

Indonesia's View: Eradicating Colonialism and Supporting Palestine

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This study aims to analyze the reasons behind Indonesia's support for Palestine after the October 7 attacks despite challenges both domestically and internationally. Indonesia faces domestic criticism for prioritizing support for Palestine over pressing internal issues such as poverty and human rights abuses. Internationally, Indonesia faces pressure from Western countries such as the US and UK, as well as challenges from OIC member states that normalized relations with Israel. Indonesia's actions are analyzed in National Interest Perspective. From a national interest perspective, Indonesia aims to demonstrate religious and humanitarian solidarity while in an international interest, Indonesia seeks to assert itself as a global leader in human rights, strengthen its friendship with developing countries, and fulfill its role as legitimate leader of Bandung Conference 1955 and as a member of international organizations like UN Security Council and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), in maintaining world peace. This support has been continuous and very consistent since the beginning of Indonesia's independence until the Jokowi administration era. Using explanatory methods and data collection through library research, this study concludes that although Indonesia's support for Palestine has not succeeded in ending the conflict with Israel, these efforts have shown Indonesia's courage in challenging the status quo and strengthening its diplomatic position and identity in international politics. In conclusion, Indonesia's support for Palestine is driven by its historical and ideological commitment, humanitarian principles, public and political support, strategic diplomatic influence, continuity in foreign policy, and ability to navigate international pressure in order to eradicating colonialism brought by Israel and its allies.

Keywords: National Interests, Humanity, Indonesia, Palestine

Introduction

Indonesia's consistent foreign policy of being in favour of Palestine is influenced by the peaceful spirit of the Bandung Conference (1955). The Bandung Conference was an important event in the history of post-colonial international relations, emphasising the principles of anti-colonialism, self-determination, and non-intervention (Weber

& Winanti, 2016). The final communiqué of the conference explicitly addressed the Palestinian issue, advocating for the rights of the Palestinian people and eradicating colonialism and imperialism (Umar, 2019).

Not just a foreign policy issue, Indonesia's standing position for Palestine also reflects its enduring legacy of commitment and spirit of Bandung solidarity

among developing countries (Brigg et al., 2016). Following the events of 7 October, Indonesia has reaffirmed its support for Palestine, condemned the violence, and called for a peaceful settlement (Setiawati, 2024). This research will analyze the importance of Indonesia's support for Palestine after the October 7th 2023 attack amid the emergence of parties aiming to normalize relations with the opposing side, Israel.

On October 7th, 2023, armed groups led by Hamas carried out coordinated attacks in southern Israel, attacking Israeli military bases. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) report, these actions included the direct shooting of civilians, the burning of homes, and the taking of hostages (Human Rights Watch, 2024). Hamas rejected those findings and accused HRW of being unprofessional and biased against Israel, and called for the report to be retracted (Al Jazeera, 2024). Hamas launched the attack in response to more than a century of colonization and oppression endured by the Palestinian people, including ethnic cleansing, forced land occupation, a suffocating blockade, and continued human rights violations by Israel (Kusuma, 2024).

Facing the conflict, Indonesia received double standard sentiment for Papua from inside (Jubi, 2021) and pressure to normalize its diplomatic relations from outside of the country (Meiliana, 2024). From within the country, despite having different roots, what is happening in Papua and Palestine has similarities in terms of violence and potential human rights violations, but for a long time, the government controlled all

information concerning Papua. This stands in stark contrast to information concerning Palestine (Amindoni, 2021).

External parties that contradict Indonesia's support for Palestine come from countries that embrace democracy, human rights and international liberalism, such as the United States, which continues to send military aid to Israel (United States Department of State, 2025). Then UK, which tends to be indecisive in responding to UN resolutions (UK Government, 2024). In addition, several Arab countries/members of the OIC (Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco and the UAE) that are supposed to support investigations into Israeli armed violence, instead maintain their diplomatic relations with the human rights violator (Israel) (CNN, 2023).

Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi said that

"There is a lot of pressure on Indonesia to start normalizing relations with Israel. And I said that we are not closed. But there are conditions, which is the two-state solution can be realized, which means that Palestine is independent, Palestine has a state and is recognized by Israel, to coexist with Israel (Meiliana, 2024).

