception, is a guarantor of a way of life, and the adherence to which could preclude

external interference and preserve the legacies of self-determination.

Pluralism and solidarism are often seen as two contradictory normative orientations of international order (see Bull, 1977). The former emphasizes a communitarian view to accommodate and preserve the diversified conceptions of the 'good life' to ensure order and stability of the international system. In contrast, the latter champions a cosmopolitan impulse to unify the international system with one conception of the 'good life' in pursuit of universal justice (Buzan, 2014). However, we see an organic fusion of the two in the internationalist project of the Global South, with solidarism in the right to self-determination providing the basis for pluralistic development and pluralism in peaceful coexistence, adding an insurance for maintaining post-colonial solidarity. The kind of internationalism articulated in Bandung has often been portrayed in the Western world as revolutionary, seeking to alter the modern international order radically. However, upon scrutinizing the normative basis of post-colonial internationalism, it is not difficult to see that it is a reformist one rather than revolutionary: the post-colonial nations claimed that they deserve to enjoy what the Western states had been enjoying for decades, i.e., sovereign equality and non-interference, which undoubtedly conforms to the principles of the UN Charter and the Westphalian model of states-system (Devetak et al., 2016).

The Bandung Conference was a significant moment in world politics, with enduring but mixed legacies. On the one hand,

the pluralist vision based on the solidarity of the post-colonial world, as articulated in the conference, laid the normative basis for decolonization as a global political project, which was later ratified and institutionalized through the adoption of the UN General Assembly Resolution 1514, i.e., The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, with the language of which significantly mirroring the Final Communiqué (Basu-Mellish, 2023). The pluralist vision had another significant impact – it changed the international outlook of many post-colonial nations through the principle of peaceful coexistence. Before Bandung, many post-colonial states entered collective security arrangements with the West, including the Bagdad Pact (1955) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (1954). As the idea of peaceful coexistence entrenched, they soon realized that such arrangements would not ensure their security but would constrain their freedom by dragging them into the Cold War confrontation. Chief was the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, who was seen as pro-West before Bandung but radically changed his foreign policy afterward (Acharya, 2016). The idea of peaceful coexistence attracted many supporters in the post-colonial world, as it allowed them to escape from the confrontational atmosphere of the Cold War. This sentiment was soon formalized into a concrete political project, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

On the other hand, the 'Bandung Spirit' did not flourish as expected in the decades after the conference. Umar (2019) identified several reasons, including the domestic political changes in many states in the Global South in the 1960s, the post-colonial world's shift of focus from independence to development, and the escalation of the US-Soviet Union confrontation, which had dragged many Third World states into it. Among them, the focus shift from independence to development is arguably the most relevant, adding another normative component to internationalism in the Global South.

Developmentalist Internationalism and the New International Economic Order

As more colonial nations achieved independence, they soon realized the persistence of the colonial elements in the international economic order, which had seriously constrained their pursuit of a 'good life.' As Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah (1965) noted, many post-colonial nations, upon independence, still faced the problem of neo-colonialism – the former imperial powers were still able to direct the policies of these post-colonial states through economic and monetary means, like monopolistic export of goods, the control over foreign exchange, and the imposition of a banking system managed by the former imperial powers. Neo-colonialism operates by creating states incapable of independent development and relying on their old economic and financial links with the former imperial powers. In such cases, foreign capital becomes a tool to continuously exploit the post-colonial nations rather than a means to facilitate their development, and the worst part is, according to Nkrumah (1965), that the imperial powers do not need to justify their conduct

except for stating that this is how things are done in the global market.

Against this background, the post-colonial nations' call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) unfolded. The political project of NIEO represented the culmination of a series of political events following the Bandung Conference. While the Asian and Arabian voices dominated Bandung, the call for the NIEO stemmed from Latin America, more specifically, the famous theory of the Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, which revealed that the trade relationship between primary producers and manufacturers would worsen gradually without regulation. This theory has had a significant influence on the development agenda of the Third World, as it broadly characterizes the economic relationship between Third World countries (primary producers who supply raw materials) and the West (manufacturers) (Gilman, 2015). An incentive, therefore, emerged in the Global South to study the possible regulation of the international economic order, which led to the creation of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 with Prebisch as its first secretary-general and attracted more than one hundred developing countries to attend. In its second session, 77 of them formed the G-77. The binding force that united the G-77 was the kind of post-colonial solidarism articulated in Bandung and was reinforced by the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raising of oil prices in 1973, which demonstrated that the developing countries could shape global trade (Gilman, 2015). In its

subsequent meetings, the G-77 at the UNCTAD studied the various aspects of reforming the international economic order, which eventually led to the proposal of the NIEO at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974, with specific measures, including nationalizing natural resources, fixing the international price-setting system, removing political conditions for foreign aid, re-structuring debts, and regulating the activities of transnational corporations.

In many aspects, the NIEO crystallized and carried forward the development agenda outlined in the Bandung Final Communiqué. As Weber (2016) noted, development was discussed in Bandung as a meta-narrative, setting the general direction for international cooperation among post-colonial states in all aspects related to development. While adhering to the principles outlined in Bandung, the NIEO made the agenda more specific and operable in its economic and financial aspects. The normative orientation of the NIEO was characterized by a fusion of solidarism and pluralism, aligning with the 'spirit of Bandung.' On the one hand, it called for redistributive justice in the name of the post-colonial peoples whose rights and capacity for development had been. It was continuously deprived and constrained by the international economic order's embedded colonial structure (see Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the Declaration, 1974). On the other hand, the NIEO firmly held that economic cooperation must be carried out based on mutual respect, sovereign equality, and non-interference. Remarkably, the NIEO acknowledged that all states, irrespective of

their political and economic systems, are entitled to participate in and benefit from international economic cooperation (see Articles 4(a) to 4(e) of the Declaration, 1974).

Above all, the NIEO introduced a kind of developmentalism into the normative package of internationalism in the Global South. By fusing post-colonial solidarist and pluralist ideas to reform the international economic structure, the NIEO envisioned a post-colonial international (economic) order in which states are the principal actors in facilitating development and exercising strong and even absolute control over resources, capital, trade, and technology. In this view, 'development' essentially means 'national development' and conforms to the general idea of modernization (Weber, 2016; Weber & Winanti, 2016). The rhetoric was framed as the post-colonial nations must 'catch up' with the West. As Nehru often said, 'What Europe did in a hundred or a hundred and fifty years, we must do in ten or fifteen years' (quoted in Chakrabarty, 2005). Therefore, this form of developmental internationalism's goal was to live a modern, Western life with advanced industrialization, urbanization, social welfare, infrastructure, education, medication, etc. To do this, the West must remedy its past faults through redistributive justice and make the international economic order more equal to the Global South. This rhetoric of principled persuasion generated broad support for the NIEO in the Global South (Fioretos, 2020).

The Revival of Internationalism in the Global South? The BRICS and the Libyan Intervention

As Prashad (2012) noted, the NIEO marked the highest point of the Third World project. While this observation acknowledges the significance of the NIEO, it also means that after the NIEO, the Third World project gradually headed toward a decline. In the 1980s, major Western countries introduced a series of reforms to their national and international economic structures partly in response to the NIEO and to address the internal deficiencies in the post-war economic model following the collapse of the Bretton Wood System. Rather than following the developing countries' call for regulation, the West, guided by the neoliberal economic theory, promoted further liberalization and privatization in the global market, leading to rapid economic growth in the 1980s and making the NIEO no longer desirable for developing countries. By the late 1980s, it had become clear that the Third World project was in jeopardy, so the NAM instituted a commission to study the political and economic difficulties facing the NAM countries. The Commission (1990) reported that both external and internal pressures had damaged the Third World project, as neoliberal globalization seriously undermined the political force of the Third World for the NIEO and the kind of leadership that was used to be found in Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasser vanished. Following the decline of the Third World project, internationalism in the Global South fell silent.

Over the past decade, many discussions have been about the revival of internationalism in the Global South following the economic success of major developing countries like China, India, South Africa, and Brazil. It has been argued that with their growing economic and political influence over global affairs, they would be increasingly willing and able to represent the interests of the Global South in the liberal international order led by the US. One of the often-cited cases has been the BRICS's contestation over NATO's intervention in the Libyan civil war in 2011 (see Amar, 2012; Brockmeier et al., 2016; Moore, 2018). Though with formal authorization from the Security Council through its Resolution 1973 and the normative justification offered by the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), NATO's military campaign, which eventually overthrew the Qaddafi regime, triggered widespread international discontent, as it not only resulted in excessive killing and prolonged warfare but was also questioned for exceeding the mandate and deliberately ignoring political mediations (Kuperman, 2013). In the Security Council, the BRICS advanced strong pluralist arguments centered around sovereignty and non-intervention. The Chinese representative, for instance, repeatedly stressed the importance of respecting the 'sovereignty, independence, unity, and territorial integrity of Libya' and that 'the internal affairs and fate of Libya must be left up to the Libyan people to decide' (UNSC, 2011a).

Above all, the BRICS (except Russia) were bound together by their post-colonial legacies. The way NATO's intervention in Libya unfolded – the outside European powers intervened to facilitate regime change by military means in the name of human rights – evoked their painful memories of colonialism. They were reminded of the 2009 statement of Miguel d'Escoto Brockmann, the President of the UN General Assembly's 63rd Session: "Recent and painful memories related to the legacy of colonialism give developing countries strong reasons to fear that laudable motives can end up being misused, once more, to justify arbitrary and selective interventions against the weakest states" (UNGA, 2009). As the Indian Ambassador to the UN, Hardeep Singh Puri noted: "Only aspect of the resolution of interest to them (Western powers) was the use of all necessary means to bomb the hell out of Libya" (India Post, 2012). He reportedly told a colleague that Brockmann was right and that the BRICS now saw that protecting civilians meant regime change (Prashad, 2016). The collective colonial trauma ignited an upsurge in anti-colonial mentality and solidarity in the Global South (Nuruzzaman, 2022). When the domestic armed conflict in Syria escalated, the BRICS together blocked the Western powers' attempts for intervention. In the Security Council, the Syrian representative, backed by the BRICS, accused the Western powers with a strong argument: 'Through such conduct, they undermine international legitimacy and seek to lead the entire world into a new colonial era and military adventures in various places that are bound and doomed to fail. Those very States led the whole world into two world wars that claimed millions of lives on our planet. With

their colonial behavior, their enslavement, and their attitude, they caused the untold suffering of hundreds of millions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.' (UNSC 2011b)

While it is true that the BRICS, through and after their involvement in the Libyan-Syrian episodes, have gained momentous power and prestige, they have also become increasingly active and assertive in using such power and prestige to influence world politics (Amar, 2012). Nevertheless, it may be too soon to tell whether the rise of the BRICS would revive Global South internationalism. On the one hand, after Libya, there has seldom been any international event that could mobilize high levels of post-colonial morale and solidarity as pervasive and remarkable as those that took place between the 1950s and the 1970s. The pluralist values have been deeply entrenched that the middle and small powers in the Global South, who used to follow the lead of major Third World powers to push forward decolonization, now increasingly tend to pursue their interests rather than commit themselves to any 'noble cause.' On the other hand, the BRICS itself is encountering problems. Russia's 'special military operation' in Ukraine has undoubtedly undermined the values of sovereignty and non-intervention that the BRICS has been upholding. Finessing amongst the BRICS, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the Commonwealth, India has been increasingly pursuing a strategy of 'multi-alignment' instead of non-alignment (Mohan, 2022). In contrast, China has its vision of international order, as implied by its Belt and Road Initiative. In some ways, internationalism in the

Global South represents a zeitgeist particular to the historical context in which it emerged. Though its legacies endure to form a constitutive part of the social structure of international order and inform the political practices of many countries, it would be difficult to imagine its rebirth with its normative core intact, when the 'leading players' are pursuing their own visions and the normative picture of Global South internationalism as a whole is largely characterized by fragmentation.