Despite the distinctions among countries, Indonesia's action has been in line with Bandung's principles of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty.

Furthermore, on January 23, 2024, Retno Marsudi delivered three statements in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Open Debate in New York. First, the importance of an immediate and permanent ceasefire. Second, Palestine must be

immediately accepted as a full member of the UN, and third, to stop the supply of weapons to Israel (Kemlu, 2024). Minister Retno and other heads of state delegations also walked out of the room when Israel's permanent envoy delivered his statement (Jakarta Globe, 2024), demonstrating symbolic opposition and diplomatic aggressiveness.

Various studies have shown that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most complex international issues and has a broad impact on global geopolitical dynamics. In this context, Indonesia has taken a strategic step by applying the concept of defense management to support a peaceful resolution. According to Asakir and Almubaroq (2024), Indonesia plays an important role through active participation in international forums such as the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Indonesia's focus is on diplomacy and international cooperation, where the country has consistently supported a two-state solution as a just way out of the conflict.

Setiawati (2024), explore the motivations behind Indonesia's consistent support for Middle Eastern conflict resolution. Indonesia's commitment to resolving the Middle East conflict is not only based on equal status as developing countries or the rules in the constitution, but also on Islamic solidarity towards the majority of the population of the region.

Nugraha and Maura (2023) conducted a study which aims to analyze Indonesia's foreign policy objectives from 2014 to 2023. They show that promoting and securing human security for the Palestinian people

is the primary goal that the Indonesian government aims to achieve in every effort for Palestine. It's because the role of power holders is seen as focusing only on state security without integrating a focus on humans as individuals or groups threatened by military attacks

Sembiring & Oktreza, (2024) seeks to review Indonesia's support for Palestine. Indonesia shows strong solidarity with Palestine through various forms of support. One if from action by civil society, such as demonstrations, fundraising, or awareness campaigns. The Indonesian civil society stands with the Palestinian people who are struggling. Another is through government aid with Indonesia provides other assistance in the form of food and medicine as well as plans to send a hospital ship from the Indonesian Navy to Egypt to be an additional medical facility to treat and heal victims of the war in Gaza.

The literature review concludes that Indonesia's support for Palestine is driven by the equal of status as Southern nation-state and for the sake of protecting human security. One study also shows concrete evidence of this support through actions taken by both the government and civil society. Nevertheless, previous studies have yet to provide a comprehensive analysis in Indonesia's support for Palestine as a national interest.

This research will analyze the important reasons behind Indonesia's consistent support for Palestine along with counter-actions from various parties both at home and abroad. The concept of National

Interest is the analytical tool used in this study. Through this concept, the author can identify Indonesia's interest in Palestine as an action that is in accordance with the Indonesian constitution and the demands of Indonesian civil society.

National Interest Concept

The realist conception of national interest, in which security becomes the primary goals of the state is no longer relevant in the current era (Dermawan, 2020). The justification for this is that security concerns, actors, health issues, globalisation, regional dynamics, and technology are constantly evolving. As a result, adaptation is required to address contemporary challenges with more expansive and cooperative approaches to human rights.

Furthermore, Nuechterlein (2019) defines national interest as the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment. It means that national interest is no longer considered merely a theory in foreign policy-making, but becomes a reference in the foreign policy-making process itself.

Interest of a state is also the interest of the international community or in other terms, national interest is beyond national boundaries (Nye, 1999). Along with that, Weldes (1996) states that national interests are produced in the construction, through the dual mechanisms of articulation and interpellation, of representations of international politics.

Indonesian policy of continuing to support Palestine is an example of how national wealth is defined not by security or economic prosperity, but by emerging norms, transnational solidarity, and active diplomacy. It is consistent with the concept of national interest in the contemporary era, which is dynamic, ideas-driven, and linked to globalisation.

In the next section, the author will focus on explaining the significance of Indonesia's role in assisting Palestine and providing concrete evidences that the assistance provided would not be discontinued. In essence, the study seeks to answer the question of why Indonesia continues to support Palestine with qualitative explanatory method

Methodology

This research is a qualitative explanatory study that generally aims to analyze the reasons or causes behind a specific issue, in this case, the reasons for Indonesia's support for Palestine in the Palestine-Israel conflict. The research involves several stages: data elimination, data analysis, and conclusion. Data elimination involves summarizing data to focus on key aspects deemed important in analyzing Indonesia's national interests and its continuous support for Palestine.

In the data analysis stage, the data obtained, whether in the form of narrative texts or interview transcripts, are comprehensively analyzed. For instance, statements from the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs are examined to interpret their meaning. This helps in understanding

the underlying reasons and motivations for Indonesia's support.

The final stage involves testing the preliminary conclusions drawn from the data analysis. The validity of these conclusions then matched against evidence obtained from various sources. This cross-verification ensures that the conclusions are robust and well-supported by the data. The conclusion phase is critical in forming a coherent analysis that explains the challenges and issues related to Indonesia's support for Palestine. These three step methods collectively assist the researcher in constructing an analytical framework that explains the challenges and problems surrounding Indonesia's support for Palestine.

History of Indonesia's Support for Palestine

The long history of Indonesia's support for Palestine could be analyzed through the continuity and change approach. Continuity refers to the consistency of policy patterns that have persisted for a considerable period. Although it encompasses minor changes, these changes do not alter the overall policy principles. Change refers to significant changes in policy and cannot be separated from various triggers, both domestic and international (Yani, 2009). These two concepts could guide the understanding of Indonesia's foreign policy towards Palestine, whether there have been significant changes (Change) despite changes in governance models and leadership, or whether Indonesia's continuity (Continuity) in supporting Palestine has grown stronger.

Indonesia's favourable relationship with Palestine is a legacy of the Soekarno era, which explicitly prioritised solidarity with anti-colonial movements and developing nations. One example of this is that Israel was left out at the 1955 Bandung conference and inviting Palestinian representatives instead (Muttaqien, 2013). Requests to establish diplomatic relations from Israel were also made, but the content of the letters was never responded to by President Soekarno (Wibowo, 2021).

Indonesia's support for Palestine is the same as the attitude of Arab countries. Many of them have also recognized Indonesia's independence even before the Netherlands did so in (1949). In exchnages, Indonesia's also pledges support for Arab goals such as supporting Gamal Abdel Nasser during the 1956 Suez Crisis and boycotting Israeli athletes at the 1962 Asian Games. Even though Indonesia was later stopped by the IOC (International Olympic Committee), Soekarno was not deterred, he even sponsored the rival international sporting event by organizing the Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFo) as a challenging alternative (Muttaqien, 2013). Soekarno's decision was not just a political maneuver, but it was a decision to expand efforts to eradicate colonialism in all fields.

Furthermore, Indonesia strengthened its cooperation with Palestine by formally establishing diplomatic relations during the presidency of President Soeharto. During the Soeharto era, Indonesia continued to support the right of Palestinians to establish an independent state and reject Israeli occupation

of Arab territories. However, the implementation of Indonesia's foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict was more moderate than during the Soekarno era. Indonesia proposed direct talks between Israel and Arab countries after the 1967 War, although this was sensitive among Arab countries that did not recognize Israel at the time. Indonesia also did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo by Arab countries against countries supporting Israel because of the pro-Western New Order regime of Soeharto, especially towards the United States. Secret relations between Indonesia and Israel also occurred, including the purchase of aircraft from Israel. In 1989, Indonesia opened the Palestinian Embassy in Jakarta to gain Arab support for Indonesia's position on East Timor and its desire to become the chair of the Non-Aligned Movement (Muttaqien, 2013).