Conclusion

This article has studied the evolution of internationalism in the Global South from three normative standpoints: solidarism, pluralism, and developmentalism. In articulating each of these normative components, this article has demonstrated that they derived from the post-colonial internationalist practices in the Third World, from the drafting of the UDHR to the Bandung Conference and the proposal of the NIEO. In each of these episodes, internationalism emerged in response to a particular objective problem facing the Third World countries. The Third World leaders, as well as civil societies, engaged in extensive interactions and cooperation through conferences and social movements, and in each episode, articulated a new normative component to the Third World project, from the simple idea of anti-imperialism to post-colonial solidarism, to which was added pluralism to preserve the solidarity and the developmentalism which exhibited both solidaristic and pluralist features. These normative components make the Global South internationalism qualitatively

different from its Western counterparts, as it is rooted in the unique post-colonial experiences and practices of the Global South nations and has its own conceptions of order, justice, development, modernization, and the 'good life.'

Following the rise of the BRICS over the past few decades, some argue that internationalism will be revived in the Global South based on observing its emerging role in the Libyan-Syrian episodes. However, upon scrutinizing the process, it could be argued that the BRICS' collective responses were stimulated by the collective colonial memory and the strategic incentive of upholding the values of sovereignty and non-incentive rather than marking the rise of a systemic global social phenomenon. Whether this will happen shortly still waits to be seen

Acknowledgement

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Mapping Indonesia's South-South Triangular Cooperation

Initiatives & potential: Climate Adaptation and Mitigation

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Indonesia has committed to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), and one of the commitments includes its efforts to enhance South-South Cooperation (SSC). Within those SSC sectors, one of the most promising sectors is the Climate change aspects such as Agriculture, disaster risk reduction, renewable energy and energy efficiency, forestry, transport, water resources, and waste management. Notably, countries are increasingly recognizing the utility of SSC as a strategic tool for addressing climate change and achieving their National Determined Contributions (NDCs). This paper employs qualitative research methods, drawing insights from existing literature and data, to analyse Indonesia's SSC efforts as part of its AOIP commitment. The study sheds light on Indonesia's endeavours to provide SSC within the Indo-Pacific region, considering the political, economic, and strategic benefits of assisting countries in this area. Additionally, it underscores the significance of technological exchange, particularly with countries sharing similar geo-climatic, cultural, and socio-economic conditions, in fostering effective cooperation, particularly within the Climate Change agenda. The study proposes a potential framework for cooperation by aligning each host countries specific needs with an analysis of their NDCs, complemented by the expertise of contributing nations.

Keywords: *South-south cooperation; ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific; climate change; NDC implementation*

Introduction

South-South Cooperation (SSC) is a collaborative learning model for sharing innovative and cost-effective solutions in addressing diverse development challenges, such as poverty, education, climate change, and post-conflict reconstruction. It signifies a partnership among Southern countries, moving beyond traditional aid recipient roles. This collaboration also involves traditional donors participating in Triangular Cooper-ation (TrC), commonly called South-South Triangular Cooperation (SSTC) for increased efficiency (UN Secretary, 2012). With the global focus on climate change, many developing countries, disproportionately impacted by its effects, are joining in to implement this agenda. However, these countries need help in implementation due to limited capacities in finance, knowledge, skills, technology, and institutional structures. By joining forces, those Countries with similar backgrounds

could combine resources and expertise to adapt to climate change consequences and explore sustainable energy alternatives more effectively. With the growing global emphasis on climate change, South-South Cooperation has emerged as a crucial tool in addressing these challenges. Targeting promising sectors in agriculture, disaster risk reduction, renewable energy and energy efficiency, forestry, transport, water resources, and waste management (UNOSSC, 2023).

Climate change mitigation involves deliberate efforts to curtail the emission of greenhouse gases, aiming to prevent a drastic rise in global temperatures. This includes adopting cleaner energy sources and sustainable practices. Climate change adaptation focuses on adjusting behaviors and systems to shield communities and ecosystems from the unavoidable impacts of climate change. It involves building resilience through strategies like climate-resilient infrastructure and improved agricultural practices. The synergy between mitigation and adaptation is crucial. By actively reducing emissions, we enhance our ability to adapt to ongoing changes, fostering a more sustainable and resilient future (WWF, n.d.).

The Indo-Pacific, spanning two-thirds of the world's oceans, faces significant climate change impacts. South Asia deals with glacier melting, and the Pacific Islands cope with rising sea levels. Despite economic growth, development challenges persist. These challenges intertwine and intensify security concerns, biodiversity loss, and climate issues. Indonesia is dedicated to advancing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) through collaboration with partners across the Indo-Pacific region, exemplified by its commitment to the ASEAN Outlook in the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). Some Indo-Pacific region countries are among the most susceptible to climate change risks due to their reliance on natural resources, agriculture, densely populated coastal areas, and weak institutions. Among those vulnerable countries within the Indo-Pacific, a large amount is located within the many island nations of the Pacific Ocean (Bower Group Asia, 2023). Underlining Indonesia's commitment to AOIP, one of the commitments includes its efforts to enhance SSC and, in this case, a highly sought sector within the climate change agenda (AOIP, 2019).

A recent performance report by the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggests that the implementation of SSC by the Indonesian government needs to be evaluated to ensure complementarity with Indonesia's grants to foreign governments or institutions. Recognizing this issue, the paper aims to examine the country's current strategies, partnerships, and potential in addressing the pressing challenges posed by climate change within the context of SSC. This paper exclusively focuses on the analysis of SSC administered by Indonesia from 2017 to 2022. The chosen timeframe aligns with the period following Indonesia's submission of its first Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) in 2016, which is within the timeline of Indonesia's President Joko Widodo's term in office. By doing so, the study aims to provide a comprehensive understanding of the nation's role and contributions in the global

effort towards climate resilience, especially in this context towards the Indo-Pacific Region. This paper also provides an overview of the historical development and current state of Indonesia's South-South cooperation on mitigating and adapting to climate change, which is commonly referred to as and, from this point on, will be called Climate Change South-South Cooperation (CCSSC).

Theoretical Framework

As presented by Joseph S. Nye, soft power diplomacy is a theoretical framework that emphasizes the ability to shape and influence others through attraction and co-operation rather than coercion. Soft power diplomacy offers an alternative approach to achieving goals, often called "the second face of power." This concept involves diplomatic abilities to guide national interests toward other countries through non-coercive cooperation indirectly. SSC is integral to fortifying Indonesia's soft power in every conflict resolution. Currently, international relations actors recognize that using hard power as a form of unilateralism only sometimes resolves issues. In practical terms, the SSC exemplifies Indonesia's commitment to employing soft power strategies in its foreign policy, highlighting the importance of collaboration and shared goals in international relations (Nye, 2004).

This paper embraces institutional liberalism theory, a perspective rooted in the broader framework of liberalism in international relations. Institutional liberalism emphasizes the vital role of cooperative arrangements among nations, positing that enduring peace and cooperation can be achieved by establishing and strengthening international institutions. One of the key proponents of this theory is Immanuel Kant, an influential Enlightenment-era philosopher. Kant's ideas, notably articulated in "Perpetual Peace," lay the groundwork for understanding how international institutions, by fostering shared norms and regimes, can contribute to a more harmonious world order. In the context of this paper, institutional liberalism theory serves as a guiding framework to underscore the significance of international organizations and coalitions in collaboratively addressing shared global challenges (Johnson et al., 2018). Recognizing the cooperative potential embedded in institutions and alliances, the paper seeks to amplify the importance of multilateral efforts in tackling issues that transcend national boundaries. This approach aligns with the core principles of institutional liberalism, emphasizing the role of shared norms, rules, and organizations in shaping a more cooperative and stable international system. Ultimately, by drawing on the insights of institutional liberalism, the paper aims to contribute to a nuanced understanding of the cooperative mechanisms essential for addressing contemporary global issues, in this case, climate change.

Indonesia and the Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific region is a geopolitical concept that refers to the vast area encompassing the Indian Ocean, and the western and central Pacific Ocean. This region has gained significant attention in global geopolitics due to its economic, strategic, and po-

litical significance. The term emphasizes the increasing interconnectedness and interdependence of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, recognizing the mutual interests and interactions of the countries within this expansive area. The countries within the Indo-Pacific region vary, and the list may differ slightly based on different perspectives.

Table 1: List of the Indo-Pacific comprises 40 countries and economies

The Indo-Pacific Member Countries			
1	Australia	14	Myanmar
2	Bangladesh	15	Nepal
3	Bhutan	16	New Zealand
4	Brunei	17	The Pacific Island Countries (14 member countries)*
5	Cambodia	18	Pakistan
6	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)	19	People's Republic of China (PRC)
7	India	20	The Philippines
8	Indonesia	21	Republic of Korea ROK
9	Japan	22	Singapore
10	Laos	23	Sri Lanka
11	Malaysia	24	Taiwan
12	Maldives	25	Thailand
13	Mongolia	26	Timor Leste

*Pacific Island member countries include Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru,
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Cook Islands, Niue
Source: Government of Canada (2022)

Active participation by Indo-Pacific nations is vital for effectively addressing global challenges. Progress in addressing climate change and safeguarding biodiversity necessitates the involvement of Indo-Pacific countries, which are recognized for having some of the highest and rapidly escalating greenhouse gas emissions worldwide, responsible for over 50% of the world's carbon dioxide emissions. While Indonesia is also investing in reducing its emissions, the international community argues that the Indo-Pacific must collaborate to go up against this Climate Change issue (International Military Council on Climate and Security, 2020).