During the presidency of President B.J. Habibie (1998-1999), which lasted only one year, Indonesia's foreign policy was greatly influenced by internal situations such as domestic political and economic stability, which were still in the process of recovery. Additionally, the presence of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as a secondary actor in Indonesia's foreign policy also had a strong influence on the government. However, Indonesia's stance did not undergo significant changes and remained supportive of Palestine. During Habibie's presidency, Indonesia continued to support Palestinian independence and actively participated in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to resolve conflicts in the Middle East. At the time of

his death, hundreds of Muslims in Gaza, Palestine, held a memorial prayer performed at the Great Mosque of Umar in the city of Jabalia, northern Gaza, to honor and pray for the third President of Indonesia. In addition to performing prayers, Palestinians in Gaza also raised the Indonesian flag at half-mast at the international pier in the city of Gaza as a form of tribute (Jauhary, 2019).

Subsequently, during the presidency of Indonesia's fourth president, Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Indonesia was influenced by the principle of "turning enemies into friends," but with significant pressure from both domestic and international sources, this stance became firmer through condemning Israel's attacks through a press release titled "Stop Attacks on Palestine" (Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, 2023). In the book entitled "Peace with Gus Dur," two reasons are explained for his proposal to establish diplomatic relations with Israel. First, Gus Dur wanted to ensure that the capitalist George Soros, who is of Jewish descent, did not disrupt the capital markets. Second, he wanted to enhance Indonesia's bargaining position in the Middle East because as a predominantly Muslim country, it was only natural to actively engage in peace-building efforts there. Such foreign policy was influenced by Gus Dur's perception that it was impossible for Indonesia to reconcile both sides if diplomatic relations were only established with one party (As-Sunniyah, 2021).

During Megawati's leadership (2001-2004), Indonesia pursued bilateral diplomacy with George W. Bush to halt armed conflicts

in the Middle East, but it did not result in significant pressure on the adversaries. The conflict continued to escalate until the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Indonesia invited Hamas and PLO representatives, including Mahmoud Abbas as the President of Palestine, to foster reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, two Palestinian government factions with differing ideologies, strategies, affiliations, and political objectives (Anrian, 2023). Indonesia's efforts to firmly stand with Palestine continued during the presidency of Indonesia's seventh president, Joko Widodo, who established a special Consulate General in Ramallah and became one of the OIC's representatives to support the ceasefire in Israel (Suratiningsih et al., 2020).

Factors Influencing Indonesia's Support for Palestine

Based on the discussion above, Indonesia can be said to have consistently supported Palestine in its conflict with Israel. This is influenced by several factors. Firstly, from the opening sentence of its own 1945 Constitution:

"...colonialism must be eradicated from the earth, as it is not in line with the principles of humanity and justice."

In this context, Israel's actions in attacking Palestinian civilians are a form of colonialism that must be stopped. Secondly, Indonesia's actions are also influenced by its membership in the OIC and the UN, which both fundamentally strive for peace. Both influences are continuously applied through a series of humanitarian diplomatic

efforts conducted by Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in collaboration with Indonesian Islamic organizations such as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, by sending food, clothing, medicines, and other aid to Palestine. Although the process of resolving this conflict is difficult and as of the writing of this text, the conflict remains unresolved, Indonesia's contribution to humanitarian values and global peace will never waver. In addition to domestic arrangements, Indonesia also strengthens its support for Palestine through diplomatic channels.

Indonesia reinforces its diplomacy for Palestinian independence through various international forums, including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the UN. At the 19th NAM Summit in Kampala, January 2024, Indonesia emphasized the importance of a ceasefire in Gaza and advocated for peace processes and full Palestinian membership in the UN. Indonesia also consistently voices the rights of the Palestinian people in the UN, supporting the two-state solution, and reminds the UN Security Council of its responsibility in resolving the Palestinian issue. The Indonesian Parliament especially, the People's Representative Council (DPR), actively advocates for Palestinian independence in the Inter Parliamentary Union (IPU) Assembly. At the 147th IPU General Assembly in Angola, October 2023, the DPR proposed a resolution urging the cessation of Israeli attacks on Gaza, the lifting of the Gaza blockade, and the pursuit of long-term solutions for Palestinian peace. Political support for Palestinian independence

with East Jerusalem as its capital remains the primary focus (Muhamad, 2024).

Challenges to Indonesia's Support for Palestine

The challenges to Indonesia's support for Palestine come not only from external sources but also from within Indonesian society itself. The disparity in collective action and differing values of justice between Indonesia and the permanent members of the United Nations (UN) Security Council are some of the issues on the international stage. Meanwhile, pragmatic sentiments are emerging domestically, accusing Indonesia of having asymmetrical humanitarian priorities by focusing on external issues like supporting Palestine, rather than internal problems (Medcom.id, 2021).

The differing ideological constructs of developed countries, which tend to support Israel over Palestine, came from dominant UN countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States often acts as Israel's proxy in advancing its interests on the international stage, exemplified by its frequent vetoes on numerous Palestine-Israel conflict resolutions. Additionally, the US supports Israel with arms supplies, which are then used to devastate lives in Palestine (Xinhua, 2024).

According to Al Jazeera, the escalation of the fight on October 7, 2023 resulted in numerous casualties for both sides. In Gaza, at least 38,983 people were murdered, including more than 15,000 children, with over 89,727 injured and more than 10,000 reported missing. In the Occupied West Bank,

at least 578 people were killed, including more than 140 children, and over 5,300 were injured. In Israel, the dead toll rose to 1,139, with at least 8,730 injured. More than half of Gaza's homes have been destroyed or damaged, as have 80% of commercial facilities and 88% of educational structures. Hospitals, highways, and places of worship have also suffered considerable damage, worsening the humanitarian catastrophe (Al Jazeera, 2024).

Indonesia clearly condemns this partiality by the US and other developed countries. In a roundtable agenda at the United Nations Headquarters (12/12), Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated:

"Those who often dictate to us about human rights are the ones who now allow Israel to violate human rights".

Retno emphasized that no country should apply double standards in upholding human rights, as double standards are the biggest issue in the implementation of ideal human rights. She continued,

"These actions are unjustified and in clear violation of international humanitarian law".

Thus, it is no longer relevant to consider the United States as the world's police because it contradicts its constitution as a country that upholds human rights.

Besides the United States, Germany, the UK, and Arab countries that are racially similar to Palestinians, such as Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates, have also tainted their support for Palestine (Bermant, 2023). The implementation of the Abraham Accords, which unite diplomatic relations and economic cooperation between

Israel and these Arab countries, does not align with their membership in the OIC, which prioritizes human rights for Palestinians as one of its main agendas (Justin, 2020). Despite conflicting with multilateral principles, this normalization of relations has received a positive response from the international community (Fikrie et al., 2022). So why has this not occurred in Indonesia? Is it because humanitarian intervention is deeply rooted in every individual Indonesian? Or is it true that no one opposes Indonesia's continuous support for Palestine, which resurfaces like a tidal wave?

Conni Rahakundini, an academic and military and defense observer, argues that perceptions of Israel need to change to avoid viewing it solely through the lens of religious sentiment. Such sentiments, she suggests, only create a biased perception that prevents opening opportunities for bilateral relations with a country often in conflict with the Arab world (Purba, 2020). Arguments like these have gained more attention since the escalation of the conflict on October 7, 2023, but have not affected Indonesia's support for Palestine.

Some sentiments arise in Indonesia, where netizens argue that Indonesia is too pro-Palestine and neglects its responsibilities to address domestic humanitarian issues like the limited information on the ongoing conflict in Papua (Amindoni, 2021). Many netizens have also voiced that the conflict in Papua has similarities to the series of events in Israel-Palestine. Examples include acts of violence against people accused of being separatists or terrorists, the

emergence of misinformation or fake news, internet blackouts in Papua, and news of developments in the armed conflict between joint TNI-Polri forces and pro-Papuan independence groups.

In addition to impacting sales, the movement like boycotting Israeli-related company already affected workers due to a sharp drop in sales. Due to the boycott, there were mass layoffs (Nugraha, 2023). Including the resignation of 3 directors in Unilever company and 126 employees who were fired from PT Nestle Indonesia in order to adjust the business to be more efficient and have the opportunity to continue growing in the future (Nada et al., 2024). Indonesia's response to the boycott is promoting import substitution and local products through a campaign called "*Bangga Buatan Indonesia*" (BBI/Proud of Indonesian-Made Products). This initiative aims to ensure that local SMEs can compete domestically and internationally, replacing Zionist-aligned products commonly consumed by the public (Unair News, 2023). also serves as a tool for effective international cooperation in reducing the impact of Zionist-related products, in line with the global solidarity principle that is upheld by Indonesia.