The Pacific region remains relatively uncharted territory for Indonesia. Historically, Indonesia's involvement in the area in the mid-1980s primarily revolved around strategic interests aimed at minimizing regional support for independence movements in East Timor (before 2002) and Papua. There has also been tension between Indonesia and other Indo-Pacific countries, which has presented itself as an obstacle to Indonesia and several Pacific Island bilateral relations (Wangge, H, 2023).

At an annual press conference, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs Retno Marsudi emphasized Indonesia's perspective on the Indo-Pacific. She articulated Indonesia's commitment to fostering substantive cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region through the recently adopted ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The minister underscored that the Indo-Pacific should be viewed from a security standpoint and recognized for its significant economic potential.

Due to shared challenges with Pacific nations, especially climate change, sea level rise has become an existential threat for coastal countries such as Indonesia and most Pacific Island countries. Knowledge sharing and practical cooperation on projects to tackle these threats should become key priorities alongside economic and infrastructure cooperation (Darmawan, A, 2022).

However, Indonesia has acknowledged the crucial role Pacific Islands Countries have as a partner, and in recent years, there has been a shift in Indonesia's focus toward the Pacific, with efforts to enhance its presence through channels like development aid, financial grants, technical assistance, high-level visits, and other significant efforts. Although these efforts are seen as a positive development, their effectiveness and contributions still need to catch up in comparison to other newcomers in the region, like India and South Korea, who exhibit a strong commitment to actively engage with the region. Indonesia's high-level diplomatic engagement is currently limited to ministerial meetings (Wangge, H, 2023).

Table 2: Indonesia's grant provision to Countries within the Indo-Pacific Region 2014 to 2022

Year	Types of Assistance	Country	Project Name
2017	Financial Assistance	Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)*	Grant to support MSG operations
2017	Financial Assistance	Fiji	Grant to the Government of Fiji
2018	humanitarian assistance	Papua New Guinea	Grant to the Government of Papua New Guinea (Emergency Response to Earthquake Disaster)
2018	Development Assistance	Fiji	Grant to the Government of Fiji (Hand Tractors)
2019	Infrastructure Development	Tuvalu	Financing for the Development of a Conference Hall
2019	Infrastructure Development	Solomon Islands	Development of Futsal Field and Sports Stadium for the South Pacific Games 2023
2019	Humanitarian assistance / Education Assistance	Fiji	Rehabilitation of Queen Victoria School Phase 1
2020	humanitarian assistance	Fiji	Medical Supplies Assistance in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
2020	Humanitarian assistance / Education Assistance	Fiji	Rehabilitation of Queen Victoria School in Phase 2
2020	humanitarian assistance	Solomon Islands	Medical Supplies Assistance in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
2021	humanitarian assistance	Papua New Guinea	Medical Supplies Assistance in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic
2022	capacity building	Multi beneficiary country** (Papua New Guinea, dan Fiji)	Passenger Assessment Workshop for Asia/Pacific Customs Administrative Officers
2022	humanitarian assistance	Melanesian Spearhead Group (Vanuatu)	The renovation of the VIP building at Port Vila Airport, which was damaged due to Cyclones Judy and Kevin

The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is an intergovernmental organization comprising inter alia Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Indonesia was recognized as an associate member in June 2015.

** *Multi-beneficiary country, comprised of several countries, including Pacific island countries such as Papua New Guinea and Fiji.*

Source: Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan International (Indonesian AID) grant provision report 2014-2022, compiled by Author

From President Joko Widodo's time in office between 2014 to 2022, Indonesia has contributed to 13 assistance projects beginning since 2017, administered through the Indonesian aid programs focused on the Pacific island countries. Mostly within the humanitarian assistance and financial assistance. With a Melanesian population of approximately 13 million, Indonesia was accepted as an Associate Member (AM) during the 20th MSG Leaders' Summit held in Honiara, Solomon Islands, in June 2015 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022).

Compelling national interests in security also drove this obvious focus on the Pacific Island countries. The imperative underscores this priority to address and mitigate regional instability, notably concerning the longstanding issue of Papuan separatism. These SSC activities act as a soft diplomacy approach towards the Pacific island countries with the same Melanesian identities. Through providing foreign aid, the Indonesian government aims to use soft power diplomacy to gradually improve Indonesia's image (Rahmadani, 2022).

1. **The History and Concept of South-South Policy**

Table 3: Timeline and Milestone of SSC

1955: Origin of South-South Cooperation (SSC):	1955-1974: Initial Objectives and Establishing Foundations:
• Bandung Conference where Asian and African nations sought independence and mutual cooperation. • Focus on economic-cultural collaboration without colonial powers.	• Objective: Economic development and political independence. • Emphasis on technical assistance, knowledge exchange, and institutes establishment. • Formation of key international organizations (UN, World Bank, IMF).
2000: Shift Towards Poverty Reduction:	Post-2008: Emergence of New Actors and Donors:
• Aligned with the UN Millennium Declaration. • Gradual shift towards poverty reduction.	• Response to the global economic crisis. • Middle-income countries sharing technology and knowledge.

1974: Formal Recognition by the UN:	1978: Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA):
• Establishment of a special unit for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC).	• Adopted during the first UN Conference on TCDC. • Emphasis on economic cooperation through technology transfer and knowledge-sharing.
New Development Institutions (Post-2008):	2015: Adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development:
• Establishment of the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. • Alternative avenues for development funding and cooperation.	• Recognition of South-South Cooperation alongside official development assistance (ODA). • Crucial for achieving Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). • Key approach in international development cooperation.

Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (2021)

In short, as per the operational guidelines outlined in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) regarding support for South-South and Triangular Cooperation, South-South Cooperation is defined as a collaborative process where two or more developing countries pursue their respective or joint national capacity development goals through the exchange of knowledge, skills, resources, and technical expertise. This involves regional and interregional collective actions, including partnerships encompassing governments, regional organizations, civil society, academia, and the private sector. The aim is to derive individual and mutual benefits within and across regions. It is essential to note that South-South Cooperation is intended to complement, rather than substitute, North-South cooperation. Alongside that, in the realm of development cooperation, South-South Cooperation is anticipated

to serve as a valuable approach, functioning as one of the tools to restore conditions and contribute to accomplishing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) for 2030, emphasizing the principle of building back better (UN/SSC/19/3, 2016).

Unfortunately, the implementation of SSC still faces challenges, such as:

a. **Outside influences**. SSC risks mirroring the issues of traditional cooperation; the current geopolitical landscape raises concerns about SSC being influenced by powerful nations, jeopardizing its uniqueness and potential benefits for developing countries (The Reality of Aid Network, 2023).

b. **Transparency and accountability in SSC spaces.** Ensuring transparency and accountability in SSC projects is challenging due to scattered activities and a need for an overarching institutional structure. Efforts like Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD), an initiative by OECD, aim to track and collect data on the project flow, but challenges persist within these spaces (TOSSD Secretariat, 2022).

c. **Civil society engagement in SSC is limited,** with insufficient consultation on ground-level project implementation. Challenges include a lack of trust, inadequate information systems, and SSC's state-centric approach (Moilwa, 2015).

d. **Lack of clear analysis and measurement.** Creating comprehensive implementation reports for SSC is challenging due to the need for robust information management systems among many Southern providers. Making a targeted program that truly addresses development needs in the Global South (CPDE Working Group on South-South Cooperation, 2019).

To enhance the efficacy of SSC projects, transparency should be ensured throughout the entire process, and a thorough project review should be made feasible. This review enables the administering countries to refine their projects with a more targeted approach, ultimately improving outcomes. Additionally, transparency facilitates assessing potential opportunities for broader collaborations among participating countries.

Figure 1: Percentages of South-South Cooperation Resources Allocated by Sustainable Development Goals 2019 to 2021

Source: Total Official Support for Sustainable Development Data Visualization Tool (2021)

This report draws insights from over 4,500 SSC activities. The highest project allocation is aligned with SDG goal number 13, focusing on combating climate change and its impacts, followed by goal number 15, which emphasizes ecosystem protection, restoration, and enhancement. Conversely, the lowest allocations are observed in SDGs goal number 3 for good health and well-being and goal number 16 for peace, justice, and stronger institutions. It is worth noting that many projects could not be specifically categorized under a particular SDG goal due to report inconsistencies.

2. Indonesia South-to-South Policy

To bolster its standing and impact in global alliances, Indonesia strategically positions itself as a significant participant in SSTC (South-South and Triangular Cooperation). This stance is underpinned by three primary factors: historical, political, and economic contexts. For over forty years, Indonesia has been actively engaging in SSTC to support the development of other nations, aiming to establish a global order based on freedom, lasting peace, and social justice. Since the 1955 Asian-African Conference, Indonesia has actively participated in international cooperation, notably contributing to the Bandung Communiqué. This Communiqué categorized the South as developing and the North as developed, fostering collaboration among Southern nations. Positioned as a middle-income nation and an emerging economy alongside Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand, Indonesia plays a dual role as a recipient of aid from traditional donors and a provider of foreign assistance to other developing nations. (National Coordination Team of South-South Cooperation, 2014) In alignment with global initiatives such as the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness, the Accra Agenda for Action, and the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, Indonesia strives to enhance the quality and effectiveness of its foreign aid policies.

The increasing demand for Indonesia's foreign assistance has prompted ongoing improvements in its operations and development efforts. Over the past two decades, Indonesia has made substantial contributions through over 1,000 programs involving over 13,000 participants. (Foreign Policy Strategy Agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, 2022).

The Indonesian government's target areas encompass Asia, the Pacific, Africa, the Middle East, South America, the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe. The SSC projects encompass a wide range of activities; according to the Center for Policy Analysis and Development for Multilateral Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, these include training programs, knowledge transfer initiatives, internships, expert exchanges, infrastructure development, agriculture, maritime fisheries, energy, democracy promotion, good governance, disaster risk management, and the empowerment of women (Rahmanto, 2021). To support those activities, the Indonesian government so far has established several efforts to strengthen SSC Implementation in Indonesia according to the Directorate of

International Development Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (Faizasyah, T, 2021), those efforts include :

1. Strengthening cornerstone institutions for international development cooperation.
2. The role of multi-stakeholders.
3. Increase promotion and profiling of South-South Policy in Indonesia.
4. Improving the mechanism for implementing aid programs.
5. Expansion of the public-private partnership network.
6. Utilization of IT and database improvement.

Through the efforts undertaken by the Indonesian government to strengthen the South-South Cooperation (SSC) agenda, several crucial elements have been identified as instrumental for the smooth progression of SSC projects. Profiling Indonesia on international and domestic fronts is highly important, showcasing the nation's commitment to fostering well-being. Technological advancements and IT progress are also considered pivotal for the Indonesian government, recognizing that disparities in technological capabilities can impact all sectors. Indonesia aims to bridge the gap and maximize its technological proficiency, understanding that a country's technological lag could significantly affect opportunities to eradicate poverty.

The Indonesian government actively pursues the expansion of public-private partnerships, acknowledging potential limitations in governmental capacity. In this context, the involvement of private sector companies becomes paramount for implementing and developing the SSC agenda. For instance, companies allocating Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds can collaborate to uplift other developing nations, contributing to the realization of shared goals (Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik – Universitas Indonesia, 2021).

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which had a pivotal role in implementing these agendas, the implementation of SSC was also faced with obstacles. Prioritization of infrastructure development in Indonesia was briefly diverted several years ago due to the urgent demands posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, the country momentarily shifted its focus within the SSC, particularly emphasizing the health and disaster management pillar, and it had to allocate its attention to domestic demands.

Another significant challenge during this period was the need for more awareness among individuals, institutions, and key stakeholders. Many questioned the necessity of extending assistance to other developing nations, given Indonesia's ongoing development challenges and its pressing issues. However, it is crucial to recognize that aiding other developing countries aligns with Indonesia's constitutional mandate and is a cause worth championing. This commitment is ingrained in the essence of SSC, with Indonesia playing a pivotal role in its establishment. As a key contributor to the creation of the SSC, Indonesia should be the forerunner in putting the SSC agenda forward.

To facilitate and oversee the design, execution, and assessment of SSTC initiatives, the Indonesian government formed the National Coordination Team of SSTC (NCT of SSTC) in 2010. This entity comprises four key Ministries: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of National Development Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of State Secretariat. Up to this point, Indonesia's SSTC endeavors have primarily involved extending aid in various forms, such as project assistance, provision of equipment, internship programs, hosting seminars and workshops, facilitating study visits, offering training sessions, and deploying experts to assist and foster growth in developing nations (National Coordination Team of South-South Cooperation, 2016).

Indonesia is actively fulfilling its commitment to bolster hands-on diplomacy and address growing requests for aid from developing countries. This led to the establishment of the International Development Cooperation Fund Institute (LDKPI). In the beginning, Indonesia played a prominent role in global development partnerships, as seen in initiatives like the Asian-African Conference (AAC) and involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), actively supporting the advancement of developing nations. Additionally, in line with its constitution, Indonesia is dedicated to maintaining an engaged and equitable foreign policy to contribute to a global order grounded in principles of freedom, enduring peace, and social justice.

Table 4: SSC Mechanism in Indonesia

Actor (Who)	Issues (What)	Location (Where)	Time (When)	Commitment (Why)	Implementation (How)	Funding
1. Recipient Country 2. Implementing Agency 3. Development Partners	1. Leading Sectors 2. Form of Assistance /Cooperation Program	1. Centers of Excellence 2. Strategic Location/ Center of Community Activities	1. Duration 2. Period/Single/Multi years)	1. Bilateral 2. Regional 3. Multilateral	1. Experts 2. Activity Materials 3. Translator 4. Coordinator and Consultation	1. LDKPI* 2. DIPA/KL** 3. Development Partners and Other Funding Sources

*LDKPI: Lembaga Dana Kerja Sama Pembangunan Internasional / International Development Cooperation Fund (IDCF), commonly called the Agency for International Development Cooperation Fund.

**DIPA: Daftar Isian Pelaksana Anggaran / Budget Implementation List

Source: Center for the Study of Multilateral Policy Implementation, Agency for Foreign Affairs Research and Development (BPPK) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia (2021)

The planning phase of the South-South Cooperation (SSC) program begins with prioritizing and mapping the recipient countries and formulating program documents such as the Country Partnership Strategy and Regional Partnership Strategy. Indonesia identifies the key stakeholders, recipient countries, implementing agencies, and potential partners in this stage. The determination of themes is guided by the concept of being demand-driven, focusing on requests for assistance from the recipients. However, these demands undergo re-evaluation and analysis to prioritize programs based on Indonesia's capacities and strategic sector mapping.

SSC is also viewed as a diplomatic tool, with programs often initiated by the Indonesian government based on its role and interests of Indonesia in the international

arena. This influence affects the choice of bilateral, regional, or multilateral cooperation. Funding for SSC programs is sourced from LDKPI and DIPA of ministries and institutions, often leveraging support from development partners invested in Indonesia's development. Indonesia frequently receives collaboration from organizations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the German Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and other strategic partners.

**Table 5: Indonesia's Significant Increase in their RPJMN Funding**

*RPJMN Period	international development cooperation activities focusing on SSTC	Total funding for international development cooperation activities, including SSTC (Rp billion)
2010~2014	Strengthen coordination within the institutional framework	N/A
2015~2019	Increased Indonesian Leadership and contribution to South-South Cooperation	112
2020~2024	Optimizing international development cooperation to encourage quality economic growth	190

RPJMN (Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional), or Indonesia's periodical National Medium Development Plan, details national development strategies, policies, and key projects, including a macroeconomic framework and covers intra- and inter-ministerial programs, regional initiatives, and funding structures for 5 (five) years
Source: Indonesia's periodical National Medium-Term Development Plan 2020-2024, compiled by Author

Indonesia's commitment to SSC is depicted within the Asia-Africa Conference, G20, and SDGs commitment and further implemented in Indonesia's periodical National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN). Under RPJMN, Indonesia is committed to optimizing foreign policy with four important aspects in mind, and within the second clause, it was stated that the Indonesian government realized that their effort in handling non-traditional markets in most South-South countries has yet to be optimal. For this reason, they deemed that Indonesia must strengthen their international development cooperation by optimizing South-South and Triangular Cooperation to support trade and investment.

Figure 2: Indonesia's SSC Roadmap

Source: UNDP Indonesia-Brief South-South and Triangular Cooperation in Indonesia (2015)

Indonesia has established a comprehensive framework that outlines the trajectory of its work and implementation goals up to the year 2050 within the context of South-South Cooperation and Triangular Cooperation. This framework reflects Indonesia's commitment to fostering collaboration with other developing nations and leveraging partner-

ships with more experienced countries or intermediary organizations. The long-term goals set for South-South and Triangular Cooperation underscore Indonesia's dedication to building enduring partnerships, sharing expertise, and collectively addressing global challenges. This forward-looking approach positions Indonesia as a proactive contributor to international development and cooperation initiatives.

3. South-to-South Cooperation and Climate Change

Another pressing domain where the potential of South-South Cooperation needs to be harnessed is in the pursuit of climate action. Developing nations are disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change. Through South-South Cooperations, countries are collaboratively leveraging resources and expertise to enhance their collective ability to adapt to the challenges (UN, 2023). Technologies originating in developing nations are often better suited and cost-effective for other developing countries due to their alignment with similar climatic, cultural, or socio-economic conditions. Therefore, South-South Cooperation is becoming an increasingly important international dimension in addressing climate change (IISD, 2018).

The United Nations has been instrumental in advancing South-South Cooperation in addressing climate change's mitigation and adaptation aspects. With the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, countries have been trying to find ways to contribute towards the Net Zero or simply a greener state of the earth. The Paris Agreement is a global treaty addressing climate change by limiting the rise in global temperature. Each participating country must create a National Determined Contributions (NDC); according to the UN's explanation, NDC is a country's plan to reduce emissions and deal with climate change effects. Parties to the Paris Agreement must create and update their NDCs every five years.

A case study from UNFCCC showcased diverse South-South Cooperation (SSC) approaches for climate action. These included sharing best practices through field trips and workshops and implementing low-emission infrastructure projects, varying in scale from small to large. This study highlighted that in developing countries NDCs, NDCs outlined their goals, strategies, and actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, with some also including adaptation and economic diversification plans. Many of these countries prioritize adaptation actions due to the adverse impacts of climate change. Notably, despite unique national circumstances, these countries often share similar development priorities related to climate action, which align with the SDGs. Several Parties emphasized the use of South-South, Triangular, or Regional Cooperation as a means of support for NDC implementation. This includes addressing specific needs such as financial assistance, capacity-building, and technology development and transfer.

The NDCs highlight the need for financial, technical, and capacity-building support in implementing climate action for develop-

ing countries. Many of these countries, including South-South Cooperation countries, are increasingly interested in collaboration to align with their NDCs. This cooperation may focus on various areas such as sustainable energy, low-carbon agriculture, biofuels, forest monitoring, restoration activities, and sustainable transport. They refer to past projects within these fields, such as projects aiming to increase climate resilience in agriculture due to developing countries being predominantly economically agricultural, water security, and transition to future mobilities commonly seen within emerging projects. Strengthened cooperation and alliances between nations provide a valuable pathway for enhancing the capacity to devise and execute collective development strategies. Such strategies are increasingly crucial in the current era of implementing international treaties.

A good starting point for such cooperation could be the priority areas outlined in the NDCs of these countries. Countries could adjust the target of projects by the intended enhancement of NDCs in each target donor country. Based on the United Nations Climate Change Secretariat (UNCCS) analysis, only some situations are spatial. Nevertheless, an examination of NDCs reveals that numerous developing nations face comparable requirements and limitations regarding finance, capacity-building, and technology for climate adaptation and mitigation. Therefore, these two parts of mitigation and adaptation are deemed crucial; those sides include:

a. Mitigation

In many developing countries, NDCs cover a range of greenhouse gases and align with the main emission categories, including energy, industrial processes, agriculture, forestry, and waste. The most prioritized sectors with mitigation actions in these NDCs are energy, transport, waste, land-use change, forestry (LULUCF), agriculture, industries, and buildings, as illustrated in Figure 1. Subsequent sections will focus on the top five prioritized sectors.

Figure 3: Sectors in which developing countries intend to reduce greenhouse gas emissions as presented in NDCs

Source: United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2017)

In response to growing energy needs, developing countries, as noted by UNFCCC research, emphasize the economic viability and increasing demand for renewable energy technologies. Governments aim to diversify their renewable energy portfolios, including solar, wind, biomass, hydro, geothermal, and ocean energy, to ensure stability in the supply chain and avoid energy crises. Con-

currently, efforts focus on enhancing energy efficiency across power generation, transmission, and distribution. Within their NDCs, many countries prioritize land use, forestry, and waste sector emissions reduction strategies, promoting sustainable practices and mitigating climate change impacts. Specific actions, such as REDD-plus initiatives and waste-to-energy projects, are outlined. Agriculture, vital yet vulnerable, sees a dual approach in NDCs, emphasizing adaptation measures and improved farming practices for efficiency and emissions reduction (IMF, 2022).

b. Adaptation

According to the UNFCCC, most countries have integrated adaptation components into NDCs. Some nations highlighted adaptation as their primary focus, emphasizing its integral connection to national development, sustainability, and security. Considering their national circumstances, developing countries primarily identified concerns of flooding, drought, higher temperatures, sea level rise, and storms in their NDCs. These challenges impact various sectors, with water, agriculture, health, ecosystems, and infrastructure consistently recognized as priority areas for action. Most adaptation measures align closely with overarching development objectives, including poverty eradication, economic development, improved living standards, environmental sustainability, security, and human rights.