Indonesia's National Interest in Supporting Palestine

Nuechterlein identifies four aspects of national interest: defense, economic, world order, and ideology. In this context, Indonesia's reasons for supporting Palestine are also influenced by these four aspects.

a. Defense Issues

In terms of defense, it is crucial for Indonesia to support Palestine due to the stability and security of the region. The Israel-Gaza war is more worrying for Southeast Asians than the South China Sea row (Lin, 2024). Thus, concern arises primarily for two reasons: firstly, as fears of extremism grow, the Gaza war resonates deeply among Southeast Asian respondents in a recent survey, given the significant proportion of Muslims in the region. Secondly, the State of Southeast Asia 2024 Survey highlighted concerns about the global rules-based order and a potential rise in extremist activities (South China Morning Post, 2024). Aside to Southeast Asia, Indonesia also wants to contribute to peace and stability in the Middle East, which indirectly affects international relations (Setiawati, 2024). This is related to the Indonesian government's efforts to resolve the conflict in a peaceful manner.

b. Economic Aspects

As the concept of national interest in the modern era has expanded to include external interests, the economic aspect is also an important part to discuss. The global economic issues resulting from the Palestine-Israel conflict have affected oil prices, international trade, and foreign direct investment (Dewi, 2024). In terms of support for Palestine, Indonesia strives to ensure that the economic impacts experienced by other countries do not affect its own domestic trade security.

The war in Gaza ("genocide") has had significant impacts on the international

economy, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa. The IMF reported that economic growth in this region did not meet projections, with a downward revision to 2.9 percent this year, due to the conflict between Israel and Hamas as well as oil production cuts by producing countries. This war has also affected revenue from the tourism sector and triggered an increase in global shipping costs due to attacks in the Red Sea by Houthis who support Palestine. Additionally, shipping companies have been forced to reroute from the Red Sea to the Cape of Good Hope, South Africa, which is longer and more expensive (Kisihandi, 2024).

IMF Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva noted that this war exacerbates existing economic challenges from previous conflicts. Despite efforts to mitigate these impacts, as conveyed by Egyptian Finance Minister Mohamed Maait, spending projections remain down. Amid this situation, the IMF emphasized the importance of eliminating regressive energy subsidies to save costs, reduce pollution, and increase social spending in the region (Reuters, 2024).

The impacts of this conflict on Indonesia's macroeconomy include rising oil prices, supply disruptions, effects on the financial sector and the Indonesian Rupiah exchange rate, and impacts on the trade sector. The government also promptly reducing unnecessary spending, including non-urgent landmark projects such as the new capital city (IKN) and the high-speed train (Handayani, 2023).

Bureau of Indonesian Statistics (BPS) recorded various Israeli goods entered

Indonesia in 2023. By mid-year, machinery and mechanical equipment were the highest category with a value of 3.7 million USD. Imports of weapons and ammunition were valued at 6.5 thousand USD (Putra & Aziz, 2023). Besides imports, Indonesia actively exports various commodities to Israel, such as fats, vegetable oils, processed meat, flour, vegetables, fruits, beverages, alcohol, vinegar, salt, sulfur, cement, pulp, food industry waste, organic chemicals, and pharmaceutical products (Nugroho, 2024). However, amid these concerns, the Indonesian government remains optimistic that the impacts will not be too significant for Indonesia as the two countries are not major trading partners. The efforts made by the government to anticipate the macroeconomic impacts of the Israel-Palestine war include focusing the state budget (APBN) on strengthening people's purchasing power and controlling food price inflation, especially rice (Handayani, 2023).

c. Global Order

The global order as a national goal of Indonesia is outlined in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, *which is to protect the entire Indonesian nation and all Indonesian bloodshed, to promote public welfare, to educate the nation's life, and to participate in implementing a world order based on independence, eternal peace, and social justice* (Kemhan_RI, 2015).