Figure 4: Sectors adaptation actions referred to in developing their countries INDCs

Source: United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2017)

Adaptation strategies in agriculture, as outlined by 108 developing countries in their NDCs, vary based on agricultural systems, locations, and climate change scenarios. These nations emphasize the importance of adapting agriculture to ensure food security, improve farmers' livelihoods, and enhance environmental services. Planned actions include sustainable agriculture, improved land management, enhanced irrigation systems, and adopting climate-resilient crops and livestock breeds. Integrated pest management, access to medicine and veterinary services, and incorporating traditional knowledge are also highlighted. Additionally, these countries prioritize infrastructure resilience as a key adaptation measure, acknowledging the vulnerability of infrastructure to climate impacts. Strategies include risk assessments, hazard maps, building codes, infrastructure protection measures, and contingency plans, with some NDCs featuring insurance

schemes to incentivize climate-proof construction.

c. Previous SSC related to Climate Change Efforts

Beyond direct South-South Cooperation (SSC), various countries have collaborated with multilateral organizations to advance efforts in addressing climate change. China, for instance, partnered with the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to successfully implement a Climate Change South-South Cooperation (CCSSC) initiative in Mongolia. This project focused on enhancing farmers' resilience to climate change by introducing innovative technologies, including solar-powered greenhouse cultivation. Additionally, China has undertaken climate change adaptation benefits projects in Ethiopia, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone (UNDP in China, n.d.).

4. Indonesia's SSC related to Climate Action Agenda

With a history of active participation in various global initiatives focused on South-South Cooperation (SSC) and currently holding an upper-middle-income country status, Indonesia aims to advance global collaboration among southern nations. Simultaneously, the country seeks to strengthen cooperation with Northern countries, propelling both forms of collaboration to a higher level. As part of the commitment made during the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of the Parties 21 (COP 21) held

in 2019, on a global scale, Indonesia is dedicated to persistently encouraging developed nations to play a more active role in addressing climate change. This commitment goes beyond merely reducing emissions; it focuses on providing funding for predictable and escalating initiatives in mitigation and adaptation to climate change in developing countries. Indonesia aims to foster the exchange of best practices and encourage South-South cooperation in climate change mitigation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, 2019).

As an illustration, Southern cooperation on climate technologies has occurred, involving partnerships such as Cuba and the Caribbean Islands, Samoa and China, and India collaborating with Indonesia and South Africa (UNFCCC and UNOSSC, 2018). Another example is that Indonesia has actively pursued SSC, focusing on the Pacific Islands countries, providing technical assistance to address challenges related to extreme weather and climate threats. Under this framework, various programs, particularly in disaster risk reduction, have been executed. Notably, between 2014 and 2017, Indonesia conducted 41 training sessions for Fiji as part of the technical cooperation framework. From July to August 2017, a training program on the National Multi-Hazards Early Warning System, emphasizing Geospatial Applications for Disaster Risk Reduction and Sustainable Development, involved participants from six Pacific countries.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Technical Cooperation was crucial in disaster risk reduction programs.

Indonesia facilitated an International Workshop on Enhancing South-South Cooperation on Disaster Risk Management, which included representatives from Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The workshop aimed to exchange ideas and promote collaboration by sharing Indonesia's expertise in disaster risk management and climate change adaptation. Additionally, the International Workshop on Disaster Risk Management focused on Strategic Planning for South-South Cooperation, formulating the SSC for Disaster Risk Reduction Strategic Plan for 2009-2011. These efforts highlight Indonesia's commitment to fostering regional cooperation and building disaster resilience capacity in the Pacific region.

5. Possible Framework for Indonesia's CCSSC within the Indo-Pacific

a. Possible Key Areas of Expertise for Indonesia to Prioritize as the Focus for CCSSC Target

Indonesia's initial NDC, submitted in 2016, targets an emission reduction of 29% conditional and 41% unconditional with international assistance. With international assistance, Indonesia submitted another NDC and raised its target to 31.89% and 43,20%. This adjustment was based on the 26th United Nations Climate Change Conference COP-26 in 2022. The Enhanced NDC document includes revisions to diverse national policies addressing climate change, aligning with the directive from the COP-26 decision last year. This decision urged each country to elevate their NDC targets, aiming to curb the global temperature increase to no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius (Triferna, P, 2022).

Climate change presents significant risks for Indonesia's natural resources that will, in turn, impact food, water, and energy production and distribution. Therefore, the Indonesian government considers climate adaptation and mitigation efforts an integrated concept essential for building resilience in safeguarding food, water, and energy resources. The Indonesian government has made significant efforts towards developing and implementing a National Action Plan on Climate Change Adaptation, which provides a framework for adaptation initiatives that have been mainstreamed into the National Development Plan.

These core missions are consistent with the national commitment towards a low-carbon and climate-resilient development path, in which climate change adaptation and mitigation constitute an integrated and cross-cutting priority of the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN). Indonesia's newest NDC focused on the mitigation target for forest and land use and energy sectors, which account for about 97% of the total commitment. Based on the 2020 newly submitted NDCs, Indonesia's mitigation focus is to reduce risks, enhance adaptive capacity, strengthen resilience, and reduce vulnerability to climate change in all development sectors, such as:

Table 6: Indonesia's NDC Mitigation Commitment

Sector	Key Program
Forestry	Ambitious targets for peat land restoration (2 million ha) and degraded land (12 million ha) rehabilitation by 2030.
	Implementation of REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) National Strategy to achieve NDC targets and FOLU (Forestry and Other Land Use) Net-Sink 2030.
	Submission of Forest Reference Emission Level (FREL) to UNFCCC, with improvements in the 2nd FREL currently under assessment.
Energy	Development of clean energy sources as a national policy directive.
	Government Regulation (No. 79/2014) on National Energy Policy sets targets for the primary energy supply mix by 2025 and 2050, including promoting new and renewable energy.
	Presidential Regulation (No. 22/2017) on National Energy Grand Plan with a target of 23% New Renewable Energy (NRE) in the national energy mix by 2025
	Fossil fuel subsidy reform policy to create fiscal space for renewable energy projects.
	National mandatory biodiesel policy, starting with B20 (20% biodiesel) in 2015 and enhanced to B30 (30% biodiesel) in 2020
	Targeting 100% utilization of biodiesel B-40 in 2030.
Sustainable Mobility	Implementation of the Battery Electric Vehicle Program for Road Transportation (Presidential Decree No 55/2019).
	Mandate for the development and standards of Battery Electric Vehicles (BEV), aiming for 750,000 units of 4-wheel BEV and 2,450,000 units of 2-wheel BEV by 2030.
Waste Management	A comprehensive waste management strategy includes policy and institutional capacity improvement, landfill waste reduction, and waste utilization for energy production.
	Commitment to reduce emissions from the waste management sector through policy development, institutional strengthening, financial mechanisms, technology innovation, and socio-cultural approaches.
	Presidential Decree (No. 97/2017) on National Policy and Strategy on Solid Waste Management and Presidential Regulation (No. 35/2018) on Acceleration of Construction of Thermal Generation Facilities for Converting Waste into Electricity Energy with Environmental Sound Technology.
	Mitigation actions in industrial solid waste handling include composting, reusing raw materials, and using energy.
	implementation of wastewater treatment in various industries, such as palm oil, pulp and paper, fruits/vegetables, and juices processing, with a focus on methane capture and utilization (biogas)

Source: Indonesia Enhanced NDC (2020)

Climate change substantially risks Indonesia's natural resources, impacting food, water, and energy production and distribution. With a growing population, the strain on already limited resources intensifies. Vulnerable populations, especially those below the poverty line, bear the brunt of climate change-induced natural disasters, hindering asset accumulation and driving them deeper into poverty. The resulting socio-economic disparity may contribute to political instability in regions most affected by climate change. Recognizing the importance of environmental services, Indonesia emphasizes its adaptation efforts, focusing on economic resilience, social and livelihood resilience, and ecosystems and landscape resilience while focusing on priority fields such as food, water, energy, health, and ecosystems through programs such as:

Table 7: Indonesia's NDC Adaptation Commitment

Focus	Key program	Sector
Economic Resilience	Sustainable agriculture and plantation	food & Ecosystem
	Integrated watershed management	water & Ecosystem
	Reduction of deforestation and forest degradation	Ecosystem
	Land Conservation	Water & Ecosystem
	Utilization of degraded land for renewable energy	Energy & Ecosystem
	improved energy efficiency and consumption pattern	Energy
Social and livelihood resilience	Enhancement of adaptive capacity	Disaster
	Development of community capacity and participation in local planning processes to secure access to key natural resources;	Ecosystem & Disaster
	Ramping up disaster preparedness programs for natural disaster risk reduction	Disaster
	Identification of highly vulnerable areas in local spatial and land use planning efforts	Ecosystem & Disaster
	Improvement of human settlement, provision of basic services, and climate-resilient infrastructure development	Health, Ecosystems, Disaster, Water
	Conflict prevention and resolution	Disaster
Ecosystem and Landscape Resilience	Social Forestry	Ecosystem
	Coastal zone protection	Ecosystem, Disaster

Ecosystem conservation and restoration	Ecosystem, Water	
Integrated watershed management	Water, Ecosystem, Disaster	
Climate resilient cities	Ecosystem, disaster, energy	

Source: Indonesia enhanced NDC (2020)

Table 8: Indonesia's NDC achievement rank

Category	Score	Rank	Overall Rating
GHG Emissions (40% weighting)	20.97	38	Low
Renewable Energy (20% weighting)	11.09	12	High
Energy Use (20% weighting)	13.16	29	Medium
Climate Policy (20% weighting	9.37	27	Medium
Overall Rating	54.59		

Source: Climate Change Performance Index (2023)

Indonesia earns a high score in the Renewable Energy category, medium in Energy Use and Climate Policy, and low in GHG Emissions. Indonesia aims to diversify its electricity demand by enhancing its renewable energy presence. It stipulates that by 2025, Renewable energy shall make up 23% of the primary energy mix, up from 8% today. The policy focuses on hydro and geothermal resources, with solar and wind power already taking their course. With the growing investment from countries such as China, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia is slowly building its capacity within the renewables

sector. Moreover, a new forestry and other land use target aims to achieve net carbon sequestration through the forestry and land use sector by 2030.