Indonesia's dedication to a fair and just global order also influences its support for Palestine. Its vigorous participation in international fora that defend Palestinian rights and sovereignty reflects this (Setiawati,

2024). The position is consistent with Indonesia's "Free and Active" foreign policy, which places a strong focus on non-alignment and respect for human rights and international law (Wardhani & Dugis, 2023). By supporting Palestine, Indonesia strengthens its image as a supporter of international justice and human rights.

d. Ideology

Ideology is a systematic collection of ideas and beliefs related to human life. As an aspiration, ideology is used as the fundamental framework in the governance of a state. Indonesia adopts the Pancasila ideology, which prioritizes the cultural values, peace, justice, and religiosity of the Indonesian nation (Mahkamah Konstitusi, 2015). This is similar with the thoughts of the Palestinian people, where they also have the determination to eradicate colonization and fight for independence and human rights. The text of the Declaration of Independence of the Palestinian National Council (November 14, 1988) reads:

"The State of Palestine declares its commitment to the principles and objectives of the United Nations, and to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and to the principles and policy of non-alignment" (Palestinian National Council, 1988).

The determination of the Palestinian people to end colonization and fight for independence and human rights is also reflected in United Nations Resolution No. 8, in "The Rights of Self-Determination of the Palestinian People." The resolution states:

“Strongly condemns all Governments which do not recognize the right to self-determination and independence of all peoples still under colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation, notably the peoples of Africa and the Palestinian people” (United Nations, 1979).

Therefore, Indonesia's reason for supporting Palestine is a nationalist call that has been rooted as the nation's identity.

The four aspects of national interest, that not only focuses on pure political and economic interests, are a reflection of the Indonesian nation's support for Palestine. All of these are known to be inseparable from the basic values of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, with its missions being anti-colonialism, respecting the sovereignty of other countries, and upholding human rights. Thus, it is also evident that Indonesia is not a materialistic state or a state that operates solely for profit, but rather a state of noble character, idealism, and integrity.

The Importance for Indonesia in Supporting Palestine Internationally

Indonesia's relationship with Palestine is not only based on religious solidarity, but also shows strategic value in strengthening diplomatic positions, national identity, and international political influence. In addition, involvement in construction projects and humanitarian aid also benefits Indonesia economically and socially.

While it has been explained earlier that Indonesia's goal to support Palestine is solely influenced by its sense of responsibility to fulfill constitutional and humanitarian

obligations, it cannot be denied that Indonesia also benefits from positive international recognition due to its stance. Some of them are the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which regularly recognizes RRI Indonesia's active role in supporting the rights of the Palestinian people at various meetings and conferences (Falah, 2016). The Palestinian government itself has several times appreciated Indonesia's strong support, which has also always been vocal in United Nations (UN) forums, including when it became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 2019-2020 (RRI, 2023). In the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) forum, Indonesia has always called for international solidarity for Palestine, while many Islamic countries appreciate Indonesia's consistency in supporting Palestinian independence.

Therefore, efforts to support human rights in the Palestine-Israel conflict have never ceased. This is because the greater and more intense support Indonesia provides, the greater the opportunity for Indonesia to receive positive recognition from the international community.

Indonesia's international interests as a country that upholds human rights have yielded many positive outcomes. Besides being a well-reputed country, another benefit is Indonesia's chance to sit on the leadership seat of international organizations, receive offers for international cooperation, and strengthen bilateral relations with countries that share the same vision. Consequently, material benefits can also be indirectly obtained by Indonesia through international relations and global diplomacy with various

partner countries from different regions.

Having a good human rights reputation in the eyes of the international community provides positive legitimacy for Indonesia. The opportunity to demonstrate this existence is also done by Indonesia by taking responsibility for leading international organizations such as the UN Security Council, ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the OIC in efforts to protect human rights. Concretely, Indonesia, represented by the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi, on January 23, 2024, delivered three statements in the Open Debate of the UN Security Council in New York City, which include, the importance of an immediate and permanent ceasefire, immediate acceptance of Palestine as a full member of the UN, and to stop the supply of weapons to Israel (Kemlu, 2024).