Indonesia has also been advancing within the electric vehicle transition agenda. Indonesia is positioning itself as a crucial player in the electric vehicle (EV) sector, aiming to become a central hub within the EV supply chain. As the largest automotive market in Southeast Asia and the second-largest production center in the region, surpassed only by Thailand, the country recognizes the strategic importance of capitalizing on its automotive industry prowess. With a strong focus on becoming an influential player in the EV market, Indonesia is likely to leverage its existing automotive infrastructure and manufacturing capabilities. This strategic move aligns with the global trend toward sustainable transportation and underscores Indonesia's aspiration to play a significant role in shaping the future of the EV industry. As Indonesia strives to enhance its position within the EV supply chain, this commitment is anticipated to stimulate both domestic and international interest and investment in Indonesia's evolving electric vehicle sector (ASEAN Briefing, 2023).

b. Possible Key Areas to focus on CCSSC based on target countries NDC targets

Table 9: Pacific Ocean's NDC Target Summary

No	Countries	Source of Funding	Mitigation	Adaptation
1	Papua New Guinea	100% dependent on external funding.	- Reduce emissions from electricity generation - 100% renewable energy by 2030, contingent on funding made available - By 2030, reduction in annual emissions from deforestation of 10,000 gigatons CO2 equivalent compared to 2015	- Agriculture - Health - Transport - Infrastructure
2	Republic of Fiji	1/3 Internal 2/3 external	- Reduce emissions from electricity generation (30 percent) and transport (40 percent) by 2030	- Agriculture Infrastructure - Health - Land and marine ecosystems
3	Solomon Island	International assistance is needed to accelerate the transition	-Reduce emissions by 14 percent (by 2025) and 33 percent (by 2030). With appropriate international assistance, emissions can be reduced by more than 50% by 2050	-Disaster Management -Information Management -Land and Mariner Ecosystems - Waste Management -Infrastructure -Tourism
4	Republic of Vanuatu	The proposed interventions would need substantial external funding of around US$180 million to proceed when needed. In addition, substantial technology transfer would be required, including institutional support and training.	- Transition to nearly 100 percent renewable energy in the electricity sector by 2030 - By 2030, improvement of efficiency (10 percent) in the transport sector (land and marine)	- Agriculture - Water resources - Disaster management (L&D)
5	Kiribati	Heavily dependent on external funding	- Reduce emissions by 13.7 percent by 2025 from energy generation - Planting mangroves to act as carbon sinks	- Agriculture - Governance - Infrastructure - Health - Land and marine ecosystems - Education - Disaster management
6	Republic of Marshall Islands	N/A	- 45 Percent reduction in emissions from transport by 2030 - 40 percent reduction in emissions from shipping by 2030	National Adaptation Plan (NAP) to be published
7	Samoa	The target is conditional on Samoa receiving external assistance to maintain the contribution of renewable sources at 100% through 2025. Assistance required to reach this target includes human, technological, and financial resources.	- Reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the energy sector by 30 percent in 2030 - Reduce GHG emissions in the waste sector by 4 percent in 2030 - Reduce GHG emissions in agriculture, forestry, and other land use by 26 percent in 2030	-Land and Marine Ecosystems
8	Tonga	Highly Dependent on International assistance	- Reduce emissions from the energy sector by 13 percent by 2030	- Agriculture - Land and marine ecosystems - Coastal habitats and fisheries

Source: USAID Climate Risk Analysis for Pacific Island Countries (2022) & Regional Pacific NDC Hub (2023), compiled by Author

Many countries depend heavily on international assistance as they strive to achieve their NDC targets in the global effort to combat climate change. This dependence is especially pronounced in their mitigation endeavors, where a significant emphasis is placed on addressing urgent challenges within the energy sector, specifically electricity, and transportation. These nations recognize the critical role that international support plays in helping them transition to sustainable and low-carbon energy systems, which is essential for meeting their NDC goals. Many of these countries concentrate their efforts on the agriculture and forestry sectors within the adaptation domain. Acknowledging these sectors' vulnerability to climate change impacts, there is a shared recognition of the need for international assistance to implement adaptive strategies.

The anticipated assistance goes beyond financial support and extends to crucial aspects such as technical assistance, technology transfer, institutional support, and training. The interconnected nature of these dependencies underscores the collaborative approach required to comprehensively address climate change challenges and successfully meet the ambitious targets outlined in their NDCs. Acknowledging their reliance on external support reflects a shared commitment to a collective and cooperative approach in the face of a global environmental crisis. Indonesia and the Pacific Islands share many similarities, such as archipelagic geography, rich marine biodiversity, and reliance on agriculture, all considered vulnerable to climate change; joining hands could create more.

Drawing upon Indonesia's NDCs and its commendable achievements to date, and aligning them with the NDC targets of Pacific Island countries, Indonesia stands as a guiding beacon for the future development of climate change efforts in areas such as:

Mitigation Focus
- **Energy Transition**
  The Pacific Islands need more domestic fossil fuel supplies, resulting in approximately 80% of the region's energy being imported in 2017, mainly diesel (Pacific Community, 2021). Establishing new renewable energy alternatives is crucial to address this dependency and diversify energy sources. Indonesia is a model for advocating for energy transition and

enhancing related policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions successfully. The transition towards cleaner energy sources is evident in various initiatives, including the mainstreaming of co-firing for coal plants, the widespread adoption of solar panels and New and Renewable Energies (NREs), the dieselization of PLTD (Power Plant with Diesel Fuel), and the implementation of smart grids. These efforts collectively signify a strategic move towards more environmentally friendly and efficient power generation methods (International Energy Agency, 2022). Reinforcing this commitment are established regulations, such as Presidential Regulation No. 112/2022 on Acceleration of the Development of Renewable Energy for the Supply of Electrical Power underscores the government's determination to accelerate the development of renewable energy for electricity provision, marking a significant step in the ongoing energy transition. This transition aligns with environmental goals and opens avenues for potential investments, stimulates new businesses, and increases revenue through reduced reliance on imported fuels within the energy sector (PWC Indonesia, 2023).

- **Future Mobility**
  Indonesia is actively pursuing its green mobility and energy transition goals, focusing on the shift to electric

vehicles (EVs). The government offers incentives, allocates funds for EV support, and sets ambitious EV infrastructure and down-streaming targets. Highlighting how this transition is an evolving market that presents lucrative opportunities, fostering innovation and economic growth through generating revenue for startups and attracting investments (Cyrill, 2023). Considering that Indonesia and Pacific Island countries share similar archipelagic layouts, focusing on spreading EV infrastructures and public transportation could be a valuable guide.

Adaptation Focus

- **Climate Resilient Infrastructure**

    Pacific Island countries include some countries that are highly prone to natural disasters; due to the exacerbation of climate change, the effects of that natural disaster are bound to worsen. Rising sea levels and strong wave action contribute to significant coastal erosion, one situation exacerbated by climate change. Coastal areas are exposed to permanent inundation, high tides, and land subsidence, affecting settlements, rice fields, ponds, and harbors/airports. Water resources are also put at risk through the potential salinization of coastal surface and groundwater resources. Sea-level rise is also a major threat to other forms of natural disasters, particularly cyclones, as it exacerbates impacts.

Indonesia's assistance to several Pacific islands ranging from 2017-2022 was diversified, but a large portion of it was focused on humanitarian assistance in rehabilitating infrastructure. Indonesia could navigate projects toward technological exchange by creating more resilient infrastructure that could withstand the impacts of natural disasters to some degree.

- **Agriculture and Food Security**

    Indonesia has recognized the importance of the agriculture industries to countries in the Pacific island and has previously given a grant in the form of a hand tractor to Fiji. Indonesia should further emphasize this importance by focusing on climate-smart agriculture.

Summary

1. **Regarding frameworks, and national strategies that Indonesia has implemented towards the Indo-Pacific to address climate action within the context of South-South Cooperation**

Country Priority & National Interest: The strategic focus on Asia, particularly the South Pacific region, remains a top priority for Indonesia, driven by compelling national interests. From the security side, this priority is underscored by the imperative to address and mitigate instability within the region, notably concerning the longstanding issue of Papuan

separatism. The South Pacific holds significance in this context as it is recognized as a supporter of the Papuan separatist movement, making diplomatic engagement and influence in the region crucial for Indonesia's national stability. Demographically, the South Pacific region holds added importance due to the presence of several ethnicities from Eastern Indonesia, creating cultural and historical ties that further underscore the interconnectedness between Indonesia and the South Pacific.

This demographic connection enhances Indonesia's interest in fostering diplomatic, economic, and social ties within the region, recognizing the potential for shared perspectives and collaborative initiatives. Utilizing soft diplomacy through their grant activities, the Indonesian government aims to create a better image of Indonesia.

Climate Action: Additionally, Climate change threatens national security, economy, and well-being, impacting agriculture, water resources, and infrastructure which is also another National Interest for both countries. Indonesia has made Climate Change one of its priorities, cementing it within its National Development plans and realizing it through its development strategy, general policies, and strategic priority projects. Indonesia is committed to achieving its NDCs.

It is seen in their recent advancement in transitioning to renewable energy, exemplified by its rapid electric vehicle and infrastructure improvement. Pacific island countries with similar geographical ties showcased how Indonesia could assist with its climate adaptation efforts. This consideration presents a promising avenue for future collaboration through CCSSC.

However, on a larger scale, CCSSC usually stays within the technological exchange; this kind of project would significantly need more funding than other projects.

This obstacle led the Indonesian government to opt for utilizing SSTC instead of seeking funding and additional expertise from the North. Therefore, to diversify future projects, funding schemes should be explored to support each project's enhancement and scale, whether it be from domestic private sectors, other countries' development agencies, multilateral development financing institutions, or any other International organizations.

2. **Regarding opportunities that exist for Indonesia to further enhance its role and impact in the field of South-South Cooperation for climate adaptation and mitigation**

Indonesia should prioritize regional priorities and multi-year projects based on each targeted country's

NDCs and enhance multi-stakeholder roles. Indonesia has made Climate Change one of its priorities, cementing it within its National Development plans and realizing it through its development strategy, general policies, and priority projects. Indonesia is committed to achieving its NDCs. It is seen in their recent advancement in transitioning to renewable energy, exemplified by its rapid electric vehicle and climate-resilient infrastructure improvement.

Indonesia's development of several technologies crucial for climate change mitigation has been off the charts, namely in renewable energy transition and future mobility, such as EVs and infrastructure. Pacific island countries with similar geographical ties showcased how Indonesia could assist with its climate adaptation efforts. This consideration presents a promising avenue for future collaboration through South-South Cooperation. By leveraging previous experiences and expertise, Indonesia has become a valuable source of knowledge for other nations seeking to embark on similar paths.

Through CCSSC, Indonesia has the potential to share valuable insights, best practices, and technological innovations, fostering a collaborative environment where countries in the Global South can collectively work towards achieving their climate change goals. Indonesia could match this expertise with other countries' ongoing NDCs to, develop more lucrative and beneficial projects in the future

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"*Where are the women*?"