As for international cooperation, Indonesia's relations with countries that support Palestinian independence are also strengthening. This includes OIC membership like Turkey and East Asian partners like China. The link may be discerned through mutual collaboration, particularly in the realm of economics.

Indonesia Bilateral Cooperation with Turkey

President Joko Widodo and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan convened at the OIC Extraordinary Summit on November 11, 2023, and mutually agreed to sustain their collaboration in promoting Palestinian self-determination and finding a resolution to the Gaza predicament. Moreover, both countries have agreed to accelerate the negotiations

on the Indonesia-Turkey Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IT-CEPA), aiming to complete it by 2024 (Kemlu, 2023).

Indonesia Bilateral Cooperation with China

Furthermore, Indonesia and China additionally voiced their support for the "two-state solution" and UN Security Council Resolution No. 2728, which calls for a ceasefire in Palestine, specifically in Gaza. Indonesia, along with 13 other member countries of the UN Security Council, agreed on the resolution, while the United States chose to abstain.

With the same firm stance, the special bilateral relationship between China and Indonesia brings political and economic benefits. Based on a quote from a written statement from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, represented by spokesperson Lin Jian on April 18 in Beijing, China stated,

"China supports Indonesia in maintaining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the country, appreciates the Indonesian government's adherence to the One-China policy, and is willing to continue to firmly support Indonesia's core interests."

In addition, the Chinese government also intend to continue urging Chinese companies to invest and increase imports of high-quality products from Indonesia, as stated by Jian during the event, "Indonesia is expected to maintain the stability and predictability of export policy and create a favorable environment for companies" (Natalia, 2024). Thus, in addition to continuing to support Palestinian independence, Indonesia

also does not need to worry about cooperation with China as its trading partner, which operates within the same humanitarian vision as well.

Conclusion

Indonesia's steadfast support for Palestine, despite encountering opposition from both domestic and international institutions, may be understood by examining several key factors:

1. Historical and Ideological Commitment

Indonesia has a deep-rooted dedication to promoting the independence of Palestine, based on its own ideals of opposing colonialism and prioritizing humanitarian values. Indonesia has always supported the self-determination of Palestine since gaining independence, which is in line with the nation's foundational principles.

2. Humanitarian Principles

Indonesia's foreign policy prioritizes the promotion of humanitarian principles and the protection of human security. This is seen in its unwavering political and humanitarian backing for Palestine, which includes active involvement in global efforts that seek to advance Palestinian self-governance and entitlements.

3. Public and Political Support

The overall sentiment among the Indonesian public is in favour of the Palestinian cause, as evidenced by the active involvement of civil society groups and digital activists who work towards raising awareness

and promoting the rights of Palestinians. This domestic assistance strengthens the government's position on the matter. Indonesia's foreign policy activities are motivated by its strategic objectives in preserving its diplomatic influence in international organizations like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Indonesia's endorsement of Palestine is consistent with its overarching objectives of advancing peace and justice in the Middle East.

4. Continuity in Indonesia's Foreign Policy

Throughout many administrations, starting from Soekarno to Joko Widodo, Indonesia has consistently supported Palestine, showcasing a steadfastness in its foreign policy despite shifts in leadership and external influences.

5. Navigating International Pressures

Despite substantial pressure from nations such as the United States and domestic demands to normalize ties with Israel, Indonesia has steadfastly upheld its support for Palestine. This position is frequently presented in the framework of supporting a two-state resolution and prioritizing Palestinian self-governance prior to contemplating any alterations in diplomatic ties with Israel.

Despite strong international and domestic discourse on opening dimensions of cooperation with Israel, this does not affect Indonesia's foreign policy stance in supporting Palestine. In essence, both dimensions of interest do not aim to bring material benefits into the country, but it is Indonesia that

allocates funds to be channeled out to the Palestinian people affected by the war. The potential for international trade cooperation in the form of imports and exports is an indirect consequence of the close alignment of humanitarian values held by Indonesia with its partner countries.

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