This question arises from Cynthia Enloe concerning the contribution of women in global politics (Enloe, 2014). This is also the main idea behind the book, which is an edited volume from a workshop of Women in International Security (WIIS)-Canada in 2017 for their tenth anniversary. Canada adopted the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325) on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in October 2000. However, since Canada employs the adoption as its foreign policy priority, implementing it on its overseas military and peacekeeping missions, as it has no history of armed conflict (Reichrath, 2010). Thus, the impact of UNSCR 1325 adoption on Canadians is more on deployed military women and families than on Canadian women in general. With the Women in International Security (WIIS) workshop in Canada, Canadian feminists are eager to see women's contribution to the global WPS agenda extend beyond Canadian experiences.

The book, published in 2021, is titled "Women, Peace, and Security: Feminist Per-spectives on International Affairs." Edited by Caroline Leprince and Cassandra Steer, sixteen feminist scholars contribute to the ten articles in the book that discuss feminist perspectives on international relations (IR) by tracking the adoption and progress of the WPS agenda in security studies. The articles take case studies from Canada and cases from Africa, the United States (US), and its near cross-border areas. It is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the feminist approach in IR analyses. The second part focuses on Canadian military dynamics, discussing the gendered concept of military culture and institutions. The third part highlights how the feminist movement and tools empowered women from all walks of life at the domestic and local levels.

In the first chapter, the introduction chapter, Leprince and Steer examine the underrepresentation of female researchers in international relations studies, highlighting the disparity in recognition between female and male academia. Feminist researchers in the fields of International Relations (IR) and international law, such as Cynthia Enloe, Jac-

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qui True, Judith Ann Tickner, Brooke Acker-ly, Hilary Charlesworth, and others who co-incidently come from the Global North, have advanced various theoretical frameworks aimed at stimulating discourse on gender within the IR discipline, while concurrently pushing for gender equality and the inclusion of women in positions of influence. IR feminist researchers critique the marginalization of women's voices and other marginalized groups through their personal experiences and examination of narratives. The historical exclusion of women's participation in international affairs, such as at the Hague conference following World War II, is one of the instances (Tickner & True, 2018) that calls for an update to IR's theoretical frameworks. According to True (2008), the exclusion of women's points of view and contribution to international politics stems from the specific paradigm (realism, liberalism, and others), epistemology (positivists, non-positivists, and postpositivists), and methodology in international relations. The main argument in chapter one resonates with the aforementioned feminist scholars' reviews of international relations studies.

The second part consists of three chapters, starting with chapter 2. Chapter 2 by W.R. Nadège Compaoré discusses one of her fieldwork experiences as a female researcher in Ghana, Gabon, and South Africa. She finds a gap in power dynamics between interviewees and herself in interactions during her autoethnography research. She identifies how her attributes (age, gender, race, citizenship, and occupation) affect the interaction (outsider and insider status), per-

ception, and distinction between herself as a researcher and participant among local people. These factors are essential for feminist research, as feminist research pays attention to the power dynamics concerning identities, stakeholder relationships, and social and political location that affect the decision to include and exclude research subjects (Ackerly & True, 2020). As a reflection, Compaoré highlights the importance of understanding intersectionality in knowledge production for young researchers. Intersectionality is a fundamental feminist analytical tool as it allows the imbrication of race and gender in a social and political setting that women face daily, in addition to other factors such as class (Ackerly & True, 2008).

In Chapter 3, the author explores the metaphorical framework of soft and hard power notions within foreign policy formulation and the pursuit of national security objectives. According to Tanya Monforte, the epistemology analysis toward soft and hard power is gendered and commonly found in the Global North's policy decisions and outcomes. The author demonstrates that this metaphor influences both female and male political leaders in its portrayal in the media and its impact on their current circumstances. Monforte proposes utilizing the smart power idea as a viable option, wherein it is categorized into a binary framework to achieve equilibrium between the application of hard and soft power in equal measure. Finally, Monforte highlights the potential of evolving concepts to foster fresh perspectives and diminish entrenched gender stereotypes within media and policymaking.

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Chapter 4 captures Leah Sarson's comprehensive analysis of feminist research methods and research designs within the field of IR. The article commences with a concise examination of feminist methodology. It follows with a conversation transcript from a 2017 WIIS-Canada panel presenting three IR feminist scholars: Maya Eichler, Heather Smith, and Sarah Tuckey. The panelists expressed their challenge of finding an alternative research design that aligns with the feminist agenda while moving away from the positivist framework. As multidisciplinary researchers, the panelists are seen as less IR researchers due to their contribution to other disciplines. On the other hand, conferences and institutionalized systems often fail to recognize feminist approaches. The article illustrates how IR feminist scholars deal with research methodologies and academic recognition.

The second part, Chapters 5 and 6, examines Canadian military culture, system, and community. Chapter 5, authored by Rebecca Jensen, centers on the issue of gender-based violence (GBV) in the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). This chapter explores the interplay between masculinity and femininity, attitudes, language, and actions, which contribute to the manifestation of abusive behaviors toward the weaker party, particularly women. Such behaviors are perpetuated by the existing hierarchical power dynamics and the prevailing masculine culture within the military's chain of command. The inherent structure of military institutions often results in victims of sexual assault being compelled to coexist with their assailants in the same environment. Jensen advocates for transformative cultural shifts to safeguard the well-being of sexual assault survivors within military institutions.

Meanwhile, Leight Spanner's topic in Chapter 6 is military spouses' employment. The primary emphasis of the analysis pertains to the interplay between gender and power, both of which are deeply ingrained into the military system through the implementation of traditional Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) policy. The contention posits that the implementation of policies promoting masculine dominance has had an impact on the employment status and opportunities available to military spouses, defined as individuals who are married or in a common-law or conjugal relationship with a military service member. The position of military spouses is gendered by power dynamics, resulting in their position as second-class members. Moreover, the notion of a two-person career has inadvertently imposed a sense of obligation on military spouses to actively participate and perform their responsibilities inside the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) institution. The impact is visible on household finances, as military families rely solely on soldier income because military spouses have limited space and work hours that make recruiters reluctant to hire them. Military spouses struggle with employment difficulties that affect their fulfillment and their households' economic stability. Moreover, adhering to traditional gender norms results in military members encountering social disapproval when they avail themselves of "parental leave" to assist their spouses with

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household responsibilities. The author proposes implementing gender-responsive policies by the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) to address the existing policy gap between military troops and their spouses.

The third part focuses on feminist activism and women's empowerment. Chapter 7, authored by Rasema Coronado, Toula Drimonis, and Elisabeth Vallet, examines the political dynamics in the US election 2017 about feminist movements in Washington, DC, and the adjacent cross-border regions spanning from El Paso to Montreal. The rise of a conservative narrative within the realm of US politics, spearheaded by President Trump, shaped the way the media and public perceived women's attitudes, behaviors, and bodies. The presidency of Donald Trump has had a significant impact on women residing in proximity to cross-border regions, resulting in state-sanctioned acts of abuse. Consequently, the present state of affairs regarding the women's march movement in El Paso exhibits a greater degree of obscurity when juxtaposed with its counterpart in Washington, DC. To conclude the chapter, the authors propose that fostering the advancement of feminist movements in the United States is crucial for amplifying women's political involvement. The general public and political parties should actively contribute to this cause.

Chapter 8 of Sharon Hamilton's work delves into examining a significant court case in Canadian history called the Person Case. This case revolves around the Famous Five, a group consisting of Emily Murphy, Nellie McClung, Irene Parlby, Louise McKin-

ney, and Henrietta Muir Edwards. The case aimed to establish a legal definition of "person" encompassing women's status within the Canadian legal framework. The author presents a comprehensive account of the feminist activism undertaken by the Famous Five in their efforts to address the structural obstacles posed by the law and bureaucracy of the Senate while seeking to amend Section 24 of the British North America Act. The essay elucidates the utilization of creative media by the Famous Five as a strategic instrument for disseminating their messages to specific target audiences.

Chapter 9 examines indigenous women's activism related to decolonization issues. The article suggests that the indigenous people, especially women, are still experiencing the effects of the colonization system. The article is a reprint of the speech by the president of the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWAC), Francyne D. Joe, in the WIIS-Canada 2017 workshop, followed by a commentary on the speech. In the written speech, Joe argues that Indigenous women's safety in Canada is the state's responsibility, as Indigenous people have been affected by colonization, which resulted in changes in women's positions and roles in society from a matriarchal to a patriarchal system—Lianne Leddy, an indigenous woman from Serpent River First Nation, authors a commentary to the speech. Using a post-colonial perspective, the chapter explains the colonization system in Canada through state policies. The lack of access experienced by Indigenous women in Canada contradicts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People

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as a global norm. The authors suggest that dedicating more effort to supporting indigenous women in reclaiming their traditions and personal safety is vital to achieving social justice in Canada.

The conclusion chapter, chapter 10, ponders upon the questions conveyed in the introduction chapter, "Where are the women?" and "Where is the gender-based analysis?" against the background of the UNSCR 1325 WPS Agenda. The author, Cassandra Steer, concludes that some progress has been made on women's contribution to global politics and security issues. Notwithstanding the progress made, gender-based violence (GBV) continues to persist, exerting its influence on individuals of both genders throughout various domains. Still, the author admires the women's narrative and authentic leadership, citing their forthrightness and persistence as practical approaches. Steer proposes to use feminist research methodologies, including story-telling and discourse analysis, in order to examine power dynamics within the scholarship critically. In order to be ready for the structural change that will also affect women's future generations, it is crucial to consider all of the different viewpoints, voices, and experiences on women's issues. Equally important, feminist researchers must celebrate and commemorate any advancement made since it will help prepare the next generation of women leaders, who will inevitably encounter the arduous obstacles of their time.

The book presents a range of viewpoints about implementing the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda, as evidenced by its ten essays. The book presents a collection of case studies primarily focused on Canada, illustrating the approaches both state and non-state actors employ in addressing women's issues. Although the development of the WPS agenda is acknowledged, the book highlights that it remains significantly distant from its desired state. As an extraordinary publication on the WPS agenda's adoption, the book brings reflection on what an upfront feminist idea should look like, followed by questions of what impact we can expect from this perspective, as well as what the key difference between this perspective and other schools of thought on peace and security issues?

One of the notable features of the book lies in its loyalty to feminist issues through the presentation of narratives that delve into women's experiences from a distinctly female standpoint and are authored exclusively by women. For example, it is a breath of fresh air to the security issues when women in story-telling style are upfront about their female-specific experiences, indigenous women nonetheless, as shown in chapters 2 and 9. The candid conversation held by feminist scholars in Chapter 4, which discusses their challenges within academia, is notable due to their ability to evoke a raw emotional response that resonates with numerous women in academic settings. It is regarding their research experiences and their non-positivist research approach, which feminist research typically employs and, at times, is considered less academic.

Chapter 3 is a thought-provoking article as it presents a compelling argument that

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critically examines the fundamental concept of power in international relations (IR), especially the conception and operation of hard power. It intriguingly posits that the concept of power is inherently biased toward masculinity for its alignment with security. At the same time, it implies that "soft" aligns with notions of weakness and femininity in policymaking, such as women's roles as agents of peace (pages 42–43 and 46). The author critically examines international relations security studies, specifically focusing on the fundamental idea of power, its origins, and its implications for global dynamics. A similar opinion was shared in Chapter 4, in which the discussion implied that the methodologies and themes of IR scholarships are overwhelmingly masculine (page 78). Fieldwork studies conducted on the military in chapters 5 and 6 remind the readers of the perpetual challenges surrounding gender dynamics in an assumed masculine institution, such as the military, that do not go away despite the structural reform that has been made in the case of Canada. Feminist researchers can offer a set of methodologies for the security sector's policymaking that align with the feminist perspective. Studies in Part 2 of the book serve as triggers to spark further discussion both in feminist research methodologies and policymaking about finding the solution to the nexus between power dynamics and gender beyond relying on institutional changes.

Furthermore, the book elucidates how the Western feminist paradigm differs from Eastern WPS concerns. As a global norm, WPS diffuses differently throughout different geographies in dealing with women's issues, as evidenced in this literature. At present, the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which pertains to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Agenda, has been adopted by 104 UN member states and regional organizations such as the European Union (EU), African Union (AU), Organization Security and Co-operation Europe (OSCE), and various others, into their respective policy frameworks (Tickner & True, 2018). Nevertheless, the issues about WPS values in the key pillars of Participation, Protection, Prevention, and Relief and Recovery still exist due to the need for more apparent languages worldwide (George & Shepherd, 2016).

The book practically offers different concepts to non-western countries and expands the familiar notion of feminism from a Western perspective that focuses on women's emancipation for gender equality rights. The book explores the binary concept, such as intersectionality, that brings more development in IR narratives and practices. However, when it comes to human rights, these concepts may need to be understood when applied to cultural transformations and face challenges in addressing non-Western indigenous values. The adoption of WPS emerged when countries democratized and spread women's voices and rights into policy adaptation at local and national levels (True, 2016). However, despite the acceptance of the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda by United Nations Member States, including nations in the Global South, there remains a lack of accountability

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in the implementation of Regional Action Programs (RAPs) or National Action Programs (NAPs) (George & Shepherd, 2016). The African Union has included the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda in its regional policy framework. However, it has limited its implementation by primarily emphasizing the involvement of women in the context of gender-based violence, as noted by Hendricks (2017). The commitment of the African Union can be attributed to the experience of conflict among its member states. However, despite this commitment, it has yet to be realized entirely due to financial constraints and the persistent lack of progress in addressing the underrepresentation of women in political structures, practices, and behaviors (Hendricks, 2017). Furthermore, it is essential to note that gender-based violence toward women by military soldiers still exists in its peace unit (Hendricks, 2017). The WPS issue is a broader scope of women's issues interconnected with other issues such as human security, economy, and social aspects, and also the achievement of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 (Arostegui, 2015; Osland et al., 2020).

The book aims to discuss the relevance of women's livelihood in WPS. Alternatively, it proposes new theoretical developments, such as women's narrative, as an acceptable research method without the need to provide generalizations to be considered academic, thereby allowing readers and researchers to explore further WPS discussion. However, the direct correlation with UNSCR 1325 is rarely found in all chapters. Nevertheless, it offers perspective on how essential intersec-

tionality ideas are for women and marginalized groups. Further, the book has provided a productive discussion on women's issues in several major IR theories, such as constructivism and post-colonial theories, using discourse analysis, historical analysis, and narrative storytelling.

The critical point that should be highlighted is how readers might encounter ambiguity regarding how to differentiate the feminist agenda in the feminist movement from WPS as a global norm that departs from the authors' various methodologies. However, the ambiguity may be advantageous because it helps readers realize that it is not necessary to distinguish between the two in order to comprehend feminist concepts on a practical level. Indeed, the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda is a set of norms emerging from women's activism; however, the limitations on which scope covers WPS issues might need to be clarified in this book. Similar ambiguities can also be found in Chapter 4, which discusses the concept of multidisciplinary analysis in which international relations studies and international law intersect. The question arises while reading Chapter 3, which covers soft and hard power metaphors into smart power, seen from the binary concept of masculinity and femininity: How can this binary concept be accepted and applied in Global South policymaking? The book also repeatedly summarizes each chapter in the introduction and conclusion parts, but this might offer an easier description for readers since the scope of discussion is extensive.

Lastly, the audiences for this book may vary, and it will be highly beneficial

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specifically for women's activists, feminist scholars, or academia that needs an in-depth discussion on feminist literature. Equally significantly, the book will benefit readers interested in expanding feminist scholarship in IR. On the global norm adoption notion, the national cases presented in this book serve as a primary tool for reflection. Then, the comparison with other countries and different geographies might increase knowledge production for a better understanding of the global norm and its adoption.

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Title
Must be brief and informative, between 15-20 words
(16pt, bold, single pharagraph spacing, 0 before-after)

First Author; Next Author; Last Author – without academic title (12pt, bold)
First Author's Affiliation (Department, University, Country) (12pt);
Second Author's Affiliation;
Third Author's Affiliation;
email@writer.ac.id (only write email for the corresponding author)

Abstract (13pt, bold)

Abstract should be typed in italic, font size 10pt, single-spacing format and justified. The abstract should briefly summarize the aim, findings, or purposes of the article. Authors encouraged to write clear explanation on methodology or conceptual framework used in the article, followed by short summary of the research findings. The end part of the abstract should give conclusion that indicates how this paper contributes to fill the gap in previous studies, or any practical implication that might occurs. The abstract should be written in one concise paragraph of no more than 250 words.

Keywords*: contains; three to five; relevant keywords; separated by semicolon; written in lower case, italic 10pt*

Guidelines (13pt, Bold, Title Case)

The manuscript should be written in English on A4-sized papers (21x29.7 cm), with custom margins as follows: left 2.5 cm, right 2 cm, bottom 2 cm, and top 2 cm. The manuscript should use Callisto MT, 12pt font size, 1.5 line spacing. Manuscript should consist of 4,000—7,000 words (research article) and 3,000—4,000 words (book review). Referencing and citing technique used is APA 6th edition, with in-text citation format

Guidelines - Introduction

All sources quoted or paraphrased should be listed in the reference list. Cite source using APA in-text citation format, by writing author's last name followed by the publication year, for example: (Hudson, 2014). Direct quotations, tables, or figures referred should include the page number, for example: (Hudson, 2010, p. 44).

The introduction part should explore these elements: (1) Explanation about the research background and the general theme or topic; (2) Provide clear and convincing answer to the question: Why is this article is important? (3) A concise literature review of available literature or research. Please cite the most imperative part, theories, or debates from existing studies; (4) Indicate how your article will contribute to fill the gap to the current studies. This is also important to show that your idea is original; (5) Offer explanation on specific problem or question[1] and hypothesis

that will be the main point(s) of the article.[2] We encourage authors to bring only one or two questions.

Author should also describe objectives of the research and offer the brief structure of the article.

Guidelines - Methodology

Author is encouraged to describe methodology clearly. Put it in a dedicated subchapter if necessary. This part should contain a brief justification for the research methods used.

This part should contain enough detail to enable the reader to evaluate the appropriateness of your methods and the reliability and validity of your findings.

How To Write Your Subchapters

[This is an example text]

Vivamus quis nisi ut diam vehicula mollis rhoncus et massa. Sed in sem felis. Nulla facilisi. Fusce lobortis vel nisl non viverra. Phasellus id molestie nunc.

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[1] Fewer question or hypothesis is better, we encourage author to bring only 1-2 questions

[2] Footnote may be used to provide additional description (terms, concept, specific event, etc.) that might be too excessive to be included in-text.

tempor odio, in porta orci. Phasellus scelerisque

est ac elementum ullamcorper. Duis ut lectus non nibh dictum malesuada. Quisque convallis lectus non justo posuere venenatis. Nam bibendum sem et nibh eleifend placerat sit amet a nibh. Vestibulum quis varius purus.

If You Have 2nd Level Subchapters, Use 12pt, Underline, Title Case

[This is an example text] Proin non consequat justo. Praesent tempor aliquam nibh vitae venenatis. Praesent pulvinar nulla ut ligula ultricies, bibendum pretium mi hendrerit. Quisque luctus, purus in tincidunt consequat, nibh metus laoreet ex, at rutrum nisi metus ut lacus. Integer commodo purus orci, non pharetra nisi iaculis non. Aenean eget rutrum risus, eu egestas erat. Sed lobortis diam dolor, at porttitor dolor consequat tempus. Etiam erat felis, porttitor sed enim a, aliquam commodo elit. Cras ac posuere est, eu interdum mi. Maecenas posuere lacus vitae nisi efficitur, sed malesuada erat tincidunt. Nullam a dignissim massa. Fusce molestie finibus augue id lacinia. Integer tincidunt at metus ac pharetra. Vivamus hendrerit, mauris quis pharetra fringilla, orci ipsum interdum lacus, et imperdiet massa mauris quis lorem. Pellentesque placerat fermentum imperdiet. Fusce scelerisque purus eget suscipit semper.

If You Have 3rd Level Subchapters, Use 12pt, Italic, Title Case. Run the text on after a punctuation mark. **[This is an example text]** In hac habitasse platea dictumst. Nunc in euismod libero, vel interdum lacus. Proin ut dignissim risus. Nunc faucibus libero sed eleifend bibendum. Nam mattis, odio ac placerat euismod, mauris felis consequat nunc, ut porttitor ligula risus ac nisl. Nulla ullamcorper sapien non quam gravida, nec dignissim ligula

dignissim. Curabitur congue nunc sed eros luctus, sed dapibus arcu elementum. Mauris venenatis odio leo, ut placerat augue congue at.

Curabitur convallis nulla leo, sit amet auctor est vestibulum nec. Aenean ut neque vel quam egestas accumsan eu in elit. Nullam lobortis faucibus lectus posuere consequat.

- Duis convallis nulla ligula, ac congue ipsum cursus sed.
- Sed ut dolor eleifend, malesuada sem vitae, mollis risus.
- Sed sit amet massa felis. [This is an example te xt for 2nd level subchapter]

Guidelines - Conclusion

Conclusion is a brief summary of findings and discussion. It is strongly recommended to avoid mere repetitive statements or phrase from the previous section. Author may also discuss implication of the findings and point out prospect for further research.

Conclusion should followed by reference list format. Reference list is based on American Psychological Association (APA) style. Reference list should appear at the end of the article and include only literatures actually cited in the manuscript. Citation should be sorted alphabetically and chronologically, written in single spacing and 0pt before-after spacing format.

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
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